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THE
SONOROUS BODY

MUSIC, ENLIGHTENMENT & DECONSTRUCTION

STEVE SWEENEY - TURNER

Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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STEVE SWEENEY TURNER

ultima differentia specifica
est primo diversa ab alia

- John Duns Scotus


not from the abstruse syllogisms
of a quibbling dialectic

- Adam Smith

ögrogöööö / viola

- Hugo Ball

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The intervals between writing, the philosopher, the machine, and the arboreal organism:
David Hume by Louis Carrogis (Scottish National Portrait Gallery)

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dedicatit tae diane warren
whae gart ma thochts
tae birl anent *différance*

slàinte, a' chridhe

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PREFACE

ESTABLISHING THE FIELD: CRITICAL MUSICOLOGY

Few books today are forgivable.

– R.D. Laing^[1]

How forgivable is a musicological text on deconstruction two decades after its assimilation by the other "humanities" disciplines? Moreover, how forgivable is a discipline as a whole which has allowed one of the most challenging aspects of post-war critical theory to pass it by to this extent? In no other field are Laing's remarks more likely to resonate today than that of critical musicology.

Even the adoption of the *critical* epithet itself is a relatively recent phenomenon. However, it is indicative of an emergent desire for musicology to finally engage with contemporary critical discourse in general. Such a call has been made from "outside" the profession by cultural critic Edward Said, who calls for an end to "the generally cloistral and reverential, not to say deeply insular, habits in writing about music." [*Musical Elaborations*, p.58] From "within" the field, Susan McClary laments that the crucial critical debates are "almost entirely absent from traditional musicology." [*Feminine Endings*, p.54] Likewise, what is increasingly

[1] *The Politics of Experience*, p.11.

unforgivable according to Ruth Solie is "our customary methodological behindhandedness [sic]" [*Musicology & Difference*, p.3].

Various routes away from the methodological backwaters have been suggested. For instance, in a conference paper in 1984, Richard Middleton defined a twofold approach which appears to combine aspects of structuralism and Marxism. Middleton called firstly for a move into "*semiology*, broadly defined and stressing the social situation of signifying practise: this should take over from traditional formal analysis." [quoted in Shepherd, *Music as Social Text*, p.209] Secondly, this should be supplemented with an "*historical sociology* of the whole musical field, stressing critical comparison of divergent sub-codes of the 'common musical competence': this should take over from liberal social histories of music" [ibid., p.209] As a method for introducing this new musicological mode, Middleton recommends the inclusion of popular music as a field of study. Indeed, his implication is that such a challenge to the classical hegemony would naturally entail a move towards this twofold approach, and would by itself open up "a golden opportunity to develop a *critical musicology*" [*Studying Popular Music*, p.123]. In this sense, an expansion of the field of study could lead to a necessary adoption of new methodologies.

In a parallel manner, Susan McClary has suggested that "The project of a critical musicology [...] would be to examine the ways in which different musics articulate the priorities and values of various communities." [*Feminine Endings*, p.26]. McClary continues to point out the existence of such methods in the field of ethnomusicology, and recommends the adoption of this model for the discipline in general. As an example of

how to move into this field with a *critical* awareness, she also cites the work of Theodor Adorno, Michel Foucault, and Antonio Gramsci. For McClary, the critical epithet entails the self-critique of a discipline, an interrogation of "how various discourses operate to structure, reproduce, or transform social reality." [*Feminine Endings*, p.29] In her programme, a feminist approach leads to a questioning of the fundamental assumptions which musicology has made about our relationship with sound.

The various proposals for a critical musicology^[2], despite their slightly differing accents, all imply certain paradigmatic inadequacies in the current state of the discipline. Significantly, there also appears to be a general consensus that whichever route is taken out of our present methodological impasse, the cue is likely to come from the incorporation of the critical techniques of other humanities disciplines within the framework of musicology.

However, it is also clear that this will require an *adequate awareness* of those theoretical developments as they operate within their "source" disciplines – an awareness which is not always to be found in the writings of musicologists. As McClary has noted, even when musicology does reach out beyond its traditional boundaries, the influences are often anything but contemporary;

For many complex reasons, music has been and continues to be almost entirely exempted from criticism as it is practised within other humanities disciplines: even those scholars who produce work resembling that of the old-fashioned New Criticism of literary studies still count as radicals in musicology. [*Feminine Endings*, p.20]

[2] A recent English development is the Critical Musicology Group, which at time of writing is still highly formative (cf. *Critical Musicology Newsletter* 1).

Middleton's proposed semiology of music, expressly designed to move us beyond formalist analysis, could possibly also move us beyond the New Criticism phase which McClary criticises. Yet semiologists themselves hardly "still count as radicals" in literary criticism. Further, Middleton's call for a non-formalist, broadly (socially) defined semiology is an echo of a similar call made in the francophone world in 1975, with Jean Molino's crucial article *Musical Fact and the Semiology of Music*, which calls for a semiological dialectic within the analysis of the "total social fact". [*Musical Fact*, passim] (discussed more fully in Chapter 1).

Yet if a small number of recent books are proving to be in Laing's terms forgivable, perhaps even believable, then the first actual *post*-structuralist tremors are finally beginning to be felt within musicology^[3], even if, as Said comments, "their work is both at a relatively early stage and, I have gathered, occupies minority if not marginal status" in this most structurally inclined of professions. [*Musical Elaborations*, p.xii] McClary in particular identifies her work as operating within one of the most crucial threads of post-structural thought: deconstruction. Few other musicologists have attempted to assimilate themselves to deconstruction on any level, and even those who have can seem reluctant to openly discuss

[3] As will be argued in Chapter 1, quite how far Molino succeeds in breaking away from a structuralist framework is a moot point.

their use of its procedures^[4].

For McClary as a feminist musicologist, there is an above-board political commitment in her adoption of deconstructive techniques. In her introduction to Catherine Clément's *Opera, or the Undoing of Women*, she identifies several popular composers who rework material from classical operas, and claims that,

rather than transmitting them as sacred objects, they are deconstructing them - laying bare their long-hidden ideological premises - and yet reenacting them, so that one experiences a shared heritage and its critique simultaneously. The sounds of whiplash, the masochistic rap, and the controlling phallus that bombard "Un bel dì" in McLaren's "Madame Butterfly" tells us a good deal more about what is at stake in that opera than any traditional production. [*Opera*, p.xvii]

For McClary, it is the combination of *engagement with a heritage* and its *simultaneous critique* which constitutes deconstructive compositional technique. Here, the political programme is one of exposing the (allegedly) underlying ideological structures of a tradition, precisely by invoking the processes of that tradition. Of Madonna's use of pornographic images, for instance, she comments that "it becomes necessary to invoke the image in order to perform the deconstruction"^[5] [*Feminine Endings*, p.162]. To an

[4] The essays collected in Ruth Solie's recent edition, *Musicology and Difference: Gender and Sexuality in Music Scholarship* (1993) demonstrate a lamentably low level of engagement with the texts and techniques of deconstruction considering their publication under the term *difference*. What is even worse is the opportunistic usage of the term "deconstruction" in such slack attempts at critical trendiness as the title of Stradling & Hughes' recent book, *The English Musical Renaissance 1860-1940: Construction and Deconstruction*, which in fact has nothing to do with the field at all.

[5] Leo Treitler has recently asserted that McClary, in employing similar strategies within the field of theory "adopts the very stereotypes that she has deplored" [*Gender & Other Dualities of Music History*, in Solie (ed.), *Musicology and Difference*]. This form of critique against deconstruction will become increasingly significant throughout the current project.

extent, these statements ally McClary's conception of deconstruction with that of Jacques Derrida, whose formulation of deconstruction will be taken as the measure throughout the current text.

A further example of Derrida's influence on a musicologist is Lawrence Kramer, particularly in his *Music as Cultural Practise: 1800-1900* (1990). Kramer's interest initially appears to be more at the level of signifiatory processes than does McClary's; "deconstruction [...] proposes that texts find it difficult to restrict what they mean and that their very effort to restrict meaning often propagates it further." [*Music as Cultural Practise*, p.xii] However, both McClary and Kramer use deconstruction for the project of (respectively) "questioning the claims to universality by the 'master narratives' of Western culture, revealing the agendas behind traditional 'value-free' procedures" [*Feminine Endings*, p.123], and, "minimizing the authority that may be invested in potentially monolithic structures" [*Cultural Practise*, p.177]. Such statements obviously set up all kinds of political resonances, and also suggest some possible uses of deconstruction, but as will become clear, politics can also be found to

operate at the most ostensibly abstract of levels^[6].

It is just such a level with which much of the current text engages – the "structural politics" of harmonic theory – and, in a modest attempt to

[6] It should be noted, though, that both McClary and Kramer often make statements which risk being interpreted as counter to the whole agenda of deconstruction as laid out in Derrida's *Of Grammatology*. Kramer in particular would have done well to explore the metaphysical ramifications of the concept of "voice" more fully in his final chapter, "*As if a Voice were in Them*": *Music, Narrative, & Deconstruction*. His coining of the term *other-voicedness* leads to statements such as "One can speak the words of the same *but in another voice*, a voice that emerges from within language to spread itself throughout the whole system, fissuring it in every direction." [*Music as Cultural Practise*, p.178] Kramer here asserts that the aspects of language which disrupts sameness and promotes difference are *forms of speech* and *voice*: "othered" forms, but nonetheless speech and voice. *Of Grammatology*, however, spends its whole length showing that these two concepts are precisely the aspects of language which inhibit difference and promote sameness, and are structurally opposed to the disruptive concept of *writing* (see Chapter Two). Given the power of phonocentric thought in musical circles, a fuller account of this *other-voicedness* as a form of "writing" itself would have been advantageous. McClary often makes equally metaphorical use of the term "voice" in relation to various women composers and theorists. However, as a feminist, she is inherently implicated within the nexus of debates around whether or not one can assimilate the deconstructive concept of authorial absence with the concept of the gendered author. (This problematic is also touched upon in Carolyn Abbate's informed paper *Opera; or, the Envoicing of Women* [*Musicology and Difference*, pp.225-258]). Nevertheless, this problem in the writing of both of these voice-interested theorists requires fuller elaboration within their texts. Anyone engaging with deconstruction cannot afford to make even potentially equivocal usage of phonocentric concepts. (This is not to assert that Derrida's concepts cannot be reversed themselves to produce further deconstructions – what is required, however, is a careful elaboration of such a strategy, and just such a programme is attempted in Chapter 6.) Equally, McClary's conception of deconstruction as the "laying bare [of] long-hidden ideological premises", and "revealing the agendas behind traditional 'value-free' procedures", would to many critics imply more of an agenda of demystification than deconstruction *per se*. In other words, her lexis here suggests that deconstruction is a form of *analysis* which uncovers an ideological sub-structure beneath an obfuscating surface. Deconstruction in its "properly" Derridean mode would immediately set about interrogating the opposition between surface and sub-structure, as is argued in Chapter One. Equally, if ideology can only be conceived of as a sub-surface construct which must be analytically unearthed, then Deleuze/Guattari's statement that "there is no ideology and never has been" [*A Thousand Plateaus*, p.4] becomes significant (cf. Chapter Eight).

advance the programme of critical musicology, the field of Derridean deconstruction has been chosen as a salient theoretical site from which to operate. This is, however, not an arbitrary choice. In *Of Grammatology* (1967), Derrida engages with a series of theoretical differences which emerged in the Parisian intellectual milieu in the Eighteenth Century. One of the main disputes which he deals with is that surrounding the Genevan Jean-Jacques Rousseau's theory of language. Within this theory, however, there is also a significant debate around the origin of music, as the full title of Rousseau's text demonstrates: *Essay on the Origin of Languages, which Treats of Melody and Musical Imitation* (1752). Reading within the margins of Derrida's text, then, we can find a means of locating deconstruction in musical discourse.

However, a wider net will be thrown than one will find in *Of Grammatology* itself^[7]. Derrida's specific concern with the Parisian Enlightenment will be examined in the second chapter. From that point on, an alternative reading of Enlightenment music theory will be carried out. This will be informed by Derrida's text, but will also represent an increasingly divergent reading of certain key concepts which Derrida's reading itself relies upon. This alternative engagement will begin, for various pragmatic reasons, with a close reading of the equivalent debates within the Edinburgh Enlightenment^[8]. Deconstruction relies heavily on nuances of language, and as such, the status of the current project as an

[7] In a pedantic mode, one can calculate that only 1/75th, or 1.33r% of *Of Grammatology's* 350-odd pages deals directly with the debates around Rousseau's music theories.

[8] The contribution of theorists also working in the other metropolitan centres (particularly Glasgow and Aberdeen) should not be overlooked lightly, however.

English language text presupposes a closer intertextuality with other texts in that same language. Further, this text was written within the geographical space of metropolitan Scotland, and, in a time when a cultural revival was under way (particularly within classical music), it would have been a missed opportunity not to have engaged with this area's theoretical traditions. Not only as an initial recovery of a neglected and significant aspect of a general European tradition, but also, ultimately leading to the question of how the Caledonian strand could be read within a contemporary, post-structural theoretical milieu. Equally, the two crucial centres of the eighteenth century Enlightenment were, of course, Paris and Edinburgh; to therefore link these two centres in a single study is to provide a background for a fuller understanding of European Enlightenment in general.

Although the intertwining of these two threads of Enlightenment theory has been well documented in other disciplines (notably philosophy and politics), only the Parisian thread has been unravelled in the context of musicology. The study of Scottish music aesthetics in general is still very much behind the study of Scottish composition, which has itself only recently emerged as a credible force^[9]. It is thus necessary to briefly pose a historical question, and to consider its implications for a text which will form a crucial starting point of our engagement with Enlightenment

[9] While studies of Scottish popular musics (particularly folk) have been undertaken in earnest for some time, study of the classical traditions has traditionally been neglected on the false (and often ideologically-motivated) premise that they barely existed. This spurious historiographical manoeuvre has been debunked in particular by the diverse findings of Kenneth Elliot, Helena Shire, David Johnson, Isobel Woods, D. James Ross, and John Purser, whose publications (listed in the Bibliography) span a musical history across two millennia.

harmonic theory.

TRACING A PATH: A SCOTTISH ENLIGHTENMENT FIGURE

What are Scottish music aesthetics?^[10] Firstly, it must be understood that none of the texts discussed below were written in a cultural vacuum. Scottish thinkers have never been impeded by their geographical distance from the traditionally-acknowledged "centres" of Continental research. Since the establishment of the first Celtic (particularly Gàidhlig) monasteries around 500 A.D., they have travelled, studied, and taught widely, exchanging knowledge with their counterparts throughout Europe, and often being crucial to the development of Western traditions in general.

A full archaeology of Scottish aesthetics will probably find that, initially, music largely appears in a series of footnotes to the philosophical and literary traditions (even if those traditions are encapsulated within the concept of music itself at many junctures). However, this would merely conform to a more-or-less general pattern throughout most countries in pre-Renaissance Europe. What is certain is that many Scottish manuscripts

[10] A sequel to the current volume is currently being planned, which will specifically engage this question, under the heading of *Musical Thought in Scotland, 900-1900*.

have been lost or misappropriated throughout history^[11]. Many texts may also be currently available, but, for a variety of reasons, remain bibliographically obscure^[12].

A further problem facing any historian of Scottish culture is that of language: the first song-texts to have survived from the first millennium are those of Aneirin and Taliesin, written in Cumbric, a northern dialect of Old Welsh^[13]; then, of course, we have the Latin traditions of the Gàidhlig monasteries and the later scholastics, Gàidhlig itself, the Scots language, and finally, English. Any thorough historical survey of Scottish writings on and in music requires a linguistic dexterity of phenomenal proportions, (particularly considering the geographic size of the culture in question).

Fortunately for the anglophone scholar, Scottish Enlightenment

[11] For loss, cf. the C11th scholar, Aaron Scotus, whose treatise *De Utilitate Cantus Vocalis* (amongst others) has been lost, not to mention the C13th Simon Tailler's *De Tenore Musicali*, and other works. For misappropriation, cf. the C13th *St. Andrews Music Book* and the history of its reception as either an English or a Continental manuscript since its removal from St. Andrews to the Wolfenbüttel Library in the C16th. For instance, the following description of this MS., from the *New Grove Dictionary*, demonstrates considerably muddled scholarship - "*Date and provenance*: mid-13th century, English (or Scottish). [...] It was almost certainly compiled for, if not in, St Andrews, Scotland" [*New Grove*, Vol.17, p.653] Equally instructive in this respect is the reception history of the C17th composer Tobias Hume, often referred to as English (cf. *New Grove* article, etc.), but now known to be Scottish (and this on the authority of contemporary *English* court sources which have been available for scrutiny all along). Unfortunately, inadequate scholarship of this kind can severely restrict perceptions of a given culture.

[12] cf. the C13th *Sprouston Breviary*, well-known to scholars of Latin literature, but only recently discovered to contain the accompanying plainchant [Purser, 1992]. It is now acknowledged as one of two *known* examples of Celtic plainchant from Scotland, a genre said for many years not to exist.

[13] cf. Vol.I of *A Guide to Welsh Literature*, ed. Jarman & Rees Hughes.

theorists expressed themselves predominantly through the medium of the *English* language^[14]. This is indubitably one of the major reasons why historians have concentrated on this period above all others, in their considerations of Scottish politics, philosophy, historiography, sociology, etc. What we lack, however, is an adequate body of research to provide a context for the study of the music *aesthetics* of even this most studied of periods. The current project attempts to begin a remedy to this situation, and deals in some detail with the often neglected music aesthetics of Adam Smith. Despite his current reputation as an economist (and certain spurious political associations which have been alleged of late from St. Andrews and Westminster), his contemporary reputation and employment was based on his work within moral philosophy and aesthetics. Indeed, Smith's lectures on literature in Edinburgh and Glasgow eventually led, through his student Hugh Blair, to the establishment in 1762 of a Chair of Rhetoric and Belles Lettres in Edinburgh University – effectively the first

[14] A notable exception is Adam Ferguson's *A Sermon Preached in the Ersh Language* (1746), a pro-Hanoverian Gàidhlig address (albeit anglo-titled for publication).

Chair of English Literature in the world^[15]. Almost inevitably, then, we will have recourse to Smith's theories about the relation between music and the linguistic arts, providing a large intertext with Rousseau's work. However, Smith's work is also contextualized by an extended reading of Thomas Carlyle's reaction against him. Carlyle marks a significant moment in the shift from the Enlightenment to Romanticism, not only in Scottish terms, but also within the wider anglophone field. Along with the English poet Coleridge, Carlyle was responsible for introducing certain key aspects of C18th German thought into anglo-discourse which were to gain increasing ground in the organicist, dynamical definition of Romanticism, as against the mechanistic theories of the Franco-Scottish Enlightenment. Equally significant in this respect are the various *politico*-aesthetic strategies which Carlyle adopted to remove any remaining traces of the *auld alliance* between French and Scottish culture which the Enlightenment revived in philosophical terms, and the various Jacobite and Republican

[15] The linguistic selectivity of scholarship on the Scottish Enlightenment often takes an ideologically insidious form, as exemplified in the following remarks on Hugh Blair by F.W. Bateson, a respected academic from Oxford University: "Blair was the Professor of Rhetoric at Edinburgh and spoke broad Scots, as we know from Boswell, and his comments [on Addison] need not therefore be taken very seriously." ["Addison, Steele & the Periodical Essay" in ed. Lonsdale, *Dryden to Johnson*, p.148] (Evidently, a French-speaker would also be disqualified from commenting on Addison?) Serious investigation of actual theoretical tracts in Scots is not at an advanced stage to date. Even an excellent writer such as Alexander Broadie, in *The Tradition of Scottish Philosophy*, is not unsusceptible to the avoidance of Scots. In the chapter titled "The Mirror of Wisdom: Philosophy in the Scots Tongue", he discusses John Ireland's *The Meroure of Wyssdome* (1490) with few quotations, and those which are included are translated into English anyhow. A notable exception to this rule is the critical edition of the anonymous treatise *The Art of Music Collected out of all Ancient Doctouris of Music* (c.1580) by the American scholar Judson Maynard.

struggles revived in political terms^[16]. However, we begin our Scottish sojourn with a reading of a text on music theory by a more obscure figure than Smith or Carlyle, and for this reason, it may be fruitful to preface the main body of this study with a historical positioning of this figure who is nevertheless crucial to the whole project.

Chapter 3 opens with a quotation from a theoretical tract on music by one Alexander Malcolm. Malcolm was born a "son of the manse" in 1685, probably in Edinburgh. His profile is in many respects typical of Edinburgh's Enlightenment intellectuals, having several parallel professions. He held an M.A., presumably (but not necessarily) from Edinburgh University, and was primarily a mathematician. His three books in this field were the *New Treatise of Arithmetic and Book-keeping* (1718), the *New System of Arithmetic, Theoretical and Practical* (1730), and the *Treatise of Book-keeping, or Merchant Accounts* (1731). However, his most important work for current purposes was undoubtedly the *Treatise of Musick, Speculative, Practical and Historical*, published in Edinburgh in 1721. Several commentators have discerned the influence of his mathematical training in this text^[17].

Like his father, he was also a minister in the Kirk, and on emigrating to the New England colony in 1734, this was his main mode of employment

[16] cf. in particular Peter Berresford Ellis & Seumas Mac a' Ghobhainn's ground-breaking study, *The Scottish Insurrection of 1820* (1970), William Donaldson's *The Jacobite Song: Political Myth and National Identity* (1988), Christina Bewley's *Muir of Huntershill: A Scottish Patriot's Adventures Around the World* (1981), and Thomas Crawford's *Boswell, Burns and the French Revolution* (1990).

[17] Hawkins noted that Malcolm's training as a mathematician "enabled him to discuss, with great clearness and perspicuity, the doctrine of ratios, and other abstract speculations, in the language of a philosopher and a scholar" [quoted in Maurer, *Alexander Malcolm in America*, p.231]

(albeit within the Anglican, rather than Presbyterian or even Episcopalian traditions). In 1749, he moved South to Maryland, finally settling at Annapolis. Here, he joined the "Tuesday Club", where he was in demand for his abilities on flute and fiddle. This gentleman's club had been established in 1745 for the furtherance of music and sociability by fellow-expatriot Alexander Hamilton. Hamilton was a doctor, but also an amateur artist who, in club style, had been nicknamed "Loquacious Scribble" for the sketches he made of the other members – beneath Malcolm's portrait, the musician's *nom de plume* is recorded as "Philo Dogmaticus". After a turbulent dual career in Maryland as a rector and schoolmaster, Malcolm died in 1763^[18].

The *Treatise* is one of the largest texts on music published in Enlightenment Edinburgh, and was certainly widely read^[19]. Its reception history begins with Thomas Bruce's *The Common Tunes; or Scotland's Church Musick Made Plain* (1726), which states that music is "fully largely and learnedly described and treated upon, by the judicious and learned Mr. *Alexander Malcolm* a Scots Gentleman, an exact Master of Musick's Theory, if you will please read his Book upon Musick, intituled, *A Treatise of Musick Speculative, Practical and Historical*." [*The Common*

[18] According to Maurer Maurer's article *Alexander Malcolm in America* (1952), which is the key reference for Malcolm in this context, the obituary in the *Maryland Gazette* for 30th June read: "A few Days ago Died, in an advanced Age, in Queen-Anne's County, the Reverend Alexander Malcolm, A. M. Rector of St. Paul's Parish in that County: A Gentle man who has obliged the World with several learned Performances on the Mathematics, Music, and Grammar." [*Alexander Malcolm in America*, 1952]

[19] However, Kidson's remarks in the 1970 edition of *Grove's Dictionary* that it was the first important Scottish music theory text are misplaced in the light of, at the very least, the anonymous C16th *The Art of Music Collected out of all Ancient Doctouris of Music* (which, despite being written in Metropolitan Scots, is often mistakenly referred to as an English treatise). cf. also fn. 15.

Tunes, p.37]

Subsequently, two English editions appeared, the first in 1730, and the second "abridged, by an Eminent Musician" in 1776, the same year in which John Hawkins published his *General History of the Science and Practise of Music*. The potential relevance of this coincidence may lie in the fact that Hawkins used Malcolm's work as a reference throughout his own book, and wrote of it as "one of the most valuable treatises on the subject of theoretical and practical music to be found in any of the modern languages". Malcolm's work was still being used as source material in the 1780's edition of Chambers' *Cyclopaedia*. According to Roger Lonsdale, the latter (ironically) was in turn used as a source by Hawkins' great rival, Charles Burney, for his contributions to Rees' *New Cyclopaedia* (1802-20)^[20]. Evidently, this *savant écossais*, as Fétis described him, had a wide, if somewhat dispersed, influence.

In 1904, Malcolm's contribution was again being acknowledged by J.A. Fuller-Maitland, in *The Age of Bach and Handel*. In the final chapter, *The State of Music in England* [sic], Fuller-Maitland writes of a British [sic] theorist:

In 1721 Alexander Malcolm published *A Treatise of Music* [sic], *speculative, practical, and historical*, at Edinburgh, in which the facts of just intonation, and the necessity for establishing equal temperament, were explained a year before the appearance of Bach's *Wohltemperirtes Clavier*. [p.346]

However, by grafting Malcolm to an English identity, and then implying some significance in him being well ahead of Bach on equal

[20] Lonsdale claims that "Burney did not, of course, have to supply entirely new articles for the *Cyclopaedia*. His definitions of musical terms were often based on those (by Alexander Malcolm) in the 1781-6 edition of Chambers' *Cyclopaedia*." [Dr. Charles Burney: *A Literary Biography*, p.412]

temperament, Fuller-Maitland is being slightly (yet doubly) disingenuous. Although Malcolm was indubitably a Modern in his adherence to equal temperament, the whole debate had been continuing (in Europe) since at least the time of Henricus Grammateus in 1518^[21].

Perhaps the grandest claim made for Malcolm's achievements, however (and one which today carries more weight than Fuller-Maitland's) is that made by the American scholar Norman Phelps in the *Harvard Dictionary* article on "Theory". Phelps places his note on Malcolm immediately prior to that on Rameau, and states that the *Treatise* is "notable for including the first 'correct' table of key signatures, essential to the full development of the major-minor key system." [*Harvard*, p.847] However, Phelps does not elucidate on whether he considers that it was actually Malcolm's table or simply the key signatures themselves which were "essential" for the development of the tonal system. Whichever is the case, Phelps' claim for Malcolm's precedence in this respect is nevertheless a salient point.

The Modernity of the *Treatise* was further testified to in Michael Tilmouth's 1971 review of a facsimile edition. Here Tilmouth describes Malcolm as "a product of the new scientific age of the time", and "a creature of the Age of Reason" [*Musick Theory*]. However, as will become clear in Chapters 3 and 4, Malcolm was not a Modern through blind faith. Herbert Schueller writes that his position on the Ancients and Moderns debate was interesting,

[21] Grammateus' book, published in Nuremberg, had a surprisingly Scots-looking title: *Ayn New Kunstlich Buech* (this trivial point merely indicates the similarity of two teutonic languages, however). Here, Grammateus recommended a system of ten equally-sized semitones and two slightly smaller ones.

not only because it probably expresses the opinion of most people who think the quarrel [...] about trivialities, but also because Malcolm came half-way between Sir William Temple and Burney. He intended to answer the one, and he anticipated the historical writing of the other. Malcolm's language reflects his impatience: the contenders in the quarrel [...] "fight at long Weapons, I mean they keep the argument in *generals*, by which they make little more of it than some innocent Harrangues and Flourishes of Rhetoric." [*The Quarrel of the Ancients and the Moderns*, p.329]

Of course, Malcolm was not so much anticipating Burney's position, as forming one of its basic points of influence, if we are to accept Lonsdale's arguments (cf. fn.20).

Yet there is another sense in which we could make a claim for the significance of Malcolm's *Treatise*. From the information given above, it is evident that it had an international reputation as a reliable reference text. It would therefore be rather surprising to discover that the philosophers of the Edinburgh Enlightenment who wrote on music had not consulted it (significantly in this respect, several were also amateur musicians^[22]). Indeed, in Chapter 3, a case is made for a less than accidental intertext between a passage in Malcolm, and one in a key text by Francis Hutcheson, the *Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue* (1725).

Reading through the literature, Malcolm has had little coverage to date, and practically none since the 'seventies. Yet when he does appear, often in texts which deal with canonical issues, his work is presented as

[22] For instance, James Beattie appears to have had a strong interest not only in classical music, but also folk and church music, publishing a short open letter in 1778 titled *On the Improvement of Psalmody in Scotland*. However, his main contribution to music was the *Essay on Poetry and Music as They Affect the Mind* (1776). He was also a member of the Aberdeen Musical Society, and continued to play the 'cello despite an accident which severed the tendon of his middle finger on the left hand. His publication on psalmody would most likely have lead him to read Thomas Bruce's work, in which Malcolm's *Treatise* is strongly recommended, but it is probable that he would have been aware of it without Bruce's reference.

intimately implicated in the great debates of his time. His agenda was the writing of a history and general study of music, and in using his work as representative of the Enlightenment approach to harmonic theory in particular, this study has as a supplementary agenda: the rehabilitation of a text – and more importantly, the tradition which frames it – deserving of further consideration within its own (and other) cultural contexts.

"Finally", a note on the epigraphic quotations which head up each chapter, section, etc. Where these are in Scots, Gàidhlig, Cumbrian, or Latin, the Anglo-monoglot reader will be able to find translational and textual notes in *Appendix I*. The translations which are given there are by the author, except where stated to the contrary.

PART ONE

HARMONY AND MELODY

In his passage amang the planeitis all,
he hard a hevinly melody and sound,
passing all instrumentis musicall,
causit be rollyn of the speiris round;
Quilk armony of all this mappamound,
Quilk moving seiss unyt perpetuall,
Quilk of this world pluto the saule can call.

Thair leirit he tonis proportionat,
as duplare, triplare, and emetricus,
enolius, and eik the quadruplait,
Epoddeus rycht hard and curius;
off all thir sex, sueit and delicious,
rycht consonant fyfe hevinly symphonyss
componyt ar, as clerkis can devyse.

ffirst diatesserone, full sueit, I wiss
And dyapasone, semple and dowplait,
And dyapenty, componyt with the dyss;
Thir makis fyve of thre multiplicat:
This mirry musik and mellefluat,
Compleit and full of nummeris od and evin,
Is causit be the moving of the hevin.

- *Orpheus & Eurydice*, Robert Henryson (fl.1450-1505)

CHAPTER ONE

OPENING DECONSTRUCTION

I'll ha'e nae hauf-way hoose, but aye be whaur
Extremes meet - it's the only way I ken
To dodge the curst conceit o' bein' richt
That damns the vast majority o' men.

- *A Drunk Man Looks at the Thistle*, Hugh MacDiarmid, 1926.

CHAPTER ONE

OPENING DECONSTRUCTION

1.1 Courting Philosophy

In approaching the term "deconstruction", we can initially distinguish it from other current theoretical terms, such as post-structuralism and postmodernism in particular. While the texts which articulate these terms have many complex connections, it is important to note at the outset that they are not wholly cognate terms. Equally, different readings of them inevitably yield different alignments of their relationships. For instance, Christopher Norris has recently attempted an ideological separation of deconstruction from any association with either post-structuralism or postmodernism [*The Truth About Postmodernism*, passim]. On the other hand, Richard Harland alleges that the arrival of deconstruction "mark[ed] the arrival of Post-Structuralism" [*Superstructuralism*, p.125], and even if we only consider this position, we can see that deconstruction could be further read as either a subset of post-structuralism, or a precursor of a post-structural situation. It is important to note, however, that a post-structural text need not necessarily be a deconstruction (or *vice-versa*), particularly if one accepts Norris' position. Similar points hold with respect to postmodernism. However, it is worth noting that the term *post-structuralism* rarely occurs

in the writings of the Parisian theorists who are normatively taken to constitute its nexus. Significantly, a philosopher who, since the publication of *The Postmodern Condition* (1979) has been closely associated with the concept of *postmodernism* - Jean-François Lyotard - has written of

The weariness with regard to 'theory,' and the miserable slackening that goes along with it (new this, new that, post-this, post-that, etc. The time has come to philosophize. [*The Differend: Phrases in Dispute*, p.xiii]

Yet in the context of the anglophone reception of Parisian thought, engagement with the debates around what constitutes "post-structuralism" is almost inevitable. Nevertheless, it will be crucial to be aware of the constant threat of this "miserable slackening" which such arguments around labelling entail, and every effort will be made "to philosophize", as far as this is possible (or relevant) within a musicological context.

It is thus also important to resist the temptation to reduce deconstruction to the idea of a movement or a theory. It is better understood as a specific mode of critique emerging from the tradition of critical philosophy. This tradition traces a path through the whole of "modern" Western philosophy, normatively understood to be that from the 17th Bréton philosopher René Descartes onwards, including John Locke, George Berkeley and David Hume (the Englishman, Irishman and Scotsman of philosophy), and the Germanic tradition of Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche, Heidegger, etc. It is, however, the Germanic critical tradition, with its circuitous roots (via Kant) in the Enlightenment scepticism of Hume, which

is one of the main pre-texts for deconstruction^[1].

Another pre-text of deconstruction is undoubtedly the discipline of structuralist linguistics, particularly the francophone tradition of linguistic analysis. This was precipitated during the Enlightenment by the Genevan philosopher, litterateur and musicologist, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and its themes can be traced right up to the discipline of semiology inaugurated by fellow Genevan, Ferdinand de Saussure. Indeed, Rousseau forms one of the cornerstones of deconstruction's intertext with music, specifically in the context of Jacques Derrida's deconstruction of his theories. However, the relation between deconstruction and semiology is perhaps over-amplified within anglophone commentaries on deconstruction. As will be argued below, there is in fact a more crucial precedent which comes from within the anglophone tradition itself. Not Swiss *semiology*, but American *semiotics*; specifically, the pragmatist philosophy of Charles Sanders Peirce. Equally, Peirce invokes yet another precedent of some significance for the final chapters – the C13th realist philosopher John

[1] Kant's famous comment on his critical debt to Hume is to be found in the preface to the *Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics that will be able to Present Itself as a Science*. Following a list of various other Scottish Enlightenment thinkers (Reid, Oswald, and Beattie), Kant writes – "I freely admit: it was DAVID HUME'S remark that first, many years ago, interrupted my dogmatic slumber and gave a completely different direction to my enquiries in the field of speculative philosophy." [*Prolegomena*, p.9] Hume's scepticism was the "cause" of Kant's desperation to provide a post-sceptical philosophy. According to Norris, "Hume is the strong (though unacknowledged) precursor" [*The Truth About Postmodernism*, p.82] for postmodernism and post-structuralism, and would therefore function as a precedent to Harland's conception of deconstruction, rather than his own.

Duns Scotus^[2]. If account is taken of Peirce's influence on current francophone thought, then the generally held belief that Parisian theory is somehow alien to or incomprehensible to what Harland calls "Anglo-Saxon ways of thinking" is, at the very least, a racial aberration on more than the obvious level [*Superstructuralism*, p.9].

What is certain is that theories of language weigh heavily on the context of deconstruction, whether it moves within the philosophical or linguistic fields as such. However, what is attempted here is not a mere "application" of certain theories of linguistic representation to the musical domain (even if the project occurs on the surface of a written text). Rather, several strategies will be employed in order to gradually uncover the application of musical concepts within certain deconstructive and post-structural texts, but also in order to interrogate the very ideas of representation, imitation, and signification in general. Inevitably, the programme will continually intersect with writings outside the musical field (literature, language, philosophy), but at no point will there be any transcendent claims for any field to be capable of operating as an interpretative meta-discourse for any other. The *direct transmission* (rather than *circuitous translation*) of one field or another into music

[2] Peirce at several key points identifies his project as avowedly Scotist. For instance, in the introduction to his *Principles of Philosophy* (where his proto-deconstructive theory of language achieves its full expression), he writes: "The works of John Duns Scotus have strongly influenced me. If his logic and metaphysics, not slavishly worshipped, but torn away from its medievalism, be adapted to modern culture, under continual wholesome reminders of nominalist criticisms, I am convinced that it will go far toward supplying the philosophy which is best to harmonize with physical science." [*Principles of Philosophy*, p.ix] Indeed, Scotus' famous concept of *haecceitas* becomes of crucial importance to Peirce, just as it does in the writings of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, discussed in the final chapters.

theory can only result in what Lyotard has described as a *différend*:

A case of differend between two parties takes place when the "regulation" of the conflict that opposes them is done in the idiom of one of the parties while the wrong suffered by the other is not signified in that idiom. [...] What is at stake in a literature, in a philosophy, in a politics perhaps, is to bear witness to differends by finding idioms for them. [*The Differend: Phrases in Dispute*, p.9/13]

How should we, as musicologists, approach such phrases by this and other writers who trace their work across the fields of philosophy and linguistics? How should we approach this problematic – the interconnection of differing discourses while bearing witness to their specificity? It was once said that *philosophy* was *the* universal meta-discourse, but this philosopher now embraces an "incredulity toward metanarratives." [*The Postmodern Condition*, p.xxiv] In order to establish some basic paths of translation between our discourses, then, let us begin to read within the idiom of philosophy itself, ever mindful of Derrida's comment that "It is precisely the limit of such a tribunal – philosophy – that is in question here." [*Margins of Philosophy*, p.39]

1.2 Difference and Différance

Being and nonbeing is the central theme of all philosophy, East and West. These words are not harmless and innocent verbal arabesques, except in the professional philosophism of decadence. We are afraid to approach the fathomless and bottomless groundlessness of everything. "There's nothing to be afraid of." The ultimate reassurance, and the ultimate terror. [R.D. Laing, *The Politics of Experience*, p.33]

In Plato's *Republic*, we find the classic formulation of philosophy as the meta-discourse for interpreting the underlying truths of all reality. In the section titled "The Allegory of the Cave", we find Plato describing humankind as a group of prisoners in a dark subterranean cavern. The

prisoners are held in devices which ensure their sight is perpetually trained on one wall of the cave. At the top of the cave, there is a fire, and between the fire and the prisoners there is a ramp, along which various objects are moved to and fro. The prisoners, however, cannot turn their heads to look at either the fire or the objects, but the whole situation has been organized so that the light of the fire projects the moving shadows of the objects onto the wall which the prisoners constantly watch. The prisoners have been there since birth, knowing nothing else, and therefore assume that the shadows on the wall are in fact the real objects. Thus, the meaning of the allegory is that humankind, prisoners to their ignorance, believe false images to be real. Plato defines the philosopher as a prisoner who has escaped from the cave and has experienced the pure sunlight of the world above. In this new freedom, the philosopher will begin to understand that shadows are only the representational *images* of real objects, and that the prisoners in the cave have thus been living with a false perception of reality. This movement from the darkness below to the light above is the process of *enlightenment* – gaining knowledge of the real source behind phenomena. Yet to stay in the realm of the light and to forget the rest of humanity still imprisoned in the cave is an act of selfishness. Plato stipulates that the philosopher must descend once more into the cave, and with the knowledge of the underlying reality behind false images, must act as the interpreter of the shadows for the ignorant prisoners, divining for them the true meaning of all that they see. For this reason, the philosopher is defined as the best possible ruler of society: "There is no one else." [*The Republic*, p.325]

The truth of which the enlightened philosopher is the sole dispenser

rests on a series of binary oppositions which Plato infuses into the whole text of the allegory: light-dark; above-below; reality-illusion; knowledge-ignorance; enlightenment-slavery; object-image; etc. It will be readily acknowledged that each of these oppositions has the overall structure of positive-negative. In other words, a certain structural priority is granted to one of the terms over the other – a *difference* is established between two terms, a difference which is fixed and which controls the relation between the two terms. This form of difference is known in philosophy as *ontological difference*. Ontology is normally defined as the science of Being, in other words, it is the study of the essence of an entity, this essence being that which defines what the entity *is* in distinction to that which it *is not*. This form of difference between two terms can be readily understood to operate along *oppositional* lines. For instance, term A *is* term A because it partakes of the essential Being of A-ness, whereas term Z *is not* term A, because it does not partake of the essential Being of A-ness; term Z's essence is *other* than term A's essence, and could be defined within the terms of A as a negative term, or nonbeing. All the other terms along the A-Z axis can also be understood within the structure of the opposition A-Z – they are simply points along the axis as one moves from the original term to the final term. Thus, we can also see that necessary components of ontology are the ideas of definition, labelling, and categorization, normally within a hierarchical, static structure. Ontological difference, then, operates according to rigid structural oppositions, and is the form of knowledge which grants Plato's enlightened philosopher a certain political power over humankind's intellectual darkness.

Deconstruction challenges such philosophy on many levels. As a

philosophical term, it emerges in Derrida's writings as a translation of Heidegger's *destruktio*n, a term signifying the concept of a positive de-structuration of ontology^[3]. Heidegger refers to the idea of a "*positive* destruction" [*Being and Time*, p.46] which would "loosen up" the structure of philosophy, and Derrida develops this motif into the idea of "the destruction, not the demolition but the de-sedimentation, the de-construction" of ontology. [*Of Grammatology*, p.10] (Indeed, in the first edition of *Of Grammatology*, Derrida used the Heideggerian *destruction* rather than *déconstruction* throughout).

However, as Derrida has pointed out, Heidegger's *destruktio*n does not necessarily go far enough, and actually leaves ontology intact: "The Heideggerian de-limitation [of Being] consists sometimes in appealing to [...] a more original thought of Being as presence (*Anwesenheit*)" [*Margins of Philosophy*, p.65]. In other words, Heidegger sometimes attempts the *destruktio*n of Being by reducing it to the concept of *presence*, which is merely a more fundamental ontological form, and is still caught within a binary opposition - presence vs absence.

Yet there is a second, more radical possibility within Heidegger's *destruktio*n of Being-as-presence, which consists in "questioning this original determination itself" [*Margins of Philosophy*, p.65]. Derrida claims that this interrogative form of *destruktio*n is "the one for which we are least prepared, [and] only permits itself to be sketched, announcing itself

[3] According to the Oxford Dictionary, "deconstruction" as a vernacular term has been in use since 1882, meaning "the action of undoing the construction of a thing". However, the term is relatively obscure until Derrida's re-derivation of it from Heidegger. It is in the Derridean context that the word has been re-introduced into contemporary discourse, and it is in this context that the term is measured here.

in certain calculated fissures of the metaphysical text." [ibid., p.65] Heidegger never fully follows this second strategy through, and it is this possibility that Derrida will pursue in his move into *déconstruction*.

Rather than reverting to the stability of a more fundamental ontological category, such as Heidegger does in his inscription of Being as presence, deconstruction ruptures the stability of ontology by the *destruktion* of the very idea of *any* fundamental level. In deconstruction, the operation of an opposition is shown to be based not on (for instance) the generation or determination of a term by a more originary term, but on an undeclared principle which frames and runs through the opposition. Difference still exists, but is thrown into a new mode which transgresses the structuralisms of ontological difference. When oppositional difference is transgressed, differences become multiplied, and are no longer to be seen in terms of arranging all terms along a straight line between A and Z, between Being and nonbeing, or presence and absence. Thus, the idea of one term of an opposition being structurally *prior* to another, derivative term, is fundamentally challenged in all the senses of that phrase.

This new form of difference which transgresses ontology is termed by Derrida *différance*, a neologism which, in French, signifies both *differing* and *deferring* – ie. both spatial and temporal difference. The ontological difference which oppositional structures are based upon is itself an attempt to limit the transgressive power of *différance*, to de-temporalize it, and make it static. However, part of the deconstructive programme can often be to uncover the operation of *différance* within ontological difference despite itself. In this sense, it is often argued that a text contains within itself the possibility of and conditions for its own

deconstruction, and this is in effect what Derrida's reading of Heidegger achieves. Thus, while Derrida evokes a difference which is of another order to that of the difference between Being and nonbeing, or presence and absence, this difference is nevertheless suggested by the critical attitude which Heidegger opens as an agenda and yet leaves suspended: the second mode of *destruktion*, which announces itself "in certain calculated fissures of the metaphysical text" [*Margins of Philosophy*, p.65]. Hence, Derrida's strategy is to turn the critical resources of Heidegger's text upon themselves – he effectively *destrukt's destruktion*, thereby discovering its potential radicality as *déconstruction*. The idea of a fundamental level in an ontological system is rejected, and ontological difference is shown to have been a restricted form of *différance*.

Such a *différance* would at once, again, give us to think a writing without presence and absence, without history, without cause, without *archia*, without *telos*, a writing that absolutely upsets all dialectics, all theology, all teleology, all ontology. [*Margins of Philosophy*, p.67]

Another crucial point about the deconstructive concept of *différance* appears here: not only is it "not" ontological difference, but it is "not" dialectical difference. As Derrida comments in *Outwork*, "the movement of difference [...] cannot be 'relieved' [*relevé*], resolved, or appeased by any philosophical dialectic" [*Dissemination*, pp.6/7] Basically put, any dialectical resolution of two terms presupposes their prior *opposition* to each other along ontological lines. In dialectics, a binary difference is in a sense overcome, resolved back onto a single, unified point – "relieved". This resolution can occur in more than one way, as a contrast between the Hegelian and Marxist models shows. In the Hegelian dialectic, we find the initial opposition is normally described as thesis–antithesis. The first term

(thesis) proves incomplete, and thus produces its opposite (antithesis) as a compensation for this inadequacy. However, the second term is also incomplete (having been produced in effect as the negative or shadow of the thesis), and thus the two must be resolved into the completed third term, or synthesis (*Aufhebung*; "sublation", "lifting up", "closing", "resolution", "capture"). Yet, if the synthesis is effectively viewed now from a new angle, it may be seen once more as incomplete, and can thus act as the thesis of a new dialectic. In this way, the finality of the synthesis can be seen as merely provisional – a *repetition* of the thesis in a *new register*. Marx described his dialectic as the materialist *opposite* of Hegel's Idealism [*Capital*, p.102] – further, it operates through the violent struggle (not synthesis) of two opposed terms, with the victory of the stronger over the weaker. Again, however, the victorious term can then become split by a further internal opposition which leads to a further dialectical struggle.

Différance, on the other hand, operates "according to a relation that no speculative dialectic [...] can master, for the simple reason that such a dialectic always remains an operation of mastery." [*Dissemination*, p.5] In deconstruction, a binary difference (an opposition) is overthrown, shown to rest in fact on a more pervasive form of difference – *différance* – which is not limited to two points in space, but also articulates differences across time. It is in this sense that Derrida writes of *différance* as "without history", if by history we mean the Hegelian or Marxist conceptions of history as logical, determinable "progress" from a thesis, or point of origin (*archia*) to a synthesis, or ultimate goal (*telos*). This version of "history" is thus deterministic, ontological, and against the alternative idea of time which inscribes itself within *différance*.

In this, it is worth noting a further problematic area of debate. One must be wary of a confusion of the space between Marxism and deconstruction which is prevalent particularly in literary criticism, but also has manifestations within musicology. For instance, John Shepherd suggests that "The Deconstruction of Music as Social Text" can be developed from a dialectical synthesis of structuralist semiology and Marxist culturalism [*Music as Social Text*, pp.85-92]. As we have already seen, however, deconstruction (*différance* in particular) works very precisely to unhook the ontologies of structuralism and dialectics, and therefore also Marxism. Shepherd appears to associate deconstruction primarily with the semiological work of Roland Barthes, although care must be taken here, since Barthes' work marks the beginnings of a transition from structuralism to post-structuralism. Christopher Norris claims that "to enlist him on the side of deconstruction is perhaps misleading in view of his elusiveness from any theoretical standpoint." [*Deconstruction*, p.10] On the other hand, Richard Harland makes the distinction between an early, structuralist period, and a later, post-structuralist period in Barthes arguing that the "later Barthes" is found in writings such as *Le Plaisir du Texte* (1973), [*Superstructuralism*, p.2]. In *The Pleasure of the Text*, Barthes introduces the post-structuralist concept of *jouissance*, which Shepherd interprets as a "meaningful dialectic between music and listener [...] an appreciable assertion of subjectivity through an active role in meaning construction." [*ibid.*, p.163] However, it is important to be aware of the distinction which Barthes makes between *jouissance* and *plaisir* (pleasure). To consult Stephen Heath's notes on translating Barthes, it is *plaisir* which is linked to identity and ego, whereas *jouissance* is, on

contrary, "a radically violent pleasure [...] which shatters - dissipates, loses - that cultural identity, that ego." [*Image-Music-Text*, p.9] Indeed, Barthes asserts that it is in fact against the very nature of *jouissance* to attempt to make a "fine dialectical movement of synthesis" between it and *plaisir*. [*The Pleasure of the Text*, p.21] Such an attempt to arrest the forceful movement of *jouissance* is to make it "merely the logical, organic, historical development of the text of pleasure" [ibid., p.20] He asserts "that pleasure and bliss [*jouissance*] are parallel forces, that they cannot meet, and that between them there is more than a struggle: an *incommunication*" [p.20]. In this sense, it is *plaisir* which attempts to capture *jouissance* in "a dialectics of desire" [p.4], whereas *jouissance*, if captured, will actively attempt to rupture such a dialectic. It is not that *jouissance* cannot be *made* dialectical, but Barthes states that we have a choice of either attempting to dialectically capture *jouissance* against its nature, or to be carried along within its own disruptive and non-dialectical movement. Thus, *jouissance* does not resolve onto a synthesis, but onto "some *other* term: a third term, which is not, however, a synthesizing term but an eccentric, extraordinary term." [p.55] Barthes writes that on this choice of our approach to *jouissance* "depends the way in which we shall write the history of our modernity." [*Pleasure*, p.20] Further, he claims that "doubtless it is in one of the greatest thinkers of dialectics, Marx, that it would be the most interesting to verify the undialectical nature of language: Marx's discourse is almost entirely *paradoxical*" [*Image-Music-Text*, p.200]. If Shepherd misreads Barthes as a dialectician, Barthes also provocatively suggests that similar readings of Marx may be equally mislead.

This is not to deny that there have been a number of theorists, particularly in the so-called "anglo-american" tradition who claim that deconstruction *is* dialectical. For instance, Roger Poole writes that "deconstruction continues in what could be an infinite regress of dialectical readings" [*Fontana Dictionary of Modern Thought*, p.206]. Christopher Butler has argued that deconstruction demonstrates "that any attempt to come down on one side or the other disregards the dialectical interdependence" of the terms of an opposition [*Interpretation, Deconstruction, and Ideology*, p.63]. Further (although with more credibility), Jonathan Culler describes *différance* itself as an "irresolvable dialectic" [*The Pursuit of Signs*, p.41].

However, a more sober account can be found in Michael Ryan's work, which claims the relationship between deconstruction and dialectics "is not unambiguous" [*Marxism and Deconstruction: A Critical Articulation*, p.65]. Ryan charts Derrida's writings, highlighting the points at which Derrida appears to use specific dialectical tools, mapping these against points at which he critiques the use of those very tools. As we have seen with Derrida's reading of Heidegger, deconstruction operates according to the structures of the text which it critiques, and is therefore inherently bound up in the movement of that text. For this reason, when deconstruction deals with dialectics, it will inevitably use the tools of dialectics *against* dialectics, in order to show the fissures within the structure, the points of leakage where the system overflows its territory and identity. Yet a deconstruction of dialectics will only *provisionally* proceed with dialectical concepts, and precisely in order to show how they overflow their structural limits. As Ryan writes, more in line with Derrida's statement

above, "deconstruction corrects classical dialectics" by identifying the *différance* suppressed within its ontological differences [*Marxism and Deconstruction*, p.81]. Let us attempt, then, a provisional formulation of deconstruction following all of the above.

1.3 The "Structure" of Deconstruction

If one were in the analytical business of structured summarization, one could reduce the process of deconstruction to a sequence of three stages - engagement, reversal, and displacement:

(1) Engagement - connect with the internal terms, concepts and processes of the text, identify the metaphysical oppositions upon which the text is based, and hook into their workings. As Derrida has written, one "operate[s] according to the lexicon of that which one is de-limiting" [*Margins of Philosophy*, p.17]. However, this engagement is carried out in order to locate the so-called undecidable term - the *indécidable* - the term which is given a negative determination within the oppositional structure: one "borrows from a heritage the resources necessary for the deconstruction of that heritage itself." [*Writing and Difference*, p.282];

(2) Reversal - reverse the polarity of the text's metaphysical oppositions, having the effect of provisionally maintaining the structure, but destabilizing it from within its own terms. Derrida writes of the oppositional metaphysics which provide the foundations for traditional theories being based on "a violent hierarchy. One of the two terms controls the other (axiologically, logically, etc.), holds the superior position. To deconstruct the opposition is first [...] to overthrow [*renverser*] the hierarchy." [*Of Grammatology*, pp.lxxvi-lxxvii] Thus, to overthrow by

reversal is to provisionally prioritize the *indécidable*.

(3) Displacement - here the destabilization of the opposition from within carried out during the stage of reversal is extended by using this instability to overspill the structure of the metaphysical opposition. Derrida describes this stage as "the irruptive emergence of a new 'concept,' a concept which no longer allows itself to be understood in terms of the previous regime [system of oppositions]." [ibid.] The scarequotes around the term "concept" here designate that the term is placed *sous rature*, or *under erasure*. This practise is derived from Heidegger, where a term to be destroyed, such as *Being*, is placed under erasure by crossing it out: ~~Being~~ (in Heidegger and Derrida, with an X). The translator of *Of Grammatology* into English, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, writes that since deconstruction engages extant terms and concepts, their continued usage becomes "Inaccurate yet necessary". [trans. pref. *Of Grammatology*, p.xiv] Thus, erasure denotes the continued usage of a term, while also pointing to its changed (deconstructed) status.

Deconstruction consists, then, in: (1) locating the *indécidable* of an opposition - the secondary, negative, derivative term; (2) provisionally reversing the structure of the opposition so that the negative term is now seen as positive; and (3) doing away with the opposition, reinscribing both terms as non-negative *indécidables*. To summarize: *deconstruction hooks into the delineation of an opposition, reverses, and displaces it*.

Yet this structural model of deconstruction, and others which

resemble it, should be treated with a healthy suspicion^[4]. As we will see, there is no totalizable "system" of deconstruction, since each deconstructive process is based entirely within the fissures of its host structure. Further, there is no necessary order in which these procedural elements need occur. Derrida's *Of Grammatology* in particular can be seen as a text in which these strategies (and others) are constantly refracting between each other.

None of this, it is clear, is a declaration of conceptual open season or of outright anarchy: "this definition of the deconstructionist is *false* (that's right: false, not true) and feeble: it supposes a bad (that's right: bad, not good) and feeble reading" [*Limited Inc.*, p.146]. In fact, deconstruction demands a certain conceptual rigour, one which, while questioning philosophy, can never truly leave it. There is no proposal here for a philosophical *carte blanche*;

What I want to emphasize is simply that the passage beyond philosophy does not consist in turning the page of philosophy (which usually amounts to philosophizing badly), but in continuing to read philosophers *in a certain way*. [*Writing and Difference*, p.288]

The themes of care, attentiveness, and responsibility constantly recur in the deconstructive field. As we will see later, though, there are markedly differing positions on what these themes constitute themselves.

[4] This model derives very much from Derrida's own account of the "structure" of deconstruction given in *Positions*, although Spivak warns that even the "master's" model is "perhaps a little too formulaic". [trans. pref., *Of Grammatology*, p.lxxvi] David Wood also follows this basic three-stage outline, but puts it in the following terms: "(1) the display of what has been called the infrastructure of a text, 'leaving everything as it is' [...] through (2) disruptive intervention [...] (3) to parasitical production" [*The Deconstruction of Time*, p.407]. Wood calls this the "*methodological level*", pointing out that it "is perhaps a misnomer", and one which, even if Derrida himself categorized in *Positions*, "he later regretted the simplifying lever it gave to others" [ibid., p.304].

1.4 Analyzing Immanence

In considering the distinctions between deconstruction and other fields, it is also important for us to recognize a conceptual difference which must be noted in its application within musicology. In musical academia, the term *deconstruction* is often misused as a more impressive (and supposedly trendy) way of saying *analysis*. However, it will be valuable to look at the distinct definitions that can be ascribed to these terms – *deconstruction* and *analysis*.

Ian Bent defines analysis as follows: "Musical analysis is the resolution of a musical structure into relatively simpler constituent elements, and the investigation of the functions of those elements within that structure." [*Analysis*, p.1] Note the closure suggested by the term "resolution". Note also the implicitly reductive nature of the process whereby this closure is achieved. Bent's comments suggest that analysis is a form of structural and functional summarization of a text, a form of explanation, setting itself up to more or less objectively describe the workings of a text (much as the simple model of deconstruction's "structure" offered above).

However, consider the following definition of deconstruction by literary critic, Barbara Johnson; "The de-construction of a text does not proceed by random doubt or arbitrary subversion, but by the careful teasing out of warring forces of signification *within the text itself*." [*Dissemination*, p.xiv] Here, Johnson makes two significant departures

from the concept of analysis as proposed by Bent^[5]. With deconstruction, we are not concerned with the resolution of a text into constituent elements, but with the "careful teasing out" of signifiatory fissures "within the text itself". This location of deconstructive praxis is a significant difference to music-analytical thought. Deconstruction positions itself not as an objective meta-discourse, as analysis often does, but *at the same level of signification* as the text.

There are, however, several points which must be made in this context, since while it is often claimed that deconstruction operates at a level *immanent* to the text^[6], the same claim is often made for music analysis, particularly in the field of semiology. For instance, in *Musical Fact and the Semiology of Music*, Jean Molino writes of beginning analysis at the "immanent" level of the "symbolic object" (ie. a score). However, this "symbolic object" should first be separated off from the context of its production and reception, so that a "*neutral level of analysis*" can occur [*Musical Fact*, p.146]. As Jonathan Dunsby comments, this "neutral level" is to be considered as the "autonomous organization that exists in the work and [...] that has nothing to do with the conditions of the creation of the music and nothing to do with the choices, habits or intuitive understanding in our response to it." [*Music Analysis*, p.217] Molino argues that after the stage of decontextualization, the "neutral", formal level

[5] However, Johnson's remarks preceding this quotation point to a further rupture in the definition of *analysis*, this rupture perhaps evoked through the precise technical meaning of the term in a musical context, as opposed to the more vernacular usage within literary theory. It should be noted that the usage of the term in the current text implies the prefixed form *music analysis*.

[6] See David Woods on the idea of "*an immanent deconstruction*" [*The Deconstruction of Time*, p.302].

should be reinserted into the contexts of production and reception through the action of "an uninterrupted dialectic" [ibid., p.146]. This three-fold dialectical approach constitutes the famous "tripartition" of the "musical fact" into: (1) the *poietic* level; (2) the *neutral*, immanent level; (3) the *esthesis* level.

Molino is careful to stipulate, however, that this semiological dialectic cannot be contained within "a single formalism that exhausts the properties of a domain of what exists" [p.147]. This lack of formal closure means that "analysis of the musical fact is an infinite process" [p.146]. In such statements, Molino begins to inhabit the space between structuralism and post-structuralism, not least when he asserts that "there is no reason to accept the hypothesis of an underlying structure" [p.131]. Craig Ayrey has claimed (Introduction to the English translation of Molino's article) that post-structuralism in the field of music analysis has its "*seminal origin*" in Molino's theory [Introduction to *Musical Fact*, p.105]. Further, Molino also questions the celebrated Chomskian concept of deep structure;

the phenomena under consideration are all surface phenomena (including, of course, if we adopt the framework of transformational generative grammar, the deep structure; in fact, this constitutes an objection to the notion of deep structure, the sole merit of which is to be posited *in order to* solve surface problems). [*Musical Fact*, p.144]

In other words, Molino appears to be suggesting that deep structure is an effect of surface phenomena, rather than *vice-versa* - a position which, as we will see, has wide post-structural resonances^[7]. Equally, Molino also calls for a semiology which is not bounded by the "muddled

[7] Shepherd writes that music can be "properly penetrated, deconstructed" [*Music as Social Text*, p.162], but this particular association of deconstruction with the analytical penetration of surface is particularly misplaced.

pathos" of Marxism, and in this he asserts yet another strand of post-structuralist thought [p.150].

However, most work which has followed this article has tended towards structuralism rather than post-structuralism, and this is no doubt due to the emphasis on the "neutral" level which characterizes what Dunsby has called the "Nattiez phase" of musical semiology, after Franco-Canadian analyst Jean-Jacques Nattiez [*Music and Semiotics: The Nattiez Phase*, passim]. Nattiez himself would appear to suggest that the semiological tripartition is in fact allied to post-structuralism when he writes that "The flight from structure, characteristic of post-structuralism, involves turning away from the immanent, in order to rediscover the author and the reader" [*Music and Discourse*, p.27]. After Molino, he suggests that this alleged post-structural rediscovery of the esthetic operates through a "dialectic of text and reader" [ibid., fn.28]. However, as we have seen, dialectics are anathema to post-structuralism, and the idea that it is all about "rediscovering the author" is well-nigh inexplicable, as Barthes' famous essay *The Death of the Author* demonstrates concisely [*Image-Music-Text*, pp.142-8].

Equally, Nattiez makes many statements which demonstrate a highly traditional approach to the identity of the "immanent" level: "Analysis of the neutral level is a kind of crib, or mnemonic, uncovering a unity" [*Music and Discourse*, p.31]. With this assumption of an inner unity to the "neutral level", as with many other passages from Nattiez, one realizes that the metaphysical tropes of structuralist formalism have not been overthrown at all, but simply re-emerge hedged around with qualifiers and an admission of certain inadequacies of the idea of autonomy. What the

tripartition allows is the continuation of autonomy, as long as the "provisionality" of its status is acknowledged ("Analysis of the neutral level is perpetually subverted" [ibid., p.31]). As Dunsby writes, "Nattiez admits that what is regarded as neutral, as systematic, as verifiable, is not, literally, entirely neutral, since it concerns intellectual categories that have no absolute claim to reality." [*Music Analysis*, p.218] One can therefore easily use the tripartition to justify a structuralist semiology of the score, as long as one admits that it is not a discovery of absolute truths, or based upon a fundamental verity (even if the revelation of *unity* is the *aim*). Not surprisingly, the concern for working through the problematics of structural analysis at the "neutral" level in fact represents the provisional suspension of the "uninterrupted dialectic" with production and reception outlined by Molino as the central concern of the tripartition. For instance, McClary has claimed that Nattiez' semiology "operates entirely within a self-contained, formalistic context with scrupulous disregard for social signification." [*Feminine Endings*, p.170] Equally, in a consideration of "The Cultural Message of Musical Semiology", Rose Rosengard Subotnik writes unequivocally of "an essentially structuralist critical method like Nattiez's" [*Developing Variations*, p.169]. Thus, the shift from Molino's *Musical Fact* to Nattiez' *Fondements d'une sémiologie de la musique* (also 1975) can be read as the shift from the "surface phenomena" suggested by Molino's provisionally sceptical attitude towards deep structure, to the "fundamentals" suggested by the title of Nattiez' text; in other words, the re-structuralization of a (very) tentative post-structural opening.

In both theorists, however, the dialectical reintegration of the

"immanent" level back into the play of production and reception is only possible as a consequence of establishing an *a priori* opposition between the "inside" of the text and its "outside": the whole theory depends on the opposition between what is *intrinsic* to the text, and what is *extrinsic* to it. Nattiez himself points to the "origin" of this opposition in Molino's tripartition:

the principle of his analysis of the neutral level inscribes itself within an epistemological filiation that originated in Saussure, since the distinctions between external and internal linguistics and between *langue* and *parole* in the *Cours de linguistique générale* enable us to identify the internal and immanent [*Music and Discourse*, pp.28-9].

Yet this apparent analogy between the *langue-parole* distinction and the intrinsic-extrinsic opposition is not unproblematic^[8]. Molino specifically writes that "we prefer to speak not of a *langue* as opposed to a *parole* but of a *message level*, a *neutral level of analysis*." [*Musical Fact*, p.146] The analogy is not completely symmetrical, but nevertheless, the "epistemological filiation" remains: one first posits an *a priori* opposition, a structural schism of the intrinsic and the extrinsic, only in order to effect a dialectical return. This form of structuralist "immanence", then, despite all the dialectical qualifiers which put it back into play with the social "extrinsic", is in fact *immanence constituted as formalist autonomy*.

[8] A further example of the structuralist usage of "immanence" is to be found in the theory of Algirdas Julien Greimas, who opposes the concept a level of *immanence* to that of a level of *manifestation*, as a translation into semiotics of the linguistic notions of *langue* and *parole*. [cf. Ronald Schleifer, *A.J. Greimas and the Nature of Meaning*, pp.85-7] In other words, Greimas' idea of immanence is that of a transcendent structural system *behind* reality, just as Molino and Nattiez conceive of it within the structure of a dialectically mediated autonomy.

1.5 The Immanence of the Text

What, then, of that tentative post-structural opening which nevertheless leaves its mark at certain points in Molino's text? If there were a set of credentials which qualified a text as post-structuralist, then one of them would certainly be a relationship with the theory of *pragmatism* which emerges most fully in late-nineteenth century America. As Jean-François Lyotard has written, one of the contexts of contemporary Parisian thought is "The 'linguistic turn' of Western philosophy [...] the penetration of Anglo-American philosophies into European thought" [*The Differend*, p.xiii]. The crucial element in this American invasion is indubitably the work of Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914), inventor of the very term *semiotics* (or, as he had it, *semeiotics*). For Peirce, language constitutes reality in a very specific way -

my language is the sum total of my self; for the man is the thought. It is hard for man to understand this, because he persists in identifying himself with his will, his power over the animal organism, with brute force. Now the organism is only an instrument of thought. [*Selected Writings*, p.71]

In this, Peirce radically challenges the biological definition of humanity so central to all of the organicist metaphysics of the nineteenth century. He claims that the *organism* is not the fundamental component of a person's identity. Rather, it is their *language* which defines them as thought itself, and their organism is only a component of the linguistic system. What, then, is the operation of this language which defines us? In answering this question, we find Peirce effectively assembling the conceptual framework which opens the whole post-structural field, almost a century prior to its alleged inauguration.

Peirce's theory of language can be found in the *Principles of*

Philosophy, a collation of various writings from the end of the nineteenth century. Here, he elaborates a general theory of structures in terms of triadic relationships, and it is in the concept of *thirdness* that we will find him at his most proto-post-structural; "By the third, I mean the medium or connecting bond between the absolute first and last. The beginning is first, the end second, the middle third. The thread of life is a third; the fate that snips it, its second." [*Principles of Philosophy*, p.170] Thirdness, then, is the condition of that which is between two other terms, and is thus the instable point of passage which breaks an initial stability and resolves onto a final stability. Musically, elements such as turns, suspensions, dominant regions, etc., could be read as being examples of thirdness. However, Peirce makes a specific point in describing language which effectively uproots all conceptions of signifiatory stability as represented by Plato's theory in "The Allegory of the Cave". In Plato's Cave, real objects would count as examples of firstness, and the enlightened perception of their reality would count as examples of secondness. The shadows on the wall, however - the representations of real objects - would have the condition of thirdness. In this sense, then, we have already seen how Plato defines thirdness within the same conceptual milieu as darkness, ignorance, falsehood, slavery and illusion. Plato would have his philosopher banish the thirdness of representation by revealing, through reasoned arguments, the ultimate reality of firstness. The revelation of the firstness of a real object would then close off the instable movement of representational thirdness, to produce a final, stable secondness - enlightened perception.

Transposing from Plato's to Peirce's terms, we have the following

triad: object (real object) - representation (shadow) - interpretant (enlightened perception). Peirce, however, makes a very simple point which effectively explodes the whole stability of Plato's well-structured model, and has reverberations throughout the whole of metaphysical and ontological thought - "The *object* of representation can be nothing but a *representation* of which the first representation is the *interpretant*. [...] there is an infinite regression here." [*Principles of Philosophy*, p.171, emphasis added] In other words, the term "object" only has provisional status; no object is an absolute origin in itself, but is instead a *sign* of that which gave rise to it. The "object" is thus a "representation" of a *prior* "object", which also refers back to a prior entity, and so forth *ad infinitum*. Equally, "the *interpretant* is nothing but another *representation* to which the torch of truth is handed along; and as *representation*, it has its *interpretant* again. Lo, another infinite series." [*ibid.*, p.171, emphases added] One can provisionally illustrate this by considering a series of terms, such as O - P - Q. Assuming that they form a representational series, the Platonist would probably allege that "O" is the real object, "P" is its representation, and "Q" is the interpretant. Peirce, however, would point out that while this is true, it is true only in an instrumental fashion, since there are other representational series which precede and follow this one (eg. F-G-H; R-S-T, etc.). Hence "O" can not only be seen as an object represented by "P", but also a representation of its preceding term "N". This would then make "P" not only the representation of "O", but also the interpretant of "N", and so forth, endlessly in both directions (unlike the alphabetical series, however, signification has no "A" or "Z").

In this way, the firstness of the object, the secondness of the

interpretant, and the overall structural closure which they represent as the Alpha and the Omega of a system, are all radically compromised by the fact that they can also be considered as representations of terms outwith the borders of their allegedly closed structure. Thus, the condition of thirdness seeps into all areas of signification, with every thing caught up in an endless cross-reference: in a certain sense, there are no real objects, if by that we mean a unitary point of origin which is preceded by nothing else. There is, then, no ultimate beginning and no ultimate ending - all things are *caught in the middle*, and this includes those things which are commonly assumed to represent either a beginning or an end. Everything is swept along by the movement of signification.

From the post-structural perspective, this is the key claim of Peircean pragmatism. As we will see in Chapter 2, it has a great impact on Derrida's deconstruction. Indeed, Derrida effectively uses Peirce's *semiotics* to deconstruct the structuralisms of Ferdinand de Saussure's *semiology*.

In his project of semiotics, Peirce seems to have been more attentive than Saussure [...] Peirce goes very far in the direction that I have called the de-construction of the transcendental signified, which, at one time or another, would place a reassuring end to the reference from sign to sign. [...] The so-called "thing itself" is always already a *representamen* [...] The *representamen* functions only by giving rise to an *interpretant* that itself becomes a sign and so on to infinity. [Of Grammatology, pp.48/9]

In Derrida's reading, Peirce's concept of the infinite signifiatory series moves, on the philosophical level, towards "the destruction of onto-theology and the metaphysics of presence." [ibid., p.50] This in itself indicates the significance of Peircean pragmatism for contemporary theory, but Derrida is hardly alone in making this crucial reference. For instance,

Lyotard writes that "the society of the future falls less within the province of a Newtonian anthropology (such as structuralism or systems theory) than a *pragmatics of language particles*." [*The Postmodern Condition*, p.xxiv, emphasis added] Further, Deleuze and Guattari write of Peirce as "the true inventor of semiotics", and identify their own form of post-Peircean pragmatics as identical with their celebrated theory of *schizoanalysis*: "we can borrow his terms, even while changing their connotations."^[9] [*A Thousand Plateaus*, pp.531, 146, 531] It is significant, then, that Molino also refers to precisely the same component of Peirce's theory of representation which opens Derrida's deconstruction of semiology: "structuralisms, too, are allegorisms, forgetting the fundamental fact highlighted by Peirce: that the cross-reference of the sign, in the movement of the interpretants that generate one another is an infinite process." [*Musical Fact*, p.127] It could be suggested, however, that Molino's reference to Peirce does not follow the concept of infinite regression through to its necessary (in)conclusion as represented by the deconstructive turn of Derrida. This is not least because Molino's emphasis here is not on the thirdness of the *representamen* which Derrida draws out, but on the concept of the *interpretant* – the "second" which denotes the *end* of a signifiatory series, its teleological arrest. As Peirce points out, secondness is the termination of life, "the fate that snips it". One only

[9] In the context of these statements of Peirce's importance by Derrida, Lyotard, Deleuze and Guattari, it is hard to understand the racial undertones of Harland's claim that "This is a paradoxical way of thinking, and especially paradoxical in relation to Anglo-Saxon ways of thinking." [*Superstructuralism*, p.9] However, what is *inexplicable* is the following idea: "C.S. Peirce, whose version of semiotics ties in with a general philosophical position quite alien to the Superstructuralist [sic] episteme." [*ibid.*, p.4]

moves on from an interpretant to another term by opening its signification up once more, and this can only be done by reinscribing it as another representamen (signifier). For Derrida, it is all signification. For Molino, it is all interpretation. Does Molino's hermeneutics represent an attempt to save us from the endless proliferation of signifiers in Plato's Cave, or does he confuse the condition of secondness with that of thirdness?

Additionally, Molino's themes of provisional autonomy and dialectical return to the social field are almost duty bound to arrest a full delimitation of Peircean thirdness. Post-structuralism in general would challenge the fundamentals of the idea of autonomy, no matter how dialectically "provisional", and would further question the mechanisms of dialectics in general. Notably, these objections to such a theory as Molino's tripartition are formulated precisely within the field of signification which Peirce opens: dialectics or *différance*?

Once more, it becomes a question of immanence, and the distinction between its semiological and post-structural faces can be illustrated by an example from the later, broadly post-structural writings of Roland Barthes. In the essay *From Work to Text* (1971), Barthes puts the traditional conception of the "symbolic object" under the term *work*, and the post-structural conception under the term *text*. The idea of the Work in Barthes corresponds closely to that used in traditional music aesthetics - it "refers to the image of an *organism* which grows by vital expansion, by 'development'" [*Image-Music-Text*, p.161]. This organic development is nevertheless internal to the Work, and its prime external connection is the composer, with listener as secondary. The Text, on the other hand, has as its image "that of the *network*; if the Text extends itself, it is as a result

of a combinatory systematic" [ibid.]. In contrast to the binary connections of the Work with either composer, listener or performer, then - or their dialectical synthesis - Barthes alleges that "the Text is plural [...] not a coexistence of meanings but a passage, an overcrossing; thus it answers not to an interpretation, even a liberal one, but to an explosion, a dissemination."^[10] [ibid., p.159] In this way, textuality is not the condition of being autonomous or isolated from other texts, even if one construes this within a dialectical provisionality - as Derrida writes in *Plato's Pharmacy*, "The text excludes dialectics." [*Dissemination*, p.122] Rather, textuality is the condition of being caught up in a passage through the combinatorial system of "the intertextual in which every text itself is held, it itself being the text-between of another text" [ibid., p.160]. The condition of the text, then, is not one of *autonomy* from a general textual system, but of *intertextuality*. This concept, as Derrida acknowledges, follows on from Peirce's "endless series" as much as his own concept of *différance* - what has occurred is "the reconstruction of the textual field out of the workings of intertextuality or of infinite referral"

[10] Some readers may assume that Barthes' conception of the text is analogous to that of Umberto Eco's conception of the "open work". Certainly, both refer to concepts of musical indeterminacy. Barthes writes that "The Text is very much a score of this new kind: it asks of the reader a practical collaboration." [*Image-Music-Text*, p.163] For Eco, "works like those of Berio and Stockhausen are 'open'" [*The Open Work*, p.4]. However, caution must be applied in aligning Eco with post-structuralism as currently defined: "The theory of the open work is none other than a poetics of serial thought [...] seriality is dialectic thought" [*The Open Work*, pp.218/245]. Just as much as Molino or Nattiez, Eco writes of, for instance, the open work's operation through "a fresh dialectics between the work of art and its performer" [ibid., p.3]. This contrasts sharply with Barthes' idea of "explosion" and "dissemination", which are distinctly aligned with the non-dialectical ruptures of *jouissance*, and Derrida's specifically deconstructive text *Dissemination* (1972). As Derrida writes, "There is no first insemination. The semen is already swarming. The 'primal' insemination is dissemination." [*Dissemination*, p.304]

[*Dissemination*, p.43] As a term, *intertextuality* was developed by Julia Kristeva, initially as a development of Bakhtin's concepts of *dialogue* and *ambivalence*. In Bakhtin's theory of signification, these terms represent two axes of cross-reference between signifiers. *Dialogue* occurs along a horizontal axis between a signifying subject (ie. writer) and an addressee (ie. reader). *Ambivalence* takes place on a vertical axis between the "text" of the word and an "external" text or set of texts. As Kristeva writes;

In Bakhtin's work, these two axes [...] are not clearly distinguished. Yet, what appears as a lack of rigor is in fact an insight [...] any text is constructed as a mosaic of quotations; any text is the absorption and transformation of another. The notion of *intertextuality* replaces that of intersubjectivity [*Desire in Language*, p.66].

In other words, in her reading of Bakhtin's terms, we can move away from the subjectivities of author and reader, even beyond positing a dialectical interplay between them, and towards the processes of signification itself^[11]. However, if *intertextuality* signifies the "transposition of one (or several) sign-system(s) into another", one must take care that it is not misconstrued "in the banal sense of 'study of sources'" [*Revolution in Poetic Language*, in *The Kristeva Reader*, p.111]. Rather, the condition of *intertextuality* rejects the notion of textual internality or externality – formal autonomy – showing that all texts cross-refer endlessly, not necessarily just in the simple senses of quotation or citation, but also in the more complex senses of the cross-referencing of significatory processes in general which Peirce demonstrates.

A further important ramification of this intertextual condition is that

[11] It is at this point that Kristeva's *intertextuality* comes close to Derrida's *différance* – both inscribe an articulation of axes, and both lead away from intentionality towards the pragmatics of signification.

each text is "in itself" an intertext, not only in the sense which Barthes draws out (that of a text *between* other texts), but also in the sense of an "internal" textual multiplicity. In this theory, each text is considered to be divisible into other texts, and so on indefinitely. For instance, if "text" is understood here in the sense of "discourse", then, as Kristeva writes, we could examine "the formation of a specific signifying system - the novel - as the result of a redistribution of several different sign-systems: carnival, courtly poetry, scholastic discourse." [ibid.] Thus, "text" in this usage cannot be reduced to the idea of a collection of printed pages, any more than "Work" can be reduced to "labour" (indeed, to put the temporal activity of "work" back into the "Work" would be to demonstrate one side of its textuality).

Hence, textuality is not the sole province of literature, even if some literary critics understand it in this limited fashion in order to privilege their activity as some kind of meta-discourse of the order that philosophy once believed itself to be^[12]. As David Carroll comments,

If American 'deconstructionists' have, as Gasché claims, turned Derridean deconstruction into a 'newer form of new criticism,' then anti-deconstructionists have accepted this

[12] Significantly, Molino argues a similar point when he questions the application of communicational theories to music, concluding that "the root of the error is believing that language constitutes the model of all symbolic phenomena." [*Musical Fact*, p.127] His reason for asserting this is that within communicational theories, the concept of the referent (the "real object" of Plato's Cave) is the point of difficulty for music. Post-structural (and even some structuralist) theories, however, would question the existence of the referent even in language; as Derrida has written, "*Even though semiology was in fact more general and more comprehensive than linguistics, it continued to be regulated as if it were one of the areas of linguistics. The linguistic sign remained exemplary for semiology*" [*Of Grammatology*, p.51] Derrida then advocates the "Barthesian reversal" [p.52] of the relationship between semiology and linguistics, and along with using Peircean semiotics as a deconstructive lever against semiology, begins to assemble the post-Peircean concept of *grammatology*.

version of Derrida's work in order to attack it for being a literary formalism. But it is only when writing has been equated with (the form of) literature and textuality with specific literary texts that 'deconstruction' (as criticism) is open to such attacks. [*Paraesthetics*, p.82]

With the limited notion of "text", we find that the "immanence" of literary deconstructionism is the same as that of music analysis. In this, one should be wary of confusing the *deconstruction* of Parisian philosophy with the *deconstruction-ism* of anglophone literary criticism, for the latter's conception of "text" is potentially retrievable into the metaphysics of what Barthes terms the "Work"^[13]. Just such a reading of the term "text" in the context of music is made by Carl Dahlhaus, who defines the "Work" as temporal sound, and "text" as static notation or "paper music" [*Esthetics of Music*, p.13]. For Dahlhaus, textuality is bound up in the same theoretical system as the concept of the Work, this system being defined as ontological. Significantly, Nattiez follows Dahlhaus' (and Roman Ingarden's) line of thinking in his attempt to move towards a structuralist semiology of music;

The work's physical mode of existence is, then, divided

[13] Equally, one should note that the term "deconstructivism" is reserved for the architectural movement which represents a reaction against the earlier *constructivist* movement of artists in Soviet Russia. Significantly, however, similar problematics inscribe themselves within deconstructivism as in deconstruction. As Mark Wigley has written, in *Deconstructivist Architecture* (1988), "The form is distorting itself. Yet this internal distortion does not destroy the form. In a strange way, the form remains intact. This is an architecture of disruption, dislocation, deflection, deviation and distortion, rather than one of demolition, dismantling, decay, decomposition and disintegration. It displaces structure instead of destroying it. What is finally so unsettling about such is precisely that the form not only survives its torture but appears all the stronger for it. Perhaps the form is even produced by it. It becomes unclear which came first, the form or the distortion, the host or the parasite. [...] No surgical technique can free the form, no clean incision can be made. To remove the parasite would be to kill the host. They comprise one symbiotic entity." [quoted in Frampton, *Modern Architecture*, p.313]

between score and performance. The work's ontological mode of existence is situated in the realm of pure intentionality, beyond the score, yet guaranteed, rendered possible by the score. [*Music and Discourse*, p.82]

Unlike this transcendent, dialectical, ontological model which invokes the limited, literary notion of "text", post-structuralism would consider the activity of performance, the experience of audition, and even sound itself as texts just as much as the notational text of the score. Following Kristeva, it would no longer be a question of the "study of sources", the tracing of a sign back to a "realm of pure intentionality", but, along with Barthes, it would be a case of moving through an intertextual "field without origin" [*Image-Music-Text*, p.146], with the "critic" and the "social" as immanent parts of that field at all points during, before and after engagement. Under these conditions, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari write that "exterior and interior are relative; they exist only through their exchanges", and these exchanges are not dialectical, but intertextual [*A Thousand Plateaus*, p.49]. Even within the ostensibly limited field of a single piece of music, however, the discourses of form and genre are textually heterogenous. At a very simple level, Kristeva's idea of novelistic intertextuality could be transposed into music, to identify, for instance, the intertextuality of The Pogues' album *If I Should Fall From Grace With God* (1988) as redistributing the signifiatory systems of big band jazz, punk, and Irish folk, or William Kinloch's *The Batell of Pavie* (late C16th) as redistributing the discourses of musick fyne, martial music and Catalan folk. This simple observation may be construed as tending towards the obvious, but with intertextuality, a number of subtle shifts occur on the critical field which nevertheless have far-reaching consequences. As John Frow writes in *Intertextuality and*

Ontology, "intertextual analysis is distinguished from source criticism [...] by its rejection of a unilinear causality" [*Intertextuality: Theories and Practises*, p.46]. This applies also to the text which constitutes an intertextual analysis, as much as the "object" of the analysis. Thus, the boundary, the limit of each text (including the "analysis") is always already provisional, and this is due to the endless cross-referencing of all levels of signification.

As Derrida has written, "the text is no longer the snug airtight inside of an interiority or an identity-to-itself" [*Dissemination*, p.36] In other words, textuality effectively deconstructs the limits of identity, so that "The Outside ~~is~~ the Inside" [*Of Grammatology*, p.44]. In this context, the erasure of the word "is" refers to the deconstruction of the opposition between "is" and "is not", Being and nonbeing - this opposition being the fundamental means of establishing ontological difference. To assert, then, that the outside ~~is~~ the inside is to reject the ontological difference between internality and externality, and reinscribe it as a difference outwith the structure of opposition - ie. *différance*. If there is a provisional limit, or horizon, in any given intertextual system, it is only ever a matter of the relativity of one's position. The map of intertextuality is curved - we can never get a "total" picture of the whole field, but we shift the horizon as we move through a textual network (and we never stop moving).

In contrast, Nattiez writes of the underlying unity of the text, and that analytical exploration (which has the revelation of this unity as its *telos*) must systematically exploit its tools "until they are exhausted" [*Music and Discourse*, p.13]. Nattiez writes of the "delimitation" of the neutral level through this analytical exhaustion [*ibid.*], but this is a highly

limited form of de-limitation, one which can only occur on a field with specific boundaries - a *limited field*. As we will see, however, the notion of intertextuality posits a *lack* of fixed boundaries and the impossibility of establishing them in any absolute sense. Much of Derrida's deconstructive work (and much of the current endeavour) assumes that, in tracing through the various significations of a text (for instance, a particular *concept*) there will be an endless number of books, events, figures, images, other concepts, etc. which constitute its field of intertextuality. In this context, the idea of de-limitation takes a fuller form: the *transgression* of limits, rather than their dialectical *transcendence*.

Thus, we can place the immanence of the Work, which remains within the boundary limitations of autonomy, in contrast with the immanence of the Text, which continually circulates in an intertextual network without border controls. The immanence of semiological music analysis remains caught within the most basic of structuralisms - the segmentation of the text from a general field of immanence in order to reconstitute it as autonomous, and analyzable "within itself", within its own interiority, its self-unity, without reference to extrinsic factors. The means by which the text then re-engages with the general textual field is by a dialectical return. On the other hand, the immanence of deconstruction, which allies itself to the concept of intertextuality, rejects the structuralization of the text into a Work, and instead engages the text within the milieu of its

textuality^[14]. This textuality by its very nature is not a discrete formalism, but is inherently caught up a movement which questions the limitation of textual signification – the movement of the intertext^[15].

1.6 Unleashing the Text

It remains the case, however, that two rival readings of deconstruction have emerged in the "anglo-american" tradition. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak identifies these readings as "general" and "narrow", depending on their proximity to Parisian deconstruction or their "domestication" to "the existing ideology of American literary criticism" respectively [*In Other Worlds: Essays in Cultural Politics*, p.16]. Domesticated deconstructionism, she argues, places signification in the autonomous "inside" of the text, and "allows the critic authority", rather than following through the ramifications of "general" deconstruction,

[14] The presentation of such post-structural concepts to musicology conferences several times yielded the question as to whether Hans Keller's "analytic scores" could be considered deconstructive. Certainly, they are immanent to their texts, but only in the structuralist sense of Molino and Nattiez. The following dialectical statement hardly qualifies Keller as a deconstructionist working within the field of intertextuality: "What, then, does my method analyse? The unity of contrasts" [*Criticism*, p.147]

[15] The precise questions of how deconstruction may be intertextually translated into the field of music analysis would, if engaged adequately, indubitably inaugurate a completely different field to that which we currently understand under the sign "music analysis", and would potentially lead to further displacements in the theories of signification in general. However, this does not fall within the remit of the current project, concentrating as it does on aesthetics. Extant examples of attempts to either combine analysis with deconstruction, or to analytically uncover the operation of a deconstructive compositional process in a piece of music can be found in Subotnik's "Toward a Deconstruction of Structural Listening: A Critique of Schoenberg, Adorno, and Stravinsky" (in *Explorations in Music, the Arts, and Ideas*, ed. Narmour & Solie), Kramer's *Music as Cultural Practice*, and McClary's *Feminine Endings*. A fully delineated theory in this field is yet to be taken up.

which "puts into question the grounds of the critic's power" [ibid]. Of course, this in effect slices through the immanence of intertextuality and locates the text at something akin to the semiological "neutral level" of analysis.

A similar, but more complex divide has been noted by Christopher Norris, in *The Truth About Postmodernism* (1993). Here, the two readings of deconstruction are identified as on the one hand, that which places deconstruction within the context of post-structuralism, postmodernism, or literary deconstructionism - "*wild*" *deconstruction* - and on the other, that which places it well outside of all those territories - "*rigorous*" *deconstruction*. According to Norris, the distinction is also that between "textualism" and "facticity"; both the post-structural tendency and literary deconstructionism are roundly condemned as "textualist", in distinction to the "factual" nature of Derridean deconstruction. In more philosophical terms, the opposition between the textual and the factual is also that between nominalism and realism, between scepticism and the search for truth [*The Truth about Postmodernism*, passim]. Conversely, eleven years earlier, Norris is to be found claiming that "deconstruction works at the same giddy limit" as Hume's scepticism, and that it is "likewise an activity of thought which cannot be consistently acted on - that way madness lies" [*Deconstruction*, p.xii]. In this, we could assume that in 1982, by aligning deconstruction with scepticism, Norris was also

aligning it with post-structuralism (judging by his 1993 distinction^[16]). However, already, we can discern a certain hesitance to go all the way and fully accept the ramifications of Derrida's statement that deconstruction produces "a force of dislocation that spreads itself throughout the entire system, fissuring it in every direction and thoroughly *delimiting* it." [*Writing and Difference*, p.21] In 1993, Norris does indeed champion his reading of Derridean deconstruction, but specifically in order to attempt its liberation from any association with the post-structural or the postmodern. He writes of "the gulf that separates Derrida's work from the currency of postmodern-pragmatist thought" [p.301], and chides critics who assemble a "highly partial (not to say distorted and opportunist) reading of Derrida" as a "laid-back textualist" [p.283]. The problem is that "new textualism is merely old scepticism in a geared-up rhetorical guise" [p.227], and thus, just as Kant's philosophy was an answer to Hume's scepticism, so too it will serve as an answer to postmodernism, and re-instate the value of *truth* (at the same time also saving Kant from various post-structural "misreadings"). Norris claims that what is required to save deconstruction from the clutches of the post-structuralists is "to push the argument much further back, to the point where deconstruction in effect joins company with other (as it seems less sceptical or troublesome) variants of the linguistic turn." [p.224] In other words, what Norris desires is to utilize the radical force of deconstructive technique, but

[16] Butler also makes the sceptical association in *Interpretation, Deconstruction, and Ideology* [pp.60-65], and laments that "if Derrida is right, all interpretation which respects the nature of language is condemned to indeterminacy." [p.65] Yet, *interpretation* is not the only critical mode available, as the whole agenda of deconstruction demonstrates.

without "going all the way down" into the logical (in)conclusion of a full textuality.

Just as there are Marxist readings of deconstruction which take it as dialectical, then, there is also a certain humanist-realist reading which takes it to be the arena of "truth" and "fact" as opposed to the textuality of post-structuralism. Nevertheless, these two approaches - the grand narratives of truth and dialectics with their common ground in ontology - are subject to interrogation even by the smallest of clauses in Derrida's work; as he writes in *Plato's Pharmacy*, "dialectics (or ontology) [...] is always guided by an intention of *truth*." [*Dissemination*, p.166] The question is, does the deconstruction of truth, dialectics, or ontology in general constitute its wholesale obliteration, or a reinscription of its terms? If the latter is the case, then, as Norris points out, it may be a matter of how far we go. Once more, what is perhaps at stake here is an issue which can be seen to arise from the double strategy of deconstruction:

The movements of deconstruction do not destroy structures from the outside. They are not possible and effective, nor can they take accurate aim, except by inhabiting those structures. Inhabiting them *in a certain way*, because one always inhabits, and all the more when one does not suspect it. Operating necessarily from the inside, borrowing all the strategic and economic resources of subversion from the old structure, borrowing them structurally, that is to say without being able to isolate their elements and atoms [analysis], the enterprise of deconstruction always in a certain way falls prey to its own work. This is what the person who has begun the same work in another area of the same habitation does not fail to point out with zeal. [*Of Grammatology*, p.24]

Here Derrida acknowledges a serious ramification of the immanence of the deconstructive process to its critical subject - although the text may become deconstructed, the resultant deconstruction is itself inevitably

bound up to a degree in the lexis and conceptual framework of the original structure. This is what the detractors of deconstruction often "point out with zeal"^[17].

The current project is to investigate this problematic within the context of Derrida's deconstruction of Rousseau's music aesthetics in *Of Grammatology*. It will be demonstrated in Chapter Two that Derrida relies implicitly, but most significantly, on certain normative concepts of Enlightenment music theory in order to carry this programme through. However, rather than "zealously pointing this out" in order to detract from Derrida's efforts, the exposure of this fact will be directed towards supplementing his programme further. This supplementation will therefore reject Norris' proposal to push deconstruction "much further back" towards "less sceptical or troublesome" theoretical moments. In other words, *Of Grammatology* will itself "fall prey to its own work", and become the subject of a further deconstructive interrogation. While Norris rails against the blander American versions of deconstruction(ism) as much as Spivak, he nevertheless comes perilously close to another form of "domestication". If, in his terms, deconstruction can be either "wild" or "rigorous", could we not also conceive of a *rigorous post-structuralism*, as an alternative to the Norris' determination of it as "wild"? (*And what is the significance of the fact that what Norris calls "wild" is claimed by Spivak*

[17] David Wood, in an extensive interrogation of "Derrida's self-understanding" of what is at stake in the deconstruction of Hegel, comments that the immanence of Derrida's deconstruction to Hegel's text means that "a teleological dialectics has itself been transformed dialectically." [*The Deconstruction of Time*, p.316] What should be borne in mind, however, is the *point* of the deconstruction: that, utilizing Hegelian language, it "nonetheless works a displacement with it - one both infinitesimal and radical." [ibid.]

to be "domesticated"?)

Two post-structuralists who Norris singles out as particularly dangerous are Deleuze and Guattari, who nevertheless claim that their post-structuralism is precisely *not* achieved by "wildly destratifying" [*A Thousand Plateaus*, p.160]. One does indeed "destratify", but not *wildly*: "how necessary caution is, the art of dosages, since overdose is a danger. You don't do it with a sledgehammer, you use a very fine file." [ibid., p.160] It is this conception of a rigorous and attentive post-structuralism which is embraced below. Much will therefore hinge on the strategies by which the intervals between deconstruction and post-structuralism are articulated. In the context of Harland's contention that *Of Grammatology* "mark[s] the arrival of Post-Structuralism", the significance of the role of Enlightenment music theory in Derrida's text should not be underestimated. If *Of Grammatology* is implicated in the emergence of post-structuralism, then so are the music theories bound up in its textual framework. From this perspective, *Of Grammatology* potentially holds a long-neglected key for connecting musicology to two of the most challenging aspects of contemporary thought. It becomes a question of the following:

in the song melody is originally corrupted by harmony.
Harmony is the originary supplement of melody. [...] supplement [is] another name for *différance* [*Of Grammatology*, pp. 214 & 150]

What leads Derrida to connect his famous deconstructive concept of *différance* with the musical concept of harmony? Additionally, what is the significance of the fact that the specific opposition of harmony to melody which he deconstructs is that within the debate between Rousseau and Rameau over the very origin of music – the debate which became known as

the "Quarrel of the Buffoons"? In short, what is the connection between Enlightenment theories of music and post-structuralism - specifically, deconstruction? It is this question which forms the strategic opening of the current text. However, the articulation of this question cannot afford to be overly direct. In Derrida's text, the concept of *différance* is gradually formulated through a reading of Rousseau's conception of melody. This concept is in turn is formulated by a reading of Rameau's theory of harmony. In order to finally engage with Derrida's writing on music, then, we will begin to trace through this chain of readings not so much at its beginning, but at least at its provisional harmonic root.

CHAPTER TWO

THE HINGE OF DIFFÉRANCE

Now let ilk man his way avance:
Let sum ga drink and sum ga dance.
Menstrell, blaw up ane brawll of France:
Let se quha hobbils best!

- *Ane Satyre of the Thrie Estaitis*
David Lindsay, 1552.

CHAPTER TWO

THE HINGE OF DIFFÉRANCE

2.1 Intervallic Logic

Rameau's mistake corresponds to the model of all mistakes and all historical perversions as they *take shape* under Rousseau's eyes [*Of Grammatology*, p.211]

Music is the science of sounds; therefore sound is the principle subject of music. Music is generally divided into harmony and melody, but we shall show in the following that the latter is merely a part of the former and that a knowledge of harmony is sufficient for a complete understanding of all the properties of music. [*Treatise*, p.1]

In this initial short passage from the *Treatise of Harmony*, Rameau gives a definition of music which contains the first principles requisite for a full understanding of musical theory as he sees it. Music is to be studied scientifically, beginning with the concept of its division into the two branches of harmony and melody. Underlying this division, however, is the structural derivation of melody from harmony. In other words, harmony is the origin of melody, and as such, a study of the fundamental structures of harmony can yield an understanding of music in general, "without considering either its loudness or its duration" [*Treatise*, p.3]. It is Rameau's prioritization of the vertical, spatial parameter of harmony over the horizontal, temporal parameter of melody, which defines his aesthetic.

Rameau's theory in the *Treatise* has a significant intertext with early Greek theory. In particular, he takes up the Pythagorean theme of the

monochord as the experimental source of the knowledge of harmony, a knowledge based on the reflexivity of harmonic and physical space. This combines with the Pythagorean concern with Number as the prime generating force of all things, and can be traced in the first quotation in the *Treatise* – significantly, from René Descartes' *Compendium Musicae*:

Sound is to sound as string is to string. Each string contains in itself all other strings shorter than it, but not those which are longer. Therefore, all high sounds are contained in low ones, but low ones, conversely, are not contained in high ones. It is thus evident that we should look for the higher term in the division of the lower; this division should be arithmetic... [quoted in *Treatise*, p.11]

This notion of the containment of the higher term within the lower term, the containment of the higher harmonics within the lower (longer) length of the string signifies a specifically Pythagorean mode of spatial knowledge. Within this schema, the relation of an open string to the higher harmonics it can produce is one of derivation by arithmetic proportion, made known to the musical scientist through empirical data^[1].

However, Rameau makes several departures from Descartes' harmonic theory, singling out his explanations of the origin of certain intervals as structurally suspect. For instance, Rameau interrogates Descartes'

[1] This must be distinguished from a knowledge of the overtone, or natural harmonic series. The first scientific proof of the overtone series was in fact given in a paper by Joseph Sauveur titled *Principles of Acoustics and Music* published in Paris in 1700. Although published 22 years prior to Rameau's *Treatise*, it would seem that in his preoccupation with Descartes' Pythagoreanism, Rameau was not aware of Sauveur's work until 1737. According to Philip Gossett in the preface to his translation of the *Treatise*, it is only then that Rameau's *Harmonic Generation* discusses the practical similarity of the two viewpoints. Here, Rameau begins to use Sauveur's term *acoustique*, a term which Sauveur had derived from the visual analogue of *optique*. He also makes the distinction, however, that while his work previously invests Nature within the vibrating string of the experimental monochord, Sauveur's scientific theory invests Nature within the pitched sounding body produced by the monochord.

statement that "the major sixth proceeds from the major third". The theory here is that the octave should be divided at the major fourth, thus allowing the major sixth to be seen as a repetition of the major third in the upper half of the octave. According to Rameau, "This completely upsets the order of harmony, since the octave, which should naturally be divided on the lower side by the fifth, is here on the contrary divided on the lower side by the fourth." [*Treatise*, p.21]

From this position, then, Rameau asserts the perfect fifth as the effective second term in harmonic division from the fundamental, thus clearing the way for a theory of inversion to explain the relationship between the intervals in the lower and upper halves of the octave. Thus, he can write, "The fourth is generated by the fifth only through the power of the octave, however, just as the minor sixth by the major third, and the major sixth by the minor third." [*Treatise*, p.17]

However, the reverse of this pattern of derivation is not true - "the minor third does not originate in this manner" [*ibid.*], for the reason that "only the octave, the fifth, and the major third are directly generated by the fundamental sound" [*ibid.* p.15]. In this sense, the minor third is an inversion of the major third, *moving downwards from the fifth*, rather than an inversion of the major sixth. The latter would effectively involve a strategic "boot-strapping" in the spontaneous generation of two intervals by each other, rather than generating them within the sequential framework of origination which Rameau is proposing. This wrap-round quality of inversions mirrored in the fifth thus opens the possibility of a coherent theory of major and minor triads. Extending the principle to inversions around other, further axes, it is possible to systematize more

and more complex chords with smaller intervals, and still retain the basic generative principle: "This inversion is found more and more as we penetrate into the secrets of harmony. For example, if we begin with numbers, which naturally increase in size, we see that in harmony they decrease." [*Treatise*, p.14] In this sense, as the numeric space which describes the harmonics beyond the length of the monochord increases, the inversion of intervals around a shifting axis is required to allow the harmonics to remain physically accessible on the monochord. Inversion, then, allows the continuous, intervallically expanding linear series of the natural harmonic geometry to remain a scientific tool of explanation even with the smallest movements within the octave – the octave being the first harmonic, and therefore the first axis of inversion, followed by the fifth, and so on.

The power of Rameau's concept of inversion, however, goes further, facilitating a new, streamlined economy of chord theory with respect to function. Throughout the *Treatise*, he accuses his theoretical predecessors, particularly Zarlino, of a wasteful expenditure of terms within harmonic theory in respect of the practise of labelling each inversion of a chord as a separate harmonic entity.

Those who have been aware of inversion have not looked into its origin, as their rules and their examples prove; for they give as many different examples and different rules as there are chords. [...] This is how sciences are made obscure. Each part is cited separately when all could be brought together. [*Treatise*, p.82]

According to Rameau, the principle of inversion, and the continual articulation of intervals around axes within the octave, effectively means that the true musical value of a note within a chord lies in its relation to the fundamental, rather than in a proportion to an adjacent proportion.


This fundamental being either its near or distant source of generation in terms of the numeric aspect of harmonic space, but always its immediate point of reference in terms of the musical function of that harmonic space. Rameau's extension of the theoretical remit to scientize experience itself provides a theory of aesthetic function which refers back to the theory of proportional generation. What he makes clear is that while the proportional theory of harmonic generation has a significant intertext with aesthetic experience, it nevertheless requires a fine-tuning to include the psychoacoustic phenomenon which makes a new set of relations between the parts of every new heard chord, and yet recognizes the functional unity of different inversions of each chord.

All the difficulties that Zarlino creates in his harmonic operations would not have existed, had he remembered the source which he had first proposed. Far from pointing it out everywhere, however, he immediately abandons it. Though he recalls it in the octave, it is only in passing; though he says that this octave is the origin of all intervals, he forgets that it is also the origin of the inversion of these intervals, of which he speaks in his *Harmonic Demonstrations*; though he acknowledges this inversion, he forgets the inversion of chords which is simply its consequence. [*Treatise*, p.25]

And again,

How wonderful is this source in its simplicity! So many chords, so many lively melodies, such boundless variety, such beautiful and fitting expressions, such well-rendered feelings! All this flows from two or three intervals arranged by thirds whose source subsists in a single sound. [*Treatise*, p.142]

Rameau's theory facilitates the classification of different inversions of a chord as functionally identical with each other. This is possible according to their relationship to a common fundamental which produces several possible permutations of a given number of terms, each permutation fulfilling the same functional value in a purely vertical sense,



"without changing the substance of the chord" [*Treatise*, p.25]. This relies, however, on the action of inversion, which must also be seen as the condition of possibility for the spacing which constitutes harmony: "inversion is basic to all the diversity possible in harmony" [*Treatise*, p.13]

The concept of inversion, then, can be seen as a strategy for rationalizing the origin of intervals, for assembling a series of spaces and distances between points which produce each other according to an additive logic, where each new term supplements its previous generative origin, in turn becoming the provisional origin of the next supplementary term, and so forth.

Rameau's *Treatise*, in its Cartesian application of a rigorous methodology working outwards from an assumed set of first principles, nevertheless makes a significant methodological departure from Descartes (aside from the observational dispute over the division of the octave). As Charles Lalo has written;

It is all there; the methodical and even hyperbolic doubt; the revelation of a *cogito* which is here an *audio*. Only this allegedly Cartesian method leads Rameau, contrary to Descartes, to *experience* and to a principle of certitude whose value lies entirely in that it exists *outside him*. [*Esquisse d'une esthétique musicale scientifique*, p.86]

Descartes, in his famous attempt to doubt the existence of all things, posits an (allegedly) irreducible cognating mind at the centre of experience, an entity which cannot be doubted into non-existence, since it is the source of that doubt itself. This is encapsulated in the phrase

cogito ergo sum: "I think, therefore I am"^[2] [*Discourse on the Method*, in *Selected Philosophical Writings*, p.36]. In place of Descartes' rationally-derived *cogito*, however, Lalo claims that Rameau places audition – the *audio* – at the centre of experience. In this sense, Rameau has introduced an interval as the source of knowledge – the interval or space which exists between the mind and the sounding phenomenon. As the *cogito* requires only itself as both its subject and its object, the displacement produced within the *audio* requires a mind as its subject and a sound as its object.

This introduction of an "inside" and an "outside" to the action of knowledge, a One and an Other, is also the possibility of an introduction of dialectics, with audition forming the mid-term, the duct or space of passage, between the first and final terms.

In this refutation of the absoluteness of the *cogito*, Rameau demonstrates his theoretical links with other thinkers of the post-Cartesian period, specifically the empiricist writings of John Locke, made known to francophone theorists largely through Voltaire's *Philosophical Letters* (1734). Of the mind, Locke wrote: "Whence has it all the materials of reason and knowledge? To this I answer in one word, from *experience*. In that all our knowledge is founded, and from that it ultimately derives itself." [*Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, p.89] However, Rameau is not so easily classified as a "Total" Empiricist; his theory hinges on a dual articulation of Lockean experience and Cartesian reason. This is

[2] It is easy to see how a linguistically-based theory such as Peirce's would immediately posit that this is not an absolute foundation, since in order for the cogitating self to propose the thought of the *cogito*, it has to rely on the existence of signification. The self is, then, the sum of its language, as Peirce would have it. In this way, it can be argued that the self is not an irreducible unity, but an irreducible multiplicity of signifiers.

asserted in the *Treatise of Harmony*;

We may judge music only through our hearing, and reason has no authority unless it is in agreement with the ear; yet nothing should be more convincing to us than the union of both in our judgements. We are naturally satisfied by our ear, while the mind is satisfied by reason. Let us judge nothing then except by their mutual agreement. [*Treatise*, p.138]

This need for a harmonization of the interval between perception and judgement in musical matters has a distinct manner of operation from the physical sciences, by virtue of the fact that music is an aesthetic science. The action of judgement not only distinguishes music from the "technological" sciences in the precise positioning of its concept of experience, but also opens the way to the social aspect of music, and the distinction of music's sociality from the material advancement of humanity which science purports to provide. We can also sense a resonance in the following of a position which claims that while the scientific realm is that purely of numerical quantity, music, by its aesthetic aspect, comprises not only number or quantity, but the energy of qualities. Music is the Art of Science.

Now although experience alone is capable of convincing us, music is not like many other sciences, in which our senses perceive things in an unambiguous manner. Someone may approve of a chord which displeases someone else. Hence arise conflicting opinions [...] and who can vouch that the man who is boasting of his consummate experience enjoys perfect accuracy of hearing? [*Treatise*, p.119]

Rameau's interest in basing the science of music on the spatial phenomenon of the vibrating string, therefore, does not open the way to a sensual anarchy. Rather, a need for generalized principles and standards is felt; a *sensus communis* of some order is necessary to this science. Gentlemen devoting their attention to the experience of sound must have an objective rule. In this sense, reason tempers experience. Indeed,

Rameau writes that "reason may supplement it" [p.xlviii]. Reason and experience, then, are at the dual origin of our musical knowledge, and it is their articulation which brings forth the perceived acoustic moment. The motif of origination is also strong in Rameau's mind when he writes of the harmonic fundamental, that "reason has no power when we are separated from the source, and in such a case, experience can only deceive us" [*Treatise*, p.120].

In specifically musical terms, however, this particular concept of experience leads us directly back to Pythagoras, and to the various narratives of his discovery of harmony within phenomena themselves. Rameau's own version of this narrative is an allusion at the beginning of the *Treatise* to the monochord: "In order to understand the relationship between sounds, investigators took a string, stretched it so that it could produce a sound, and divided it with movable bridges into several parts." [p.4]^[3] It is the results of this empirical observation which lead to the possibility of the discovery of the laws which control harmony, and this is achieved when experience is "supplemented", as Rameau has it, by reason. However, the object of reason's operation is the Pythagorean concept of Number, thus invoking all the allied notions of arithmetic, accumulation, addition, and supplementation; "everything is thus based on the rules of arithmetic" [*Treatise*, p.5]. From this numericism, a complete ontology of harmony can be deduced: "The order of origin and perfection of these consonances is determined by the order of the numbers" [p.6].

[3] However, Iamblichus, in his *Life of Pythagoras*, narrates a version where Pythagoras discovers harmony while walking past a brazier's shop and investigating the relationship between the size of the beating hammers and the pitch of the sound produced. [*Pythagorean Sourcebook*, p.86]

However, once more the fringe between the rational and the experiential is displaced when the specifically Pythagorean conception of Number (which relates very closely to Rameau's) is taken into account. Unlike the pure abstraction of many other conceptions of Number, the Pythagorean reading maintains that Number is immanent; it is not locked away in some noumenal realm "behind" reality and only accessible by virtue of a tortuous entelechy – a Fall into actuality. Rather, Pythagorean Number inheres within phenomena as they present themselves to perception. Most significantly, this actualized numericism is made possible and evident through the phenomenon of musical harmony, which then becomes a model of proportionality for the whole cosmos. As Stobaeus relates a fragment from Philolaus; "By means of sensation, Number instills a certain proportion, and thereby establishes among all things harmonic relations" [*Pythagorean Sourcebook*, p.171]. Number, while yet remaining a controlling factor (and only in this sense of control could Number be said to "produce") is nevertheless present and accessible to the senses^[4]. In this way, the Pythagorean conception of Number breaches the divide, harmonizes the interval between the abstract and the actual, providing a kind of continuity between the two, through which the generation of the cosmos – the Pythagorean cosmogenesis – becomes possible. Thus, in the Pythagorean moment, the absolute division of reason and phenomenon which is represented in the Cartesian moment does not occur; the two are

[4] It is not only Number, however, which is immanent to reality, but also the forms of geometry which Plato and others would later separate from actuality. As the doxographers recorded: "Fire is composed of twenty-four right-angled triangles [...] Air is composed of forty-eight triangles [...] water is composed of one hundred and twenty triangles" and so forth. [*The Pythagorean Sourcebook*, p.314]

bound together in a kind of originary dialectic.

Rameau's theories are further complicated in respect of the reason-experience axis in their use of the concept of "implication". Here the themes of appearance and a transcendent reality behind the appearance are repeated. Implication is the principle whereby "every sound is always implied in its octave" [*Treatise*, p.11], so that the function of the fundamental remains intact if it is represented by, or transposed to its octave. And although Rameau writes of such a chord as "less perfect", this signifies less of a judgement as to the status of the chord than a statement that the chord is less simple, for "the upper sound of the octave should in no way be regarded as a source different from that by which it was directly generated" [p.12]. Through the principle of implication, then, the fundamental can retain its proximity to, and generating force over, the other intervals despite its absence; not merely through a form of structural repetition, but in a similar way to the immanence of Number, the fundamental is, it seems, almost involved in what acousticians now call a psychoacoustic presence.

This aspect is presaged in Rameau's text by yet another reworking of a passage from Descartes. As is the case with many parts of Descartes' *Musical Compendium*, he often appears to be compelled, by a Pythagorean position on music, to be distant from many of his later purely rationalist writings, by being forced to admit of the controlling factors of perception at the very heart of harmony. As Rameau writes; "Descartes partially agrees, saying: 'We never hear any sound without its upper octave somehow seeming to strike the ear.'" [*Treatise*, p.11]. This explicit statement of a psychoacoustic image, however, has its terms inverted by

Rameau, with the upper sound structurally implying the lower. It is at this specific point that Rameau's theory bridges the interval between appearance and underlying reality, since this perceptual phenomenon is generated by the action of already manifest Number, with Number and sound in an immanent symbiosis. "Experience, in addition, which makes us feel that a chord consisting of the third and fifth is always perfect and complete without the octave, still permits us to consider this octave implied, since it is the first interval generated." [*Treatise*, p.12] This psychoacoustic moment offers the post-Pythagorean system the possibility of an actualized virtual; an immanent abstraction gained, admittedly, by an inference, but a dual inference which is equally experiential and rational.

Thus, in the concept of harmony, at its very root, is the originary articulation of an interval, an articulation which can be characterized as dialectical in its resolution of the difference between one side of a space and the other, but also a dialectic which is generative, accumulative. This dialectic is operative within the Pythagorean cosmogenesis, the originary dialectic which assembles the whole cosmos, and in which is given the image of all Pythagorean systems, whether of music, politics, justice, morality, physics, or medicine. The cosmogenesis is the process whereby the Monad, representing unity and limitedness, splits into the Dyad, representing multiplicity and unlimitedness, and generates the third term which represents the harmony of unity and multiplicity, the harmony of the limited and the unlimited. Across this cosmic axis, we can also find inscribed, as Timaeus puts it, the "mixture of two forces, the Same and the Different, [which] became the origin of motion" [*The Pythagorean Sourcebook*, p.289]. However, there remains an originary difference

between the Same and the Different, which is nevertheless broached, or articulated, by the dialectical action of harmony, thereby ensuring the priority of the Same, the Monad, which comes before all, and gives rise to all in a sense by tapping the possibility of the interval between it and the Different, or the Dyad (which it produces). In the cosmogenesis, then, the Same reproduces itself by utilizing the power of harmony to access the power of the Different, and subordinate it to its own law. Yet this Pythagorean articulation is achieved without destroying the originary interval between the two principles upon which the whole process depends and can begin once more; "The true nature of existence, how everything passes and returns" [*The Pythagorean Sourcebook*, p.164]

A highly significant aspect of this cosmogonical "true nature" is a certain anthropomorphism which operates at its centre, made explicit in the writings of the doxographers; "the first principle of numbers is in substance the first Monad, which is a male monad, begetting as father all other numbers. Secondly the dyad is a female number, and the same is called by the mathematicians even. Thirdly, the Triad is a male number." [*The Pythagorean Sourcebook*, p.312]^[5] It is highly significant here, as a general component of dialectical structures, that the original term produces its opposite precisely in order to replicate its own structure at the final level, thus (in this instance) enclosing the whole dialectic within a male order. The originary difference which is represented by the production of a female Other by a male origin gives rise to the famous

[5] Further elaborations of this process exist, however, with images of numbers right up to 10, the Decad. However, differing accounts of these principles exist, as Iamblichus' *Theology of Numbers* gives the Monad as male-female, which nevertheless could imply that the male contains the female, given that the Monad is the "first" term of the series.

Pythagorean "Table of Opposites". Here, a series of essential attributes are delineated according to their association with one or the other gender. In his *Metaphysics*, Aristotle gives the table as:

Limit	Unlimited
Odd	Even
One	Plural
Right	Left
Male	Female
At rest	Moving
Straight	Crooked
Light	Darkness
Good	Bad
Square	Oblong

Of course, this table is the prime generator of all the dualisms which we encounter in Plato's Cave, with real objects being aligned with the left column, and their representations on the right. Enlightened perception of an object, which involves the interpretation of its representation, would then be the dialectical reproduction of the original object within the perceiving mind. In Iamblichus' *Theology of Numbers*, the third term which is produced from the originary difference between the male and the female principles is given the names of Harmonia, Marriage, Knowledge, The Mean Between Two Extremes, and The All [*The Pythagorean Sourcebook*, p.322]. It is in this cosmic marriage that a long history of dialectics can be read, from Pythagoras through Plato, to Hegel, Marx, etc. The problem of dialectical anthropomorphism, however, is not confined to, does not have its "origin" in Pythagoras, and it seems to have been prevalent across cultural boundaries during his era as well as subsequent ones. A doxographer's account of Pythagoras' meeting with Zoroaster, the historical inspiration of an opera by Rameau, as well as a book by Nietzsche, has the two ancients agreeing on the anthropomorphic cosmogony:

there were from the beginning two causes of things: father and mother. The father is the light and the mother darkness; and the parts of light are warm, dry, light, swift; and of darkness are cold, moist, heavy, slow; and of all these the universe is composed, of male and female. And he [Pythagoras] says that the universe exists in accordance with musical harmony, so the sun also makes an harmonious period. [...] Zaratus spoke as follows: There are two divinities, one of the heavens and one of the earth... [*The Pythagorean Sourcebook*, p.313]

The complicity of the concept of musical harmony in this anthropomorphic dialectic cannot be underestimated. Harmony is indeed, within the Pythagorean system, the single universal principle of order, the "marriage" of the axial terms of the Table of Opposites. The principle of harmony is the reason for the famous Pythagorean concept of the Music of the Spheres, by which all heavenly bodies are given their proportions, and just intervals are established between them in order that the cosmos be arranged without dissonance. This celestial harmony, then, is derived from an anthropomorphic image of production, wherein all terms are rationally brought within the limits and the law of a single, fundamental term. For Pythagorean theorists, music becomes a means of empirical and rational research into the structure of Nature, a means of disclosing the mechanisms of the universe, discovering the Father at the origin.

2.2 Voice and Presence

it is very difficult not to suspect that all our harmony is but a gothic and barbarous invention, which we should never have followed if we had been more sensible of the true beauties of art, and of music truly natural. Mons. Rameau, however, pretends that harmony is the source of the greatest beauties in music; but this opinion has been contradicted by facts and reason. [...] Every thing that only expresses the physic of sounds, being greatly bounded in the pleasure which it gives us, [has] very little power over the human heart. [*Dictionary*, pp.191-2]

In his *Dictionary of Music*, Jean-Jacques Rousseau characterizes the concept of harmony in directly opposite terms to those of Rameau. For Rousseau, empirical facts and cognitive reason lead one to view harmony as a deviation from the true line of Nature, rather than the means of uncovering its fundamental structure. Here, the science of "the physic of sounds" can only produce a limited knowledge, and this knowledge can only produce a limited power over the passions when put into its "barbarous" practise.

Rameau's *Treatise* opens with the claims that "music is the science of sounds", and that therefore "sound is the principle subject of music". As Rousseau states above, however, sound is not his primary concern. Indeed, it is the "power over the human heart" which Rousseau wishes to establish as a central concept, and his total opposition to Rameau is characterized by an avoidance of the fact that Rameau himself sees this "science" not in physical, but in aesthetic terms. Rousseau refuses to acknowledge the synthesis of reason and feeling which Rameau establishes. In this sense, it is not so much Rameau *per se* that he objects to, but his own specific reading of Rameau;

So long as one insists on considering sounds only in terms of the shock that they excite in our nerves, one will not attain the true principle of music, nor its power over men's hearts. The sounds of a melody do not affect us merely as sounds, but as signs of our affections, of our feelings. It is thus that they excite in us the emotions that they express, whose image we recognize in it. [*Essay*, p.60]

Just as Rameau proposed that melody has its origin in harmony, Rousseau will propose the inverse - the origin of harmony in melody. It is through this manoeuvre that Rousseau will achieve his aim of explaining music's "power over men's hearts". At the root of the theory is the concept

of representation. His claim is that melody does not affect the body through some form of harmonic resonance, but that melodic affectivity is governed by the signification of "feelings", which are transmitted from a source to a destination. He states that the melodic "signs of our affections [...] excite in us the emotions they express, whose image we recognize". In order to unravel Rousseau's theory, then, it is necessary to engage with his positioning of the concept of representation. In Derrida's deconstruction of Rousseau, the most crucial aspect of his representational aesthetic is that within the theory of language, although certain musical resonances are never wholly absent:

Languages are made to be spoken, writing serves only as a supplement to speech. [...] Speech represents thought by conventional signs, and writing represents the same with regard to speech. Thus the art of writing is nothing but a mediated representation of thought. [*Essay*, quoted in *Grammatology*, p.144]

In this elaboration on Plato's Cave, Rousseau defines language as the representation of thought. However, language is itself divided into two components: *speech* and *writing*. Further, each component of language has its own representational mode, defined according to the order of the *interval* between *thought* and *representation*. Speech represents thought directly, but writing only represents thought indirectly, given that writing is primarily a representation of speech, which is in turn a representation of thought. Thus, with Rousseau, representation has two modes; the one authentic and the other inauthentic. What is crucial here is that the determination of a representational system as one or the other is dependant on the proximity of representation and represented object; in other words, the key factor in the structure of inauthentic representation is the existence of an intervallic mechanism, whereas the

key factor in the structure of authentic representation is the lack of an interval.

The theory of language which is implicated in the above quotation goes well beyond the aesthetic level of representation, becoming involved in a series of much wider metaphysical concerns. For instance, if we now consider the dynamics of this system in relation to the agencies which initiate either speech or writing, we find ourselves within the metaphysics of Being. Simply put, speech (authentic representation) is made possible by the *presence* of the speaker who represents their thoughts to the listener directly. On the other hand, writing (inauthentic representation) is possible in the *absence* of a writer who represents their thoughts to a reader in a mediated fashion. Let us trace the dynamics of these two circumstances through a series of texts.

In French, the word meaning "to hear", *entendre*, carries an additional meaning: "to understand". It is the action of this simultaneous hearing-and-understanding which elevates the spoken word above the level of writing; the reflexivity of the word with the thought ensures a kind of hermetically-sealed package of communication, one which circumvents the intervallic dangers of the Platonic shadow. As Derrida writes (paraphrasing and thus assembling a reading of Rousseau), the spoken sign can authentically represent an absent object, through the metaphysics of vocal signification;

Voice penetrates into me violently, it is the privileged route for forced entry and interiorization, whose reciprocity produces itself in the "hearing-oneself-speak," in the structure of the voice and of interlocution. [...] The self-presence of the voice and the "hearing-oneself-speak" conceals the very thing that visible space allows to be placed before us. The thing disappearing, the voice substitutes an acoustic sign for it which can, in the place of the object taken

away, penetrate profoundly into me, to lodge there "in the depth of the heart." It is the only way of interiorizing the phenomenon; by transforming it into *akoumène*... [Grammatology, p.240]

However, within this forceful semiotic penetration of sound into the body, this interiorizing of the phenomenon by "transforming it into an *akoumène*", the Pythagorean spectre is raised once more, this time within Rousseau's system. The Pythagorean term *akoumenon* invokes a whole series of associations within the structure of the Table of Opposites. As one may imagine from Derrida's characterization of the term as a penetrational element, it can be placed on the originary side of the Table, as a masculine term. It is worth noting here that, according to the doxographers, Pythagoras, Plato and Aristotle all claim that both "*sound* is immaterial" and "*the power of seed* is immaterial" [*Pythagorean Sourcebook*, p.311, emphases added]. Thus, both sound and seed fall within the same structure, and vocal signification begins to take on a phallogentric aspect: semiotic insemination.

The very structure of Pythagorean education was based on this principle, involving a division of students into two categories according to their relationship to the voice of the lecturer. The *mathematikoi* studied at an advanced level, and were expected to engage in research of their own. They were also expected to debate points with each other and their lecturer. In other words, there was for them an exchange of vocal power with the lecturer - the possibility of disputation. However, the less advanced group, the *akousmatikoi*, were forbidden any vocal power of their own. According to Iamblichus,

The philosophy of the Hearers [*akousmatikoi*] consisted in lectures without demonstrations or conferences or arguments, merely directing something to be done in a certain way,

unquestioningly preserving them as so many divine dogmas, non-discussable, and which they promised not to reveal, esteeming as most wise those who more than others retained them. [*Pythagorean Sourcebook*, p.77]

Thus, the *akousmatikoi* were the passive receptacles of seminal knowledge, and the propagation of this knowledge was achieved through the vocal authority of the lecturer. This Pythagorean system is a complete study in the voice-politics of authenticity and continues today in the lecture-seminar distinction. In a commentary on Nietzsche, Derrida describes the metaphysics of the lecture schema;

the student writes as he listens [...] dangles by the umbilical cord of the university [...] Dream this umbilicus: it holds you by the ear which dictates to you what you presently write when you write according to that mode called 'taking notes.' In fact the mother – the bad or false one whom the teacher, in his capacity qua functionary of the State, can only simulate – yet the mother dictates to you precisely that which, passing through your ear moves along the cord as far as your stenography. This in turn links you, like a leash in the form of an umbilical cord, to the paternal belly of the State. Your pen is its pen; you hold its teleprinter as you hold those ballpoints in the post office which are attached to chains. And all the motions are induced through the body of the father representing (*figurant*) the *alma mater*. How can an umbilical cord create a link to this cold monster that is a dead father – or the State? This is what is *unheimlich*. [*All Ears: Nietzsche's Otobiographies*, pp.247/8]

Rousseau's aesthetic relies on precisely these mechanisms of direct, organic communication, and specifically at the moment where the written sign is caught within the law of the phonic sign. His definition of vocal signification turns upon the concept of sound as an indicator of presence, coupled with the unity of sound and meaning; "as soon as vocal signs strike your ear, they announce to you a being like yourself. They are, so to speak, the organs of the soul." [*Essay*, p.63] Vocal signification, then, is an authentic representation of thought, wherein the soul can communicate, through the immediate medium of sound, directly with

another soul. In other words, the voice can overcome the interval between speaker and listener, reducing space to a single point of meaning experienced at absolute proximity by two souls drawn together in a unison. It is this metaphysics of the voice which sets it against the structure of harmony and of spacing.

At the centre of this system is the action of the *logos*, or "unified utterance" of the Ancient Greeks^[6]. It is in this sense that Derrida characterizes Rousseau's theory as *logocentric*. Equally, we can describe it as *phonocentric*, in its prioritization of the *phonic* power of sound, over the *sonic*. Derrida reads Rousseau as invoking

the heritage of that logocentrism which is also a phonocentrism: absolute proximity of voice and being, of voice and the meaning of being, of voice and the ideality of meaning. [...] phonocentrism merges with the historical determination of the meaning of being in general as presence [*Grammatology*, pp.11-12]

In Rousseau's system, then, the metaphysics of presence lead to the concept of speech as the origin of language. By a parallel move, and one which derives from Rousseau's position contra-Rameau, the origin of music is given as *melody* rather than *harmony*. This is the move characterized by Paul de Man as *melocentric* [*Allegories of Reading*, p.88] This prioritization of the horizontal parameter over the vertical indubitably has its origin in

[6] In James Hutton's translation of Aristotle's *Poetics*, *logos* is translated as "unified utterance"; "A unified utterance is a composite significant sound" [*Poetics*, p.67] cf. footnote 20.2: "By 'letter' Aristotle here means the sound and not the written symbol. The word translated as 'unified utterance' is *logos*, which, as defined by Aristotle below in accordance with Greek usage, includes every significant combination of words from the single phrase to the complete poem or oration." *Logos* therefore combines the written and spoken parts of a word, and subjects them to a unification with other words where there is a uni-vocal meaning throughout those words. In this sense, it is less of a harmonizing action, since that depends on a chaining of differences, than an attempt to bring several components into absolutely unified space.

the debate known as the Querelle des Bouffons (Quarrel of the Buffoons). Both Rameau and Rousseau were implicated in this argument which turned on whether or not the Italian or the French style of operatic composition was superior, with the former characterised as melodic and thus vocally based, and the latter as harmonic, and thus more instrumental in character. Within this context, Rousseau wrote of Rameau's harmonic theory as a scientific pseudo-art, devoid of the "organs of the soul" which can only be accessed through the phonocentric power of vocal melody;

What are we to say to a painter sufficiently devoid of feeling and taste to think like that, stupidly restricting the pleasurable character of his art to its mere mechanics? What shall we say of a musician, similarly quite prejudiced, who considers harmony the sole source of the greatness of music? Let us consign the first to house-painting and condemn the other to doing French opera. [*Essay*, p.55]

In aesthetic terms, Rousseau's phonocentrism leads him to develop a theoretical alliance between language and music. As we will see, a component of Rousseau's theory is the grafting onto music of a representational capacity, accessed through the communicational power of the *logos*. This is inspired by a nostalgia for Ancient Greek music, and is established in opposition to the "scientific" aspects of Rameau's Modern harmonics. This phonocentric view of music, however, is counter-historical, even sentimental, in its attempt to reinstate the condition of a past epoch. In a move which places him in line with the familiar theory of the union of poetry and music in Ancient Greek times, he claims that "in a language [like...] the Greek at the beginning, the difference between the speaking and singing voices would be nil. We should have the same voice for

speaking and singing."^[7] [quoted in *Grammatology*, p.198]

In this, we can read yet another of Rousseau's attempts to reduce the differential space of two terms. Just as speech can reduce the interval between two souls, the historical concept of the originary singing voice can bring the media of language and music into an aesthetic unison. Thus, as language has its origin in speech, and music in melody, their mutual origin is in a form of melodic speech; "at first, there was no music but melody and no other melody than the varied sounds of speech." [*Essay*,

[7] Hume's reaction to the Rousseauist concept of an ideal past is as follows: "The *state of nature*, therefore, is to be regarded as a mere fiction, not unlike that of the *golden age*, which poets have invented; only with this difference, that the former is describ'd as full of war, violence and injustice; whereas the latter is painted out to us, as the most charming and most peaceable condition, that can possibly be imagin'd. The seasons, in that first age of nature, were so temperate, if we may believe the poets, that there was no necessity for men to provide themselves with cloaths and houses as a security against the violence of heat and cold. The rivers flow'd with wine and milk: The oaks yielded honey; and nature spontaneously produc'd her greatest delicacies. Nor were these the chief advantages of that happy age. The storms and tempests were not alone remov'd from nature; but those more furious tempests were unknown to human breasts, which now cause such uproar, and engender such confusion. Avarice, ambition, cruelty, selfishness, were never heard of: Cordial affection, compassion, sympathy, were the only movements, with which the human mind was yet acquainted. Even the distinction of *mine* and *thine* was banish'd from that happy race of mortals, and carry'd with them the very notions of property and obligation, justice and injustice. This, no doubt, is to be regarded as an idle fiction" [*A Treatise of Human Nature*, pp.193/4] Here, Hume pillories the Rousseauist concepts of ontological unity and sameness, suggesting instead the reality of *difference*; the difference between the "mine" and the "thine", the difference between justice and injustice, etc. Note also the scepticism about the particular conception of virtue which binds itself in to sameness. For Rousseau, virtue is to be found in sameness, in continuity, but for Hume, it is found in *difference*. As Derrida himself has said, even if deconstruction is not a scepticism *per se*, "Hume [...] proposed a kind of philosophy of difference - that interests me greatly." [ed. Wood, *Derrida and Différance*, p.145] As Simon Critchley points out, scepticism does not operate through dialectics, and this in itself results in a form of *différance* [*The Ethics of Deconstruction*, pp.159/60]. Much hangs on the post-structuralism or otherwise of deconstruction, and the Humean moment which Norris problematizes is one crucial point of articulation to which we return at various later points.

p.50] The network of connections which Rousseau establishes is held together by the concept of a speech-melodic origin, where intervals are reduced to a unison. We saw above in connection with the phallic law of the Pythagorean *akoumenon*, that the unison of sound and meaning is absolute. As Derrida points out, Rousseau's nostalgia is for a golden age which was "an epoch of natural languages, of the neume." [*Grammatology*, p.279]. This epoch is to a degree recoverable for Rousseau in his time through the agency of vocal music. In song, the penetration of the *phonē* into the organs of the hearing body are a reassuring reminder of the certainty of presence. The particular order of the voice which is at the undivided origin of both language and music is, according to Derrida, described by Rousseau in the *Dictionary* article on "Neume";

It is on this onto-theological model that Rousseau regulates his repetitions of origin. With this exemplary model of a pure breath (pneuma) and of an intact life, of a song and an inarticulate language, of speech without spacing, we have, even if it is placeless [atopique] or utopian, a paradigm suitable to our measure. We can name and define it. It is the neume: pure vocalization, form of an inarticulate song without speech, whose name means breath, which is inspired in us by God and may address only Him. The Dictionary of Music Defines it as such... [*Grammatology*, p.249]

In this way, we can discern the gradual unfolding of Rousseau's general system, with its base in the ultimate origin of a mysterious "inarticulate song" (the breath of God), followed by a division of the originary category into speech and melody. These two categories retain their proximity to the source, and therefore remain authentic derivatives of neumatic song. For Rousseau, the gradual disintegration of his mytho-historical schema occurs at the point when the two derivatives of the origin are themselves further divided, thus splitting their products off from the origin. As we have seen, the disaster for language occurs at the

point when writing cuts the immediacy of the connection between thought and representation which speech offers. There is thus a positive and a negative form of language. In music, the disaster occurs when the science of harmony comes to replace the natural state of melody. Rousseau describes the disaster as a Fall from the paradise of Greek aesthetic unity;

Melody being forgotten, and the attention of musicians being completely turned toward harmony, everything gradually came to be governed according to this new object. The genres, the modes, the scale, all received new faces. Harmonic successions came to dictate the sequence of parts. This sequence having usurped the name of melody, it was, in effect, impossible to recognize the traits of its mother in this new melody. And our musical system having thus gradually become purely harmonic, it is not surprising that its oral tone [accent] has suffered, and that our music has lost almost all its energy. Thus we see how singing gradually became an art entirely separate from speech, from which it takes its origin; how the harmonics of sounds resulted in the forgetting of vocal inflections; and finally, how music, restricted to purely physical concurrences of vibrations, found itself deprived of the moral power it had yielded when it was the twofold voice of nature. [*Essay*, p.71]

With Rameau's assertion that "melody arises from harmony", in short, with the advent of harmonic signification, music has become truncated with respect to its vital force, the moral power of the melodic voice has been displaced by a representationally silent algebra of vibrations. The sin of harmony is its scientific materialism, its negation of the metaphysical essence and vitalism of the voice. Writing specifically of Rameau, Rousseau comments that "what is worse, in all his music, is that harmony is the unique foundation of art, that melody derives from it, and that all the grand effects of music are born of harmony alone." [*Examination*, in *Grammatology*, p.211/2] According to Rousseau, harmony, not only in itself, but also in an action upon meaning, places a distance, a space, at the centre of music, which partakes not only of an immorality which defaces

the maternal body of sound which is melody, but equally dislocates the representational integrity of that maternal body. To allege that harmony precedes melody is tantamount to declaring that the child gives birth to its mother.

Rousseau's reading is of a Rameau who has totally rejected the horizontal parameter which is the medium for the continuity and self-proximity of the undivided, original and authentic articulation of the voice in its representation of the affections. By concentrating on harmony, Rameau has debased music by castrating it of its natural vitality (which is based in controlled reserve rather than expenditure), and by placing the space at the centre, rather than the line. In other words, placing harmony at the centre of music silences the melodic voice, substitutes the derivative term for the originary, places absences where there should be presence (pure, undivided, and univocal), and opens the condition of possibility for instrumental music.

For Rousseau, harmonic or instrumental representation signifies a precipitous danger. That is, the representation of the source, the fundamental, the origin, by distant, a-proximate means. Rousseau's fear is a fear of the repetition of the origin in a new register. His authentic representational apparatus would have the origin made absolutely proximate to the destination. He would "excite in the soul the *same* movement", or in Pythagorean terms, excite the movement of the Same in order to inhibit the movement of the Different. This limitation of difference is the closure of the interval to deny the spacing action of harmony.

Rousseau's proposal is that we return as closely as possible to the originary voice, but not only by prioritizing speech and song over writing

and instrumental music. In a theory of evolution, Rousseau alleges a southern origin for humanity, the ramification being that as one moves from the south to the north, one moves from originary languages towards derivative languages. Thus, the more originary, melodic qualities of the Italian style are to be preferred to the more northerly, supplementary qualities of the French harmonic style. Once more, we have a recurrence of the narrative of the Fall from paradise:

for as there are languages more or less harmonious, whose accents are more or less musical, we take notice also, in these languages, that the speaking and singing voices are connected or removed in the same proportion. So, as the Italian language is more musical than the French, its speaking is less distant from song [quoted in *Grammatology*, p.198]

Here, we begin to discern the two series of opposing terms which Derrida locates at the axiological centre of Rousseau's thinking, born from the dual origins of Pythagoras' Table and Plato's Cave:

At the pole of the origin, at the greatest proximity to the birth of language, there is the chain origin-life-south-summer-heart-passion-accentuation-vowel-metaphor-song, etc. At the other pole, to the extent that one departs from the origin: decadence-illness-death-north-winter-cold-reason-articulation-consonant-correctness-prose-writing. [*Margins of Philosophy*, p.147]

The whole debate between Rousseau and Rameau turns on the question of the intervals between these series, the interval in general. For Rousseau, there must be a stylistic reduction of the interval in music by adopting southern melodic techniques, for this brings us closer to the originary unison of language and music, and thus to the voice of Nature. In asserting the presence of the voice, Rousseau ensures the negation of absence. In other words, through closing off difference, the farther reaches of harmony as represented by dissonance are not possible.

This closure of all intervallic movements is contrasted to Rameau's

rationalisation of dissonance and thus multiplication of intervals; as Rameau writes of the *harmonic* origin: "dissonances are also related to this source. Since all dissonances are generated by adding a new sound to the first chord, which always subsists in its full perfection, this is easily tested. Reason alone, therefore, suffices to authorize dissonance and to determine its use." [*Treatise*, p.140] According to Rameau, the fundamental in fact produces, by virtue of its serial, additive capacity, *all* sounds, whether consonant or dissonant. The values are classified according to their proximity to the original fundamental: the closer to the origin, the more consonant, while the further the distance to the source gets, the more dissonant. It is the logic of additive derivation which produces all discords, and it is reason which creates, in tandem with audition, the conditions for the judgement of these sounds. It is this extensional possibility within harmony which Rousseau cannot face.

In the following quotation from Rameau's *Treatise*, it becomes clear that the great Querelle not only encompasses an opposition of rival claims to the concepts of the Natural, the Ancient, the Rational, and so forth, but also a contest over the concept of music's representation of the passions; "Harmony may unquestionably excite different passions in us depending on the chords that are used. There are chords which are sad, languishing, tender, gay, and surprising. There are also certain progressions of chords which express the same passions." [*Treatise*, pp.154/156] It is important to note, then, that Rameau does not deny music's "power over men's hearts". Rousseau's reading of Rameau yields a Rameau who has not so much done away with all representation in music, but one who initiates a different departure, a mode of representation in a new register, further away from

the voice. Rousseau's Rameau produces a musical representation which, in its harmonicity, is in the inauthentic mode, and is thus *the structural equivalent of writing*. Just as "writing serves only as a supplement to speech", so harmony is derivative of melody – *harmony "supplements" melody*. Rameau's crime against Reason is to place music within a system of representation which is a *supplementary* one, which acts within the orchestra and places the voice in an absence – the voice is negated by instrumental music through the mediumship of distance, being inadequately represented by the instrument. Rameau's representation of the passions through harmonic means is therefore an artificial ruse depleting, diffusing, the immediacy of authentic Nature. Thus, for Rousseau, harmonic mimesis is sophistry rather than rhetoric, and instrumental music is the ontological equivalent of writing.

Another issue should be addressed here within this lexis of mimesis, one which appears equally problematic for Rousseau's critique, but is actually accommodated by him within the concept of supplementarity, through the doubling of the meaning of a concept to incorporate both an authentic and an artificial face. It remains a fact that Rameau not only *does* suggest an aesthetic, affective power in music, but that he also cites the power of the *melodic* aspect of music. In a passage which could almost be looking forward to a time when Rousseau will read it as a direct provocation, Rameau writes that;

Melody has no less expressive force than harmony, but giving definite rules for its use is almost impossible, since good taste plays a greater part in this than anything else. We shall leave to privileged geniuses the pleasure of distinguishing themselves in this domain on which depends almost all the strength of sentiment. We hope that those able men to whom we have said nothing new will not bear us ill-will for having revealed the secrets of which they wished perhaps to be the

sole trustees. Our little knowledge does not permit us to argue with them about this last degree of perfection, without which the most beautiful harmony may become insipid. [*Treatise*, pp.155/6]

Within a Rousseauist reading, this melody of which Rameau writes is still nevertheless debased by the action of the supplement – it is a fallen kind of melody, which Rousseau will read thus: "this sequence having usurped the name of melody, it was, in effect, impossible to recognize the traits of its mother in this new melody" [*Essay*, p.71]. This usurpation is complicitous with the unnatural derivation of this deformed melody, with the origin of melody lying, for Rameau, in harmony, as a continuation of the above quote testifies: we begin with harmony, and "derive from it a melody". Still further on, Rameau provides us with a theatrical metaphor for this representational supplementarity:

A good musician should surrender himself to all the *caractères* he wishes to portray. Like a skilful actor, he should take the place of the speaker, believe himself to be at the locations where the different events he wishes to depict occur, and participate in these events as do those most involved in them. He must declaim the text well, at least to himself, and must feel when and to what degree the voice should rise or fall, so that he may change his melody, harmony, modulation, and movement accordingly. [*Treatise*, p.156]

Through this supplementary ruse, then, the instrumental musician skilfully deceives the onlooker by his substitutional science into believing the false representation to be the real thing. What makes matters worse here for a Rousseauist reading is the instrumental actor's complicity in his own deception – his deception can only trick the onlooker if he first tricks himself. Of course, it is obvious that on Rameau's stage, we will indeed witness melody, but again the action of the supplement charges these terms with a positive aspect and a negative aspect – the actor *supplements*

the speaker, he should "*take the place of*" the authentic source, and displace it, generate a representational *interval* between the originary voice and its expression.

Rameau's "voice" is here an instrumental metaphor substituted for the organic referent. In this sense, Rameau raises the possibility of a reading of the concept of the voice which assembles a full supplementarity, reinscribing the term outwith the structure of the origin. This is what Rousseau attempts to attenuate in his constant repetitions of originary structures, and yet, as Derrida's deconstruction will now indicate, this is also what his system will inevitably fail to avoid.

2.3 The Originary Interval

Either writing was never a simple "supplement," or it is urgently necessary to construct a new logic of the "supplement." [*Grammatology*, p.7]

As we have seen above, Rousseau's main interest is in polemically assembling the logic of the origin as a positive force and the logic of the supplement as a negative force. What Derrida proposes is to begin the deconstruction of Rousseau's theory by reinscribing the concept of the supplement in order to displace its position within originary logic. It is important to realise that Rousseau's whole system (in Derrida's reading) depends on the opposition of the concepts *origin* and *supplement*. It will therefore not be adequate to simply repeat this opposition at another level, merely by reversing the system to provide a "positive" reading of the supplement (an undeconstructed return to Rameau). Neither will it be adequate to synthesize the two terms through the action of a dialectic – as we have seen, dialectical structures rely on the repetition of the structure

of the first term through the body of the second term. Thus, if the opposition is to be deconstructed successfully, other strategies will have to be put into place, and the structure of opposition itself will have to be transgressed. Just as Rousseau sets up the series of ontological oppositions between melody and harmony, origin and supplement, presence and absence, the logic of the deconstructed supplement must result in a formula of the following order: "the supplement is neither a presence nor an absence. No ontology can think its operation." [*Grammatology*, p.314] This deconstructed logic of supplementarity can be thought of as being an alternative (but without opposition) to the logic of origination. However, in its rethinking of supplementarity outside of the structure of opposition, it is equally an alternative to the logic of Rousseau's undeconstructed supplement, which is contained within the originary system as a negative term. Nevertheless, deconstruction occurs at the level of the text itself, and so a further layer of reading is required in order to achieve a redistribution of Rousseau's terms.

As we have seen above, Rousseau is concerned with a history of music's Fall from an Ancient original state of melodic Naturality to a

Modern, supplementary state of harmonic perversion^[8]. However, a close reading of Rousseau's texts will yield a seemingly innocent but nevertheless devastating slippage which occurs at several points. For instance, in the *Dictionary of Music*, Rousseau admits that, with regard to the theory of his beloved Ancients, "[in] the ancient treatises we have remaining [...] *harmony* would be very difficult to distinguish from melody." [pp.186-7]. Such an admission that the opposition of melody to harmony may not always have been so clear cut, and that this elision occurs precisely during the historical context for the mythical Golden Age, means that we have to proceed carefully. Much rests on Rousseau's insistence on the opposition of melody to harmony, and by implication, speech to writing, nature to culture, virtue to evil, and so forth. However, a further passage from the *Dictionary*, and one from no less a source than the article on "Melody", extends the degree of the problematic yet further;

Melody has reference to two different principles, according to the manner in which we consider it. Taken in the connection of sounds, and by the rules of the mode, it has its principles in harmony; since it is an harmonic analysis which gives the degrees of the gamut [...] but when taken as an art

[8] In this context, it is interesting to note the apparent acceptance of certain Rousseauisms by his latter-day namesake, Jean-Jacques Nattiez, particularly in the article *Can One Speak of Narrativity in Music?* To begin with, a distinction between the concept of narrative modes in literature and music is defined as "a clear ontological difference" [p.242]. Further, Nattiez asserts that while linguistic narrative can "speak directly to us" [ibid.], musical narrative is "an ontological illusion" [p.245]. What is also striking is the idea that listeners and readers supply a presence in the intervallic space of a representational absence – they act as "a 'gap-filler'" [p.249]. This, of course, is the action of "reconstruction" which marks Nattiez out as a semiological structuralist very much in the Rousseauist tradition. In this article, Nattiez also describes a critical approach to Schumann as an attempt to "*penetrate the mysteries* of his creative process." [*Can One Speak of Narrativity in Music*, p.256, emp. add.] With this least post-structuralist of sentiments, one wonders if Nattiez could even manage to penetrate to the deep structure of a "universal constant of human pleasure" [ibid., p.257] in Derrida's work.

of imitation [...] another principle must be sought for it [...] the same which makes the tone of the voice vary when we speak [*Dictionary*, pp.227-8]

Rousseau attempts to define the most crucial aspect of melody as its imitative aspect – that which operates through the phonocentric action of the voice. This is the aspect of melody and of language which he defines as the essential and the originary. However, note the admission that, regardless of his historical desires, melody is structurally based on harmony. This simple admission which is so seemingly obvious to anyone acquainted with the basics of musical theory, nevertheless has a devastating effect for Rousseau's metaphysics, where so much rests on the integrity of the vocal origin. Rousseau at once defines melody as the historical and even moral origin of music, but also mentions that harmony precedes melody in the structural sense. In other words, he admits (effectively in parentheses) that there is *an origin prior to the origin*.

If this is the case, then the melodic origin is in fact the supplement of a harmonic origin. Furthermore, if harmony is the origin of melody (as Rameau asserts), and if harmony has an essentially supplementary structure which always threatens to rupture originary logic (as Rousseau asserts), then there can be no origin at all, only ever an endless supplementarity defined by intervallic, harmonic mechanisms. Derrida writes;

in the song melody is originally corrupted by harmony. Harmony is the originary supplement of melody. But Rousseau never makes explicit the originarity of the lack that makes necessary the addition of the supplement – the quantity and the differences of quantity that always already shape melody. [*Grammatology*, p.214]

This character of the harmonic quantities which "always already shape melody" in fact contains a trace of the version of Greek harmonic

thinking which is such a pervasive force throughout Rameau's text. For within the writings of the Pythagorean theorists, harmony is read as a resource for the condition of the possibility of melody - in treating of the harmonic structure of the modes, for instance, one is at the same time describing the reserve which the economy of melody calls into expenditure and exchange. In this sense, harmony is certainly the "originary supplement" of melody. And as Derrida points out, while Rousseau "never makes explicit" the supplement in this sense "prior" to the origin and thus producing the origin as its own supplement, the trace of this thought cannot help appearing in Rousseau's text, almost despite itself.

The possibility of the structural contradiction suggested by the "originary supplement" creates a theoretical fissure within Rousseau's text; a fissure that, in his deconstructive programme, Derrida works wider and wider, in a gradual spreading out of Rousseau's melocentrism into a pragmatics of signification. In this sense, Rousseau's text is constituted by the condition for its own deconstruction, and this condition is the very intervallic structure of harmony -

This fissure is not one among others. It is the fissure: the necessity of interval, the harsh law of spacing. It could not endanger song except by being inscribed in it from its birth and in its essence. Spacing is not the accident of song. Or rather, as accident and accessory, fall and supplement, it is also that without which, strictly speaking, the song would not have come into being. In the Dictionary, the interval is a part of the definition of song. It is therefore, so to speak, an originary accessory and an essential accident. Rousseau says it without wishing to say it. [*Grammatology*, p.200]

The origin as author effects his own effacement - the very *textuality* of his writing effects the displacement of the authorial voice - "Rousseau says it without wishing to say it." Elsewhere, Derrida pulls a similar move on Aristotle, who "says it without saying it, lets it say itself, or rather it

lets him say what he says" [*Margins of Philosophy*, p.56]. In other words, it is not the author who *speaks* through the text, but the condition of textuality which opens itself out to write the "author". This deconstructive strategy of invoking the condition of intertextuality allows the *indécidables* to leak out of the text's structural fissures – the textual body is displaced from the margins.

What Derrida does is to reverse the origin to show that it is nothing other than one supplement among many; its central role is inherently undermined as soon as the flow of signification begins, in that it becomes a supplement to its "ensuing" supplement, and invariably the production of a "preceding" supplement, and so forth. The flow of harmonic signification is constant, and can never be stopped – it is, as Derrida claims, "always already" in motion, and if signification is always already in motion, then the origin is always already a supplement, and can never have been an origin in actuality. In this sense, the great metaphysical quest for the actual origin can only deliver the virtual origin; the origin which is teleologically inferred. The actual origin is in fact no origin at all; "The supplement is always the supplement of a supplement. One wishes to go back from the supplement to the source: one must recognize that there is a supplement at the source." [*Grammatology*, p.304] Thus, the history of the philosophical canon as defined by the search for the origin becomes a grand narrative of ontological failures.

In more explicitly semiotic terms, the trinity of signifier-signified-referent which derives from Plato's Cave and has the structure of a logic of origination, is deconstructed when one reinscribes the referent and the signified as signifiers in themselves. The structures of the referent and

the signified are totally transformed by their redeployment as signifiers; in other words, the origin becomes reinscribed as a supplement. As Derrida writes, "the signified is originally and essentially (and not only for a finite and created spirit) trace, that it is *always already in the position of the signifier*" [*Grammatology*, p.73]. Thus, there is no referent, no signified, only signifiers endlessly flowing onto each other in a system which is always already in motion and expanding. "The play of the supplement is indefinite. References refer to references." [*Grammatology*, p.298]. This is the Peircean moment of Derridean deconstruction: the movement of the supplement.

It has already been mentioned that the supplement is engaged in a certain spacing, in contrast with the authenticity of proximity required for the presence of the voice. The supplement represents through displacing the immediacy of communication, it is a mediating barrier placed between other supplementary units which in turn interrupt and redirect the flows of others. It displaces intentionality by releasing energy from a source, in turn constituting that energy as a unit in itself, a provisional origin to the next supplement, and so forth. This distancing of units across a space is of great importance in understanding the disjunctive nature of the supplement, since it is this spacing which allows the movement of signification across, between and through an intertextual network.

It may be that the supplement can achieve all of this through the structure of the space and the interval. However, if we are to avoid a simple reversal of Rousseau's opposition of space to time, harmony to melody, then a further strategic layer must be invoked in the deconstruction of the supplement. Again, we must be wary of risking a

synthesis of musical space and time which is bounded by the structure of the dialectic if we are not to simply repeat the priority of harmony in a new register. It is time now to assemble the temporality of the supplement, and to recall that Derrida states of this *indécidable* that the "supplement [is] another name for *différance*" [*Grammatology*, p.150], and that at other points, he writes of "*différance* as temporalization" [*Grammatology*, p.71].

Inscribed in the Derridean action of temporalization, is the *articulation* of the opposite terms harmony and melody beyond their ontological structures into the space of the deconstructed supplement (the supplement under erasure). Within the trace of *différance* is the condition of the possibility of connective movement, of a synthesis which is always already in operation, and which finds a point of fusion between the two parametric axes. Equally, this synthesis is never completed as a programme; it is always in motion, ever partaking of an active temporalization; the "movement of *différance*, irreducible arche-synthesis, open[s] in one and the same possibility, temporalization as well as relationship with the other" [*Grammatology*, p.60]. Supplementary *différance*, then, is a point of *articulation* between the temporal and the spatial: the *hinge of différence* - *La Brisure* [ibid., p.65]. And if this is "the hinge [*brisure*] of language as writing", then it is also the *hinge of music as harmony* [ibid., p.69]. This hinge at the origin is the origin under erasure:

To say that *différance* is originary is simultaneously to erase the myth of a present origin. Which is why "originary" must be understood as having been *crossed out*, without which *différance* would be derived from an original plenitude. It is a non-origin which is originary. [*Writing and Difference*, p.203]

Here, it is important to not only distinguish between the Rousseauist

supplement and its deconstructed counterpart, but also between the structure of ontological difference and the "arche-synthesis" of *différance*. Ontological difference is that within which the concepts of origin, structure and hierarchy are inscribed. This difference has no time, or rather, it has a transcendental, rather than actual time. It is this economy of static spatiality (as opposed to the serial spatiality of the deconstructed supplement) which is deconstructed by the particular synthesis of time and space inside the economy of *différance*.

Origin of the experience of space and time, this writing of difference, this fabric of the trace, permits the difference between space and time to be articulated, to appear as such, in the unity of an experience [...] This articulation therefore permits a graphic ("visual" or "tactile," "spatial") chain to be adapted, on occasion in a linear fashion, to a spoken ("phonic," "temporal") chain. It is from the primary possibility of this articulation that one must begin. Difference is articulation. [*Grammatology*, p.66]

This "origin", however, is of the same order as the instrumental "voice" which Rameau has his performer act out – it is metaphorical, a pun on the fact that the origin is plunged into the supplementary abyss of movement by the time of *différance*. In the terms of the Cartesian graph, the origin *o* which is the meeting point of the *x* and *y* axes is severed; Rousseau's hope for an undifferentiated origin uniting melody and harmony within a melodic synthesis is ruptured by *a space at the origin*. The two lines then move and connect with each other at different places at different times; they are free to slide through, across, and between each other, creating an indeterminate, inherently connective genesis. Unlike the graphic origin, then, this hinge *flexes*. It is the so-called "originary" supplement; the supplement which produces other supplements, but which is always already produced itself, and always already unfixed and moving.

The temporality of this hinge of *différance*, or as Derrida also describes it, this "trace", cannot be contained within the classical concepts of time. While it would be true to say that the generation of supplements occurs in one temporal "direction", and that Derrida often invokes the metaphor of the chain of supplements, it can be inscribed within the trace of *différance* that a serial concept of time is inadequate, even if Derrida himself often "avoids" this issue^[9]. Notions such as a series of presents which approach and recede from this present, or notions of events coming into the present from the future to slip away into the past, in other words, those theories of time which rely upon the concept of a temporal horizon, a limit or *peras* in Greek lexis, are potentially deconstructed by the force of the supplementary trace of *différance*; "The concepts of present, past, and future, everything in the concepts of time and history which implies evidence of them - the metaphysical concept of time in general - cannot adequately describe the structure of the trace." [*Grammatology*, p.67]

As we have noted above, Derrida's deconstruction of Rousseau's musical ontology depends on his hooking into the workings of the concept of harmony in order to demonstrate its operation as the *indécidable* within the body of melody. This derives from the agenda to uncover the movement of the supplement within the structure of the origin. Equally, he makes a claim here for the concept of the trace (arguably, another spatial term in "origin") as a step towards the deconstruction of "the metaphysical concept of time". All of these points of deconstruction depend upon the structure of the space, yet Derrida attempts, through the "arche-

[9] cf. Derrida's description of Heidegger's "avoidance" of the concept of *Geist* in *Of Spirit*. Derrida equally engages "avoidance" with respect to serial time.

synthesis" of the concept of *différance* to assemble a non-dialectical fusion of the opposing strings of spatial and temporal terms. The hinge of all this, however, remains the concept of spacing, which he tries to assemble as the simultaneous verbing of time and space into each other. As Derrida puts it;

Spacing (notice that this word speaks the articulation of space and time, the becoming-space of time and the becoming-time of space) is always the unperceived, the nonpresent, and the nonconscious. As such, if one can still use that expression in a non-phenomenological way; for here we pass the very limits of phenomenology. [*Grammatology*, p.68]

This deconstruction of ontologies, then, is not reducible to a phenomenological programme, not least because of the ontological action which invariably presents itself within phenomenology. "Phenomenology in general, as the passageway to essentiality, presupposes an anticipation of the *esse* of essence, the unity of the *esse* prior to its distribution into essence and existence." [*Writing and Difference*, p.134] But equally, it is not reducible to an empirical programme, since the discourse of this deconstruction is necessarily poised on the brink of a metaphysical foundation. Indeed, as has already been noted, this forms one of the possible dangers of Derrida's deconstructionist programme: that by its very nature, it must couch itself within the lexical and conceptual confines of the system which it is attempting to rework. Thus, it is possible to raise various accusations at Derrida's work which may in fact be residues of an alternative critique better levelled at the systems he targets. The very incompleteness of a deconstructive reading runs the risk of ensuring that it operates "within" its target: in *Of Grammatology*, Derrida's initial points of deconstruction always involve a prioritization of a spatial term in

preference to a temporal term, even if this prioritization is only (successfully) provisional. The crucial point is whether or not the deconstruction goes far enough to displace the ontological structure's gravitational pull on the concepts which Derrida attempts to loosen, whether the deconstruction can resist the pull to reconstruct at the original, or a secondary level. Does the deconstruction of a structure make it tremble enough to not only dissolve its foundations, but also the possibility of a reconstruction around a new fundament?

At this juncture, let us summarize Derrida's implied investments in Rameau's harmonic theory. Rameau's name appears in *Of Grammatology* only twenty times: eight times in statements by Derrida; seven times in statements by Rousseau, thrice in book titles, and twice in statements by others^[10]. The first mention of Rameau exists, as they all do, to contextualize the deconstruction of Rousseau's phonocentric theory of language in the *Essay*. Having just covered aspects of chapter 13 of the *Essay*, Derrida supplements his discussion of Rousseau's melodic theory with the following: "It is difficult to understand what is at stake in Chapters 13 - "On Melody" - and 14 - "On Harmony" - if one does not perceive its immediate context: the polemic with Rameau. [...] But this context serves only to reveal a systematic and permanent necessity." [*Of Grammatology*, p.210] It is a question, then, of the necessity which Rousseau systematizes into permanency; the ontological difference between

[10] pp. 107 (1 mention); 193 (1); 194 (3); 210 (4); 211 (4); 212 (2); 213 (1); 345 (3); 346 (1). It is pertinent to note here that, with the exception of pages 345-6 which are end-notes, Rameau's name only appears in Derrida's statements across four pages, from p.210 to p.213. In this sense, only one seventy-ninth of *Of Grammatology* is devoted to overt discussion of the Querelle as it intersects specifically with Rousseau and Rameau.

melody and harmony. The Querelle with Rameau only serves to delineate that which is at stake within Rousseau. Immediately, Derrida cites Rousseau's description of the Fall of melody and harmony into a modern separation which negates the true Ancient origin of music as an absolute proximity of the two axial forms. In "the ancient treatises we have remaining, [...] *harmony* would be very difficult to distinguish from melody." [*Dictionary of Music*, pp.286-7]. In this Fall into differential separation, we can read the return of the concept of a space *between* Space and Time, a void or abyss between the two ontological axes which is comprised of the very substance of the vertical axis itself. This precipitous danger for melody is abhorrent to Rousseau – he reads it as an attempt by Rameau to state that the origin of Melody is in fact Harmony. Derrida states: "Examining that [system] of Rameau, Rousseau reproaches him for passing off as natural what is purely conventional" [*Of Grammatology*, p.210].

Again, Derrida's techniques imply that Rameau only signifies to him as Rousseau's fear of the supplement. Yet we must remember that it is precisely the events of this fear which Derrida is introducing as a series of *indécidables* into Rousseau's text throughout *Of Grammatology*. Indeed, it is the injection of this theoretical virus into the logic of the origin which constitutes the body of Derrida's deconstruction. Rameau may not be a cause, therefore, of Derrida's programme, but that very programme is an effacement of the notion of origin or cause. In this sense, the symptom within Rousseau's text which is Rameau gives a powerful resonance. For Rousseau, the possibility of Rameau represents the death, the annihilation of Rousseauism. For Derrida, Rameau is a metaphor for the whole

collectivity of Rousseau's fears: "Rameau's mistake corresponds to the model of all mistakes and all historical perversions as they *take shape* under Rousseau's eyes" [*Of Grammatology*, p.211]. The recurrent factor in Derrida's mentions of Rameau is the paraphrase of Rousseau's position: "Rameau's fault" [p.210]; "Rameau's mistake" [p.211]; "Rameau's abberation" [p.212]. Yet if Rameau represents the "model of *all* mistakes", "faults", "aberrations", and "perversions" to Rousseau as Derrida sees it, and if Derrida is intent on undermining Rousseau's system with precisely that concept of spacing which he (Derrida) draws from Rameau's theory of harmony, then there is evidently a more significant position for harmonic theory within the systems of *Of Grammatology* than the scant mentions across four pages might suggest.

In short, the problem lies in the fact that Derrida uses the image of harmonic theory only as it appears in Rousseau's fearful delineation of Rameau. Thus, while Derrida initiates a deconstruction of Rousseau's system from within its own terms, the concept of harmony upon which so much turns - for both Rousseau and Derrida - remains uninterrogated within its own context. While rival aesthetics of melody have been subjected to a critical delimitation, only one theory of harmony has been delineated, and not yet delimited. The possibility of more than one harmonic aesthetic has crucial repercussions if the musical programme of *Of Grammatology* is to be fully elaborated, and the beginnings of the deconstruction of harmony itself will lead to a significant new perspective on that text. Even within Rameau's theory itself, what are we to make of the assertion that harmony is capable of "*penetrating to the soul* and affecting it according to [the composer's] *intentions*"? [*Observations*, p.92, emphasis

added]. What is the status of a penetrational, intentional harmony for Derrida's programme?

The ramifications of all this for Derrida's deconstruction are extensive. The Pythagorean opposition works, it seems, from the centre of *harmonic*, as much as melodic theory, and (by dangerous implication for Derrida) the theories of Rameau. This invokes the power of dialectical production which would appear to constrict the free signifiatory movement proposed in the reworked concept of the "supplement" (if we are to take supplementary logic as more than a vaguely radical concept of serial dialectics). The question becomes a serious one when the action of self-containing repetition within a dialectical system is addressed, in the sense that the first term, the origin, exists only to reproduce exactly itself, and utilizing the mediumship of the second term as a ductile means of entelechy in the production of the third term. This third term, however, remains entirely a reproduction of the first. From this it can be seen that there is precious little movement outside of a highly specific universe of two terms which merely provisionally switch roles in order to maintain the stasis of the whole. If a chain is possible, it is only in the sense of a chain of ontological repetition, a chain of sameness, not of difference. In no way can it be described as a chain of free production such as the term supplementary logic proposes.

Derrida's approach is to take two opposing ontological claims and provisionally prioritize one over the other. He escapes the accusation of claiming harmony as the express origin of melody only by his particular approach to harmony, which states that harmony is non-originary by its very mode of operation. In this sense the anti-origin becomes the origin,

and, despite attempts to do otherwise, the privileging of the term "supplement" over the term "origin" from Rousseau's lexis only serves (at worst) to invert the system which Rousseau proposes. And if Rameau and harmonic theory are "the model of all" sins to Rousseau, then deconstruction as represented by *Of Grammatology* may be only a slight extension of a well-worn theoretical area in the mathematics of music.

It will become important throughout what follows to consider and question the possibility of the interval, spacing, and all allied concepts, as a kind of originary dialectic, whether operating across an axis of presence-absence, space-time, reason-experience, etc. From this point on, we shall be concerned with working towards this question which Derrida's text always seems to precipitously risk, and which, as we have seen, Derrida acknowledges as a constant risk in deconstruction.

What is required is a disinvestment in the specific lexis and metaphysical modes of Rousseau's *Essay*, and a reinvestment, at first cautious and circumlocutory, into other discourses, rival and otherwise, which will nevertheless have a particular series of intertexts with Derrida's reading of Rousseau. In this way, not only the concept of melody can be interrogated, but also, and more crucially for *Of Grammatology*, we can establish a course for the deconstruction of harmony. For Baroque harmonic theory can hardly be considered any more or less "deconstructive" than Serialism, Indian Ragas, the Sonata principle, or Punk. It is the supplement itself which requires deconstruction, and to this (non) end, let us first approach the concept and theory of harmony from another direction, re-reading Derrida in the margins of a wider music-theoretical intertext.

CHAPTER THREE

HARMONIC METAPHYSICS

- the large rhythm that undulated through that of the great masters antient and modern - the sustained note of informing purpose - the deep vibration of some unifying undertone / now rising to accent and emphasis - now sounding faintly, beneath the multifareousness of accompanying motives -

- Charles Rennie Mackintosh, 1902.

CHAPTER THREE

HARMONIC METAPHYSICS

3.1 The Axiology of Sound

dialectics is the indefinite movement of finitude, of the unity of life and death, of difference, of original repetition [Derrida, *Writing and Difference*, p.248]

TUNE and *TIME* are the Affections or Properties of Sound, upon whose Difference or Proportions *Music* depends. [...] the Power of *Musick* [is] heightened, when the Differences of *Tune* and *Time* are artfully joined: 'Tis this Composition that can work so irresistibly on the Passions. [*A Treatise of Musick*, pp.385/6]

Alexander Malcolm's *A Treatise of Musick* was published in Edinburgh in 1721, one year prior to Rameau's *Traité*^[1]. Rather than proposing a grand new harmonic theory, however, Malcolm's *Treatise* represents an attempt to collate extant knowledge on music – mathematical, practical, and historical. In this text, the aesthetic tropes of the

[1] To avoid confusion between these two *Treatises*, the French form will designate Rameau's text from this point on.

Enlightenment are fully operative^[2]. In particular, the idea that music operates along an oppositional ontological axis becomes the theory upon which all else hinges; according to Malcolm, there are two planes or dimensions which are proper to sound - *tune* and *time*. That is, the vertical, spatial aspect, and the horizontal, temporal aspect. In other words, Malcolm here states the classic Enlightenment formulation that music aesthetics is based on an originary opposition of harmony and melody. This axiology is assembled according to a similar Cartesian, graphic approach to the metaphysical geometry of music as we find in Rameau. Thus, it becomes a question of the connection of two metaphysical entities, space and time, and of the mechanics of their mutual connectivity. For Malcolm, this connectivity is encompassed by the concept of *proportional difference*, signifying the interval at the origin of the two planes which, when bridged by an "artful joining" of harmony and rhythm, creates the Powers of music to stir the passions.

Throughout this reading of Malcolm, the concept of Proportional Difference will be shown to inscribe a space at the very origin of space and time. It is through this graphic hinge - the geometric point of articulation of harmony and melody - that music's affective power which works "so

[2] In the Introduction to *Edinburgh in the Age of Reason* (1967), Douglas Young asserts that "It was in Edinburgh, in the last quarter of the eighteenth century, that the Scottish Enlightenment kindled into flame." [pp.7/8] This is a remarkable statement even if one considers the publication dates of David Hume's texts (1739-) or Francis Hutcheson's (1725-), and the publication of Malcolm's *Treatise* in 1721 clearly demonstrates the idiosyncrasy of Young's sentence. In contradistinction to this position, for instance, Paul Scott (*Andrew Fletcher & the Treaty of Union*) points to the existence of Enlightenment traits in the even earlier figure of political theorist, Andrew Fletcher (1653-1716). Equally, to limit the whole of the Scottish Enlightenment to Edinburgh seems to fly in the face of Adam Smith's work in Glasgow, as well as the work carried out by many others in Aberdeen, St. Andrew's, and so forth.

irresistibly on the Passions" can be assembled. This proportional hinge thus has its deconstructive equivalent in Derrida's hinge of *différance*, the "originary" interval between harmony and melody. However, the significant question of the distinction between these two differential hinges turns on the form of structural priority which Malcolm's proportionality operates. The space at the origin, at the juncture between time and space, is also the means by which space can tap into and even capture the power of time for its own use. This is achieved by the spatialization of time as units of rhythm. The primacy of spatiality in the ontology of music is the recurrent prioritization of Malcolm's writings, and of many other Enlightenment texts which deal with concept of harmony. As will become clear, this concept marks the point of departure for the following, by inhabiting the margins of Derrida's deconstructive practices, tracing the various significations of metaphysical terms which are at issue in deconstruction.

3.2 The Harmonic Dialectic

the universal Character whereby *Concord* and *Discord* are distinguished, is to be sought in the Numbers which contain and express the *Intervals* of Sound: But not in these Numbers abstractly; we must consider them as expressing the very Cause and Difference of Sound with respect to *Tune*, viz. the Number of Vibrations in the same Time [*A Treatise of Musick*, p.71/2]

The "Cause and Difference" of music here is in the immanent numeric articulation of harmony with rhythm. The idea of difference being an originary generator of music depends on this articulation of the two ontological planes at their graphic origin. The possibility of the affective difference which operates within the sensations of concordance and discordance is underpinned by a proportional difference of quantities at

the origin of music. It is through this process that the classification of intervals into those which are and are not proper to musical harmony is achieved. In other words, this originary difference which is articulated across a proportional space generates the ontological determination of music and its Other: *noise*, which proceeds by *inharmonic* degrees.

Yet there is the possibility that musical harmony can dialectically access and even appropriate the power of noise for its own ends. As Hélène Cixous states,

what is called "other" is an alterity that does settle down, that falls into the dialectical circle. It is the other in a hierarchically organized relationship in which the same [*le propre*] is what rules, names, defines, and assigns "its" other. [...] The other is only there to be reappropriated, recaptured, and destroyed as other. [*The Newly Born Woman*, p.70]

In this way, the condition of *Otherness* within the dualistic or dialectical system is, contrary to all internal theoretical claims, not a *natural* condition. It is, indeed, *constructed* as an *a priori* oppositional category. Yet, the Other is necessary for the transmission of the *energeia* of the dialectical movement. As Susan McClary comments, it is "the dissonant Other who is necessary for the motivation and sustaining of the [tonal] plot." [*Feminine Endings*, p.57] In his dialectical rationalization of the interval between music and its noisy Other, Malcolm invokes the Latin categories of the *concinnus* and the *inconcinnus* as the tools of measuring the proportionate values of dissonances;

The indefinite Number of other *Ratios* being all *Discord*, belong not essentially to *Musick*, because of themselves they produce no Pleasure; yet some of them are admitted into the *System* as necessary to the better being of it, both with respect to *Consonance* and *Succession* [...] such are called *concinnous intervals*, [...] all other *Discords* are called *inconcinnous*. [*A Treatise of Musick*, pp.217/8]

The acceptability, the *properness*, of each vertical or horizontal interval falls into categories firstly of concordance and discordance^[3]. From this point, discords divide into those which are proper to music and those which are not. Significantly for deconstructive discourse, Malcolm gathers dissonances under the heading of "*other Ratios*". The practical result is that the tone and semitone are acceptable (although "inharmonic") because they are produced in tolerable harmonic proximity to the tonal source, whereas the quarter tone is both inharmonic and radically distant from the source in harmonic terms, and is thus unusable – it is Other in its ratio. This is expressed as a function of experience; we have those which "produce pleasure" and those which do not. In this way, harmony becomes intricately bound up with the theory of affectivity, and accesses a rational basis for emotional and sensual mechanisms. The imaging of discordance as a device of the senses is a common enough motif in the Enlightenment, and as we have seen, Rameau's *Traité* provides other examples. For instance, after having clearly defined the aesthetic judgement of music as a dual articulation of hearing and reasoning, of the ear and the mind, Rameau immediately extends the theory to a discussion of the properties of concordance and discordance. In the following passage we have an image of anarchic multiplicity being tempered by the action of a sceptical mind:

[3] Elsewhere, Malcolm writes of the Pythagorean root of these divisions, and provides an equivalent Greek terminology; "The abstract Reasonings of the *Pythagoreans* about the *Ratios* of the *Concords*" [p.508] which mean that "DISCORDS are either (*Emmeli*) *concinuous*, ie. fit for *Musick* [...] or (*Ecmeli*) *inconcinuous*." [p.510] The New Grove article "Emmeleia" gives the meaning of *emmeles* as "in the melos", and associates it with the harmony of music and dance. Malcolm, however, uses the term not in this temporal sense, but in a specifically harmonic, spatial sense. The Grove gives this spatial definition as one associated with intervals smaller than a P4th, whereas the Harvard Dictionary cites Engelbert of Admont's (d.1331) definition as "the difference between two consonances".

"Experience offers us a large number of chords susceptible of an infinite diversity, in which we shall always lose our way unless we search for the source elsewhere. Experience sows doubts everywhere [...] Reason, on the contrary, presents us with only a single chord" [*Traité*, p.139]. Sheer unmediated perception – the experimental ratio of harmonic Otherness – signifies the danger of a loss, and the occasion of a scepticism. Multiplicity is meaningless unless ruled by the law of unity. As we saw with Rameau in Chapter 1, it is reason which allows the possibility of the sociality of music, in the sense of its complicity in the determination of judgement, and the establishment of a *sensus communis*.

Dissonances must be judged proper according to sound *and* source, and in Malcolm, this dual experiential and rational origin for dissonance is also made dialectical. "We know by Experience how much the Mind of Man is delighted with Variety" [*Treatise*, p.218] However, this variety must be tempered, since the mind "can stand no Dispute, whether we consider intellectual or sensible Pleasures" [ibid.]. An appropriate balance must be struck, then, between the disputing extremes of each axis; the difference implied by variety must be tempered by a general organizing rule.

Of variety and its complicity in this notion of the harmonic dialectic, Francis Hutcheson wrote, four years later (1725) that;

There is indeed observable, in the best compositions, a mysterious effect of discords: they often give as great a pleasure as continued harmony, whether by refreshing the ear with variety, or by awakening the attention, and

enlivening the relish^[4] for the succeeding harmony of concords, as shades enliven and beautify pictures, or by some other means not yet known. Certain it is, however, that they have their place, and some good effect in our best compositions. [*An Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue*, I,2,xiii.]

Hutcheson perhaps is less reserved in his praise of discords here, and certainly Malcolm gives more formal consideration to the issue. Nevertheless, the concept of variety as a dialectic means of harmonic procedure is evident. Malcolm's implication is also that the greater the differences, the greater the pleasure, "unless it proceed to an Excess; for so limited are our Capacities, that too much or too little are equally fatal to our Pleasures." [*Treatise*, p.218] Here we read of the space in which our pleasure exists, surrounded by a boundary, for this space is "so limited". It is a territory, whose "capacity" is propriety, where the discordant, the irrational, can only signify within the law of the concordant, the rational. "Fatal" danger is signalled by the possibility of an "excess", an overflow from the Otherly region beyond the space of pleasure - the danger is that

[4] The identity of lexis between Hutcheson and Malcolm is perhaps significant here: both write of discordance in terms of "variety" and of "relish" as aspects of its dialectic. If one were in the business of inference, perhaps it would not be too outrageous to suggest that the philosopher was aware of and perhaps informed by the mathematician's treatise. cf. Malcolm's statement concerning "a more exquisite Relish of the perfecter *Intervals*" [p.220], and also; "to move by no other than *harmonical Intervals*, would not only want Variety, and so weary us with a tedious Repetition of the same Things; but the very Perfection of such Relations of Sounds would cloy the Ear, in the same manner as sweet and luscious Things do the Taste, which are therefore artfully seasoned with the Mixture of sower and bitter: And so in *Musick* the Perfection of the *harmonical Intervals* are set off, and as 'twere seasoned with other Kinds of *Intervals* that are never agreeable by themselves, but only in order to make the Agreement of the other more various and remarkable." [p.219] Here, not only the lexical intertext between Hutcheson and Malcolm is apparent, but also the precise function of lexis, with the dialectical conception of "variety" becoming a matter of onto-culinary taste, as well as aesthetic Taste. The dialectical movement of structural tensions then becomes a matter for the gourmet ear which prepares an aural *fricassée*.

of the discordant enforcing its own law on the concordant, overspilling the proper "capacity" of this space. To this end, the concord must establish its power dialectically in order to harness the energy of this danger.

Here, we have the myth of **the** appropriation of the indefinite, or in Pythagorean terms, the *apeiron*, which represents motion, this appropriation being carried out by the limited, *peras*. As David R. Fideler puts it in his introduction to *The Pythagorean Sourcebook*, "The idea of order is intimately connected with Limit (*peras*), the opposite of which is the Unlimited (*apeiron*), and these are the two most basic, and hence universal, principles of Pythagorean cosmology." [*Pythagorean Sourcebook*, p.22] For Malcolm, the manner of operation of this dialectical capture of *unlimited* by the *limited* is the application of the geometric law of the *ratio* to those components of the irrational which can be moulded to provide a contrast with the concordant, and yet never too much of a contrast: the dissonance must be concinnous in all respects; the inharmonic must be within reason-able proximity to the harmonic source.

Malcolm's composer attempts to *represent* the Other of music, the chaos of inharmonic sound or noise, but this representation is carried out with components within the system which stretch its limits *without* breaking them. Indeed, this stretching is precisely the means of establishing the boundary. The dialectic between music and its Other, between harmony and inharmony, then, does not concern itself with the *actual* Other - the abyss of noise - but with the *danger* of the Other, the *represented possibility* of the system's annihilation. This *possibility* of absolute discordance is the *concinnous* dissonance. The prospect of the annihilation of music by an overflow of noise into the former's territory,

then, must be exorcised in the dialectical and repetitive ritual of harmonic resolution: concord-discord-concord. The dissonance involved, however, being an appropriated representation of music's Other. Only the action of this appropriation can make the presentation of the possibility of annihilation (its representation) a properly propitious affair.

This means of using representation to appropriate an "outside", to bring it under the systematic control of an "inside" operates by a spatial connectivity; the origin creates its Other through the same logic which brings it into being, that logic being the action of a space, an interval, a harmonic action at the origin itself. The One produces the Other, and then harnesses it back into its own dialectic. As Malcolm wrote: "The Word *Harmonia* signifies more generally the Agreement of several Things that make up one Whole" [p.579], and these several things are produced by a source, given their own space within the economy of that source, only in order that the source can revitalize itself by capturing their space as its own mechanisms. In this way, the fundamental produces a harmonic series where each individual frequency serves not to proclaim its own identity, but to signify a spatial relation back to the original frequency, to proclaim its identity within the encompassing identity of its source.

Considering the mechanics of discordance from this point of view, we can understand that perhaps the very discord which represents to us the supposed antithesis of the concord is absolutely integral to the establishment of the concord's identity. It allows us to think of it in terms of what it is not, to establish an ontological space between it and its Other. The discordant negation of concordance, then (the concinnous dissonance), does nothing in the way of actual negation, but rather supports - and

performs an absolutely integral role in – the affirmation of concordance as the law which is the context of all musical sound. The concinnous dissonance can do this by its relative proximity to the consonant origin. The dissonance's momentary dissention is inevitably overthrown by the greater structural power of concordance, which it is there merely to prove, rather than truly threaten or assail^[5].

Thus, despite even inconcinuous dissonance's production by the source, it proves a danger to the source by the fact of its great distance, a distance over which the source has no real power of control. The inconcinuous dissonance is therefore an excess product of the original fundamental; it represents an instance of over-production, a waste-product which cannot be stopped, unless all ceases, but can at least be excluded from the system by tightening the grip of the origin on lesser forms of its Other, in an attempt to create a narrative of absolute order and control – *taxis*^[6]. By tightening the grip of the fundamental, the harmonic waste-product is effectively evacuated. The question for a deconstruction which allies itself with the concept of harmony then becomes one of how to "oppose" this dialectical closure of sound. In

[5] In the *Dictionary of Music* article "Concinuous", Rousseau states "when the music is silent, and we feel nothing more than a continuance of notes without an unison, there is no general object to which each one connects his part, and the execution proceeds always in a disagreeable strain. For this reason it is, that the French music is never concinnous."

[6] *taxis* can signify order in various forms, political, natural, but particularly structural. It can also signify a boundary or battle-line, as in "him who left the line of battle [*taxin*] or threw away his arms" [Plato, *Republic*, 468a, translated in *Greek Philosophical Vocabulary*, p.162]. It forms a particular mode of connectivity which can be described as stable, predictable, and proportioned. It, along with the concept of limit [*peras*] forms a lexical network in opposition to indeterminacy, anarchy, and so forth.

Derrida's words, "Dialectics is always that which has finished us, because it is always that which *takes into account* our rejection of it." [*Writing and Difference*, p.246] In the "light" of this, we should proceed cautiously.

The dialectical "Variety" which operates through the representational threat of music's Other generates a tension within a harmonic system, a gravitational pull, as it were, towards a goal. This narrative is expressed in the Enlightenment through diverse images, but the intertext with Freemasonry is particularly significant^[7]. Not only through the symbolism of the number 3, which immediately falls into the structure of a dialectical narrative, but also the idea of *enlightenment* itself as a systematic narrative – the journey from darkness to light, expressed most fundamentally in Plato's "Allegory of the Cave". For the composer John Clerk, these images were seamless with the architectural aspects of Freemasonry, as the metaphysical model which he built in his garden demonstrates. It consisted of a tunnel through a small hill, the end

[7] The concept of harmony in the Enlightenment has a significant intertext with the rise of the Masonic movement. As Purser has noted, many Scottish composers of the period were members, not only Clerk (1676-1755), but also Thomas Erskine (1732-1781), John Reid (1721-1807), and James Oswald (1711-69), most of whom were involved in establishing the "Temple of Apollo" as expatriots in London. The members of this secretive masonic society were exclusively musicians [*Scotland's Music*, p.p.173-196]. Later Burns also wrote songs in honour of fellow masons such as *The Farewell. To the Brethren of St. James's Lodge, Tarbolton*, where the image of the "Sons of light" coincides with stanza three; "May Freedom, Harmony and Love / Unite you in the *grand Design*, / Beneath th' Omniscient Eye above, / The glorious ARCHITECT Divine!" [*Poems & Songs*, p.217] The idea of the universe as a vast piece of architecture is an inherently spatial concept, and always combines in masonic writings with terms such as "harmony", "order", "design", etc., but significantly, the image of what Derrida calls logocentrism is prevalent in the complicity of these terms with those such as "light", "omniscient eye", etc. The masonic anthems of Oswald from the 1740's in particular also introduce textural symbolism in being set for a trinity of voices, and making structurally pivotal use of unisons as an image of the final metaphysical unison of all things [Purser, p.180]. The significance of the vocal unison as ultimate *telos* is elaborated on later.

of which represented metaphysical completion of the masonic-harmonic programme;

No-one can get across to it but by the mouth of a frightful cave. To those who enter, therefore, first occurs the memory of the Cuman Sibyl, for the ruinous aperture, blocked up with stones and briars, strikes the eye. Then comes upon the wayfarer a shudder, as they stand in doubt whether they are among the living or the dead. As indeed certain discords set off and give finish to musical cadences in such a way as to render the subsequent harmony more grateful to the ear, so does the mouth of this mournful cave with its long and shady path followed by the lightened prospect, make the exit more delightful. For suddenly the darkness disappears, and as it were at the creation of a new world. [Clerk, quoted by Purser in *Scotland's Music*, p.171]

Plato's Cave resonates in every turn of this passage. The threat of annihilation is present here, and it is this possibility which provides the impetus for motion towards the final cadence of *enlightenment*: "metaphysics, unable to escape its ancestry in light" [*Writing and Difference*, p.118]. Equally, note the image of *erotic* danger implied by the "mouth of the frightful cave", and the redemption from its grip in the rebirth at the end of the tunnel. The determination of the tunnel's realm as a threatening absence or lack, and the final "lightened prospect" as full presence or completion, mirrors perfectly the musical narrative of the cadential overcoming of dissonance.

A further component of this neo-Hellenic model of consonance is the complicity of the concept of Virtue with its axiology. This binding of dialectics with morality is controlled by musical images, as in the Pythagorean fragment by Theages, *On the Virtues*;

The soul is divided into reasoning power, anger and desire. Reasoning power rules knowledge, anger deals with impulse, and desire bravely rules the soul's affections. When these three parts unite in one action, exhibiting a *composite energy*, then in the soul results *concord and virtue*. When sedition divides them, then *discord and vice* appear. [*The*

The division of the soul into three components introduces a spacing within its body. However, this spacing is overcome in a unity which has a "composite energy". The integration of parts is only possible from an initial division, and it is the fact of this division, or spacing, which gives the momentum towards unity its motive power. Thus, concordance becomes the correct tuning of the composite parts, or rather, the harmonizing of those parts into a situation where they realize their full systematic potential in relation to each other, all working together to uphold the greatest power which their union is capable of. Thus, the full realization of a thing's specificity does not depend on the annihilation of difference, but on its dialectical temperance, the correct hierarchization of parts. Theages continues,

So too, health, which is an adjustment of the bodily powers, does not consist in expelling the cold and the hot, the moist and the dry, but in adjusting them suitably and symmetrically. Likewise in music, concord does not consist in expelling the sharp and the flat, but in exterminating dissonance by concord arising from their adjustment. [ibid., p.227]

In this sense, music is the model of all things to the Pythagorean mind. Concordance becomes a matter of justice, virtue, health, power, and

society in general^[8].

In the *Treatise of Musick*, Malcolm also connects the necessity of the concinnous dissonance to a biological origin. Taking his cue from Descartes' *Musical Compendium* (also one of Rameau's sources), he ascribes the intervallic movement of a solo voice to physio-affective expediency.

He [Descartes] observes, that an *acute* Sound requires a greater Force to produce it [...] and hence he concludes, that *acute* Sounds, or the Motion of the Air that produce them immediately strike the Ear with more Force. [...] From which Observations he thinks may be drawn the true and primary Reason why *Degrees* (which are *Intervals* less than any *Concord*) were invented; which Reason he judges to be this, Lest if the Voice did always proceed by *harmonical* Distances, there should be too great Disproportion or Inequality in the *Intenseness* of it [...] which would weary both Singer and Hearer. [*A Treatise of Musick*, pp.219/20]

Proceeding by tone or semitone, rather than octave, fifth or third, then, not only makes the physical effort on the singer's part less, but also makes the effort on the listener's part less. This parity exists by virtue of the fact that the force required to produce the sound and the force which that sound effects on the receiving ear are proportionate.

[8] C.G.Jung gives an account of Nietzsche's *Beyond Good and Evil* and *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* which is significant in its tracing of the concept of opposites back to Pythagoras, rather than reading Nietzsche as anti-Platonic, as many post-structuralist critiques do. In his *Psychological Types*, Jung comments: "that dichotomy which Nietzsche laid at the door of Zarathustra: the discovery of pairs of opposites, the division into odd and even, above and below, good and evil. It was the work of the old Pythagoreans, and it was their doctrine of moral responsibility and the grave metaphysical consequences of sin that gradually, in the course of centuries, percolated through to all strata of the population, chiefly owing to the spread of Orphic and Pythagorean mysteries." [*Selected Writings*, p.136] Nietzsche himself writes that "The fundamental faith of the metaphysicians is *the faith in antithetical values*." [*Beyond Good and Evil*, p.16] The tradition represented by Nietzsche is dealt with in a later chapter. For present purposes, it is enough to note the interlinking of the concepts of consonance, virtue, and metaphysical method, particularly that of dialectics. A reading of the metaphysical tradition of philosophy which takes consonance, rather than phonetics, as a key operator would yield a new understanding of its attitude towards both literature and music.

However, this step-wise additive movement which aims at a balance of efforts also opens the possibility of intervallic contrast and could be characterized as operating within a certain image of the dialectic, and therefore of spatiality. In this sense, Descartes, as related to us by Malcolm, appears to be suggesting the possibility of a representational integrity, despite the displacement, the rupture, caused by the interval. The use in the following passage from Malcolm of the word "medium" is therefore interesting, given the additional meaning of hermeneut, druidic interpreter of the Beyond. "Hence it appears, says he [Descartes], that the *Degrees* are nothing but a certain *Medium* contrived to be put betwixt the Extremes of the *Concords*, for moderating their Inequality" [p.220]. Once more, we find the narrative of a dialectical possibility operating upon a series of terms in a generative capacity, generating endless chains and combinations of events from a limited set of units with specific combinatorial values (one could almost write *valencies* or *potential differences*).

At every stage of the process, however, there is a periodic return to the overarching law of the concord; the discord only functions to provide a route of passage from one concord to the next. The discord is encompassed by the law of the concord, it is "within" that law. Malcolm describes the articulation of the voice across intervallic space thus: "when the Voice has moved one Degree, the Ear is not yet satisfied until we come to another, which therefore must be *Concord* with the first Sound." [p.220] In the same way that the first term of a dialectic frames and controls the movement of the whole process, producing for itself an Other through which to appropriate an energy which will allow it to reproduce its own

reflection in the third term, Malcolm has concordance appropriating the power and force of discordance in order to reach a further level of concordance. A journey is embarked upon only to discover a return; "by a fit Division of the *concording Intervals* into lesser Ones, the Voice will pass smoothly from one Note to another, and the Hearer will be prepared for a more exquisite Relish of the perfecter *Intervals*, whose Extremes are the proper Points in which the Ear finds the expected Rest and Pleasure." [A *Treatise of Musick*, p.220] Thus a whole theory of musical structure and periodicity can be generated from this theory of harmony, with repetition of the original concord being bridged by intrusions of that which allows the return: the concord's Other, only ever given as an image or representation of the Other. To do otherwise - to go the way of the Other and place oneself within the milieu of the outer harmonics, the inconcinuous - would be to risk the annihilation of the whole system.

It is this repetitive function, perhaps, which allows what Malcolm suggests Descartes is intimating to operate as a self-proximate displacement. The inevitability of the return ensures integrity and the displacement ensures, through its complicity in a dialectic, the very self-proximity which it only *appears* to rupture. The return allows the source to exorcise difference, and annihilate annihilation. It is a question of the seminal centre maintaining its self-sameness, *despite* its intervallic dispersal throughout remoter structural regions. This dialectical limitation of difference is that which, according to Derrida, returns the intertextuality of the excess product - the *outwork* - to the framework of the ontological self-centric Work: "The effacement or sublimation of seminal difference is the movement through which the left-overness [*restance*] of

the outwork gets internalized and domesticated into the ontotheology of the great Book." [*Dissemination*, p.45] Thus, harmonic ontology, just like Rousseau's melodic ontology, can return us to the Great Book of Nature written by God's breathy *logos*. Through introducing the concept of the harmonic, Derrida interrogated the idea of the fundamental root. However, harmonic theory itself, in introducing the concepts of the concinnous and the inconcinnous provides the possibility of an orthodox dialectical closure of harmonic *différance*. We must trace our way through this field with caution indeed.

3.3 Space of Melody and Voice of Harmony

Malcolm's *Treatise*, in its determination of the composition and operation of the theory of harmony, demonstrates a significant intertext with Descartes' *Compendium Musicae*^[9], the writings of the ancient Greeks and its contemporary continental music theory^[10]. However, the position of the concept of narrative in Malcolm's text introduces another layer into the theory of harmony, which serves to demonstrate the symbiosis of the relationship between harmony and time.

[9] While it is not clear whether either Malcolm or Rameau were fully familiar with the original Latin version, it is clear from their references that they direct the reader's attention to the English and French translations respectively; the *Musical Compend* (tr.1653), and the *Abrégé de la Musique* (tr.1668). It is also worth noting that the full title of the French translation which Rameau uses, by Fr. Nicolas Poisson, is *Traité de la mécanique, composé par Monsieur Descartes. De plus l'Abrégé de musique du mesme auteur mis en françois*. The use of the term "mechanics" is significant.

[10] One of the distinguishing features of Malcolm's *A Treatise of Musick* is the detailed application of mathematics to musical harmony, and awareness of many contemporary scientific developments. Indeed, he demonstrates a greater knowledge of French scientific theories of music than does Rameau, but given his background as a mathematician, this is hardly surprising.

In Malcolm's descriptions above of the movement of a voice across intervallic space can be discerned an idea of melody as an essentially harmonic activity. The fact that melody, the horizontal parameter, is comprised of intervals, points to this. Melody, being governed by harmony, is thereby equally spatial: the voice moves "from one Degree of Tune to another" [p.218]. In quantitatively differentiating one moment of time from another, one necessarily has recourse to a spatial movement. The possibility opened by this horizontal spacing is that of harmony being conceived as not only an operator in the vertical parameter, but also in the linear realm of time. Thus, musical form becomes governable by the harmonic laws of repetition, permutation, proportion, and so forth. We are faced with the action of a segmented temporality, a spatialized time.

In particular, the concept of repetition is introduced as a means of structuring time through limiting the infinite variability of the succession of events. The idea of the return to a single point provides a coherent law around which diversities can be arranged within the same set of significations. In a rhetorical metaphor, Malcolm compares the structure of tonal narrative to that of literary narrative^[11]. In a literary narrative,

there is a *Subject*, viz. some *Person* or *Thing* the Discourse is referred to, that ought always to be kept in View, thro' the Whole, so that nothing unnatural or foreign to the *Subject* may be brought in; in like Manner, in every regular and truly *melodious Song*, there is one Note which regulates all the rest; the Song begins and at least ends in this, which is as it were the principle Matter, or *musical Subject* that demands a special Regard to it in all the other Notes of the Song. [*Treatise*, p.266]

The subject of the tonal narrative, then, actually forms the object

[11] The specific mode of narrative which Malcolm refers to here is *oration*, and the resonances of this potentially phonocentric image will be explored more fully in the following chapters.

of the audience's *gaze*, to be "kept in View", in close proximity to the gazing subject. Yet it equally forms the measure of that proximity, the gravitational centre of the narrative's formal structure, this measure defining the narrative's ontological mechanism along the axis of natural-unnatural, as well as its territorial claims of belonging and being structurally foreign.

The musical correlate of this is as follows: the object of the audience's aural gaze is the tonic key-note, which also forms the gravitational centre of the piece, its subject, in specifically structural terms; we will begin here, depart keeping our gaze directed towards our source, and return to the source after having experienced the distances between "the other Notes" and this One note which "regulates" these Others. The musical subject, the object of the gazing subject's gaze, subjects the Others to the condition of being its objects.

Of course, the concept of the *gaze* points to a further spatializing metaphor in Malcolm's imagery; the visual is tacked on to the literary/aural. The concept of the gaze occupies an axial position in much recent theory relating to the visual arts. Representation always implies a certain positioning of components into an assembled format which at least structurally dislocates the exact alignment of signification in the "original" which is being represented. In this sense, representation has a further signification which lies in the intertext of the "original" and the "copy", the juncture between two related and yet different systems of signification. This intertext can give rise to various ideological analyses of why the representation has realigned the "original" network of signification in the way which it has, and so forth. Further, there is the

question of which audience is being targeted by the representational network, and this gives rise to the possibility of another layer of ideological analysis. In other words, the modification of the world in a representation begs the question of what is being signified about the world and to whom? In *Vision and Difference*, Griselda Pollock writes; "The sexual politics of looking function around a regime which divides into binary positions, activity/passivity, looking/being seen, voyeur/exhibitionist, subject/object." [*Vision and Difference*, p.87] From this critical position, Pollock renegotiates the concept of the gaze in the direction of the possibility of a non-oppositional system. In the paintings of Mary Cassat and Berthe Morisot, she finds that "One of the major means by which femininity is thus reworked is by the rearticulation of traditional space so that it ceases to function primarily as the space of sight for a mastering gaze, but becomes the locus of relationships. The gaze that is fixed on the represented figure is that of equal and like" [ibid.] In Malcolm's statement above, he claims that the "subject" of narrative must be "kept in View", and that the same applies to the tonal centre of a piece of music. The oppositional and dialectical language which Malcolm's theories assemble cannot but become enmeshed in precisely the kind of structures which Pollock delineates. The "subject/object" division which she points to as a major component in misogynist painting also operates in the structure of Malcolm's harmonic theory derived from narrative. In this sense, there is a structural intertext between the male gaze and Classical harmony.

However, what occurs in Malcolm is that the signifying centre of tonality - its "*male*" essence - effectively becomes a "*feminized*" other for

the listener. As we will see, though, this does represent a simple reversal, inversion, or negation of what Pollock describes. In harmonic theory, the dialectical force of structural modulation (asserting a new chord I within an Other region) means also that the anthropomorphic images of gender attributes are also transposable. Thus, the subject-object relation, the acting and the acted-upon relation, the measuring and the measured relation, all have provisional status with regard to a relation "before" them and "after" them in terms of structural priority. Each One-Other relation is but one relation in a chain of relations, each relation intervallically supplementing those on either side.

This is worth stressing: the supplementarity of Malcolm's semiotic derived from a literary/visual image is as follows - within the context of the musical performance situation, the key-note is the object of the listener's "gaze", but within the context of the piece of music alone, the key-note is the subject which subjects the Other notes to its law, thus marking them as its tonal objects: "masculine" and "feminine" determinations are provisional, and relative to the direction in which a term faces.

Equally, we find here the narrative of a structured temporality made possible by the dialectic of consonance and dissonance. The return to the origin of consonance is not only an attempt to dialectically span time, but also to temper the possibility of total change or annihilation. The return signifies completion, and the reduction of temporal force, the "killing" of time. This narration acts to reinstate original consonance, and its mechanism is the ritual of repetitive closure; "The given Sound is applied as the principal Note or *Key* of the *Song*, by making frequent *Closes* or

Cadences upon it [...] by a *Close* or *Cadence* is meant a terminating or bringing the *Melody* to a Period or Rest, after which it begins and sets out anew" [*Treatise*, pp.268/9]. The cadence, then, periodically terminates the dialectic narrative – but merely provisionally, in order that the whole process may begin again, continually repeating the same structures of loss and return. It represents the structural limit (*peras*) of the narrative of music's supremacy over noise. The final cadence would be the ultimate limit, the highest closure, the final demarcation of the ontological difference between music and noise^[12]. In dialectical lexis, it is the concluding term which rises above the first two, which have merely prepared the ground for its heroic appearance. The cadence, indeed, is an absolute necessity to the narrative under consideration here. Its operation is in perfect symbiosis with the transitions from consonance to dissonance

[12] Structural closure is one of the great metanarratives of the Enlightenment. For instance, Malcolm quotes the English theorist John Wallis in the *Philosophical Transactions* (1698) reporting that the scale is a closed octave: there are "13 pipes within an octave" [*Treatise*, p.314]. In this, the octave runs from C to C, rather than from C to B. This means that the energetic leading-note (B) is not allowed to keep the octave open and suggesting movement into the next octave. Rather, the leading-note opens merely onto C, the octave is closed, and any potential for motion is arrested.

and back^[13]. Equally, it functions as a revelation with respect to concordance, which uses the cadence to "discover itself" [ibid.]. The journey, then, on which music "sets out" is a means of continual self-definition. An image of Otherness is explored in order to "discover" the unity of the origin all the more markedly. It is this structural narrative of tonality which McClary has noted: "Tonal music is narratively conceived at least to the extent that the original key area - the tonic - also serves as the final goal. Tonal structures are organized teleologically, with the illusion of unitary identity promised at the end of each piece." [p.155] The mechanism described by Malcolm supports and is made possible by a serial ontology which categorizes sounds according to their proximity to a source which is unified and complete in itself, and yet is continually exceeding its capacity to produce an infinite harmonic series. This ontology is made explicit in the following passage, where again, the lexis is spatial, invoking the image of boundaries which divide and separate capacities:

[13] As Rousseau states in the *Dictionary*, "there can be no dissonance without a cadence" [article on "Cadence"]; it is the imperative law of the harmonic dialectic. Equally, Malcolm writes: "Aristotle in his treatise concerning the world [...] answers that question, if the world is made of contrary principles, how comes it that it is not long ago dissolved? He shews that the beauty and perfection of it consists in the admirable mixture and temperament of different things [...] ie. musick, by a mixture of acute and grave, also of long and short sounds of different voices, yields one absolute or perfect concert. Again, in *Lib.6.* explaining the harmony of the celestial motions, where each orb, says he, has its own proper motion, yet all tend to one harmonious end, as they also proceed from one principle, making a choir in the heavens by their concord, and he carries on the comparison with music thus: as in a choir, after the præcentor the whole choir sings, composed sometimes of men and women, who by the different acuteness and gravity of their voices, make one concinnous harmony." [*Treatise*, pp.577/8] This passage is a fine demonstration of the complicity of the concepts of ontology, dialectics, origination, and anthropomorphism all to the single end of enforcing the image of the law of harmony, in the immediate context of Malcolm's presbyterian experience. For a connection with Rousseau's vision of universal harmony represented by presbyterian song, see Chapter 5.

the *Octave* contains in it the whole Principles of *Musick*, both with respect to *Consonance* (or *Harmony*) as it contains all the original *Concords*, and the *harmonical* Division of such greater, as are equal to the Sum of lesser *Concords*; and with respect to the *Succession* (or *Melody*) as in the *concinuous* Division of the *Octave*, we have all the *Degrees* subservient to the *harmonical Intervals* [*A Treatise*, p.267]

Within this ontological determination of sound, we find a whole structural theory of music. The "harmonical intervals" are those which occupy a privileged position within the hierarchy. These are the pitches which form intervals from the source which are in close proximity to it in the harmonic series. They are those quanta which, in their structural immediacy, are capable of forming additional structuring points, provisional "sources" with regard to the concinnous degrees which form bridges between them. As with Rameau, the harmonic pitches are intervallic additions, supplements, to the originary fundamental, but are immediate expressions of it, and are thus endowed with its mark. This mark allows them to act as carriers of the ontological law of the source while yet being increasingly distant from that source: "that note is called the key of the melody, because it governs and regulates all the rest, putting this general limitation upon them, that they must be to it in the relation of the seven essential and natural notes of the 8ve." [*Treatise*, p.269] The law, then, subjects its objects to an ontological determination. Their structural proximity to the source allows their own provisional originarity with respect to the more distant expressions, the more intervallically distant representations, of the fundamental. However, they form a different order of originarity to the fundamental origin; they are not the "cause" of the concinnous inharmonic intervals, they have no generative capacity (in the sense that the source generates *them*). Rather, they provide structural

points around which the further intervallic representations of the origin can be arranged and brought under the law of the origin. The harmonic intervals are thus the mechanisms of capture and regulation with respect to the lesser intervals - as they face the fundamental term, they show their "feminized" aspect, but as they face the remoter harmonics, they are endowed with a derivative "masculinity".

In the terms of the structure of a piece of music, this means that, while the whole "begins and at least ends" on the key-note, the provisional cadences *within* the outer limits of the piece can rest on pitches other than the tonic. In the same way that, in theoretical terms, the harmonic pitches provide points on a grid which arrange the structure of the whole according to harmonic supplements to a single origin, so the intermediate cadences can occur on these pitches. This allows for a further layer of departure and return, with cadences on the tonic framing cadences on the fifth (the most proximate harmonic point) in particular. At this point, the dialectical mechanism which spreads the structure of harmony out along a serial temporality provides the possibility of modulation. However, the narrative of the return must still apply in this new register. This is the law which provides all movements and all closures within the territory of the piece of music. It is also the law which multiplies itself through all levels of the process. Even at this point of modulation, the law reasserts its ontological imperatives; "a regular Piece must not only return to the first *Key*, these other *Keys* must also have a particular Connection and Relation to the first" [*Treatise*, p.270]. The return is inviolable so long as the object of the departure is in close enough proximity to the source to provide an image of the Other without risking the annihilation which comes

from too great an harmonically intervallic space, whether in terms of chord progressions, or modulatory sequences.

Thus, the molecular is mirrored in the global – the law operates at all levels and at all points. Its success is due to the structure of harmonicity which allows it to first produce spaces and then subject them to its law by a highly structured serial distribution of jurisdiction. The theory of harmony is used as the basis of a structural narrative which operates within all music, according to this reading.

First, the harmonic machine is assembled in theoretical space, refining its component mechanisms of generation and legal distribution. A great vertical chain of priority, derivation and control. Each component relates to its immediate neighbour through a connectivity based in proportional difference. This provides the tight efficiency of the harmonic machine's gears and cogs, where everything operates according to a universal mapping of a single principle (in an almost proto-fractal sense).

Next, this tall machine is collapsed sideways into the realm of time, in order to capture the potentials in that domain for movement and change. However, these potentials are called upon only to enact and reenact the narratives of a structured spatiality. Time is turned into a series of spaces which are organized in the image of the vertical derivation of the original law.

The advantage of this sideways collapsing as far as the harmonic chain is concerned is the possibility of the return to the origin, the first principle of the system which is contained in the harmonic value of the root. In this, the dangers of the distance between music and noise are exorcized, and the law of the single sound asserts itself in an absolute

manner. Noise appears to be tamed, because there is only *One* sound in the system's reality, and it is harmonious, encompassing all *Other* sounds as its near or distant harmonics. Harmony is that which produces and regulates discord as an image, a representation of noise. In this, noise is not actually, but symbolically tamed. The extension of the harmonic law of the originary root to the distant harmonics provides a kind of structural talisman against noise, a ritual whereby the real threat of the overspill of noise into music is warded off. As Derrida notes, dialectics dictate that "exclusion is an inclusion" [*Dissemination*, p.48]

Equally, *time*, as well as *noise*, is symbolically tamed, through the process whereby the root, the single sound at the origin which drives all the Other subsidiary sounds, demonstrates its capacity for maintaining itself intact across any temporal territory. However, the idea of dividing time harmonically or spatially immediately presupposes that time is originally continuous and undivided. If this is so, then the taming of this temporality can only be either provisional or symbolic in itself. The most that can be maintained is that the movement of space into time which harmonic theory suggests, creates its own spatialized temporality, whether out of continuous time, or from itself. The question of precisely how space can be held to be that which produces time will become crucial to the consideration of these axes. In this spatial moment, however, all the requisite materials are assembled for the structures of Western tonality. We are also in close proximity to the laws of Pythagoras.

3.4 Minding Intervallic Temporality

by some secret Conformity of the Organs of Sense with the Impulse made upon them in these Proportions [...] the Necessity of such simple Proportions in *Time* is the more, that we also have the *Intervals* of *Tune* to mind [*Treatise*, p.391]

The first real intimation of a theory of musical time in Malcolm's *Treatise of Musick* occurs on page 323. Here, Malcolm has already laid the general principles of his "*Theory of Sounds* with respect to *Tune*" [p.323], and now feels compelled to mention and then suspend the project of doing the same for rhythm, "but tho' this be very considerable in Practise, yet there is much less to be said about it in *Theory*" [ibid.] He states, then, that he will continue with an essay on composition, "where I shall have Occasion to say what is needful with respect to the *TIME*." [ibid.] Already, then, as a component of its derivation from, and simplicity in comparison to harmony, we have melody, rhythm, and time defined as less theoretical and therefore more practical. The origin of time - harmony - is a matter of knowledge, but time itself is a matter of material action. In this way, rhythm can be read here as the technical mode, force or energy, of the entelechation of harmony; through rhythm, harmony is made manifest - time is a medium through which space expresses itself^[14].

In the twelfth chapter, entitled "Of the *Time* or *Duration* of Sounds

[14] *entelekheia* is a term attributed to Aristotle by Simplicus; "*entelekheia* is a word which is Aristotle's own; it means the form that is actualized." [*Physics* 278.6, quoted in J.O. Urmson, *The Greek Philosophical Vocabulary*, p.55] Entelechy is normally considered to be achieved through an energy, or *energeia*, which becomes the medium of actualization. As Aristotle writes, "the word *energeia* is used with reference to the function and it itself tends to the entelechy" [*Metaphysics*, 1050a 22, *Greek Philosophical Vocabulary*, p.55] Significantly for later developments in this reading of Malcolm and harmonic theory in general, Aristotle also makes a connection between the soul and entelechy; "soul is the first entelechy of a natural body that potentially has life" [*De Anima* 412a 27, *Greek Philosophical Vocabulary*, p.55] Thus, entelechy becomes a central term in Vitalism.

in *Musick*" [p.385-413], Malcolm makes a statement which echoes that quoted above where he gives an image of a semiotic chain of harmonic intervals stretching from one subject to the next and alternating the subject-object, male-female polarities at every connection: "THINGS that are designed to affect our Senses must bear a due Proportion with them; [...] nor can we easily judge of the Difference of Parts where it is great; therefore, that the Proportion of the *Time* of Notes may afford us Pleasure, they must be such as are not difficultly perceived" [*Treatise*, p.390]. There must be a relation of harmonic proportions between the rhythm and our capacity for perceiving that rhythm; this is achieved by a close proximity in terms of proportion between one rhythmic value and the next. Thus, the proportionality involved in the interval between two temporal units is itself in proportion to our senses and pleasure.

Again, it is a matter of proportion with regard to time which motivates Malcolm's theory, invoking the law of the spatial interval as a means of ontologically determining time by the same harmonic mechanisms as space. Additionally, further along the intervallic chain, it would be possible to conceive of a harmonic regulation operating within the mechanisms of perception and pleasure – in short, a *harmonics of the affect* (just such a possibility will become extant in relation to the writings of Adam Smith in Chapter 5 onwards).

Spatial harmonics therefore offers a rule for the operation not only of the *sonorous body* (or *corps sonore* in Rameau) and its distribution throughout time, but also its reception by the human body, and further, the production of an affect within that body. In a sentence the like of which is to be found in almost all music treatises of this era, Malcolm

writes: "*Pythagoras* is said to have had an absolute Command of the human Passions, to turn them as he pleased by *Musick*" [p.495]. This passage continues by detailing the precise action of Number within time; "the only *Ratios* fit for *Musick*, besides that of Equality, are the double and the triple, or the *Ratios* of 2 to 1 and 3 to 1; of greater Differences we could not judge, without a painful Attention" [p.390]. Malcolm reduces musical time to an alchemy of three terms: 1, 2, 3, which are permutable into three combinations - 1:1 ; 2:1 ; 3:1 - always, it is a question of two quanta connected by their proportional relation, "of Two Notes immediately next other" [p.391], supplementing each other according to a law of mediated difference^[15].

There is, then, a harmonious relation between these numeric rhythmic divisions and our sensory judgement; a question of the judgement of sounds "without a painful Attention". Yet, just as these rhythmic harmonies differ from their tonal counterparts which Malcolm immediately states as 2:3 ; 3:4, etc., so our perception of musical time

[15] There is a significant intertext between harmonic theory and alchemy at all points in its articulation. No doubt, the common reference point which each theory finds in Pythagorean thought is a component of this, but the question goes further into the dialectical operations of each. As Malcolm's dialectic divides sound into two categories only in order to re-articulate their connection according to the law of one end of the opposition (in the theory of the *concinuous* and the *inconcinuous*), so too alchemy divides an unstructured reality in order to re-synthesize it according to a specific component. In the words of C.G. Jung, "The alchemical operation consisted in separating the *prima materia*, the so-called chaos, into the active principle, the soul, and the passive principle, the body, which were then reunited in personified form in the *coniunctio* or 'chymical marriage.'" [*Paracelsus as a Spiritual Phenomenon*, in *Alchemical Studies*, pp. 122/3] The complicity of the soul-body duality of this action is also resonant for what has already been discussed of Descartes, and of the concept of *entelechy* as applied to harmonic theory.

differs from our perception of musical space^[16]. Once more, we have an implied complicity of reason and experience in generating knowledge;

'Tis true, that in the Proportions of *Tune* the *Ratios* of 2:3, of 3:4, &c. produce *Concord*; and tho' we conclude these to be the Proportions, from very good Reasons, yet the Ear judges of them after a more subtil Manner, or rather indeed we are conscious of no such Thing as the Proportions of the different Numbers of Vibrations that constitute the *Intervals* of Sound, tho' the Agreeableness or Disagreeableness of our Sensations seem to depend upon it, by some secret Conformity of the Organs of Sense with the Impulse made upon them in these Proportions; but in the Business of *Time*, the good Effect depends entirely upon a distinct Perception of the Proportions. [*Treatise*, pp.390/1]

Here the problematic relation of space to time becomes more complexly layered, and is no longer a question of a simple materialization, or entelechation from one domain to another. Rather, the entelechation of space into time is given a further spacedness in that a difference between two forms of perception is delimited; the perception of harmony and the perception of rhythmic time. This implication of two modes of perception in the process of harmonic space's materialization into the temporal world

[16] cf. Appendix I for a consideration of proportional ratios in Henryson's *Orpheus and Eurydice*. Equally, writing of meter, rather than "time", Rameau states: "We may derive meter from the source of harmony, for meter consists only of the numbers 2, 3, and 4, numbers which also give us the octave divided arithmetically and harmonically. Furthermore, since meter depends upon an equal series of movements, we may reduce it to two beats, as the space of time placed between the first and the second movements continues naturally with regularity" [*Traité de l'harmonie*, pp. 164/5]. This is in complete agreement with Malcolm, representing the organization of the next level of temporality up from "time" as an equally spatial order, but with a more truly "harmonic" set of numeric terms. Equally, Rameau's further analyzing down of meter to a movement across two units, or "times" is the same move which Malcolm makes in stating the object of his analysis as "two notes immediately next other". This determination of the prime component of rhythm as a two-term "phrase" is of great significance in terms of a dialectic of musical rhythm, as well as opening the possibility of an anthropomorphic image of temporality, as is discussed later with respect to the theories of de Momigny. It will also be noticed that this bi-polar division is at work in late nineteenth century theories of rhythm, such as Riemann's.

leads Malcolm into the area of psychological aesthetics: for Malcolm, the perception of tonal harmony is not conscious; it comes from a secret design of the ear, whose sensory capacity is mystically endowed with a proportionality corresponding to that of the harmonic intervals themselves. Thus, tonal harmony is a more veiled form of the universal principle of proportion, whose affects can be experienced in an immediate manner and without the necessity of rational reflection, although reason can supply us with a rationale for the phenomena, and indeed should be used. Note the return of a Platonic/Cartesian theme: the *energeia* which is transmitted from source to receiver is transmitted intact across an interval. As we have seen from Descartes, "an *acute* Sound requires a greater Force to produce it" [*Treatise*, pp.219/20], and thus "*acute* Sounds [...] strike the Ear with more Force" [ibid.]. For this reason, the voice proceeds by small intervals to avoid "Disproportion or Inequality in the *Intenseness*" [ibid.]. Thus, voice, sound and ear are all linked together by a common proportionality. Malcolm elaborates this point through the concept of "secret Conformity": the integrity of the unit of sound transmitted across the space between source and listener is based in the "secret Conformity" of the ear with the "Impulse made upon" it. The common proportionality of the sonic transmitter and the receiver ensure that the unit of sound retains all of its original characteristics.

Rhythm represents a simpler form of the principle, and relies on smaller, closer harmonic proportions. In rhythm, the differences between one note and its consequent are not so great as they are in harmony. It is as if the inherent danger of motion must be arrested by narrowing the degree of proportional difference, but it is also a matter of time's

subservience to space, since " the Necessity of such simple Proportions in Time is the more, that we have also the *Intervals* of Tune to mind^[17] along with it." [*Treatise*, p.391] It is also a question of our sensory capacity, since Malcolm writes: "of Two Notes immediately next other, these [simple proportions] ought to be the *Ratios*, because only the Notes in immediate Succession are or can be directly minded" [p.391]. The object of the listening "gaze", then, is the proportionality of harmonic space, with an originary root at its base. Our attentions must be turned towards this parameter above consideration of all others. Rhythm is merely the instrument of harmony's entelechy: of course it is segmented according to the same principles as harmony, making it a harmonic time, but this is merely expedient in providing a temporal structure into which the more pressing matter of harmonic structure can be inserted. Rhythmic structure

[17] Here there is indubitably a strong resonance of the Scots verb *mind*, meaning "remember", although Malcolm has put it into a present, rather than past, context, so that "to mind" is to *cognate* - to *call* to the mind, rather than to *recall* to the mind. Malcolm's first language would almost certainly have been Scots, along with other Edinburgh intellectuals such as Hume. The latter is particularly noted (along with Boswell) for his repeated attempts to eradicate "scotticisms" in his written language. Indeed, there was a fashionable industry in Enlightenment Edinburgh devoted entirely to rooting out the Scots language amongst the intellectual classes, even if English remained more of a written than a spoken language for many of them. Paul Scott notes that "in the 18th century the *literati* of the *Scottish Enlightenment* still spoke Scots but for writing they had developed an effective, but Latinate and sometimes ponderous, English prose." [*Andrew Fletcher and the Treaty of Union*, p.69] He goes on to quote an English traveller to Enlightenment Edinburgh: "I shall only say, that they appear to me, from their conversation, to write English as a foreign tongue; their mode of talking, phrase and expression, but little resembling the language of their works." [*ibid.*] It was only after the Act of Union with England in 1707 that the English language began to have an effective power within even the Scots-speaking capital, and much of the education system continued to use Scots as a medium for some time. Indeed, the philosopher Francis Hutcheson (an Ulster Scot) is credited as being the first Glasgow University professor to lecture through the medium of English following his appointment to the Chair of Moral Philosophy in 1730.

is, then, only an expressive vehicle for harmonic structure.

Composition becomes the implementation of the entelechy of harmony. The composer arranges sound in time in order to sequentially express the natural principles at work within the sonorous body. Yet while we are compelled always to express the same imperatives of proportional structure, our invention wills ever new permutations of the terms which remain ontologically constant. "The Length of Notes is a Thing merely accidental to the Sound, and depends altogether upon our Will in producing them" [p.391]. In the region of the practical and of composition, there are two kinds of rules which should be followed, or at least two modes of the same law which should be taken into account. Just as Malcolm claims that there are two mechanisms of aural perception – one for harmony (unconscious), one for rhythm (conscious) – there are two kinds of procedural constraints for composition.

As far as the temporal aspect of music is concerned, Malcolm writes that "*Melody* is chiefly the Business of the Imagination; so that the Rules of *Melody* serve only to prescribe certain Limits to it, beyond which the Imagination, in searching out the Variety and Beauty of Air, ought not to carry us" [p.420]. The theoretical territory under whose jurisdiction melodic composition falls, then, and whose boundaries may not be crossed, is inhabited by the imagination. To this extent, there is a freedom within this absolutely defined space, but only those freedoms which are prescribed as alternatives by the rules can be pursued. Our compositional freedoms in the domain of melody are legitimated by our compliance with the "ought" which Malcolm inscribes over our movements. In the same way that the law of close proximity defines which sub-harmonic intervals can

be called concinnous and utilized for mediating the spaces between harmonic intervals, there are only a limited number of movements possible in melodic composition, and these are contained within the proximity of this theoretical space.

We have already discerned that within Malcolm's writings on musical temporality there is an originary harmonic space which assembles all the requisite laws for temporal ontology. As we might expect, the laws which operate within the harmonic component of composition are less flexible: "But *Harmony* is the Work of Judgement; so that its Rules are more certain, extensive, and in Practise more difficult" [ibid.]. The *theoretical* space of harmonic composition turns out to be more "extensive". However, its *practical* territory is narrower, more strictly defined by a series of legitimizing clauses, more self-proximate and more efficient in producing its affects than that of melodic composition. The directives are clear, but require a harder resolve, calling once more upon reasoned judgement for their execution. Harmony's affects may operate in a "secret conformity" with the ear, but it is necessary to make this conscious on the part of the composer, to bring the reason behind the experience to the surface, through judicial knowledge. "in *Harmony*, the Invention has nothing to do, for by an exact Observation of the Rules of *Harmony* it may be produced without that Assistance from the Imagination." [ibid.] These laws are absolute and universal - our imagination, our will, our desire for varied innovation, all hold no ground at all with respect to the harmonic directives. The inviolability of the harmonic rule of law is necessary - here is the first term of all subsequent compositional dialectics, if the origin is nothing more than harmony, then in the space of harmony, innovation

cannot move. Only in this way can the various layers of harmony's entelechy be kept under the same generative principle as the source itself.

At every stage in the production of music, then, the harmonic proportions which underlie the mathematically verifiable phenomenon of the sonorous body are imprinted onto the next stage. The composer expresses the structures of harmony by arranging them in a time turned to an image of harmonic space. A piece of music inscribes this same image, by virtue of a "secret conformity" of the receptive proportions of the ear and the "impulse" which strikes the ear. There is then a further "secret conformity" between the ear and the passions, which are impulsed proportionally with the soul. The significant aspect of this particular harmonicity is that the content of the original information unit - that which is being expressed - remains absolutely intact in its passage from one layer of the system to the next. Perhaps the hyper-efficiency of this aspect of the Malcolmist system stems from the total conformity of the "containing" terms which pass the original unit from the source to the destination - time has been compartmentalized by the same rule as reception, and so forth. Thus, intention and structure are absolutely maintained in a system which draws analogies between Plato's enlightened philosopher and Malcolm's composer of the Enlightenment.

At this point, it would be all too easy to imagine that within this axiological determination of harmony and rhythm, the "virile" component would be unproblematically the harmonic one, if it were a question of an anthropomorphic image operating within the terms of the Pythagorean Table of Opposites. Yet, this is not the case; the dynamics of this system are again, more complex than one first imagines. First, note that the idea

of the "gaze" immediately comes complete with all the baggage of a semiotic gender divide: the object of the gaze is classically feminized and passive, the gazing subject masculinized and active. Secondly, we could note that while it is the law of harmonics which the rhythmic domain is captured by, complies with and is assembled under, once this has taken place, the rhythmic structure functions to contain the harmonic within its boundaries. Thus, rhythm becomes a highly active mode of the dissemination of the sonorous body, which is now, in a sense, acted upon by time, even if the law of sonority has previously arranged the mechanism of this mode. Thirdly, let us recall Malcolm's serial semiotic which involved a switching of subject-object polarity at every new level of connection. What is occurring at all levels is an archetypal process which constantly modifies the definition of input and output, which moves through levels of signification to keep the dialectical motion in action, redefining each level as each stage in the process is completed.

It is for these reasons amongst others that Malcolm, after having stated that rhythm "is a far more simple Subject" [p.386], can now state that "AGAIN, it must be minded, That the *Rhythmus* is a very principal Thing in *Musick*" [p.548]. The distance traversed by Malcolm between these two statements lies in the specific aspects of his system which he has assembled prior to each: the first statement is embedded in the consideration of theory. At this point, the absolute seat of power is in the harmonic origin. The second statement, however, comes after the section on the rules of composition. Thus, the practicalities of the entelechy of harmony have now been assembled, and the production of music has been shown to operate by the semiotic codes described above.

Malcolm can now deal with the affective, temporal aspect of music, and in discussing the ancient Greek approach to this, he demonstrates that even though we can consider the harmonic origin to be the "male" component during the theoretical assembly of music, the opposite can be true during the practical stage of the process. Rhythm is a "very principle Thing" in this stage,

for 'tis this Variety of Movements in the quick or slow Successions, or Length and Shortness of Notes, that's the conspicuous Part of the Air, without which the other [harmony] can produce but very weak Effects; and therefore most of the Ancients used to call the *Rhythmus* the *Male*, and the *Harmonica* the *Female*. [*Treatise*, p.548/9]

From this we can understand the particular way in which Malcolm's harmonicity works as a serialized dialectic; a chain of dialectical processes with terms from one linking on to terms in the next, ever re-polarizing each other. There is therefore no absolutely stable definition of one stage in the process - the limited pragmatics of each situation must be taken into account.

First, we have an original source, the first term of the dialectic. This is the virile, controlling term, because it generates an essence, or *ousia*^[18], and transmits it into the second, middle term - time. At this point, the second term is merely an empty capacity, incomplete and therefore territorially indefinite prior to the arrival of the *ousia*. The dialectic is closed when the first term inseminates the second with the *ousia*, thus creating the whole of the third term, specifying its boundaries,

[18] This term is also translated from the Greek as Being; "in relation to the true being [ousian] which you say always remains in every way the same" [Plato, from the *Sophist*, 248a, translated in *Greek Philosophical Vocabulary*, p.120] Equally, in a non-technical capacity, the term can be translated as "possessions". This immediately links it into the network of meanings surrounding property, propriety, properness, and so forth.

and stabilizing it.

The second stage of the process now begins, with the third term of the previous dialectic becoming the first term of the next dialectic. Now it is this term's turn to change its polarity and inseminate its second term with the *ousia* in order to create a further dialectic at a further level, and so on.

In this way, the proportions of the process - which are the proportions of the original *ousia* - are repeated at every level. However, each "next" containing term is merely a potential container, an indeterminate space - a pure capacity which, at the instant of the injection of *ousia* is assembled into a virile and determinate body with respect to the following term.

Additionally, the *ousia* which is passed down this semiotic chain remains intact. It is the carrier of virility and the condition of proportional formation. It is this original component which assembles the "masculinity" of terms from their previous "femininity". There is never any need to modify it, since its law is successfully stamped on every intermediate term. As it passes from one to the next, there is, in a sense, a perfect fit of unit and containing capacity. Nothing is damaged, lost or added in transit. And is *ousia* not one of the essences of logocentrism? The vast harmonic machine, with its light-filled essence has the listener's soul as the goal of its manifestation. As Derrida has written of another such metaphysical system, it all rests on "this *logos* which calls to itself and summons itself by itself as *telos*, and whose *dynamis* tends toward its *energeia* or *entelechia*" [*Writing and Difference*, p.166] Could this apply as much to a "harmony" as to a "melody"?

From this position, we can see that the image of harmony as given by Derrida (through Rousseau) in *Of Grammatology* is only one possible reading. That reading was of a harmony which was inherently concerned with the multiplication of spacings, but a multiplication which was infinite and threatened the rupture of the very concept of structure. However, by engaging directly with harmonic theory (which Derrida avoids) we can easily provide a reading where everything turns on the image of a harmonic mechanism which, rather than engendering chaos, operates by dialectically mastering its energy in order to state structural imperatives over and over. Further, and it is also possible to consider the existence of a system of essences which operates within the structure of harmony, being the site of production for a pseudo-Rousseauist form of spatial attenuation. This spatial attenuation keeps the intervallic mechanisms of harmony in check, assuring the continual emphasis on *concinuous*, rather than ultimately dissonant spaces. Rather than the interval acting as a rupturing force, then, one can read it as always ever encapsulated within the ontological law, and the gravitational pull towards structural unison. If harmonics are true supplements, they can just as easily be determined as images of an origin, and *bound by that origin's law*.

CHAPTER FOUR

RHYTHMIC SPACE

This the feeling heart
Would tenderly suggest: but 'tis enough,
In this late age, adventurous to have touched
Light on the numbers of the Samian Sage.
High Heaven forbids the bold presumptuous strain,
Whose wisest will has fixed us in a state
That must not yet to pure perfection rise:
Besides, who knows, how, raised to higher life,
From stage to stage, the vital scale ascends?

- *Spring*, James Thomson (1728).

CHAPTER FOUR

RHYTHMIC SPACE

4.1 Ontological *Rythmus*^[1]

there is a *Subject*, viz. some *Person* or *Thing* the Discourse is referred to [...] in like Manner, in every regular and truly *melodious Song*, there is one Note which regulates all the rest [*Treatise*, p.266]

Malcolm's conception of tonal form relies here on images drawn from the theory of *rhetoric*. The renewed interest in such models have, of late, begun to provide a store of *topoi* for the ideological analysis of music – the return to rhetoric as a strategic means of connecting the sonic to the *forms*, if not the *content* of the phonic, thus opening the way for a hermeneutics of instrumental signification. Susan McClary, for instance, derives a feminist critique of tonal practise from the recovery of the fact that during the Enlightenment, "music was typically discussed in terms of affect and rhetoric." [*Feminine Endings*, p.20] From this basis, she traces various *subversions* of rhetorical codes to show a series of pseudo-deconstructive "*reversals* in the representation of gender" [*ibid.*, p.49, emphasis added] On the other hand, Elaine Sisman accuses McClary of perpetrating "overheated ideological reading[s]" in this field [*Mozart: The "Jupiter" Symphony*, p.98]. Nevertheless, Sisman broadly concurs with

[1] Throughout this chapter, Malcolm's spelling has been adopted unless there is a quotation from another source.

McClary's hermeneutic basis, writing that "the Classical composer may be seen as drawing on a common fund of musical types or 'commonplaces,' the source of ideas and arguments that constitutes *invention (inventio)*, the first five parts of Classical rhetoric." [ibid., p.46] In much of McClary's work, the deconstruction of autonomous "absolutes" in instrumental music relies on putting certain phonically-derived *indécidables* back into play in order to *displace the sonic*. However, the phonic "source" which Sisman and McClary flag up can be shown to rely on certain aspects of harmonic theory itself. Yet, as we will see, the reversal of this rhetorical return is not a simple matter of following Derrida's deconstruction of Rousseau, of reactivating the sonic *indécidables* within a phonocentric theory. In the previous chapter, harmony itself was characterized as a dialectically logocentric (although not fully *phonic*) schema. Clearly, the search for the "source" is more labyrinthine.

Let us pick Malcolm's thread up here, but this time, moving in the *opposite* direction – not the rhetorical sources of instrumental music, so much as the harmonic mechanisms of rhetoric;

the ancient *Greeks* and *Latins* [...] took infinite Pains to cultivate their Language, and make it as harmonious, especially in what related to the *Rythmus*, or Number, and Combination of long and short Syllables, as possible; to this End particularly were the *pedes metrici* invented, which are the Foundations of their Versification [*Treatise*, pp.601/2].

Quoting the Dutch theorist, Isaac Vossius, Malcolm opens a *diametrically* analogous agenda to Rousseau's phonocentric theory of music; namely, a *harmonic theory of poetry*. His approach to this agenda lies in a summary of an Ancient Greek division of the temporal aspects of the arts into two categories – *rhythmica* and *metrica*. While the first category is a subdivision within music proper (along with *harmonica*) the

second category, *metrica*, "belongs properly to the *Poets*, and respects the versifying Art" [p.455]. Thus, the possibility is raised of a complicity between music and poetry established not through a common vocal source, but through a common medium of rhythm, or *spatial time*. We have already considered the segmentation of time which is carried out to ensure the entelechation of music-harmonic space, and here we have the poetic possibility of a spatially measured temporality.

Malcolm continues his delineation of this division by citing the claim of Aristides Quintilianus that *rythmus* is further subdivided into two categories: the *static* or the *mobile*. The static aspect of *rythmus* is expressed in purely visual-spatial terms, and is the concrete realization of harmonic number in the temporal world, as in "a well made Statue" [p.456]. *Rythmus* which is mobile itself divides into two further subcategories. First there is the motion of a human body, as in dancing; this is again visual-spatial, but now takes on the aspect of dividing time spatially, rather than simply existing spatially in time. Second, there is "the Motion of Sound or the Voice" [ibid.], in music or in oratory. This is also involved in the spatial organization of time, but is no longer *visual-spatial*. Rather, it exists in an acoustic space. For these reasons, Malcolm writes that "Rythmus is perceived either by the Eye or the Ear, and is something general" to all arts [ibid.].

Rythmus "may be without *Metrum*", as is the case with the first two categories - sculpture and dance [ibid.]. *Metrum*, however, belongs to the third sub-category of *rythmus*, being "perceived only by the Ear"

[ibid.]^[2]. Despite this differentiation between *metrum* and the visual manifestations of *rythmus*, it is yet imaged in rigidly spatial terms, taking the anthropomorphic model of the *pedes metrici*, or *metrical feet*. The grafting of the spatial concept of the *pedes metrici* onto acoustic *metrum* represents once more the appropriation of time by a spatial mechanism in order to harmonize the distant term to the original space. In this way, the use of metrical techniques in performance become^s a kind of dance across the proportional capacities of the ear. This aural dance is also that which Malcolm referred to when writing of the "secret conformity" of the ear with the proportions of the "impulse" made upon it. These spaces are "danced" across by these "metrical feet", the feet which are in perfect proportion to the spaces of the ear.

This image derived from dance and applied to music arrives there by way of literature. Yet regardless of which direction the "influence" of one art upon the other lies (or indeed, whether we can write of influence at all, if by that we invoke a theory of origination), there is a complicity between the theories of music and language which partake of the Hellenic moment, and this complicity arranges itself around the issues of harmony and rhythm. One of the first extensive studies of harmony and language to be written in English, and very much in the Pythagorean mould, was John Mason's *An Essay on the Power and Harmony of Prosaic Numbers*, published in London, 1749, 28 years after Malcolm's *Treatise*. Mason conceived of this text as a sequel to his earlier *Essay on the Power of Numbers and the Principles of Harmony in Poetic Compositions*, yet the harmonic power of

[2] Malcolm's *metrum* here signifies metre, not the Gregorian Chant meaning of the same Latin word. *Metrum* is thus the structural organization of *rythmus*, just as metre is of rhythm.

Number, perhaps due to the greater aesthetic distance to be transversed, is all the greater in his study of prose.

On the first page of the preface, Mason writes that his programme is to instill in the reader's use of language "a critical Regard to the Structure of their Periods; or of such a Care in the Choice and Disposition of their Words as will give them that agreeable Flow which the Antients called *Rhythmus*: The Harmony of which every good Ear perceives" [pp.iii/iv]. Once more, the emphasis on a spatial temporality and its proportional correlation with the ear of the initiate, but this time within a description of language. Further, there is the use of lexis more accustomed to a specific musical application. Quoting Geddes' *Composition of the Antients*, Mason asserts that "many Writers [...] being destitute of a just Ear, run into dissonant and jarring Measures" [p.v]. Here, the ear is not only imaged as partaking of a just judgement, but also as operating within the musical sense of tuning - justice and consonance are compounded to dispel dissonance. However, this dissonance occurs in the parameter of "measures" - it is a metrical dissonance, evoking the image of a tuning of temporal, not harmonic, intervals.

Equally, the image of the ear is of significance - if this is a theory of prose as an art of writing, then it is within a phonocentric mode. It is not the reading eye that counts to Mason, but in Derridean terms, the hearing and understanding ear. Just as Rousseau's unified theory of poetry and music must negate the instrumental or at least problematize its delineation in theory, so the same Hellenic will to unify the arts problematizes the written page for prose. The economy of both arts is hemmed in by the borrowed image, a mutual debt of reference. Mason

demonstrates how his awareness of the theoretical manoeuvres of the music treatises of the time frame his desire to do the same for poetry. In the preface, he echoes the Rameauist moment in asserting that reason and knowledge must supplement our experience – the ear cannot of itself provide a sound basis for judgement, and music theory is his model: "*A good Ear is worth a thousand Rules* – 'Tis true; so it is in Music. But an Acquaintance with the musical Notes and Chords, and the Rules and Principles of Harmony is notwithstanding necessary to make a good Musician." [p.8] Mason's project, then, is to write a harmonic theory of poetry on a par with the music treatises of the scientific Moderns. To this end, he develops the specifically Pythagorean aspects of the Aristotelian moment; his prime image is what he calls Numerous Composition – a manifestation of Pythagorean Number in prosody.

Across this concept Mason inscribes an anthropomorphic image, when he writes of the Art of numerous composition as "far from being Effeminate" [p.4] Numerous composition is a specifically masculine entity, and as we will see, is so by virtue of the action of a harmonic mechanism within it. This harmony, however, is always phonocentrically imaged in Mason's text. Number itself is a virile voice to Mason, when he asserts that "all *Demosthene's Thunder* would have failed him had it not been hurled in Numbers." [p.3] Here we can read of an anthropomorphism comparable to that which Malcolm assembles in his intervallic chain, with its alternating gender polarities which exchange a presence for an absence, and *vice versa*. In Mason, the possibility of harmony depends on the crucial moment of entelechy through a compositional act – in other words, the introduction of time. When space exceeds itself and spills over into time, or is "hurled"

into time by the composer (creating as it does so a spatial construction of time) it is then that the voice at the centre, the *ousia* which is transmitted, can access the force of time, *rythmus*, dividing time by this numeric principle, and successively voicing each proportioned unit.

The question can be raised as to what constitutes the construction of the masculinity of numeric composition in structural terms; what are the techniques which assemble the form of the numbers which allow for the possibility of space being hurled into time? To understand this, we must return to the action of the *pedes metrici*, the image of metrical feet which belong to the ground of *metrum* common to music and language. One aspect of this anthropomorphic image is its bipedal connotation - two feet, one left, one right, both swinging from under the body, alternating in a symbiosis of backwards and forwards motion, but with the net effect of a general forward motion. In "putting one's best foot forward", as the phrase goes, one also realizes a certain priority of one foot over the other - just as we are left handed or right handed. The possibility of the dialectic is not far away in this simple model. With the introduction of two "lengths" to the feet, the prioritization of the one over the other is compounded - short and long. Mason gives two tables, the first of which sets out the composition of the familiar "simple feet":

Feet of Two Syllables:

Pyrrhic	vv
Iambic	v-
Trochee	-v
Spondee	--

Feet of Three Syllables:

Tribrachys	v v v
Dactyl	- v v
Amphibrachys	v - v
Anapæst	v v -
Bacchic	v - -
Cretic	- v -
Palimbacchic	- - v
Molossus	- - -

In Mason's system, just as in the small scale there are two forms of prime unit, the long and the short, so at the level of these simple combined units, there are two forms which operate not merely at the level of whether the unit is comprised of two or three prime units, but whether the unit is capable of occupying a central structural role. Again, it becomes a question of anthropomorphism; "These Numbers, considered in themselves or unconnected with any other, are either Generous and Strong, or Base and Weak" [p.9]. These units are to be considered in isolation from each other, and divided into two categories - they are, inherently, ontologically strong or weak. Their division according to this principle creates the following table:

The Strong, Generous Numbers:

Iambic	v -
Spondee	- -
Anapæst	v v -
Cretic	- v -
Bacchic	v - -
Molossus	- - -

The Weak, Base Numbers:

Pyrrhic	v v
Trochee	- v
Tribrachys	v v v
Dactyl	- v v
Amphibrachys	v - v
Palimbacchic	- - v

Thus, the two categories, strong and weak, are assembled according to whether the unit cadences on a long or short beat respectively. That which occupies more time, or more temporal space at the final moment, is that which endows the unit with a stable "masculinity". As Mason writes, "a Foot that ends with a long Syllable is more Strong and Sonorous, and consequently more Noble and Generous, than one that terminates in a short one." [p.11] For Mason, the masculinity of the strong feet is bound up with a heightened sonority: in other words, the sustainment of sound through time, the conquering of time by space is what is achieved by the sonority, the virility of the literary voice.

However, as we have observed in other systems, so too in this - the stable requires an alteration with the unstable in order to create a mechanism of passage from one stability to another. The short, weak beat here connects two long, strong beats, forming a periodic regulation of the exchange between two essential structural units. In this respect, Mason's system is a dialectical one which provides a model in the rhythmic dimension itself for a pseudo-entelechy of the structurally *essential* temporal space through the motive power of a structurally *provisional* temporal space. "Termination", closure, must occur on the strong element in order to guarantee a masculine nobility.

Again, it is a question of legal balance:

When we call these Feet base, low and feeble, we mean only when they are taken by themselves; for when they are judiciously blended with others, they are of equal Importance with the rest, and (like Mortar in a Building) contribute as much to the Strength and Beauty of the Composition. [p.10, fn.1]

In a manner identical to Malcolm's theory of the mutual dialectical reliance of the concinnous and inconcinnous interval, Mason sets up a

system whereby the One requires its Other in order to continually define itself as the One. The propagation of its law across all other spaces is achieved by virtue of a "judicious blend" of the two archetypally opposed elements. As Malcolm writes of the "inconcinuous degrees", or steps of the scale, "of themselves they have not Sweetness enough to satisfy the Ear, and are of Use only with regard to the *Concords*" [*Treatise of Musick*, p.220]. The supplementary, transitional term, then, only signifies within the economy of the originary, structural term – by itself it cannot produce the return to stasis, and therefore the reification which produces pleasure as an expression of closure.

The closure represented by the cadence, whether final or intermediary, is of great structuring importance to a serialized temporal structure. It is the point at which the full presence of the law is asserted, then to either be succeeded by another play of the return of the law of the origin, or to close on the origin for good. First, it requires the division of time into discrete units: "Every Sentence may be conceived as divisible into distinct and separate Clauses; every Clause where there is an apparent Cessation of the Voice, should always End with a generous Foot" [*Essay on the Power of Numbers*, p.19]. The structural significance of the return, then, requires the division of sentences into clauses, and then the hierarchization of these clauses into cadential or connective, according to their complicity in the presence or the absence of the voice. Next, it must be assured that there is a judicious balance between the two types of clauses, so that "the short ones be duly qualified by the succeeding long ones; reserving the best and most harmonious Numbers for the Cadence." [p.19] In other words, the weaker rhythmic units are legitimated through

their acceptance by and positioning within the law of the strong unit.

With Rousseau's ghost inhabiting the Pythagorean margins, two terminological series are assembled and set up in opposition to each other:

(1) The Strong, Generous, Noble, Sonorous, Sublime, Grave, Majestic, Bold, Eager, Solemn, Stately, Vehement, Eager, Martial;

(2) the effeminate, weak, feeble, base, low, light.

Even the number of terms in each series demonstrates which Mason considers to be of more significance. From this point, Mason then goes on to make further hierarchical distinctions between the stronger *pedes metrici*, and, in taking a cue from Aristotle's *Poetics*, chooses the most archetypal unit as the model – the iambic foot: "Hence Aristotle sais that in his time it was more used than any other Number by those who spake in public. [...] *None of all the measures run more naturally into our common speech than the iambic*". [Essay, p.12, fn. (n)]

Here we have the whole situation in microcosm, with a single weak beat opening up the possibility of a closure on a strong beat. This is the prime generating structure of the whole system for Mason; "it follows that the Iambic (v-) is the most noble and generous of all the Feet." [p.12] The elemental simplicity of this rhythmic unit can be taken as a model for the structural organization of time at all levels of a work – it is the basic compositional unit of all metrical arts, based on the originary difference of the short and the long (supplement to origin; absence to presence; female to male; Other to One, etc.). This is also expressed as a function of the Natural order as it relates to Mason's musical model: "as a long Time is best

after a short one, [...] the slow Airs in Music come in most agreeably after the quick ones. This is as pleasing to the Ear as Rest after Motion is to Nature." [pp.12/3] Within this ontology, the iambic unit provides the complete and simplest image of the division of Nature itself, or rather, *herself*, as Mason would have it. Equally, the iambic foot marks the measure of all other feet: "the rest have their Degree of Excellence in Proportion as they approach or recede from it" [p.12]. Excellence is a matter of a spatial relation – more precisely, a proportional relation – with a direct correlation of proximity to the iambic foot. The series of feet is a matter of a spatial sequence, a truly linear series, with an iambic foot as its origin, stretching out its law of the return across all other terms in the series.

The vitality of the iambic unit is something which Mason particularly stresses as, if not openly determined by an image of masculine gender, then at least virile and invasive: "the *Iambic* (which is of all the Numbers most generous) is very strong and sonorous, very proper (as *Horace* observes) to excite and express the Passion of Anger. Hence the *Anapæst* and *Iambic* are not improperly called by some, the *pushing Numbers*." [p.14] This most originary of rhythmic units, then, operates a virility at the heart of the *rythmus*, and this echoes Malcolm's statements that during the act of composition, "the *Rhythmus* [is] the *Male*, and the *Harmonica* the *Female*." [*A Treatise of Musick*, p.549].

Recalling the image of Demosthene's Thunder which is generated by the "hurling" of space into time, Mason puts the following in a footnote to the idea of the "Martial Air":

v - v - v - v - - v v -
The double double Beat / Of the thundering Drum

In this image of the friction of harmony's entelechy through time is

of a territorial limit, the alternation of two elements framed by one principle. It is the archetypal possibility of the gender determined dialectic of time. This is the mechanism by which *rythmus* is assembled as a serialized, spatialized time^[3].

[3] The concept of the gendered cadence also emerges at a later point in the writings of the Belgian theorist Jérôme-Joseph de Momigny (1762-1842), particularly his *Cours complet d'harmonie et de composition* (1803-6). Here, the cadence is regulated by a division into *levé* (upbeat) and *frappé* (downbeat, lit. "struck"). These two terms are placed in a non-reversible temporal series: the *levé* always preceding the *frappé*, as the *antécédent* to the *conséquent*. The unit created by the succession of these two terms in this order is thus de Momigny's *cadence* or *proposition musicale*. Further, there are two levels of cadence; the *cadence mélodique* and its containing term, the *cadence harmonique*. This is contained by the *hémistiche* (Gk.: half a line of verse), which is contained by the *vers*, which in turn is contained by the *période*, and this contained by the *reprise*. Thus we have a series of structural terms which are capable of analyzing a score into hierarchical units, from the smallest to the largest. Here, as in Mason's gender determined rhythmic theory, we find the beginnings of a dialectics of musical rhythm, operating within a more general economy of a dialectic of absence and presence. According to de Momigny's system, rhythm is, first of all, structured and sequential. Next, within the structure of a rhythmic series, there are points of greater and lesser structural significance which can be articulated as masculine or as feminine cadences. The two cadences operate each other alternately, with the masculine term framing the overall structure, and the feminine term regulating the passage from one masculine unit to another. In this sense, the *cadence féminine* is an absence which calls forth the presence of the *cadence masculine*; it is merely the token of exchange between two structurally integral points which are the main focus of the general economy. It is this function of the *cadence féminine*, that of connective exchange, which de Momigny focuses on in his rhythmic dialectic, and which distinguishes this function of the upbeat, or *leve* from another form of the feminine principle; the *leve* or upbeat as anacrusis - that which comes before *crusis* (*krouo* being Greek "to strike"). Indeed, another name for the connective *leve* is *metacrusis*, that which is beyond *crusis* and if it is beyond *crusis*, then surely we can read it as existing outside of the space of *crusis*. The *cadence féminine*, then, is the outside of the normative *crusis*; it exceeds *crusis*. However, such a reading of the term remains hardly radical - it is still defined according to an exterior economy, and thus falls into an ontological trap it would be better to escape. If it does hinder de Momigny's dialectic, it does so only by arresting its motion, making the situation more rather than less stable. A more serious excess is suggested by Susan McClary. In *Feminine Endings* (which, despite its title only devotes two pages to the concept of the gendered cadence) she outlines the problematics operative within a passage from Edward T. Cone's
(continued...)

Mason's programme in making the *pedes metrici* the centre of his theory goes further than a simple desire to lay down the laws of prosody. It is nothing more than a restoration of Hellenic theory against the barbarous dissonance of eighteenth century practice. At the head of Chapter One, he writes of "The high Esteem the Antients had for numerous Composition. The general Neglect of it among the Moderns. The Reasons of that Neglect. And the Weakness of those Reasons." [p.1] Mason's programme, then, is to "show, that the Rules and Principles of this Art [...] are as Applicable to our Language as theirs" [p.8]. In this, he implicitly forms an alliance with the anti-Enlightenment, pro-ancient movement represented by Rousseau, albeit complicated by his positioning of historical terms. His scientific essaying on the subject of language stands as an attack on his own time, setting up the example of an Ancient golden age of harmonious linguistic production which must be returned to in order to save language from demise. Significantly, however, his return is to a harmonic origin, invoking an Ancient Science as much as Rousseau invokes an Ancient Nature or Rameau a Modern Science. In this, we find

[3](...continued)

Musical Form and Musical Performance on performing the cadences in Chopin's Polonaise in A Major. As McClary writes in *Feminine Endings*, "Cone's nervousness over the 'feminine' cast of this ending suggests that more must be at stake than mere 'weakness.' Apel defines 'feminine endings' as those in which the final sonority is postponed beyond the down-beat. But we could also describe such events in terms of excess - a feminine ending then becomes one that refuses the hegemonic control of the barline." [*Feminine Endings*, p.11] This concept of the feminine which causes McClary to drop the inverted commas around the term as used by Cone and Apel, has a far more radical possibility, in its attack on the very limit of a piece of music; a true excess of rhythmic and structural anarchy which suggests a flow of the body of the music onto the body of ambient sound. This spillage would be better termed an anticrasis than a metacrisis. The anticrasis represents a deconstructive reading of de Momigny's gendered cadence; its excess is direct and affective.

another demonstration of the danger in assuming a univocal theoretical milieu around the issues of melody and harmony, ancient and modern, natural and synthetic.

4.2 The Ancient Voice and the Modern Critique

At first glance, one may assume that Malcolm unproblematically asserts a harmonic modernity and disavows the centrality of time, thus allying himself with Rameau and against Rousseau. However, just as Mason's position requires a certain reorganisation of the dualistic schema presented by Derrida's Rousseau, Malcolm's position proliferates the problematic further. Although he is a Modern in many senses, his stance will gradually be revealed as more pragmatic than oppositional. Therefore, let us begin to engage Malcolm on the question of the Ancients and Moderns.

One of Malcolm's Modern critiques of the Ancient Greeks lies in precisely their use of Mason's *pedes metrici* as "the only *Rythmus* of their *Musick*, and so powerful, that the whole Effect of *Musick* was ascribed to it [...] to make it the *Whole*, is perhaps attributing more than is due" [*Treatise of Musick*, p.602]. This critique of the centrality of the temporal (albeit a harmonic temporality) is perhaps to be expected from a Modern. However, Malcolm is here referring specifically to vocal music, and in a slight deviation from Modern dogma, continues this passage to assert the power of *logos* over *rythmus*: "the Words and Sense of what's sung [are] the principle Ingredient" [ibid.]. Ironically though, this logocentric assertion for the case of vocal music is used as a ground for the emancipation of the instrumental from the possibility of a literary origin.

While instrumental music is capable of making "a Connection betwixt certain Passions, which we call Motions of the Mind, and certain Motions in our Bodies; [...] how any particular Passion can be excited without such a lively Representation of its proper Object, as only Words can afford, is not very intelligible" [ibid.]. While vocal music can obviously use the representational power of *logos*, it is absurd to attempt, in Malcolm's view, to contend that instrumental music partakes of the same structures of signification. In this way, the over-deterministic role of the *pedes metrici* is absent not only from the Modern instrumental music, but also from Ancient vocal music.

It is all a question of a mechanics of signification to Malcolm: instrumental music makes "connections" between the "motions" of the world, and the "motions" of the mind and body. This is achieved by the impulsional mechanics we noted earlier - a serial chain of components, all connected one after the other, pass down the line not so much a representation of a passion as the harmonic essence of a passion. This *ousia*, when impulsed upon the body of the listener, then generates by the proportions of its impulsion, a motion within that body identical to the original motion felt by the composer. All of this occurs through a harmonic metaphysics.

Malcolm continues with a summary of Vossius' argument against Modern language and music. Vossius' claim is that there will be no more great poetry, music or song until "we new model our Languages, restore the ancient metrical Feet, and banish our barbarous Rhimes." [p.604] This Rousseauist argument denies any independent status for music at all - a decay in language marked the fall of music, and a resurrection of Hellenic

But then, what an Improvement in the Knowledge of pure *Harmony* has been made, since the Introduction of the modern *Symphonies*? Here it is, that the Mind is ravished with the Agreement of Things seemingly contrary to one another. We have here a kind of Imitation of the Works of Nature, where different Things are wonderfully joyned in one harmonious Unity: And as some things appear at first View the farthest removed from Symmetry and Order, which from the Course of Things we learn to be absolutely necessary for the Perfection and Beauty of the Whole; so *Discords* being artfully mixed with *Concords*, make a more perfect Composition, which surprises us with Delight. [pp.597/8]

Here Malcolm demonstrates the Classicism of his Enlightenment aesthetic, completely in concord with the development of the symphonic genre as such^[4]. Instrumental music is made possible by this play of pure sonic proportions, where symmetry, order and unity are the main theoretical operators. The dialectical balance of oppositions "ravishes" the mind, producing delight. The introduction of the mind as the locus of aesthetic resonance here is significant, for as Malcolm continues with his attack against the supporters of the Ancients he writes that the mind is "naturally pleased" with perceiving order and proportion, and that "this is an Application of Musick to a quite different Purpose to that of moving Passion" [p.598]. According to Malcolm, the action of an Ancient, phonic music, is ultimately an action upon the passions of the soul, whereas a Modern, purely sonic music, is also an action upon the capacity for proportional resonance of the mind; literally, the *minding* of music.

The Modern music is a balance between the rational and the emotional. It is not so much that Malcolm wishes music to be purely

[4] Malcolm's own use of the word "symphony", of course, must be read in the sense of the "sounding-together" of instruments - ie. instrumental music of any kind - and not referring to the formal concept of Symphony. However, his aesthetic system here is evidently in accord with the symphonic aesthetic of the emergent Classical period.

cerebral to the exclusion of all else, for he admits that "there is scarce any Piece of *Melody* that has not some general Influence upon the Heart" [p.599]. Equally, he claims that the Modern theatrical music is on a par with the ancient: "The *Italian*^[5] and *English* Theatres afford sufficient Proof of this; so that [...] there would be no Reason to say we had lost the Art of exciting Passion." [p.591]

However, he does posit the question "why must the moving of particular Passions be the only Use of *Musick*?" [pp.598/9]. He even departs far enough from the notion of the passions to state that the new music does not move any specific or "*particular* passions" at all. Again, he writes, "we also have a new Art, whose End is rather to entertain the Understanding, than to move *particular* Passions." [p.600, emp. add.] For Malcolm, then, the new sonic art induces motions in the mind which are proportional to the motions of its sounds, and the passions of the soul become an indeterminate, although present by-product of this movement.

This slight movement from "particular Passions" to a more pragmatic, proto-indeterminate theory of musical signification is also to be found in James Beattie's *Essay on Poetry and Music as they Affect the Mind*, which involves a negation of the absolute representation of specific passions in music through, again, a distinction between the vocal and the instrumental;

when I am asked what part of nature is imitated in any good picture or poem, I find I can give a definite answer: whereas when I am asked what part of nature is imitated in Handel's "Water Music", for instance, or in Corelli's eighth concerto, or in any particular English song or Scotch tune, I find I can give no definite answer, though no doubt I might say some

[5] For a more developed perspective on the reception of the Italian style in Enlightenment Edinburgh, cf. David Johnson, *Music & Society in Lowland Scotland*, with *Scottish Fiddle Music in the Eighteenth Century*, and John Purser, *Scotland's Music*.

plausible things, or perhaps after much refinement be able to show that music may by one shift or other be made an imitative art, provided you allow me to give any meaning I please to the word imitative. [*Essay on Poetry and Music*, p.128]

For Beattie, it requires a conceptual and lexical "shift" in order to accept a Baroque concerto or a Popular tune as having a representational power of the same order as literature. There is "no definite answer", although one can supply a "plausible" description, even if the inference here is that this is possible only through sophistry or "much refinement". Beattie continues by elaborating on this lack of representational definition in relation to the specific instance of Corelli;

I have heard that the 'Pastorale' in the eighth of Corelli's concertos (which appears by the inscription to have been composed for the night of the Nativity) was intended for an imitation of the songs of angels hovering above the fields of Bethlehem, and gradually soaring up to heaven. The music however is not such as would of itself convey this idea: and even with the help of the commentary it requires a lively fancy to connect the various movements and melodies of the piece with the motions and evolutions of the heavenly host, as sometimes flying off, and sometimes returning, singing sometimes in one quarter of the sky, and sometimes in another, now in one or two parts, and now in full chorus. It is not clear that the author intended any imitation; and whether he did or not, is a matter of no consequence, for the music will continue to please when the tradition is no more remembered. [*Essay on Poetry and Music*, p.128/9]

Here, we find some conclusions being drawn which would not be too out of place in a more contemporary context. While he states that music in and of itself is incapable of representation (a move towards the era of autonomy), he nevertheless alleges that the intentionality of the author can be doubted to the extent that it does not even (necessarily) signify in the utility of the piece. Significantly, however, Beattie's aesthetic scepticism does not negate the possibility of the listener "reading" their own signification into the piece, even if it is precisely the same

signification which Beattie has just expressed full scepticism about: "The harmonies of the 'pastorale' are indeed so uncommon and so ravishingly sweet that it is almost impossible not to think of heaven when one hears them." [ibid.] Although we can *theoretically* discount such imitation, then, it may be that the listener's choice to discount that theoretical basis can produce pleasure. The logical extension of this is that theory itself has affective capabilities (and this instrumentalist approach to theory locates Beattie as a precursor to Adam Smith's concept of the Imaginary Machine dealt with in the next chapters).

However, it also remains the case that Beattie's apparently radical negation of intentionality with respect to instrumental music can nevertheless be read as a component of a pro-Ancient, phonocentric agenda;

But if you grant me this one point, that music is more or less perfect in proportion as it has more or less power over the heart, it will follow that all music merely instrumental, and which does not derive significancy from any of the associations, habits or outward circumstances above mentioned, is to a certain degree imperfect; and that while the rules hinted at in the following queries are overlooked by composers and performers, vocal music, though it may astonish mankind or afford them a slight gratification, will never be attended with those important effects that we know it produced of old in the days of simplicity and true taste. [*Essay on Poetry and Music*, p.162]

Thus, vocal music is more affective, but Modern vocal music, through its unhealthy proximity to the instrumental, has lost the ultimate affective powers of the Ancient vocal origin. Nevertheless, Beattie's position is complex, accommodating a certain cheerfulness in his negation of intentionality with his avowed preference for the medium more easily associated with musical intentionality – the voice. His schema is, for instance, distinct from (Derrida's reading of) Rousseau's valorisation of the

Ancient. Rousseau proposes an instrumental music which is degenerate in its pale imitation of vocal music. Beattie, however, proposes an instrumental music which is precisely *not* imitative of vocal music - rather, the Modern vocal music which in a sense derives from instrumental styles is the prime target for accusation. Rousseau holds that representation in instrumental music is bad imitation, whereas Beattie holds that it is not imitative at all. His delineation of the divide between the instrumental and the vocal, as a divide of affective mode as much as power, is in this sense similar to Malcolm's. Hence, a specific strategic move can be used in common by "*opponents*", even if they each use this distinction for *opposite purposes*. To quote from Beattie once more, there is no contradiction in this historicist position which he shares with Malcolm:

while I thus insinuate that music is not an imitative art, I mean no disrespect to Aristotle who seems in the beginning of his *Poetics* to declare the contrary. It is not the whole but the greater part of music which that philosopher calls imitative; and I agree with him so far as to allow this property to some music, though not to all. But he speaks of the ancient music, and I of the modern; and to one who considers how very little we know of the former, it will not appear a contradiction to say that the one might have been imitative though the other is not. [*Essay on Poetry and Music*, p.127/8]

In such moves as these, Malcolm and Beattie are claiming, for their own distinct purposes, a radical distinction between two forms of musical signification; on the one hand, there is the Modern instrumental music which operates by pure harmonic mechanisms and affects the understanding of the mind, and on the other, there are the Ancient forms of vocal music which operate firstly through the spoken word, only secondarily utilizing harmonics as a vehicle, affecting the passions of the soul.

The historical specificity of Malcolm's aesthetic here cannot be easily

overlooked. Instrumental music did not gain much intellectual credibility on mainland Europe or in the rest of Britain until later in the century. Further, while it is true that the rightful existence of the instrumental genres had been recognized by several writers around and before Malcolm, his position is far more radical in claiming a truly independent ground for instrumental music. His position differs from most writers by his disavowal of the operation on the passions by instrumental music in favour of a movement of the mind or understanding. Even Mattheson, the great champion of instrumental music in the mid-century provides more of an apologetics for its existence than a justification for its independence by focusing on the image of a "language of tones" whose aim it is to stir the passions in the same way as vocal music. Malcolm, on the other hand, attempts a far more radical distinction by asserting a qualitatively different affectiveness for the sonic which aims at the mind as much as the heart or soul. The specificity of Malcolm's position on this has far more in common with the early nineteenth century than his own early eighteenth. Malcolm was certainly well-versed in the various aspects of Parisian culture at that point, and there may indeed have been some influence on his thinking from the acoustic research at the French Academy of Sciences. Closer to home, however, it was probably the case that Malcolm had the space in early Enlightenment Edinburgh to consider the virtues of instrumental music with the recent revival of dance music in particular. Certainly, Malcolm's text also demonstrates a keen interest in the aesthetic space between music and dance.

Yet Malcolm's project is not so much to reinstate or obliterate the Hellenic moment, but to investigate its mechanisms in comparison to the

theory of the Modern music, mapping the two in terms of affective power, and casting a rational doubt upon the grander claims for ~~the~~ powers of the Ancients: "there are still wonders pretended to have been performed by the ancient musick, which we can produce nothing like; such as those amazing transports of mind, and hurrying of men from one passion to another, all on a sudden, like the moving of a machine" [p.592]. Despite Malcolm's expressed doubts as to these reports, his system, as is the case with many of his time and since, still shares the same basic "mechanics" where the mind is literally "transported" through an immediate communication of essence across the representational space. He in fact rechannels certain Ancient theoretical currents towards an expansion of the new scientific theories of music. He aims to show that the mechanisms of the Ancient aesthetic operate within the body of the Modern music, and *vice-versa*. The difference between his theories and those of Vossius or Beattie is not so much over the processes by which music has affective power - in fact, they are in close agreement on matters ontological and mechanical. The dispute is about whether any of music's powers are the sole province of the Ancients or the Moderns, and while he wishes to draw a distinction between the two epochs along the lines of the vocal and the instrumental respectively, he also asserts that "We have *vocal Musick* as pathetick [affective] as ever the ancient was." [p.606] His claim is that the affective powers of the Modern voice are equal, if not superior to the powers of the Hellenic voice; "we have admirable Compositions, and the Art of *Musick*, taken in all that it is capable of, is more perfect than it was among the old *Greeks* and *Romans*." [p.608] The capability of the Modern style is extended from not only a vocal music which is the match of the

from certain other theories of signification from the earlier Enlightenment. In this, it represents a methodological alternative to the abstract, ahistorical unity of such systems as John Locke's "Theory of Ideas". In other respects, Malcolm makes use of and adds to the kind of mechanics of signification which Locke assembles in the *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (1690). Locke's abstract reasoning negates the possibility of a historical perspective and thus represents an attempt at a univocal theory established from first principles, following on from Descartes, and presaging Rameau's Cartesianism in turn. Malcolm, however, creates a Modern theory from the first principles of harmonic science, and then introduces a proto-sociological comparison with the Ancient musical system, unearthing its theory of music, and finally creating a "bivocal" theory of musical signification. This historical method places Malcolm within the broader context of the Scottish Enlightenment in general.

Locke's *Essay* begins with a dismissal of the existence of innate knowledge, suggesting instead that knowledge comes into the mind through experience. It is the mechanics of the entry of knowledge into the mind, rather than the generation of knowledge within the mind which is under consideration here; "Sensation" rather than "Reflection". In Locke's theory of perception, it is a question once more of spatiality: "Though the qualities that affect our senses are, in the things themselves, so united and blended that there is no separation, no *distance* between them, yet it is plain, the ideas they produce in the mind *enter* by the senses simple and unmixed" [*Essay*, p.99, emphasis added]. A series is immediately set up: there is an inside and an outside to perception, a perceiving subject and a perceived object. Actual phenomena, external objects, are absolutely

measured by the proximity of two vibrational values to each other in a system of proportionality. The closer two vibrations are to each other in terms of a harmonic scheme, the more frequent their harmonic "coincidence".

From this position, the mechanics of the signification of sound can be understood with reference to the phenomenon of the consonant sympathetic vibration of two sounding bodies. "If a Sound is raised with any considerable *Intenseness*, [...] and if there is any other sonorous Body near, whose *Tune* is *unison* or *octave* above that Sound, this Body will also sound its proper Note *unison* or *octave* to the given Note, tho' nothing visibly has touched it." [*Treatise*, p.85] Thus, it is possible to excite motion in other bodies without any necessary visible contact. All that is required is a certain proportionality of vibration, a harmony of motions. This is transmitted according to a chain of affectivities: "when one String is struck, and the Air put in Motion, every other String within the reach of that Motion receives some impression from it" [p.86]. Impulsion from the initial string upon the surrounding air excites a motion of that air which is in proportion to the motion of the string. This air motion then impulses upon any other string within a certain proximity and proportionality to the quantity of the air motion either the same motion as the initial string or a motion proportional to it.

In this way, a series of surfaces already in contact with each other disseminate a vibration by means of stimulation, this vibration becoming weaker the further down the chain of surfaces it goes: "the Sound of the untouched Chord is weaker than that of the other, and its Vibrations consequently less" [p.88]. The affectivity of the vibration has a centre,

Malcolm's system suggests a supplementary dispersion of energy, it becoming less virile across successive distances, and this very distance being the cause of the dispersal, the Pythagorean model suggests an integrity of virility across distances, a transmission of original essences. As Timæus writes: "The world soul's element of divinity [in other words, its originary harmony] radiates out from the centre entirely penetrating the whole world" [*Pythagorean Sourcebook*, p.289]. It is the action of this "entire penetration" which grants the overcoming of the dispersal risked by movement across a distance. Thus, the Divine Music, the Celestial Music of the four-fold *musica mundana*, what Timæus calls the "world's soul element of divinity", enters every thing throughout the entire world, affectively presaging Locke's perceptual concept of "actual entrance".

The Pythagorean theme of total semiotic control through the aesthetic penetration of the listening body can also be seen operating in the music aesthetics of Henry Home, Laird Kames. In his *Elements of Criticism*, he writes;

Music has a commanding influence over the mind, especially in conjunction with words. Objects of sight may indeed contribute to the same end but more faintly; as where a love poem is rehearsed in a shady grove or on the bank of a purling stream. But sounds, which are vastly more ductile and various, readily accompany all the social affections expressed in a poem, especially emotions of love and pity. [*Elements of Criticism*, (1761), p.52]

Firstly, we have the image of words directly controlling the mind, according to a semiotic where communication is a matter of phonic commands. The combination of the logocentric emphasis on the word along with the directness of the signification, allies Kames here with Mason's poetics (and the Cartesian mode of Malcolm's historical survey). Secondly, this is expressed in terms of influence, and it is noted that the fluidity of

sound is its ductility, or its transmission through the ear from the outside to the inside. In other words, there is a commanding penetration occurring here, and significantly, Kames associates this twice with his determination of "love". In this sense, we have a semiotic system which supports a specific sexual politics, operating through a frame of hierarchy and invasive essence.

A particularly striking example of such a sexual politics connected specifically to music aesthetics is demonstrated in the Eighteenth Century writings of Alison Cockburn. In her *Letters and Memoirs*, she describes the penetrative power of composer John Reid's (1721-1807) flute pieces as he performs them himself;

Of all the sounds I ever heard (and my soul has soared to heaven before now), of all the sounds I ever heard, Colonel Reid's flute well, it is amazing the powers of it. It thrills to your very heart. He plays it in any taste you please and composes what he plays. You know my taste is the *penseroso*, and so it is his. He played me five acts of a tragedy that went to my heart, and I spoke in to myself all the words of it. I would not let him speak the epilogue. [...] and for his flute, it speaks all languages. But those sounds that come from the heart to the heart - I never could have conceived of it. It had a dying fall - I was afraid I could not bear it when I heard it perfectly. I can think of nothing but that flute [*Letters and Memoirs*, pp.81/2].

Here we have an example not merely of affectivity, but of extreme aesthetic penetration - Reid's music moves directly "from the heart to the heart", but also "*speaks all languages*". It is clear that Reid's flute has

phonic, and not just merely sonic, power^[8].

A similar system can be discerned in Francis Hutcheson's *Inquiry into Beauty*, where the affectivity of instrumental music is described in much the same way as Rousseau, Home and Cockburn would later. The voice is the prime *locus* of affectivity, and as such, instrumental music is a representation of vocal music: "The human voice is obviously varied by all the stronger passions: now when our ear discerns any resemblance between the air of a tune [...] to the sound of the human voice in any passion, we shall be touched by it in a very sensible manner" [*Inquiry into Beauty*, 1:VI:xii]. Although Hutcheson also uses the term "connection" within this context, it is a connectivity whose mode is that of the Pythagorean concept of "touching", leading us towards "resemblance" and thus a Rousseauist concept of vocal origins.

A more explicit consideration of these parameters can be assembled around Malcolm's relation of how the concept of "harmonick Motion" has been used in medical practise. The Pythagorean component of this theory is evident, and is present in the narrative of the "touchings" recounted above: "the Gentlemen of the Academy of Sciences in *France* apply this Hypothesis of *harmonick Motion*, for explaining the strange Recovery of

[8] In *Ranger's Impartial List of the Ladies of Pleasure in Edinburgh, with a Preface by a Celebrated Wit* (1775), a rather more direct imaging of the virility of the flute is given in a passage which appears to reverse the axis of anthropomorphism, with an image of the organ as a machine. Of "Miss Inglis, at Miss Walker's", the anonymous author writes that "Notwithstanding, she is no novice at the game of love, for she is remarkably fond of performing on the silent flute, and can manage the stops extraordinary well." [*Ranger's Impartial List*, entry on Miss Inglis] Despite the sexual politics made obvious by the book's title, and the financial relationship explicit in the passage quoted, there is here a move away from the phonocentrism of Alison Cockburn's letter, towards an instrumentalization of the human body itself.

one who has been bitten by the *Tarantula*, the Effect of which is a Lethargy and Stupifying of the Senses" [p.88]. This cessation of motion within the human body, it is held, can be overcome through its excitation by the motion of a sonorous body of a vibrational capacity proportional to that of the normal capacity of the human body;

the Recovery is by means of *Musick*; 'tis not every Kind that will recover the same Person, nor the same Kind every Person; but having tried a great many various Measures and Combinations of *Tune* and *Time*, they hit at random on the Cure, which excites Motion in the Patient by Degrees, till he is recovered. To account for this, these *Philosophers* tell us, that there is a certain Aptness in these particular Motions, to give Motion to the Nerves of that Person (for they suppose the Disease lies all there) in their present Circumstances, as one String communicates Motion to another, which neither a greater nor a lesser, nor any Combination can do; being excited to Motion the Senses return gradually. [*Treatise of Musick*, pp.88/9]

Malcolm terms this phenomenon "sympathetick Virtue in sonorous Motions". It consists of a mechanics of motion based on harmonic resonances which takes a non-penetrational form due to the very action of harmony within it. In other words, there is a harmonic specificity within each body and each ailment, and it is only the sound proportional to that specificity, the "apt" sound, which can excite a given body to motion, and expel a given venom from that body.

The narrative of the tarantula, a prevalent narrative in Enlightenment texts, and one taken up more recently in deconstructive theory, gives a practical demonstration of the kind of mechanism under consideration here. In the writings of Catherine Clément, the tarantula mechanism is dealt with equally in terms of dance; specifically in a consideration of the musical genre of the Tarantella, all framed within the

Pythagorean scene^[9]. Clément narrates that it was the women of Mezzogiorno in southern Italy (and Pythagoras taught in nearby Croton...) who were cured by art of the tarantula bite. The process is the Ancient Greek *katharsis*^[10], the combination of vibration, enlightenment and cure, three components of the Pythagorean determination of "philosophy". As Clément writes;

to start with, there is the cathartic role of music and color. Before beginning the ritual, the woman bitten by the tarantula is subjected to a double exploration in music and color and, by showing that she is affected by one color and one chord and unaffected by the others, she "chooses" the color and chord designating "her" spider^[11] [*The Newly Born Woman*, p.20]

As Malcolm writes, the cure is "hit at random", the musicians explore various meters, tonalities, etc., until finally, the patient "chooses" the sound which has the direct harmonic resonance with the illness. Again, the image of "admittance", choice, is significant - in Malcolm's account and

[9] Pythagoras' musical medicine was also paralleled by a medicinal theory of dance and of poetic meter, but always couched in musical lexis: Iamblichus writes of "Another kind of modulation [which] was invented against desires. He likewise used dancing, which was accompanied by the lyre, instead of the pipe, which he conceived to have an influence towards insolence [note from this that timbre was held to have medicinal properties also], being theatrical, and by no means liberal. For the purposes of correcting the soul, he also used select verses of Homer and Hesiod." [*The Pythagorean Sourcebook*, p.85]

[10] *katharsis* is a medical term which in Pythagorean writings takes on moral and spiritual overtones of purification, often through purgative means. In Aristotle's *Poetics*, *katharsis* becomes a component part of the affectivity of art: "Thus, Tragedy is an imitation of an action that is serious, complete, and possessing magnitude; in embellished language, each kind of which is used separately in the different parts; in the mode of action and not narrated; and effecting through pity and fear the *catharsis* of such emotions." [*Poetics*, p.50]

[11] Clément also cites the account of the tarantula given by the seventeenth century writer Athanasius Kircher, whose *Musurgia Universalis* (1650) is a prevalent reference in Malcolm's *Treatise*.

Clément's, the Pythagorean act of penetration in order to cure is absent. There is no violation of an "inside" by an "outside". Indeed, the cure is specifically set up to expel from the inside an alien substance which invaded the body from the outside. It is by finding the correct harmonic resonance with the spider's venom that the body is excited into motions of the exact proportion capable of expelling the invasive substance back into the outside, thus restoring the natural harmony of body and environment. In this way, a mechanics of *stimulation* can overcome the effects of a mechanics of *penetration*. The effects of a "touching" can be undone by an impulsion transmitted through the medium of air.

Thus it is that what Malcolm assembles in a near complete form is a pair of theoretical models for musical signification. It is only *near* complete because of the residual influence of his contemporary lexis, namely that of the Theory of Ideas as he takes it from John Locke, with all its latent Plato-Cartesianisms. It remains the case that Malcolm writes of an "admittance" of ideas *into* the understanding in a passage following the narrative of sympathetic vibration in the Tarantella. While he is careful to distinguish within brackets the precise lexis of Locke, thus marking out his own diversion from it, the concept of "admittance", although more pragmatic than that of Locke's penetrative "actual entrance", nevertheless assumes the flow of the "external" into the "internal". The concept of "admittance" still relies on an opposition which negates the image of a play of surfaces which he clearly *begins* to articulate elsewhere. Malcolm only achieves a minor swerve from the Pythagorean version of *katharsis*, which Derrida describes as "cure by *logos*" [*Dissemination*, p.128], and certainly, if the *ousia* of Malcolm's harmonic signification is specifically associated

with the Platonic logocentric concept of enlightenment, then one must be cautious of his formulation of sympathetic vibration.

Locke, on the other hand, assumes a penetrative semiotic throughout. His lexis therefore may be seen as retaining far more of a logocentric determination than Malcolm's. For Locke, it is all a question of an essence, which is transmitted through a mechanical process, but also in spite of it. In this sense, Locke's perceptual chain has more in common with what Malcolm designates as the Hellenic, vocal model than the more fully materialistic aura surrounding Malcolm's instrumental model. Locke writes that "Perception [is] the *Inlet* of the Knowledge" [*Essay*, p.122, emphasis added], and while he often writes in Newtonian terms of *impulse* and *motion*, even with respect to the spirit (*Essay*, p.193/4.), he nevertheless discounts surface in preference for the rationally inferred opposition of an "inside" and an "outside".

Here, the whole action of perception is centred on an "inlet", a fissure on the body's surface which allows the penetration of essences into the mind, and the soul. In this sense, the empiricism which Locke is attributed with having established cannot be understood in terms of an account of appearances, surfaces, or phenomena by themselves. While he replaces Descartes' thinking subject with a perceiving subject, his main methodological strategy remains inference, and it is in the moment that the "inlet" has been established upon the surface of a body that the action of inference can allow the rational mind to enter to the supposed *true core* of things. This constitutes one of Locke's penetrational Cartesianisms.

Thus, in this schema, sound penetrates the body through the surface fissure represented by the ear. Locke asserts the "passivity" of

the hearing body in this relationship. It has no choice in this matter of its being entered; it is in no position from which it can bargain. There is no "choice" as in Clément's model, no "admittance", or permission, as in Malcolm's model. The hearing body must passively accept the invading essence, despite the fact that this essence only reaches the ear by the play of surfaces represented in the mechanical model of impulsion and motion. The essence reaches the ear and penetrates it precisely despite its transmission by the action of surface.

Locke's theory as presented here bears a distinct relation to a model already derived from Mason and Rousseau. Malcolm departs from Locke's conception of an active essence penetrating a passive ear, or rather provides an opening onto a second theory of signification built on different principles. This alternative is not equivalent to a prioritization of one model of the metaphysics of sound over another, in that Malcolm proves two systems to be acceptable as theories, and expresses his preference for one to be put into practise^[12]. Malcolm's preferred theory equally supplements the kind of programme undertaken by Jean-Philippe

[12] Note however, that while Malcolm accepts the basic mechanics of the hellenistic model of vocal music, his Modern scepticism refuses to believe all that is written of the affective powers of the Ancient music: "I must observe, that the Historians, by saying too much, have given us Ground to believe very little. What do you think of curing a raging Pestilence by *Musick*? For curing the Bites of Serpents, we cannot so much doubt it, since that of the *Tarantula* has been cured in *Italy*. But then they have no Advantage in this Instance: And we must mind too that this Cure is not performed by exquisite Art and Skill in *Musick*; it does not require a *Correlli [sic]* or *Valentini*, but is performed by Strains discovered by random Trials without any Rule: And this will serve for an Answer to all that's alleged of the Cure of Diseases by the Ancient *Musick*." [*Treatise*, p.595] Again, Malcolm stresses his conviction of the indeterminacy of affect in music. The tarantula bite is no doubt cured by music, and in the manner of "sympathetick Virtue in sonorous motions", but it is a matter of chance. The hellenic claims of absolute control over signification, absolute phonic determination, are unfounded.

Rameau one year later, if not in terms of chord theory, which is Rameau's arena of innovation, then in terms of an aesthetic and a mechanics of signification. Malcolm's theory of instrumental music is pragmatic in its refusal to glibly state that the sonic is capable of the same level (not type) of affectivity as the phonic model, and therefore worthy of the same respect. His strategy is to accept that sonic affectivity has its own specificity which he marks out as distinct from that of the phonic. On these terms, instrumental music is not the equal of vocal music, nor is it better. According to Malcolm, it is *different*.


Yet despite this difference between two semiotic modes, both nevertheless operate through a dialectical mechanism which continually threatens to re-close the action of supplementary difference. Within the structure of these modes, however, there lies the possibility of gradually disinvesting in the lexis of spatiality and proximity, and reinvesting our discourse at another parallel location; the opposition between a penetrational semiotic and a vibrational one allows us to consider this axiology in terms of an opposition between *organism* and *machine*.

PART TWO

MACHINES AND ORGANISMS

Tha craobh nan rann
am bannan stàilinn,
an sgoltadh chreag,
an eag an àmhghair;
tha 'n duilleach gorm
fo cholg a' mhàbaidh,
tha Craobh nan Teud
an éiginn sàth-ghal

- *Craobh nan Teud*, Somhairle Mac Gill-Eain, 1940.



CHAPTER FIVE

THE INTERVALLIC MACHINE

Twa sage Philosophers to glimpse on!
Smith, wi' his sympathetic feeling,
An' Reid, to common sense appealing.
Philosophers have fought an' wrangled,
An' meikle Greek an' Latin mangled,
Till with their Logic-jargon tir'd,
An' in the depth of science mir'd,
To common sense they now appeal,
What wives an' wabsters see an' feel;

- *Letter to J--s T--t, Gl--nc--r*, Robert Burns (1786)

CHAPTER FIVE

THE INTERVALLIC MACHINE

5.1 Sympathetic Mechanisms

Adam Smith's aesthetics are often thought to be found primarily in his first publication, *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* (1759). Indeed, his contemporary reputation and employment as a philosopher was based on this text and the lectures on "Rhetoric and Belles Lettres" – it is only later that he becomes associated almost exclusively with the discipline of economics^[1]. The reception history of his work is initiated not so much in the context of the moral/economic concept of the *invisible hand*, but the moral/aesthetic concept of *sympathy*. In order to approach this concept, we must first deal with a division which occurs in the philosophy of the affect.

[1] Smith was appointed to the Chair of Logic in Glasgow University in 1752, and moved to the Chair of Moral Philosophy the following year. Previously, he had delivered a series of public lectures on rhetoric in Edinburgh (1748–50), and this material was revived for his course in Glasgow on "Rhetoric and Belles Lettres". The ramifications of this are immense. One of the students of Smith's rhetoric lectures, Hugh Blair, began his own series of lectures on the same subject in Edinburgh University in 1759, which in 1762 yielded him the newly designed post of Professor of Rhetoric and Belles Lettres, effectively inaugurating the first Chair of English Literature in the world. As J.C Bryce points out, "his lectures constitute an anti-rhetoric" [Introduction to *Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres*, p.36]. Indeed, Smith described traditional theory as "generally a very silly set of Books and not at all instructive" [ibid., p.26]. In his radical departure from the traditional mould of rhetorical theory, the modern English Literature department becomes a possibility.

In the second book of the *Treatise of Human Nature*, titled *Of the Passions* (1739), Hume writes of two modes of passion under the headings of *direct* and *indirect*: "By direct passions I understand such as arise immediately from good or evil, from pain or pleasure. By indirect such as proceed from the same principles, but by the conjunction of other qualities." [*Treatise of Human Nature*, p.276] From this, it is easy to read into the determination of the indirect passions a certain supplementarity – they are generated not only from an immediate relation, but also from a secondary conjunction. The indirect passions in fact "arise from a double relation of impressions and ideas." [ibid., p.439] The structure of the indirect passion is twofold, divided within itself; it contains an interval. Hume provides a tailored example;

a suit of fine cloaths produces pleasure from their beauty; and this pleasure produces the direct passions, or the impressions of volition and desire. Again, when these cloaths are consider'd as belonging to ourself, the double relation conveys to us the sentiment of pride, which is an indirect passion; and the pleasure, which attends that passion, returns back to the direct affections, and gives new force to our desire or volition, joy or hope. [ibid., p.439]

In other words, the sight of a beautiful object immediately produces the *direct* passion of desire. This leads to our possession of the object. We then derive the *indirect* passion of pride which is generated by our knowledge of the object's beauty, combined with our possession of it. However, this indirect, twofold passion then folds back onto a further direct passion, such as joy. Thus, the indirect passions are marked not only by a further intervallic supplementarity than the direct passions, but they also operate a greater level of connectivity, lying at a junction between two other terms.

In this aesthetic sequence, we can also discern a familiar structural

theme – the initiation of an originary term, which generates a secondary, less stable and more connective term, which serves to act as a transition between the originary term and a final, equally stable term (including the possibility of this final term then becoming the originary term of a further articulation of the structure). In this sense, there is a structural analogue between the logic of the direct passion and the logic of the origin, and between the logic of the indirect passion and the logic of the harmonic supplement.

The indirect passions "arise from a double relation of impressions and ideas." [ibid., p.439] Hume states that the means of connection between a sensory impression and a mental idea – the articulation of the twofold nature of the indirect passion – is a form of supplementary representation. His initial concern in Book One of the *Treatise of Human Nature* is to show "that all ideas are borrow'd from impressions" [p.319]. Nevertheless, this has less connection with originary logic than at first might appear. Hume argues that "these two kinds of perceptions differ only in the degrees of force and vivacity, with which they strike upon the soul. The component parts of ideas and impressions are precisely alike." [ibid.] Impressions and ideas, then, are two modes of the same mechanism which share identical components, the only difference between them being their position along a chain of representations between an external event and an internal experience of that event.

In the aesthetic field, we can see a practical demonstration of the non-originary nature of Hume's logic here, when he asserts the reflexivity of these two terms. Although an idea often follows from an impression, the converse is also possible so that, in the affections, "a lively idea is

converted into an impression" [ibid.]. This conversion is also a function of a reduction in distance between the two terms of a representation; "The lively idea of any object always approaches its impression; and 'tis certain we may feel sickness and pain from the mere force of imagination, and make a malady real by often thinking of it." [ibid.] In a lexical transposition which brings us closer to his intertext with Smith, Hume describes this imaginary mechanism as being "the nature and cause of sympathy; and 'tis after this manner we enter so deep into the opinions and affections of others" [ibid.]. Thus, a series of concerns are raised: not only is representation divided into a direct and an indirect form of affectivity, but the indirect form itself has a twofold structure. Within the indirect affect, the means of connection between its two faces is an imaginary mechanism defined as sympathy. Further, it is through this sympathetic mechanism that we can connect ourselves with the affective life of others^[2].

Smith's *Theory of Moral Sentiments* is specifically constructed as a reading of the concept of sympathy. His interest is not so much in what he calls the *original passions*, but rather in the *sympathetic passions*. In this sense, it can be considered as a reading of certain aspects of the logic of the supplement. However, it also extends the notion of sympathy beyond the normal associations of the word, and concentrates on the more structural aspects of Hume's reading of the term;

[2] The significance of Hume's aesthetic theory within his whole theoretical system is openly acknowledged by him: "What is principally remarkable in this whole affair is the strong confirmation these phænomena give to the foregoing system [Book I] concerning the understanding, and consequently to the present one [Book II] concerning the passions; since these are analogous to each other." [*Treatise of Human Nature*, p.319] The fact that Hume identifies the mechanism of *analogy* to be a point of connection between the terms of his *system* is significant in the context of arguments below on the idea of *analogical systems* in Smith.

Pity and compassion are words appropriated to signify our fellow-feeling with the sorrow of others. Sympathy, though its meaning was, perhaps, originally the same, may now, however, without much impropriety, be made use of to denote our fellow-feeling with any passion whatever. [*Theory of Moral Sentiments*, p.10]

In this extended sense, sympathy is defined not as a function of pity or concern, but as a mode of affective connectivity^[3]. Sympathy is the mechanism by which our passions can be made to resonate with those of *others*. However, in order that this resonance may occur, it is necessary that the relative capacities of two passions are proportional, and this is achieved through a middle term – "the propriety of every passion [...] must lie, it is evident, in a certain mediocrity." [ibid., p.27] An individual requires this balance at a mid-point because "if the passion is too high, or if it is too low, he cannot enter into it." [ibid.] Smith threads around this concept a whole web of musical imagery;

He longs for that relief which nothing can afford him but the entire concord of the affections of the spectators with his own. [...] he can only hope to obtain this by lowering his passion to that pitch, in which the spectators are capable of going along with him. He must flatten, if I may be allowed to say so, the sharpness of its natural tone, in order to reduce it to harmony and concord with the emotions of those who are about him. What they feel, will, indeed, always be, in some respects, different from what he feels [...] Though they will never be unisons, they may be concords, and this is all that is wanted or required. [*Theory of Moral Sentiments*, p. 22]

[3] It is often claimed that Smith makes a radical departure from Hume at this juncture; "Sympathy is central in Smith's account but is itself more complex than Hume's concept of sympathy. For Hume, sympathy is a sharing of the pleasure or pain produced in a person affected by an action. For Smith, sympathy can be a sharing of *any* feeling" [Introduction to *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, p.13]. However, the specifically structural role of sympathy is also a condition of Hume's reading of the term, as shown above, as an imaginary act which articulates the space between impression and idea.

Sympathy, then, is a matter of harmonization^[4]. Unlike Rousseau's concept of phonocentric representation, where two terms are brought into absolute proximity and identity with each other, Smith proposes that there "will never be unisons" and that concordant differences are "all that is wanted or required". In this sense, it is a close structural relation of the musical principle which Alexander Malcolm calls "sympathetic virtue in sonorous motions". Indeed, for Smith too, sympathy is a matter of virtue as a function of harmonic balance; "Every affection is useful when it is confined to a certain degree of moderation; and every affection is disadvantageous when it exceeds the proper bounds. According to this system therefore, virtue consists not in any one affection, but in the proper degree of all the affections."^[5] [ibid., p.306] In this notion of the "certain degree", or the "proper degree", Smith resonates most sympathetically with Malcolm's harmonic theories. All of the attendant concepts of harmony are traceable in the *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, from the virtuous balance of differences through to the idea of supplementary resonances. However, although we can discern the beginnings of an

[4] In another characteristically musical image, Smith writes in a Burnsian mode that; "The great pleasure of conversation and society, besides, arises from a certain correspondance of sentiments and opinions, from a certain harmony of minds, which like so many musical instruments coincide and keep time with one another. But this most delightful harmony cannot be obtained unless there is a free communication of sentiments and opinions." [*Theory of Moral Sentiments*, p.337]

[5] The "system" which places virtue in the "proper degree of all the affections" is actually Hume's, but Smith continues by pointing out that "the only difference between it and that which I have been endeavouring to establish, is, that it makes utility, and not sympathy, or the correspondant affection of the spectator, the natural and original measure of this proper degree" [*Theory of Moral Sentiments*, p.306] In other words, the distinction is that Smith, while agreeing with Hume's concept of virtue, concentrates specifically on the supplementary nature of sympathetic passions.

approach to music aesthetics within the imagery and structures of the *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, if we are to read Smith in more detail we must look to the essay *Of the Imitative Arts*^[6], and the margins of many other philosophical texts. As will be argued below at length, it is actually his position on music and sound in general which can be seen as the crucial factor in his general aesthetic scheme, particularly if we wish to read him *sympathetically* from a post-structural point of view.

5.2 Imaginary Machines and the Harmonic Chain of Theory

A well-composed concerto of instrumental Music, by the number and variety of the instruments, by the variety of the parts which are performed by them, and the perfect concord or correspondance of all these different parts; by the exact harmony or coincidence of all the different sounds which are heard at the same time, and by that happy variety of measure which regulates the succession of those which are heard at different times, presents an object so agreeable, so great, so various, and so interesting, that alone, and without suggesting any other object, by imitation or otherwise, it can occupy, and as it were fill up, completely the whole capacity of the mind, so as to leave no part of its attention vacant for thinking of anything else. In the contemplation of that immense variety of agreeable and melodious sounds, arranged and digested, both in their coincidence and succession, into so complete and regular a system, the mind in reality enjoys not only a very great sensual, but a very high intellectual, pleasure, not unlike that which it derives from the contemplation of a great system in any other science. [*Of the Imitative Arts*, in *Essays*, pp.204-5]

In the two lengthy sentences quoted above, Smith provides a chain of concepts which represent the turning points of his whole theoretical

[6] *Of the Nature of that Imitation which takes place in what are called the Imitative Arts*, in the *Essays on Philosophical Subjects*. The *Essays* were collated and published in 1795 five years after his death, and consist of a systematic investigation into "the principles which lead and direct philosophical enquiries", illustrated by histories of astronomy, physics, logic and metaphysics, and essays on sensation, the imitative arts, and language. The thread which runs through all of Smith's enquiries is the significance of ancient Greek thought for the philosophy of Enlightenment.

system. Not only does he declare himself to be a proponent of the non-imitative sonic affectivity of the Modern instrumental music, but he positions himself specifically within the series of concerns which mark the earlier writings of Alexander Malcolm, from the emphasis on the "variety" of harmonic textures to the definition of a dual affectivity based in the sensual and the intellectual^[7].

However, we can also discern an extension of Malcolm's programme into the conceptual field of the term *system*. As we will see in what follows, this term and its associations will gradually lead us beyond the limited notions of harmonic structure which have so far been interrogated, and towards other modes of engagement with music theory. For Smith, music is not an organic means of communication, but a *system*, and as such, is on a structural par with all other sensual and intellectual pursuits. This structural analogy, however, can be described in other terms with equally far-reaching consequences:

Systems in many respects resemble machines. A machine is a little system, created to perform, as well as to connect together, in reality, those different movements and effects which the artist has occasion for. A system is an imaginary machine invented to connect together in the fancy those different movements and effects which are already in reality

^[7] Indeed, given Smith's evident interest in music (which, extensive though it is, appears to have been largely ignored until this current study) and his reputation as a wide reader, it would be surprising if he had not read Malcolm's text. A further connection is in their mutual interest in mathematics: Malcolm wrote several tracts on this subject, but Smith also studied mathematics and natural philosophy at Glasgow, under Professor Robert Simson, who later became his friend and colleague. According to J.C. Bryce, it was during this time that Smith developed his theoretical orientation when he "learned 'the idea of a system'" from Simson [Introduction to Smith's *Rhetoric*, p.36]. Given his study of mathematics, he may well have come across Malcolm's work in this area. However, is it possible that this Simson is related to the one who Malcolm repeatedly refers to in his text on music? If so, then the interval between Malcolm and Smith is even more consonant than their theories suggest.

performed. [*The Principles which Lead and Direct Philosophical Enquiries; illustrated by the History of Astronomy*, in *Essays*, p.66]

Here, we move from a description of music as a system to a description of system as machine, but one which is engineered by an artist. Equally, just as there is a structural correspondence between the music-system and the science-system, so too we can read of "a picture, a poem, or a system of philosophy" [*Theory of Moral Sentiments*, p.21] as an "imaginary machine". The imaginary machine, is the means whereby theory presents a picture of the world. The world which theory reflects consists of "movements and effects which are already in reality performed". The imaginary machine is created to make sense out of these movements and effects. In order to achieve this, it invents connections between them. The imaginary machine builds explanations by connecting components from the world into another system, another machine. In this sense, the imaginary machine is an assembly machine, forever selecting components from the scrapheaps of reality, plugging them into each other and setting them running. The imaginary machine is theory itself.

Smith describes the necessity of theory through the following imaginary experience: finding himself in a brewery, he walks around and observes various machines which he does not understand. Firstly, he is confronted with the chaos of reality, and it is chaotic because he does not have an explanation of its workings. Unfamiliarity in things creates in him a desire for explanation. He observes "a number of appearances, which present themselves in an order that seems to us very strange and wonderful." [*History of Astronomy*, p.44] These appearances, the brewing machines of the factory, create in him a feeling of distance; he does not

understand their workings. He feels a desire to comprehend the space of that distance, to understand the system by which the brewer and his machines operate: "Our thought cannot easily follow it, we feel an interval betwixt every two of them, and require some chain of intermediate events, to fill it up, and link them together." [ibid.] The familiarity which the brewer has with his machines, his knowledge of their relations to each other in the whole process by which he produces his wares, means that he "feels no such interval"; he can hear the harmony of his machines.

At this juncture, Smith has assembled his situation within a musical image: he perceives *intervals* between the phenomena before him, but these intervals are *dissonant*, he confronts a "chaos of jarring and *discordant* appearances" [*History of Astronomy*, pp.45/6]. His desire, then, is to reduce the discordant intervals, the alienating distances between the phenomena. This is achieved by the possibilities of assemblage afforded by the imaginary machine, which "fills up" the "gaps or intervals", providing a "chain of intermediate events" by which he can tie the chaotic, independent events together to form a whole chain, an ordered sequence organized by the imaginary machine according to a rule of sympathetic connection.

The discordant intervals are imaged as disturbing gaps which tend to chaos; they are characterized by lack. The action of the imaginary machine of the philosopher is to adjust the width of these gaps, tune the appearances, until the whole vibrates with perfect ordered harmony, all vibrations expressing a common connectivity. Smith writes of the philosopher that; "By long attention to all the connections which have ever been presented to his observation, by having often compared them with

one another, he has, like the musician, acquired, if one may say so, a *nicer* ear, and a more delicate feeling with regard to things of this nature." [*History of Astronomy*, p.45] Just as the brewer hears no unfamiliar dissonance when he operates his production line, as the musician's trained ear can "discover a want" [ibid.] – in other words, a lack – in the tuning of an instrument, so the philosopher listens to the harmony of the world through his imaginary machines, fine tuning its engines until they tick and purr in synchronization with the vibrations of the cosmos.

Philosophy, the art of the imagination, the imaginary machine, confronts a chaotic scene, a series of discordant intervals. When faced with such spaces, however, "the imagination can fill up this interval" [p.42]. The imaginary machine oils the imagination, "smooth[ing] its passage from the one object to the other." [ibid.] It regulates the correct slippage of components across each other, by applying the laws of harmony – everything is arranged by the imaginary machine according to proportions. The correct resonances are found between objects, they are arranged according to their proximity not in mere chaotic space, but in a harmonic space. In this sense, the philosophical project is one which sets the objects of reality into a harmonic relation; philosophy harmonizes phenomena, it makes music out of events, and finds the points of sympathetic resonance between terms: theory as the production of structural sympathy.

Smith's Imaginary Machine is the materialist, intervallic move which Rousseauism cannot tolerate. As Derrida writes of Rousseau's paranoia of imagination as witnessed in *Emile*, "If one moves along the course of the supplementary series, he sees that imagination belongs to the same chain of significations as the anticipation of death. [...] Imagination is the power

that allows life to affect itself with its own re-presentation." [*Of Grammatology*, p.184] This harmonization of events and objects, their representation, results in what Derrida calls a supplementary chain, but which can also be called an harmonic or intervallic chain. The chain comprises "intermediate" objects, and in *this* sense can the "gaps" and "intervals" which create alienation be "filled up". It is not so much a question of the penetration of these intervals, as the lexis Smith employs would initially lead one to suspect, and which a Rousseauist reaction would entail as a necessity, but more a matter of multiplying concepts in order to create chains between them. It is this multiplication of harmonic components which "fills" the spaces between objects and events; a substitution of one form of intervallic action for another – a tempering of the tendency to dissonance of the interval, in order to keep the interval stable, in other words, consonant. In this sense, Smith's move represents the re-affirmation of absence, its re-allocation into a parity with the structural value of positivity. The distinction between "gap" and "intermediate object" becomes obfuscated by the instrumentality of the two terms, which become interchangeable.

Much hinges on the question of these intermediary harmonic components which have been in some way multiplied out of the initial phenomena of the immediate reality. Smith writes that they are actually "invisible chains" [*History of Astronomy*, p.45] which the imagination "supposes" and philosophy "represents". In this, he is claiming that the chains are not to be found so much in reality as in the imagination. They remain actual chains to the extent that the imaginary machine – philosophy – represents them. The imagination "bridges" the "gap" between two

objects in reality by the means of "supposition": the connections are synthetic. Smith's use of the term Supposition may be compared with that of Malcolm when he writes in the *Treatise of Musick* that, as a component of his dialectical conception of both harmony and time,

The *Harmony* must always be full upon the accented Parts of the *Measure*, but upon the unaccented Parts that is not so requisite: Wherefore *Discords* may transiently pass there without any Offence to the Ear: This the *French* call *Supposition*, because the transient *Discord* supposes a *Concord* immediately to follow it, which is of infinite service in *Musick*, as contributing mightily to that infinite Variety of *Air* of which *Musick* is capable. [*Treatise of Musick*, pp.433/4]^[8]

In this sense, Smith's concept of the discordant phenomena of reality which the imagination connects together into an harmonious whole by the means of a supposition of concordant intervallic chains between them could easily involve his system in a dialectics of explanation. Further, the concept of *variety*, which we have seen Malcolm associate with his dialectical systems at all levels, is also operative in Smith, articulating the space between difference and connection:

Variety is more pleasing than a tedious undiversified uniformity. Connected variety, in which each new appearance seems to be introduced by what went before it, and in which all the adjoining parts seem to have some natural relation to each other, is more agreeable than a disjointed and disorderly assemblage of unconnected objects. [*Theory of Moral Sentiments*, pp.200-1]

The same mechanics are in operation here as in Malcolm's dialectical organization of harmonies across a spatialized time; the theory of musical harmony seeks to understand sound on the basis of a repeated return to a consonant reference point, these rhythmic markers "bridging" the

[8] It should be noted that Malcolm, given the chronology involved, is not referring to Rameau's theory of Supposition which is a rationalization of chords of the 9th and 11th from the chord of the 7th.

"discordant gaps" between them. The possibility of a chaotic variety (inconcinuous intervals) is thus tempered into a "connected variety" (concinuous intervals). This image is analogous to Smith's attempt to harmonize chaos by the imagination's supposition or inference of points of order. The action of this supposition means that Smith's formulation of the connective chains which explain the relation of events and objects in reality has a certain nominalism about it. It posits that the meaning of objects has more to do with their relation to the imagination than any true "inner" essence. According to Smith's theory, it is philosophers with their imaginary machines who literally construct an order to a chaotic reality^[9]. The philosopher invents this order, and in doing so invents meanings for objects and events in a general system which is assembled, rather than given. Meaning is ascribed to objects, it does not derive from

[9] Nominalism states that the signification of a term is not an essence inhering in that term, but is supplied by an act of mind. This is in contradistinction to Realism which posits signification as a process external to the mind. In *The Circle of John Mair: Logic and Logicians in Pre-Reformation Scotland*, and *The Tradition of Scottish Philosophy: A New Perspective on the Enlightenment*, Alexander Broadie identifies a continuity of nominalist thought in Scotland from the Scholastics through to Smith's social and theoretical milieu: "Nominalism was strongly represented in the Scottish Enlightenment. In particular, Hume's philosophy is in many ways a continuation, along nominalist lines, of some of his Pre-Reformation predecessors. Indeed, from one point of view his version of the theory of ideas ensured that he had to be nominalist about almost everything." [*The Tradition of Scottish Philosophy*, p.129] Once more, this can be read as supporting the thesis that the difference between the Anglo-Cartesian tradition represented by John Locke, and the Scoto-Cartesians lies in the distinction between two different interests in signification. Equally, if we then connect Christopher Norris' account of Hume as a proto-deconstructionist [*Deconstruction: Theory & Practise*, p.xii], then a new series of very wide-ranging connections could be made, linking medieval and post-structuralist theories of signification, and hinging on the space between, say, Hume's scepticism, and Smith's aesthetic imaginary machine. As will be intimated later, such a scheme in relation to Duns Scotus is already possible, centring on the concepts of *ultima differentia specifica* and, of course, *haecceitas*. See also the arguments around Norris, Hume, and deconstruction in Chapter 1.

them, and this meaning is their place in the structure of the harmonic chain of theory; the meaning which objects are given by the imaginary machine is a value in relation to each other, in other words, within a harmonic scheme analogous to that of Alexander Malcolm.

Equally, one could make a case for Smith's theory of the imaginary machine per se as instrumentalist in the philosophical sense, in that it denies objective truth as some kind of determining force for meaning and concentrates on the utility of a theory. It is not so much his concern as to whether the specific imaginary machine is any more efficient than any other in terms of some universal veracity, but simply how it works as a system in itself, and how it relates to other imaginary machines:

Let us examine, therefore, all the different systems of nature, which, in these western parts of the world, the only parts of whose history we know any thing [...] without regarding their absurdity or probability, their agreement or inconsistency with truth or reality, let us consider [...] how far each of them was fitted to sooth the imagination, and to render the theatre of nature a more coherent, and therefore a more magnificent spectacle [*History of Astronomy*, p.46]

For Smith, as for Malcolm, the historical perspective – to which he also adds a cultural context ("these western parts") – demands a calm pragmatism; the theory of theory can only be established without a prior determination of the outcome. The significance of a specific theory is taken to be its position in a network of theories, and its efficiency as a machine, as an imaginary machine – does it aid the imagination, is it useful, does it work? These relational criteria represent a movement away from essentialist truth-criteria towards perspectivism.

utility is one of the principle sources of beauty [...] the fitness of any system or machine to produce the end for which it was intended, bestows a certain propriety and beauty upon the whole, and renders the very thought and contemplation of it agreeable [*Theory of Moral Sentiments*,

Utility and beauty become implicated in the idea of theory itself as an affective source of pleasure, effectively a notion of theory-as-art.

As we have seen, the Imaginary Machine operates according to harmonic principles – the additive, supplementary calculus which, in Derrida's reading, Rousseau attempted to suppress. Derrida makes an association of importance in this connection when he writes that "calculation, the machine, and mute writing belong to the same system of equivalences, and their work poses the same problem" [*Margins of Philosophy*, p.107]. If harmony really is the possibility of a non-dialectical system, as Derrida marginally alleges, then how are we to follow this problematic through in Smith's work – where are the *indécidables* with which we can work, and what is their status? Will Smith, like Rousseau, "say it without wishing to say it", and *who are we to say anything of an author's wishes?* Or might the *indécidables*, rather than rupturing an attempt at a theoretical unity, be in fact in place in order to mark a swerve away from such unity? Derrida asks, "What might be a 'negative' that could not be *relevé* [resolved]?" [*Margins*, p.107] Where are the *indécidables* which are not recoverable to a dialectical closure and reconstruction? More importantly, is their negativity defined in relation to philosophy *and* their specific host texts, as Derrida alleges of Rousseau, *or* can we conceive of Smith as "deliberately" aligning the *indécidables* of his text not against itself, but against the logocentric tradition. For instance, J.C. Bryce comments that Smith's *Lectures on Belles Lettres and Rhetoric* in fact assemble an "*anti-rhetoric*" – what would be the result of such a perspective if transposed into a consideration of Smith's music aesthetics?

[Introduction to *Lectures*, p.36] And does the musical equivalent of this anti-rhetoric constitute a dialectical antithesis or a radical alterity, a new departure? Derrida has written of "A machine defined in its pure functioning, and not its final utility, its meaning, its result, its work" [*Margins*, p.107] Could this also be what Smith's conception of the Imaginary Machine opens as a theoretical possibility?

5.3 "...the great hinge upon which every thing turned..."

Smith's use of the terms "events" and "objects" is significant when he deals with the dissonant phenomena of reality. Indeed, the two terms are interchangeable: "such disjointed objects" [*History of Astronomy*, p.42]; "as disjointed as any two events" [p.47]. Additionally, the components of the invisible chains themselves, those parts of the imaginary machines which link together real phenomena into a general system, are both "objects" and "events": "a chain of invisible objects" [p.45]; "a chain of intermediate, though invisible, events" [p.42]. In this way, spatial "objects" become temporalized – it is all a question of a succession along a chain, and this chain is both spatial and temporal in character. In the same way that he considers time in music to be in the position of the regulator of harmony, its dispenser, so time is the condition of all objects in space^[10]. In other words, there is no atemporal space, space is temporal. Equally, "events" become spatially organized; the action of time as the privileged medium of space's entelechation means that

[10] cf. the quote at the head of this section: "that happy variety of measure which regulates the succession of those which are heard at different times", and also that the musical machine is "regulated according to time or measure, and thereby formed into a sort of whole or system" [*Imitative Arts*, p.187].

temporal "events" are put into a succession. Each "event" then occupies a space along a line of divided compartments.

Smith's apparently lax application of "object" and "event" could be read as fitting in with a general attitude demonstrated throughout his work, when dealing with the relation of space and time. It could be understood from this that the fringe of distinction between "object" and "event" in Smith's usage is displaced in the same way that the fringe of contact between space and time is doubled by the possibility of the becoming-time of space, and the becoming-space of time, the former through its endowing space with the energy of motion, the latter through its sideways collapse into and divisional reorganization of time. In this "doubling" of the origin of the entelechy of space into time, we can also read the debate between Rameau and Rousseau, and Malcolm's pragmatic acceptance that both systems are possible. Derrida's term for the point of displacement at the origin of a *deconstructed* entelechy is "the hinge", *la brisure*, which posits the existence of an originary space before/at the origin of time. In this, Derrida radicalizes Rameau's theory of origination to a theory of supplementation, as much as he deconstructs Rousseau's theory.

In Adam Smith's system, in the imaginary machine he assembles in his *History of Astronomy*, we also find the image of "the hinge", but under different conditions to those of Derrida's hinge of *différance*. It all turns upon a component of many imaginary machines which Smith describes in his three essays on "the principles which lead and direct philosophical enquiries". This component is analogy, *analogia* to the Ancient Greek

philosophers^[11]. As Smith writes of the early "chemical philosophers", they

naturally explained things to themselves by principles that were familiar to themselves. As Aristotle observes, that the early Pythagoreans, who first studied arithmetic, explained all things by the properties of numbers; and Cicero tells us, that Aristoxenus, the musician, found the nature of the soul to consist in harmony. [*History of Astronomy*, p.47]

Here Smith has discerned a component which is used in almost all of the imaginary machines which the present text covers. Particularly in the Pythagorean moment, theories such as Rousseau's, Malcolm's or Mason's extend the analogical image in several directions at once. Rhythm is imaged according to gender categories or other anthropomorphic determinations such as that of the *pedes metrici*, harmony can equally be imaged as virile or passive according to the direction from which one considers its entelechy, the interval is imaged as an abyss or a space of potential presence, and so forth, most of the images falling in their dialectics or their polemics across some Table of Opposites. Often it is a case of mapping

[11] *Analogia* invokes the concept of proportionality as a central aspect of likeness. As David R. Fideler writes in his introduction to *The Pythagorean Sourcebook*, "In Pythagorean thought the Tektrktys came to represent an inclusive paradigm of the four-fold pattern which underlies different classes of phenomena, as exemplified by Theon of Smyrna [...] Not only does a four-fold pattern underlie each class, but each level is in a certain fashion *analogous* or proportionately similar with that same level in every other class of phenomena. In many respects Pythagorean philosophy is a philosophy of *analogia*." [*The Pythagorean Sourcebook*, p.29] The great strength of the analogical method is its ability to set up a multidirectional connective network of metaphysical planes, as Fideler points out with regard to Plato; "Plato, via *analogia*, identifies the three parts of the soul with three different parts of society" [ibid., p.37]. Smith was not the only Enlightenment philosopher to have a large analogical intertext with the ancient Greeks – as Derrida writes of Condillac's *An Essay on the Origin of Human Knowledge* (1746), "This lays claim to a new logic: the addition of the new arises from the sole association or complication – analogical connection – of a finite number of simple givens." [*The Archeology of the Frivolous: Reading Condillac*, p.62]

a term from one side of the table onto another from the opposite side, at other times, it is a case of a fusion of terms, or the subordination of one by another, and so forth – other examples abound. Each time, the phenomenon under consideration is referred to an opposition and connected in to the mechanics of that opposition. For instance, it is a theoretical assemblage which allows the opposition of the "masculine" "strong" beat to the "feminine" "weak" beat in the gendered cadence. The relation of all possible beats in reality is entirely relative and fluid – there is an infinite number of possible relations, and yet, by the action of an anthropomorphic analogy, cadential theory manages to universalize and concretize all beats into two categories which have a specific mechanics and occupy specific positions in a specific ontology. This certainly meets Smith's criteria for "soothing the imagination", even if the analogy upon which it hinges is radically reductive.

However, the significant aspect of Smith's theory here is a specific use of the analogic component in the imaginary machines of aesthetics. It is within the consideration of "the parallels of painting and poetry, of poetry and music, of music and architecture," that writers on aesthetics have made analogy "*the great hinge upon which every thing turned.*" [History of Astronomy, p.47, emphasis added] This hinge upon which the imaginary machines image reality is a pervasive component of all systems, and Smith specifically connects it to the desire for harmony and representation: "that passion for discovering proportions and resemblances betwixt the different parts of nature, which [is...] common to all philosophers" [p.84]. Proportions and resemblances are the key operators of analogy here. We are on the verge of a theory of imitation

which, unlike Rousseau's, will be tempered and regulated according to certain rules of harmonic proportionality. In order for the great hinge to turn, there must be a resemblance between the two terms of the analogy, and this resemblance is measured according to their proportion to each other. In other words, it must be established that there is some common spatial unit regulating the possibility of the analogy. From this common unit of space the two terms can be ordered according to the same rule.

In the sense of the imaginary machines of aesthetics, it is then possible within the terms of this analogic component of theory to explain one art by assembling an invisible intermediary chain of intervallic components between it and another. The components of this intermediary chain will "fill" the dissonant interval between the two arts with points of consonance, harmonizing various components of the two art machines, providing all the necessary tools for connection, and thereby explanation. Thus, the two art machines can be shown to have a common point of articulation at the analogic hinge, facilitating the use of one to measure and understand the other.

5.4 Explication

Smith's aesthetic imaginary machine is to be found at its most affective in his essay *Of the Nature of that Imitation which takes place in what are called the Imitative Arts*. Here, he assembles an axis within the mechanism of imitation along which the movement of an analogy from an object to its representation produces the pleasurable affections. The distance which the analogy traverses across this axis is the site of pleasure's production, since if the objects at either end of the axis were

of the same order, our pleasure would be reduced: "though a production of art seldom derives any merit from its resemblance to another object of the same kind, it frequently derives a great deal from its resemblance to an object of a different kind, whether that object be a production of art or of nature." [*Of the Imitative Arts*, p.178] The distance along the axis is that which affirms difference and thereby induces a certain friction between objects, the possibility of a dissonance which is nevertheless surmounted by the action of the resemblance.

Thus, a direct copy or clone of an object is not a work of art, since it has no intervallic difference, but only a proximity of type, and an indecipherable copy is not a work of art, since it has introduced too dissonant an interval between itself and the object of its representation. Again it is a question of the sympathetic consonance of the interval between two terms. A "unison" – if the image may be extended – produces little pleasure; likewise, a dissonance produces no pleasure; however, a consonance does produce pleasure because it connects two objects across the space of their difference, and is constantly working to do this against the background of the possibility of differential oblivion represented by both absolute proximity and absolute distance. As Smith wrote of the analogical action of sympathy between two passions, "though they will never be unisons, they may be concords, and this is all that is wanted or required." [*Theory of Moral Sentiments*, p. 22]

In this way, the connection of the resemblance and the pleasure it produces is not an attempt to deceive the senses into believing the relation to be one of absolute proximity. "The works of the great masters [...] never produce their effect by deception. [...] The proper pleasure which we

derive from [art...] far from being the effect of deception, is altogether incompatible with it." [*Of the Imitative Arts*, pp.184.5] Only a fool is deceived by or even threatened, as were Plato and Rousseau, by a representation. An attempt to deceive is transparent and reduces the artistic worth of an art object. Rather, the production of pleasure is based precisely on the knowledge of the self-evident differential distance. It is the movement within this representational space which produces pleasure, and this movement is close to that of the great hinge of analogy: "That pleasure is founded [...] upon our admiration of the art which *surmounts so happily that disparity* which Nature had established between them." [p.185, emphasis added]. The "surmounting" of the differential space is in fact the utilization of the energy of that difference to give force to the creation of a connection.

This self-evident constitution and aim which is a quality of all artistic representations, is precisely what creates their difference from the works of Nature "her"self. The articulatory hinging action of artistic representation is given by Smith as *explication*, the mode of which gives a measure of the specificity of an art. Of sculpture and painting, the two arts with which Smith briefly introduces his essay, he writes that they are "a sort of wonderful phaenomena, differing in this respect from the wonderful phaenomena of Nature, that *they carry, as it were, their own explication with them*, and demonstrate, even to the eye, the way and manner in which they are produced." [ibid., emphasis added]. Explication, then, is what constitutes the sympathetic hinging mechanism of representation for Smith; this is what occupies and "surmounts" the differential space between the art object and the natural object. It is the

means by which the representation announces itself to the senses precisely as a representation, and not as an originally present object.

A component of explication is the affirmation of the absence of the imitated object; the art work proclaims the "disparity" between itself and the object as the presence of an image and the absence of a source. This distinguishes it from the mode of representation of a mirror, for instance, which "can represent only present objects" [p.186] (the semiotic attraction of the mirror for the Rousseauist should be obvious on reflection).

Secondly, the "disparity" is announced by the fact that the natural object does not divulge its mode of production in so obvious a manner as the art work. Not that natural objects deceive the senses, but they do form part of a chaotic natural order for which the imagination must invent explanatory connective chains. An art work is just such a connection, an explanation of a natural object, but also of itself, in its announcement of its own means of representation, whether they are means of paint, marble, ink, sound, speech, or anything else. The art work is created by an artist as a machine which reveals its own mechanisms, which "carries, in some measure, its own explication". Each art has its own affective powers, and it is the art's *productive* mode of explication which defines its distinction from other arts, its specificity. Pictures are produced two-dimensionally with paint, canvas, brush-strokes, etc., music is produced with vibrations, motions, etc., and so on. Each art work equally has its own affective powers within the set of possible powers endowed to it by the art practise to which it belongs, and it is the work's *operative* manner of explication which contributes to its value as an art object. It is a good art work when it uses the representational and explicative mechanisms available to it

efficiently, and a bad one when it attempts to bypass its specificity as an imitation and become a deceitful copy in a failed Rousseauist attempt at authenticity.

Smith also claims that those arts which have a larger disparity to the natural object are capable of greater affective power, so that sculpture has less affective power than painting, for instance, because it is in closer constitutional proximity to the objects which it represents, as a three-dimensional art. Painting, on the other hand, exists at a further distance from natural objects, and therefore there is a greater power of explication required to surmount the gap. There are more intervallic components in the chain of representation between object and image, and therefore more imagination required to achieve a similar effect to a sculpture.

The greater the representational space, the more active the surmounting of that space, and the more pleasure produced. One could easily infer from this that Smith would grant music, and especially instrumental music, a privileged position within his aesthetic imaginary machine. Turning to the main body of his essay *Of the Imitative Arts*, one does indeed discover an emphasis on instrumental music, which assembles an alternative to the concept of imitation within the very text which names itself by that issue.

5.5 Originary Unmeaning

Smith opens the section on music aesthetics with a consideration of the voice, "the first and earliest of all musical instruments" [p.187]. The determination of the *voice as instrument* is significant here, for it not only crosses the division between Rameau and Rousseau, but can be read as

bypassing the axis altogether. For Rameau, the instrument occupies a theoretical primacy which informs the secondary ontological category of voice, although the voice has a different position in practise. For Rousseau, the voice is the prime generator of all, and instrumental music is an inadequate imitation of it. Neither suggest that the opposition itself is inadequate. Smith, however, makes a theoretical move very close to Derrida. Derrida's deconstruction of the Rameau-Rousseau axis can be read as an attempt to de-vitalize Rousseau's voice by introducing an interval at its origin, spacing it from itself and leading back towards an originary supplement, in other words, making Rousseau's system harmonic. Smith determines the voice as an instrument, and thus introduces the possibility of a *mechanized voice* as the spatial, intervallic "origin" of the self-proximate Hellenic voice. Smith does not immediately write of the ancient Greek voice, as even Malcolm does. Rather, he writes a voice before the Hellenic moment, a voice which does not operate on the penetrative semiotic suggested by such as Rousseau and hardly disputed by Rameau.

Smith's voice is both the "first *and* earliest", the latter term implying a historical, the former an ontological determination. The historical point supports an ontological claim: the sounds produced by this first and earliest voice "would not, for a long time have any meaning, but might resemble the syllables which we make use of in *sol-faing*, or the *derry-down-down* of our common ballads" [pp.187/8]. Therefore, the "first" voice, the voice which supplements the origin of Rousseau's Hellenic voice, makes use of "*unmeaning or musical words*" [p.188, emphasis added]; the voice at the originary interval is a voice of unmeaning, the true voice of music. Yet, as we will see, this originary inarticulate voice is of a wholly

different order to that of Rousseau (and Saussure), which Derrida formulates as "a natural language, a language of unarticulated song, modeled after the neuma." [*Margins*, p.151] The specifically post-structural association of Smith's voice of unmeaning is evident in Deleuze and Guattari's assertion that "Machining the voice was the first musical operation." [*A Thousand Plateaus*, p.303] Certain other connections between Smith and Deleuze/Guattari are considered in Chapters 9 and 10, but the distinction between Smith and Rousseau does not only have its "origin" in the concept of the machine.

Employing lexis similar to that of other Scottish Enlightenment historiographic work, Smith writes that this "rude form of vocal Music"^[12] [p.188, emphasis added] nevertheless assembles an essential component of music; "*sounds proper* to be modulated into melody" [*ibid.*, emphasis added]. The "rudeness" of this instrumental voice, then,

[12] Adam Ferguson's *An Essay on the History of Civil Society* (1767) is often credited with being the earliest sociological text of any significance. It describes the "progress" of society from "rudeness" to "civilization". However, these terms are not as moralistic as they would be in a Rousseauist text. Ferguson, a University professor whose childhood had been in Gàidhlig society (which the post-Union intelligentsia imaged as barbarous) knew all too well that such racism stemmed from a crass sociology. His project in the *Essay* can be read as a denial of such complacent metropolitan values; destabilizing the nature-culture opposition, he argues that "all situations are equally natural" [p.8], and more extensively, he argues for a relativistic approach to culture; "We are generally at a loss to conceive how mankind can subsist under customs and manners extremely different from our own; and we are apt to exaggerate the misery of barbarous times, by an imagination of what we ourselves should suffer in a situation to which we are not accustomed. But every age hath its consolations, as well as its sufferings. [...] In rude ages, the persons and properties of individuals are secure; because each has a friend, as well as an enemy [...] And among the Celtic nations, when age rendered the warrior unfit for his former toils, it was the custom, in order to abridge the languors of a listless and inactive life, to sue for death at the hands of his friends." [pp.105/6] Ferguson's relativism is a constant trait of the text, regardless of which culture he deals with, and is in a sense the sociological equivalent of Smith's aesthetics.

produces sounds which are nevertheless endowed with a certain "properness", even "propriety"^[13]. The proper sounds in question are those uttered by the originary voice in a state of unmeaning. There is, therefore, a sonic component at the origin of the phonic; the ontological proper of music is vibrational stimulation, sympathetic resonance, not essential penetration.

Smith continues with a historical perspective, and describes the genesis of this originary inarticulate voice. As time passes, "in the *room* of those unmeaning or musical words, if I may call them so, might be *substituted* words which expressed some sense or meaning" [p.188, emphasis added]. These proper sounds occupy a space, a "room", and over the course of time, there occurs a "substitution" of them by words. The scheme is that of the incremental addition to the sonic by the phonic; sound gives rise to and then is intervallically supplemented by *logos*.

This is the precise opposite of what Rousseau attempts to assemble, and yet is nevertheless exactly what Derrida claims he cannot fail to assemble. Rousseau fears the originary substitution of the voice by the

[13] Smith makes extensive use of the term "proper", and his long visits to Paris may have some bearing on this {much of *The Wealth of Nations* was written there}. In French, *le propre* signifies a variety of concepts from property to propriety, properness, cleanliness, and so forth. Also, Smith regularly uses alliteration: "proper pleasure" [*Of the Imitative Arts*, p.185]; "proper pronunciation" [ibid., p.188]; "proper proportion" [p.189]; "proper purpose" [p.210, also twice on p.212]; "please by a proper" [p.213]. His use of the term often seems quite Gallic. Equally, one can discern the etymology of the French form in many of the following examples: "acted with proper freedom" [p.194]; "a proper arrangement" [p.197]; "proper tone and modulation" [p.203]; "properly succeed" [p.205]. The connection between propriety and imitation is also prevalent: "proper and natural objects of musical imitation" [p.193]; "be said properly to imitate" [p.196, and p.199]; "by imitation properly" [p.198]; "properly imitative" [p.203]. Smith's lexical usage would appear, for instance, to fit well into the deconstructions of the term by the contemporary Parisian theorist Hélène Cixous, in particular.

instrument – imitation is a fatal abyss, therefore the voice must penetrate all in order to operate its law. For Smith, however, the voice itself has no other privilege than that it is the first in a structural series. It is a starting-point, but not a force of absolute determination. It even effaces its own original, proper capacity. Smith's originary voice is not an eternal principle which is absolutely present in all that follows – it even becomes absent from itself when it gradually, incrementally substitutes meaning for its original nature of unmeaning. Equally, there is no sudden catastrophe such as Rousseau fears for his originary phonic voice; Smith's voice, in the transformation which it undergoes, becomes many voices at many stages in a long process. The *logos* begins to work within a small portion of it, a small "room" is occupied at first, and a whole series of minor transformations take place before the voice has finally become its full shadow, its vocal "opposite". There are, however, components of its sonic construction which it retains as traces of its previous state. Originally, the proper sounds which the voice emanates are produced according to the strictures of a spatialized temporality; they are "modulated into melody". This is the site of their entelechy from the vertical, harmonic axis of pure sonority into the axis of time and motion. The hinging action of their sideways collapse into time arranges them across temporal spaces, carefully making sure that they are "lengthened or shortened according to the time and measure of the tune." [p.188] As the voice progresses and these temporal spaces become the site of the substitution of the phonic for the sonic, the law of organization remains the same. This much of the original nature of the voice is retained: the pronunciation of the "meaning" words "might coincide as exactly with the time and measure of the tune, as

that of the musical words had done before." [ibid.] What we have, then, is not so much of a radical change as a Rousseau would fear. The substitution of the original material is incremental – truly intervallic – not instantly or finally catastrophic, and the means of the organization of units is not substituted, but remains intact. What does change is the affective power of the voice, which can now access new energies to supplement its original sonic force. As Smith writes of the result of this genesis: "Hence the origin of Verse" [ibid.].

Again, the contrast with Rousseau's imaginary machine is useful; Rousseau states the origin of both music and poetry as a phono-Hellenic voice wherein the two media are absolutely proximate. The history of the voice from this point on becomes a genealogy of decay, a catalogue of disasters. The only alternative is to turn back to a lost era. Rousseau's theory is marked by nostalgia.

Smith, on the other hand, states the origin of both music and poetry as a *sonic* voice. This origin is framed as historical and ontological (much as Rousseau's is). However, there is no nostalgia here – the turn of events produces new formations which are equally valid. While he writes of sonic unmeaning as "proper" to the originary voice, he can also determine this initial propriety negatively with respect to the later development of the poetic voice. At the poetic stage, a return to the purely sonic voice produces verse which "would for a long time be rude and imperfect" [Smith, p.188] until it had found its own specificity, independent of the original voice. The change from Rousseau's origin to the proto-Derridean supplement is no cause for the paranoia which Rousseau's reaction to instrumental harmony suggests.

Indeed, the originary propriety of unmeaning would soon turn into an intrusion into the space of the becoming-poetic voice: "When the public ear came to be so refined as to reject, in all serious Poetry, the unmeaning words altogether, there would still be a liberty assumed of altering and corrupting, upon many occasions, the pronunciation of the meaning ones, for the sake of accommodating them to the measure." [p.188] This "liberty" runs the risk of attempting what Rousseau attempts – turning back to the originary state. In Rousseau, this is an imperative, but in Smith it is a "corruption" of the uni-directional progression of linear time. For Rousseau, a spatialized time assembles the possibility of a sinful distance from the origin. For Smith, the attempt to stop or reverse the effects of spatialized time is a corrupting force, a failure to face reality.

5.6 Divergence and Synthesis

The point at which Smith's imaginary machine has assembled an intervallic voice of meaning, is also the point where two entities can emerge distinct from each other. The first of these which he deals with is poetry per se, which operates by a "proper pronunciation of the words alone, and without any other artifice" [p.188]. This is where the poetic voice has fully emerged from its past as the sonic voice. However, it is still produced by an adherence to "the observation of time and measure, of the same kind as the time and measure of Music." [ibid.] Indeed, music has now become an independent category, as much as the poetry which need no longer use its organizational power, for it has its own.

Previously, before the two arts have established themselves as independent categories from each other, any attempt by music to restore

its precedence over poetry was a corruption. The two should not invade each other's territory. In fact, the emergence of poetry from music now comes to be seen as not a full effacement of music, but an effacement of the singularity of the original category; poetry had to assemble itself piecemeal from within the body of music only in order to break away from it and allow the independence of both media. The reaffirmation of music at this point of rupture, then, is not so much a Rousseauist return to the origin as a natural continuation, expressed as the reassertion of a temporarily dormant factor. The new division of the voice into the sonic and the poetic now establishes the possibility of a third, properly synthetic art of *song*.

Again, the concept of the great analogical hinge of explication comes to the surface in the delineation of a mechanics of imitation. When the two components of poetry and music re-combine to form vocal music, the poetry gives "sense and meaning to what otherwise might not appear to have any, or at least any which could be clearly and directly understood, without the accompaniment of such an explication." [p.188] The inarticulate unmeaning of the instrument is endowed with an explicative component when poetry is fused with it. Here meaning, explication, and imitation form the hinge between the two axes of music and poetry.

The relation of Smith's theory of the vocal explication of the instrumental, or the analogical connection of two modes of signification to their mutual benefit, can also be read (but used to a different end) in Beattie's *Essay on Poetry and Music as they Affect the Mind*;

Nor do I mean any disrespect to music when I would strike it off the list of imitative arts. I allow it to be a fine art and to have great influence on the human soul: I grant that by its power of raising a variety of agreeable emotions in the hearer

it proves its relation to poetry, and that it never appears to the best advantage but with poetry for its interpreter: and I am satisfied that though musical genius may subsist without poetical taste and poetical genius without musical taste, yet these two talents united might accomplish nobler effects than either could do singly. [Beattie, *Essay*, p.128]

However, apart from the obviously more pro-vocal position taken by Beattie, a further distinction between this and Smith hinges on the lexical turn which substitutes Smith's "explication" by Beattie's more Platonic concept of an "interpreter". Here, we see the possibility of a phonocentric re-coding of the Smithian materialist programme. Where Smith's connective mechanics are based on a pragmatic accumulation of affective powers, Beattie maintains that poetry acts as a hermeneutic tool to reinstate the logo-phonetic moment within music. This reintroduction of *pneuma* into a materialist mechanics does not occur in Smith's writings, which concentrate on affective differences between the arts, albeit centred on the issue of imitation, but this is imitation in a post-Rousseau mode. The explicative capacity of vocal music which is lacked by purely instrumental music has three main imitative components, according to Smith:

The "first species of imitation" is "Music imitating discourse" [p.190]; the music per se will imitate the form of the poetry. This is the primary imitation at work in vocal music, since it provides a direct structural analogical bridge between music and poetry. Since the poetry will be involved in the production of an imitation of a series of narrative events, this hinging action accesses the operation of the poetic imitation for the music. The "musical imitation of discourse", demonstrates a certain negativity to musical imitation in comparison to the other species. In this respect, the imitative powers of the sonic component are determined as "much inferior" to those of the phonic component; "its melodious but

unmeaning and inarticulated sounds cannot [...] relate distinctly the circumstances of any particular story, or describe the different situations which those circumstances produced" [p.195]. Instrumental music does not have a narrative power in this sense. However, by the operation of harmonic proportion between the structure of the poetry and the structure of the music, the latter can access a kind of proportional narrative power – it becomes a formal image of the narrative, which cannot convey the content of the narrative by itself, but, with the explication provided by the words, can partake of the motion of that narrative. This species of imitation nevertheless operates through the proportional media of harmony and rhythm, and is therefore a "musical" imitative power in its very structure, through this assemblage of the becoming-imitative component of sonority.

The second species of imitation in vocal music is the imitation of the passions. This is an imitation which the poetic component assembles within vocal music. The words "express the situation of some particular person, and all the sentiments and passions which he feels from that situation." [p.190] This imitative power, then, is a power possessed by all poetry regardless of its complicity in any vocal music, and forms a further basis for all poetic imitation. The sonic aspect of song can only access this imitation through the first species, its formal imitation of the poetry. The harmonizing of the two arts across the interval between them allows the sonic to call upon the imitative powers of the phonic, with the same hinging mechanism that Alexander Malcolm assembled to give harmony access to the powers of rhythm.

The third species of imitation in song is the "imitation of the actor"

[p.194]. Here, the "double imitation", as Smith puts it, of the first two species, one musico-formal, the other poetico-narrative, is supplemented by an accessing of the physico-expressive powers of drama. Every song should be "not only sung, but acted with proper freedom, animation, and boldness." [p.194] The mechanism by which this gestural imitative power is accessed by song is identical to that explicative hinging which endowed the sonic with the power of the phonic.

Firstly, there was the proportional power of music. This accessed the narrative power of poetry by the assemblage of a formal proportion between music and language. The hinge on which this union turned was no doubt the becoming-poetic of music, the disposal of musical powers at the service of poetry. Secondly, this proportional power of music accessed the gestural power of drama by the assemblage of a formal proportion between music and drama; "In a good opera actor, not only the modulations and pauses of his voice, but every motion and gesture [...] correspond to the time and measure of music." [p.194] This represents both the becoming-musical of drama, or the rhythmization of drama, but also the becoming-dramatic of music.

Through the sympathetic analogy which music sets up between itself and on the one hand poetry, and on the other hand, gesture, it would be easy to extend Smith's imaginary machine towards a description of music acting as an intermediary link in the chain between poetry and gesture. Music would be the hinge which articulates the space between the other two components in forming the whole system. Thus, a reflexive network is assembled between three components - music, language, gesture - where each component articulates the others, but all under the basic operative

laws of proportional rhythm, in other words, harmonic time. In this sense, the structure of the means of analogical linkage between all the arts relies on a musical *mechanism*.

The image of the singer as a whole system is what captivates Adam Smith. For him, the opera singer in particular must operate a triple imitation, but the mechanism at the centre of this, the great hinge upon which it all turns, is harmonic proportion, the intervallic link between all phenomena which is posited by his imaginary machine. This musical image is the analogy by which Smith makes sense out of the dissonant phenomena before his senses, and nowhere is this more important for him than in assembling his theory of the whole singer^[14]. Within the body of the singer, music operates as the hinging mechanism which articulates all the other components. "Music is as it were the soul which animates him" [p.194], where the soul can be read as a lexical hangover from a phonocentric mode, but which nevertheless remains an image, rather than a theoretical component per se^[15]. The image of the soul as that which

[14] Nietzsche makes a similar attack on Rousseauist aesthetics which also uses the concept of the total involvement of the experience with the site of production; "For art to exist, for any sort of aesthetic activity or perception to exist, a certain physiological precondition is indispensable: *intoxication*. Intoxication must first have heightened the excitability of the entire machine: no art results before that happens." [*Twilight of the Idols*, p.71] Here Nietzsche elaborates the distinction between the Apollonian and the Dionysian moment. However, the "wholeness" of the situation for both Nietzsche and Smith is distinct from that of Rousseau in that here we are dealing with a moment of multiplicity and of indeterminacy, rather than forced penetration and the reduction of an interval. This is the distinction between the full organism of Rousseau and the "entire machine" of Nietzsche.

[15] Yet Derrida himself may be slightly disingenuous to blithely accept Rousseau's position on Rameau, for instance, whose texts contain many phonocentric statements. If Derrida was being entirely thorough, a deconstruction of Rameau would have to precede that of Rousseau, if one were to base a pragmatics of signification on his harmonic theory.

animates the singer's body remains problematic, and can easily be read in a phonocentric mode. The soul of the singing machine is an image of the music of the spheres. This essence within the singer's body which has been placed there by means of an entelechy of spirit, of *pneuma*, divine breath, is the seed which propagates the site of the voice, and for this reason, those who are themselves without seed cannot take the place of the whole singer; "the castrati, who perform the principle parts, being always the most insipid and miserable actors" [p.194]; they are "scarce ever tolerable actors" [p.195]. Such statements appear to endanger what Smith writes elsewhere. They represent the possibility that his imaginary machine will collapse into a vital organism which will call for the reinstatement of the origin above all else (as if this origin were more than a supplement, for the body of the seed requires also another body for its propagation, and is there no body prior to that?)

The problem, then, is what the place of this statement of the soul's vitalism and these two solitary statements against the castrati are within Smith's text. It has already been established that a certain pragmatism is at work which is assembled in order to allow specificities their own space. This is Smith's historical approach in the *History of Astronomy*, and also his ontological approach as far as the genesis of the voice is concerned. Does this aversion to the castrato relate to his aversion to "cowards", whose sense of hearing is exaggerated? "The hare, and all those other timid animals to whom flight is the only defence, are supposed to possess the sense of Hearing in the highest degree of activeness. It seems to be the sense in which cowards are very likely to excel." [*Of the External Senses*, p.168] In short, is this statement a theory or a prejudice, or is indeed a

prejudice inherently theoretical as such?

The aversion to the castrato is also Rousseau's prejudice, and this alone would alert a reading of Smith's statements to the problematic. In the article in the *Dictionnaire de musique*, Rousseau writes of "These men, who sing so well, but without fire or passion, become on the stage the most miserable actors in the world". It would seem that it is the acting ability above all else which gives the artistic ground for the aversion, and yet Rousseau links it directly with a lack of "fire", and Smith appears to link it with a lack of "the soul which animates him, which informs every feature of his countenance, and even directs every movement of his eyes." [p.194] Smith's reversion to a phonic-pneumatic determination in this negative mode is problematized further in his direct confrontation with Rousseau's theory of essential representation.

Smith takes issue with Rousseau's article on Imitation in the *Dictionnaire de musique*: "Music [...] imitates, however, every thing, even those objects which are perceivable by sight only. By a delusion that seems almost inconceivable, it can, as it were, put the eye into the ear" [quoted on p.199]. Smith retorts that music alone cannot achieve this absolute representation which Rousseau both admires and fears, but it can approach it when it has other media such as language, gesture, scenery, etc. to explicate the formal analogy which the music assembles between itself and these other arts (this particular argument is dealt with more fully in the following chapter).

Thus, the penetrative semiotic of soul which the castrato lacks in his lack of vital essence has no real place in Smith's general theory of signification. Whether it appears merely as a theoretical wart, a tiny

rupture on the surface, or as a virus which threatens the whole system, it is nevertheless alien to not only the letter, but also the "spirit", if the pun may be forgiven, of Smith's aesthetic imaginary machine. If one were to take Smith as a phonocentric theorist "at heart", however, and attempt a deconstruction along the lines of Derrida on Rousseau, it would take very few pages indeed, given the statistically greater number of machinic statements in Smith than in Rousseau.

The theory of harmonic proportion, derived from music as a musical image or analogy, nevertheless operates within Smith's theory of the singing machine as a kind of meta-mechanism which is assembled within all the other machines and also provides all the necessary invisible chains which are needed to link each component of the whole singing system together. Within this system, Smith establishes a series of analogical chains between the phonic and the sonic, even if the phonic is defined as always already in some respects sonic. This all hinges on the idea of resonances between terms – on sympathetic connection. However, Smith also makes a move away from the concept of sympathy which has significant ramifications for the allegedly harmonic metaphysical status of instrumental music. Let us therefore begin to retrace the structure of the second species of imitation – of the passions – but this time specifically within the context of the sonic alone.

CHAPTER SIX

THE MACHINIC EAR

In those days I thought light existed to show things, that space was simply a gap between me and the bodies I feared or desired; now it seems that bodies are the stations from which we travel into space and light itself. Perhaps an illusionist's main job is to exhaust his restless audience by a show of marvellously convincing squabbles until they see the simple things we really depend upon.

- *Lanark*, Alasdair Gray, 1981.

CHAPTER SIX

THE MACHINIC EAR

6.1 Harmonic Passions

Smith's theory of the second species of imitation – the imitation of the passions – demonstrates a further layer of harmonic metaphysics with wide-ranging ramifications for the concept of sympathy so crucial to so many of the traditional readings of his aesthetics. We will begin by tracing through the musicality of the affect. Smith assembles this musicality with an emphasis on a temporal succession of affects. As with his implication of the temporal nature of objects, so too with affective stimulation. For Smith, it is a question of the tempo of "That train of thoughts and ideas which is continually passing through the mind" [*Of the Imitative Arts*, p.197]. Each passion produces its own characteristic tempo, rhythm and texture. Firstly, a "gay and cheerful" passion produces a fast succession of thoughts and ideas which have "little connection" with each other, or are "connected rather by their opposition than by their mutual resemblance" [ibid.]. In this case, speed and difference are produced. Attentiveness is high, and a breadth of stimulus is sought. No matter how various the thoughts are, however, there is no dangerous dissonance or fragmentation of passions, since all the thoughts are nevertheless *connected* by their variety. In other words, they fulfil all of Malcolm's criteria of "variety", in

that they are diverse, but always ultimately harmonious. The apparent lack of connection adds to the motive power which a sameness of character would not admit. Secondly, a "melancholy and desponding" passion produces a slow succession of thoughts and ideas which are "resembling or closely connected" [p.197]. In this case, sameness produces a slowness, or rather, a lack of succession, a textural stasis. Likewise, the third passionate disposition is a "state of sedateness, tranquillity, and composure" [ibid.], and occupies the position between the other two. Here, as one would expect, the tempo of succession is neither fast nor slow, and the relation of one thought to the next is more continuous than in the first case, and more varied than in the second.

Smith ascribes the same properties to musical pitch - high frequencies, or acute sounds, are "naturally gay", low frequencies, or grave sounds, are "melancholy". This is related also to tempo; there is a "natural connection" between high frequency and fast tempo, and between low frequency and slow tempo. There is thus a direct correspondence for Smith between musical tempo, rhythm and texture, and the passions. It is as if the passions themselves are organized by musical laws, operating according to musical structural relationships of consonance and dissonance, both "vertical" (sameness-difference) and "horizontal" (slow-fast). The passions, then, are vibrations of the mind, and the mind in this sense can be considered to be a monochord capable of being set into affective motions. This is the way in which music per se affects the mind, but in order that the string of the mind can be affected in proportion to the properties of the music, it must be at a state of rest, its motive capacity must be emptied; "if the mind is so far vacant as not to be

disturbed by any disorderly passion, it [music] can, at least for the moment, and to a certain degree, *produce every possible modification* of each of those moods or dispositions." [p.197, emphasis added]. Smith's lexis here is significant in its distinction from the Pythagorean lexis of penetration and "touchings". Notice also that, unlike Descartes, Smith writes of the passions of the *mind*. The Cartesian version of affectivity concentrates on the *soul*^[1]. It is always a question of temporal orientation for Smith; the great productive powers of music which can induce "every possible" change of passion, are nevertheless bound by the temporal strictures of "the moment". If the mind is presently in a state of dissonance, then the temporal coincidence of music and present passion can only produce further dissonance, or at best, affectivity will be possible only "to a certain degree". If, however, the mind is "vacant", if it is in possession of a capacity for production, then, such production can take place at this moment, and according to the proportions of the full affectivity of which the music is capable. Once more, the theme of the proportional relation of two spatial capacities, and the issue of their distance or proximity along a harmonic chain. Mind and sound are two surfaces which are brought into a system of resonance:

The mind being thus successively occupied by a train of

[1] Descartes' famous dualism in the "ghost in the machine" hypothesis can be readily discerned in the following passage from the opening pages of *The Passions of the Soul*: "*To understand the passions of the soul, we must distinguish its functions from those of the body.* Next I note that we are not aware of any subject which acts more directly upon our soul than the body to which it is joined. Consequently we should recognize that what is a passion in the soul is usually an action in the body. Hence there is no better way of coming to know about our passions than by examining the difference between the soul and the body, in order to learn to which of the two we should attribute each of the functions present in us." [*Selected Philosophical Writings*, p.218]

objects, of which the nature, succession and connection *correspond*, sometimes to the gay, sometimes to the tranquil, and sometimes to the melancholy mood or disposition, it is itself successively *led* into each of those moods or dispositions; and is thus *brought into a sort of harmony or concord with the Music* which so agreeably engages its attention. [*Of the Imitative Arts*, pp.197/8, emphases added.]

Music is a machine which has as its analogue the machine which is the mind. Both machines operate by analogous laws of motion. Thus, when the music machine begins a motion in a certain direction, it has a certain speed, capacity, and so forth, which can produce a corresponding motion of similar speed and capacity in the mind machine. This *minding* is made possible by the establishment of an invisible chain of intermediate components between the two machines which provides them with a site of a mutual connection. Once this connection has been made, and once each machine has been thought of as a component in itself, they can then engage in an action of analogical hinging which will connect the two components into a greater machine, with one component regulating the other according to the rules of regulation which apply to each.

6.2 Unsympathetic Instruments

Within this system of harmonic passions, Smith initially locates the sonic affectivity of instrumental music at a certain negative juncture: instrumental music cannot "express clearly, and so as to be understood by every hearer, the various sentiments and passions" [p.195] which are imitated by language. However, as was the case with Alexander Malcolm's initially negative statement of the incapacity of instrumental music to fill

directly representational space^[2], Smith later turns this provisionally negative difference into an affirmation of specificity. Already, there is the potential for an affirmative difference between phonic and sonic affectivity in Smith's conditional description - instrumental music does not signify "clearly", and so signifies on a level *other* than the logocentric action which would be required for the same semiotic message to be directly "understood by every hearer". The affirmative nature of this difference is achieved by the fact that, although instrumental music cannot be thought "properly to imitate, [it] may, however, produce all the effects of the finest and most perfect imitation." [p.196] The specificity of instrumental music does not reside in an *imitative* power, but in a *productive* power - the production of all the *effects* of imitation, but without the necessity of calling in to operation a semiotic, phonic determinism.

However, this move away from logocentric imitation which purely instrumental music achieves is also claimed by Smith to be a move beyond even the supplementarity of the concept of sympathy;

It is not, as in vocal Music, in Painting, or in Dancing, by sympathy with the gaiety, the sedateness, or the melancholy and distress of some other person, that instrumental Music soothes us into each of these dispositions; it becomes itself a gay, a sedate, or a melancholy object; and the mind naturally assumes the mood or disposition which at the time corresponds to the object which engages its attention. Whatever we feel from instrumental Music is an original, and not a sympathetic feeling: it is our own gaiety, sedateness or melancholy; not the reflected disposition of another person. [*Essay*, p.198]

Here, Smith departs radically from the concept of sympathetic

[2] cf. Chapter 3: "how any particular Passion can be excited without such a lively Representation of its proper Object, as only Words can afford, is not very intelligible" [*Treatise of Musick*, p.602].

chaining at several levels. Most significantly, if we accept the mapping of the origin-supplement opposition onto the passionate axis of original-sympathetic, we soon realise that Smith's positioning of the affectivity of instrumental music is within what may appear at first to be a form of originary logic: "whatever we feel from instrumental Music is an original, and not a sympathetic feeling". It may be, then, that the instrumental does not necessarily fall within a supplementary logic at all levels. As we have seen above, it was through a sympathetic analogy that instrumental music was able to access imitative powers, which are associated with phonic signification, and therefore potentially origination. How, then, do we come to a point where the *sonic* power of the *instrumental* meets up with a notion of *originary*?

Equally, while we have previously associated the concept of intervallic sympathy with aspects of supplementarity, and authentic imitation with the concept of originary, this question must be traced carefully, since we have already noticed that Smith's alignment of the concept of imitation is radically distinct from that of Derrida's reading of Rousseau's. For Rousseau, imitation is an attempt to generate an authenticity which closes off the abyss which the supplementary action of intervallic representation threatens. For Smith, however, imitation is precisely not a question of maintaining authenticity, but of celebrating supplementary difference. The contemplation of the *disparity* between object and representation is the site of pleasure's production: *difference* produces *pleasure*. In this, we can see that sympathy, as a harmonization of two terms, is aligned with the concept of imitation. If, then, "instrumental Music does not imitate", does not affect us "by sympathy"

[ibid.], then what precisely is the means of non-imitative *production* which instrumental music utilizes in order to bring the mind "into a *sort* of harmony" with itself? If sympathy is a harmonic mechanism in Smith, and if instrumental music is a harmonic medium, then what is suggested by the qualifier around this non-sympathetic affectivity as a *sort* of harmony? If imitation is sympathetic, harmonic, then why is its "opposite" - *production* - located within the operation of *the* harmonic art? The adequacy of the oppositional lexis which Derrida presupposes in order to effect his deconstruction begins to crumble here, and, accordingly, we should proceed with care.

Smith first asserts that in song and other art forms, the mode of connectivity which we operate is a sympathy in the sense of a resonance with the feelings of another person - ie. the singer. In this way, we are affected by the singer's original passion, and this sets up a resonance in us which produces our sympathetic passion. Instrumental music equally "soothes us into" a passionate disposition, but not through sympathy as such. Smith claims that instrumental music, rather than representing a passion which lies behind it in the body of a singer (actual or transcendental - as in Rousseau), "*becomes itself* a gay, a sedate, or a melancholy object". Thus, the sonic is not a link in a dialectical-semiotic chain between a signifying subject and a receiving subject, but is itself the site of a passionate disposition. It then becomes a question of how the mind is "*led* into each of those moods or dispositions" by music which has itself become passionate, and here we notice a certain lexical somersault which works at a deconstructive level against (Derrida's) Rousseau's origin-supplement opposition. If, whilst listening to an instrumental piece,

the passion which we feel is *original to us*, then how can it have been produced by the music when such a mode of production would classify it as a supplement of the music's originary passionate disposition? Could it be that Smith has taken the notion of supplementarity to such an extent that the play of instrumental music sets up a form of resonance which even goes beyond certain definitions of sympathy? In other words, the interval between source (sound) and destination (mind) is so great that no form of causal logic can encapsulate the relation?

If passion is defined without recourse to spirit, or soul, then it is a short step to define it as material, and describe its mechanics. From there, it is to be understood as a quality of any machine which is capable of incorporating such components. The mind is one, but so is music itself; the passions are determined by Smith as being assembled from a musical mechanics, they operate according to proportional laws of analogy. For this reason it is possible to conceive of this music-mind relationship from the opposite end of the chain. The mind is "brought into a sort of harmony or concord with the Music" for the reason that the music "*becomes itself a gay, a sedate, or a melancholy object*" [Smith, *Essays*, p.198, emphasis added]. In this, the non-imitation and non-penetration of instrumental music is radically affirmed. If the passions *are* musical, then music *is* passionate. If the passions are mechanisms, and if this mechanism is harmonic, then music can *become itself* an "object" (or event) in which the passions reside. In other words, passion becomes a component of not only the mind which is moved in proportion to music, but becomes a component of music itself. This is not to impart any quality of "consciousness" onto sound, but rather represents a step towards a materiality of

consciousness, a further formulation of the idea that music has an affective capacity, a potential connectivity, which is independent of the affectivity of the listener's mind - the sonic is not representational, because it embodies *the actual passion*, which inheres as an affect of its motion. At this point, Smith's system is assembling in a manner which makes it quite distinct from such harmonicist theories as Alexander Malcolm's. Malcolm describes a mechanical operation which produces the passions in the mind, but the mechanism which he considers is specifically that which can be thought within sympathetic vibration. With that concept, there is a certain sense of the attenuation of centralized semiotic power as sound becomes disseminated throughout space. Yet sympathetic vibration can be considered to have a residue of the penetrational semiotic in the sense of a depositing of an essence of motion (impulsion), even if this is subject to decay across an intervallic chain - in order for dis-semination to occur, there must be an extant seminality to begin with. In Smith's notion of instrumental music, however, this residue is not present, and he is at pains to rule out the possibility that his imaginary machine be understood in the limited Malcolmist sense: instrumental music specifically operates through "an *original*, and not a *sympathetic* feeling" [ibid.] The passion which is experienced during an act of audition does not take place *because of* the passion which inheres in the music. It is not the *same* passion, it is the passion which inheres in the mind. Smith here radicalizes the space between music and mind beyond the notion of sympathy, and beyond any notion of sound as cause and a-ffect as e-ffect. The problem of lexis here is that the term "sympathetic" potentially evokes a latent penetrational or causal residue, in that in a sympathetic vibrational system, there is an

original vibration which sets up, *causes*, vibrations in other bodies. Thus, in that system, although there are factors which interfere with and disperse the essential identity of the original vibrational essence (the loss of affective power over a distance which Malcolm recognized), there is yet a point of causal origin.

Smith has already called into operation the conditional mechanisms of "the moment", and thus the "certain degree" of indeterminacy which can throw surfaces in the way of an *ousia* or pseudo-*ousia*, and deflect it in unexpected directions – *dissemination*. As Derrida writes, "There is no first insemination. The semen is already swarming. The 'primal' insemination is dissemination." [*Dissemination*, p.304] The temporal nature of the coincidence of mind and sound assembles a further layer of uncertainty with respect to the integrity of a passion across the mind-sound space, in that it is the temporal-harmonic nature of the mind mechanism which regulates its potential connectivity to the musical machine. Again, it is a matter of the proportionality of two entities which affects their connectivity, but this proportionality is neither fixed nor inherently controllable. Thus Smith emphasizes the independence of the passion inhering in the music "itself" from the passion which is "original" in the mind. An aspect of the integrity of the identity of cause and effect which still bears a trace in Malcolm has been replaced by an almost complete causal collapse in Smith, if causality is taken as a mode of penetrational propagation, even to the mild point of direct sympathetic vibration. In other words, cause and effect have been finally invested with full material power, devoid of any metaphysical traces such as that which involves Malcolm in the concept of the "admittance" of vibrations *into* the mind, and

Locke in the forced entry of sounds. Despite Malcolm's pragmatism inherent in his use of this lexis, disassociating himself from Locke's violence, it remains a residue of a penetrative semiotic, in that it supports the locational axiology of such as Locke. Smith, in affirming the complete independence of sound and mind, by affirming that no essence is transmitted through a space, but that both sound and mind have their own passions as "original" modes of their own surfaces, has refined the notion of production to a point where all is surface, all contact is frictional, and not invasive.

6.3 Original Passion – The Proximate Supplement

A further comparison with Hume elaborates another transgression at work in this reading of Smith's Original Passions. In book two of the *Treatise of Human Nature*, Hume writes specifically *Of the Passions*. Here, the passions are linked in closely with the concept of the origin; "A passion is an original existence, or, if you will, modification of existence, and contains not any representative quality, which renders it a copy of any other existence or modification." [*Treatise*, p.413] Significantly, Hume defines passions as operating not within a representational form of logic, but one in which terms are *modified*, or, as Kristeva would have it, *intertextually transposed*. This assertion also has a large intertext with Smith's attack on Rousseau's theory of imitation and deception, in claiming that passion is original to the mind to the extent that it is not a direct transmissional copy of an external entity which has penetrated the surface of an internality. Hume's statement that the passion is not a copy of another "existence or passion", in other words, another person's passion,

accords with Smith's contention that it is "not the reflected disposition of another person". For Hume also, it turns upon the question of representation; whether it is either authentic or inauthentic, as Rousseau holds, or affective and connective, as Smith holds.

Here, the issues of truth and reason come into play for Hume. Passion is original to the mind in that it is produced as a mode of the mind, a *modification* of an extant component, and not as a deposited essence which has penetrated the mind's surface. Passion, therefore, cannot contradict truth or reason, "since this contradiction consists in the disagreement of ideas, considered as copies, with those objects, which they represent." [*Treatise*, p.415] Thus, the contradiction of passion with truth and reason is a by-product of a Rousseauist establishment of an axis of origin and supplement, where the supplement is defined as the deceptive copy of the origin. In other words, the opposition of passion to truth and reason can only be produced if there is also an opposition of origin and fake. Since the passion is no copy, there is no opposition, because the passion is neither an origin in itself, and nor is it a deceptive supplement. This constitutes its transgression of the axis, and requires a new investment in the meaning of the terms origin and supplement, if not their outright *disposal* (rather than Derridean *displacement*).

Smith's Original Passion is "original" precisely because it is so supplementary in Rousseauist lexis. Or rather, while it is indeed connected to other entities such as the ear and the mind, it cannot be encapsulated in either end of the Rousseauist opposition of origin and supplement. For it to be encapsulated within that framework would immediately require the presupposition of the internality and the externality of an entity which has



been penetrated. In this sense, to state that the Original Passion is original because it is so supplementary is also to call for a new differential lexis which will not admit of confusion with the penetrational semiotic.

Derrida, too, intimates the necessity of such a move when he states that "The supplement is neither a presence nor an absence. No ontology can think its operation." [*Of Grammatology*, p.314] However, the fact that the term "supplement" has been drawn from a specifically ontological system (Rousseau's) presents at least a lexical problem for Derrida's play beyond presence-absence. To inscribe any non-ontological value into the term "supplement" is immediately to take a provisional position with respect to the deconstruction of ontology, and always risk its automatic reconstruction. The strategy of erasure nevertheless relies on the structure of the concept beneath the strikeout or questioned by the scarequotes.

Hence, the concept of the "original passion" can perhaps be read as a pun as much on Rousseau's lexis as Derrida's "supplement at the origin", for this original passion of the mind is no simple origin of itself; it is not an organic origin, one which would, in an ideal phonocentric "system", directly produce from within its own body, and from nowhere else, a "child" as its external representation. Rather, it exists as an affect of a supplement – an affect of a supplementary mind, a mode upon a surface – and it has been produced not in a manner of direct proximity to an "external" source, but at a great, quite independent distance along a chain of provisional and transitional proximities. It is "original", in that it belongs to itself, and is independent, precisely because of this, but also because it is so supplemental with respect to other origins. In Smith,

organic causality has collapsed, machinic causality has been affirmed; connective affectivity has replaced penetrational intentionality. The affect is not the effect of imitation.

6.4 Taking the Imitation out of the Ear

The radical distinction between a phonic music which is an imitational art, and a sonic music which is an affective art is also, by analogy, that between the model of the organism and that of the machine, and between penetration and vibrational stimulation. The distinction is drawn very neatly by consideration of Smith's answers to Rousseau's article in the *Dictionnaire de musique* on Imitation, where the organicism of the one is contrasted with the materialism of the other. Smith introduces Rousseau by describing him as "an Author, more capable of feeling strongly than of analysing [sic] accurately" [p.198], and continues with a quotation from Rousseau^[3];

Music, one might imagine, should be equally confined to [the objects] of hearing. It imitates, however, *every* thing, even those objects which are perceivable by sight only. By a *delusion* that seems almost inconceivable, it can, as it were, *put the eye into the ear* [Rousseau, *Dictionnaire* article "Imitation", quoted in Smith's *Of the Imitative Arts*, p.199, emphasis added].

Smith has already objected to the notion that imitational art deceives

[3] On a more personal level, Smith had harsher words to describe Rousseau. Following Rousseau's famous paranoid insults in the face of Hume's generosity, Smith sent his condolences to Hume, advising him to ignore the provocations; "By endeavouring to unmask before the Public this hypocritical Pedant, you run the risk, of disturbing the tranquillity of your whole life. [...] He is in danger of falling into obscurity in England and he hopes to make himself considerable by provoking such an illustrious adversary. He will have a great party. The church, the Whigs, the Jacobites, the whole wise English nation, who will love to mortify a Scotchman, and to applaud a man that has refused a Pension from the King." [*Correspondence of Adam Smith*, p.113]

the senses. In fact, the whole first stage of his assembly rested on refuting this, when he wrote that works of art "never produce their effect by deception" [*Essays*, p.184], and that the "proper pleasure" which we derive from it, apart from being "incompatible" with deception, is founded "upon our admiration of the art which surmounts so happily that disparity" [p.185] between object and representation. His objection to the concept of deception forms the basis of his desire for the mechanism of analogy, and the great hinge upon which everything turns. Much is at stake, therefore, when he confronts Rousseau's theory, and it is his concept of explication which he initially invokes; "without the accompaniment of the scenery and action of the opera, without the assistance of either the scene-painter or of the poet, or of both, the instrumental music of the orchestre [sic] could produce none of the effects which are here ascribed to it" [p.199]. Again, instrumental music is not an imitative art; it can only "imitate" objects if there are other media with which it connects and by which its "imitation" is explicated – other media which are actually imitative in capacity, and are capable of endowing music with certain semblances of their imitative powers, through a proportional mechanism of analogy (thus, the whole of Smith's aesthetic imaginary machine, as much as Derrida's, can be read as a specific refutation of Rousseau).

Rousseau, however, was also commenting on the Theory of Ideas in much of his work, and it is evident from the contention that musical imitation can "*put the eye into the ear*", that there may be many music-aesthetic resonances within this tradition, particularly in the attempt to append a visual penetration to an aural "organics". This is not least due

to the fact that its most prominent theorists (Locke, Berkeley, Hume, etc.) tend to concentrate their theories of perception upon the eye, to the near exclusion, or at least subordination of the ear. Rousseau's statement is a particularly blunt attempt to negate the specificity of the ear, and equally bluntly proposes that the visual model of signification can mysteriously penetrate the operation of the aural organ^[4].

Such assertions can be read as developing the theories of Descartes, who, in the *Principles of Philosophy* (1644), proposes a common structure for vision and audition which operates through a locational axiology, an opposition between internality and externality; "the properties in external objects to which we apply the terms light, colour, smell, taste, sound, heat and cold [...] are, so far as we can see, simply various dispositions in those objects" [*Principles*, in *Writings*, p.206]. According to this view, sound (along with other phenomena) is a property, a disposition of an *external* object. Its connectivity with respect to the ear then (given its externality) could be held to depend on the depositing of a semiotic essence into the interiority of the ear. Again, "we perceive by our senses as being located outside us [...] light, colour, smell, taste, sound, and tactile qualities." [ibid.] The common ground between sound and light, then, is their externality, and from this, all the connective mechanisms of perception are potentially involved in the rupture of a surface, its forced division in

[4] However, in Derridean mode, we should notice that the penetration of the visual *logos* into the aural *sonos* is described by Rousseau as a "delusion" - ie. this organicist form of the "explication" of two modes of perception provides Rousseau with yet another disturbing interval within the organism.

order to unite an internal and an external term^[5].

However, it is at the point of entry, and the question of what it is that enters, that the nature of the connection between sounding body and hearing ear requires more detailed consideration. Descartes only hints at the problem by suggesting a difference between sound and affective sensation; "When the air strikes the tympanic membrane it produces a disturbance in the little chain of three small bones attached to it; and the sensations of different sounds arise from the various different movements in these bones." [ibid., p.203] Harmonic connectivity is invoked by the evidence of the "little chain" of vibrating bones, and the possibility of sympathetic vibrational mechanisms along a supplementary chain is not far away. What the issue hinges on here is the striking of the air on the ear, a forceful vibration which leaves its mark upon the limited intervallic chain. The difference between sound and sensation, then, could be the difference between sound and affect, but only where we determine sound as origin, and affect as causally-determined. Although Descartes begins to provide an intervallic explanation here, a causal residue remains as a

[5] Equally, Kant makes a similar move which associates sound with colour in the *Critique of Judgement*, and extends himself into the body of universality: "The art of the beautiful play of sensations (externally produced), which admits at the same time of universal communication, can be concerned with nothing else than the proportion of the different degrees of the disposition (tension) of the sense to which the sensation belongs, ie. with its tone. In this far-reaching signification of the word it may be divided into the artistic play of the sensations of hearing and sight, ie. into *music* and the *art of color*." [*Critique of Judgement*, p.168] Kant's position, though, is considerably more complex with regard to consideration of the internality-externality axis.

potential trace of a semiotic penetration^[6]. In *Tympan*, Derrida provides a neat description of this Cartesian mechanics of auralized spirit -

indefatigably at issue is the ear, the distinct, differentiated, articulated organ that reproduces the effect of proximity, of absolute properness, the idealizing erasure of organic difference. It is an organ whose structure (and the suture that holds it to the throat) produces the pacifying lure of organic indifference. [*Margins of Philosophy*, p.xvii]

Despite the potential rupture suggested by a *mechanics* of spirit, the service of such mechanisms to the law of the *ousia* dialectically returns

[6] Smith specifically engages with Cartesian methodology in the following extract from one of his *Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres*; "in Naturall Philosophy or any other Science of that Sort we may either like Aristotle go over the Different branches in the order they happen to cast up to us, giving a principle commonly a new one for every phaenomenon; or in the manner of Sir Isaac Newton we may lay down certain principles known or proved in the beginning, from whence we account for the severall Phenomena, connecting all together by the same Chain. - This latter which we may call the Newtonian method is undoubtedly the most Philosophical [...] It gives us a pleasure to see the phaenomena which we reckoned the most unaccountable all deduced from some principle [...] and all united in one chain, far superior to what we feel from the unconnected method where everything is accounted for by itself without any reference to the others. We need not be surprised then that the Cartesian Philosophy (for Des-Cartes was in reality the first who attempted this method) tho it does not perhaps contain a word of truth [...] should nevertheless have been so universally received by all the Learned in Europe at that time. [...] we justly deem [it] one of the most entertaining Romances that has ever been wrote." [*Rhetoric*, pp.145-6] This is a complex passage, perhaps due to its dissemination through the hands of a student, and yet we can readily find Smith's cheerful passion for instrumentalist theories which utilise a "connected variety". What is significant, however, is his identification of this method as a Cartesian one. In this connection, it may be inferred that Smith would approve of Descartes' attempt to link all modes of perception by a common mechanism. However, we should also note Smith's reserve in relation to Descartes himself, and also his warning elsewhere that the "man of system" who is "wise in his own conceit" can, through misapplication of systematic thought, risk the "highest degree of disorder" [*Theory of Moral Sentiments*, pp.234-5] It should be remembered that each Imaginary Machine is to be judged on its aesthetic merit - Descartes is "one of the most entertaining Romances that has ever been wrote", but this does not mean that his system (or any other) should be applied dogmatically and uncritically. Philosophy is an art - not a social panacea, and most attempts at the latter have indeed ended in the "highest degree of disorder" in the political field, whether we consider Maoism's dialectical dogmatism or the Nazi obsession with the philosophy of Spirit.

the mechanisms to the organic body. This hearing, then, is a *phonic* hearing, which organically connects the ear with the throat not through an *interval* but a biologically internal *passage*. It is the organics by which the singer performs an authentic and self-proximate signification without an interval, the "hearing-oneself-speak" of Rousseauism. The *organic difference* between the vocal and auditory organs – their division into two separate mechanisms – has as its *telos* the dialectical return of voice and ear to within one and the same body, an undifferentiated unity, or *organic indifference*.

Between Descartes, Locke, and Rousseau in aesthetic terms, however, it is merely a matter of degree. To "put the eye into the ear", as Rousseau suggests, or to associate visual and aural mechanisms as Descartes does, is also to append to the experience of audition another aspect of the *logos*; the penetration of Light into the darkest recesses to shine pure, undivided Reason upon them. This logocentric activity is, of course, Plato's recommendation for the enlightenment of his ignorant Cave-dwellers. Equally, Locke's penetrational theory of audition is mentioned in the previous chapters, in contrast with the sympathetic vibrational theory of Alexander Malcolm. However, Malcolm's theory retains a trace of a Lockean semiotic in its insistence on an axis of internality and externality. From that position, it is hard to maintain a play of mutually stimulating surfaces, although this can be read as the direction to which the concept of sympathy gravitates.

A similar movement can be found in Berkeley's writings. In *An Essay Towards a New Theory of Vision* (1709), he writes that "a man is easily convinced that bodies and external things are not properly the objects of

hearing; but only sounds, by the mediation whereof the idea of this or that body or distance is suggested to his thoughts." [*Essay*, in *Works*, p.21] In other words, it is the mediation of sound which produces the idea of a source, and thus the sensation of hearing across a distance. Sound becomes the medium through which a spatial relation to a source is inferred. Berkeley has moved from a determination of audition as a reception of a penetration towards a conception of a surface which interrupts the absolute continuity of an acoustic *ousia*, to the point where its meaning has to be rationally inferred. This aspect of Berkeley's theory must also be connected with another of the rare instances of a discussion of sound, in the *Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous* (1713), where Hylas states that "sounds too have no real being without the mind" [*Dialogues*, in *Works*, p.144]. Here, the issue of inference is stated fully as the endowment of a state of Being upon sound by the mind. This is no mere conception of a lack of existence of sound in the absence of a perceiving mind, but an angulation of the issue across a specific determination of existence as the presence of Being. In the light of Berkeley's more thorough treatment of the mechanics of vision, and the statement that "by the ear I perceive distance, just after the same manner as I do by the eye" [*Essay*, p.21], it is possible to associate with the concept of sound's Being a further vast series of visual and penetrational mechanisms. However, in the absence of a significant body of writing from Berkeley on the issue of sound, other texts must be consulted to trace the development towards an imaginary machine for musical signification.

Hume's *A Treatise of Human Nature* (1739) provides many paths for a reading of the concept of penetrational mechanics, and for reasons of

space, only a certain route will be traced here. In the *Appendix*, we find an unambiguous position on this matter. On the issue of the intervals between two bodies, Hume makes two statements. Firstly, he states that, empirically, the interval is "a property of the objects, which affect the senses" [p.638]. The interval is a mode of the connection of the two objects as far as appearance is concerned. Hume then considers the proposition that such intervals are "full of *body*" to be inconclusive, in that it is a question based not on appearances only, but on the possible inference of a body which is imperceptible to the senses. However, he does *provisionally* hold the opposite; "If *the Newtonian* philosophy be rightly understood, it will be found to mean no more. A vacuum is asserted: That is, bodies are said to be plac'd after such a manner, as to receive bodies betwixt them, without impulsion or penetration."^[7] [p.639] Here, we have an explicit rejection of penetrational mechanics, where the vacuum is determined as a kind of potentially full interval, if only on account of the inability of the sense organs to correctly perceive a body there. This still requires the action of inference in cases where such an intermediate body is "invisible or intangible", and as Hume admits, he accepts this argument because it is "more suitable to vulgar and popular notions."^[8] [ibid.] However, it is the case where there is a visible and tangible intermediate body, and the vacuum in question can be read as the potential connectivity of two bodies,

^[7] cf. the previous footnote on the Smithian version of Newton "rightly understood", as the methodological precursor of the intervallic Imaginary Machine, but with its ultimate roots in the "entertaining Romance" of Descartes.

^[8] In this connection, cf. the quotation from Robert Burns at the head of the previous chapter, which accuses the philosophers of "sympathetic feeling" such as Smith and Reid of appealing merely to "What wives an' wabsters see an' feel" [*Letter to J-s T-t, Gl-nc-r*].

their potential difference.

Further, and Hume provides a mechanics of translation between these two forms of distance; "an invisible and intangible distance may be converted into a visible and tangible one, without any change on the distant objects." [p.59] This is achieved through a spatial and temporal movement of a sense organ such as the hand, which can provide an experience of the interval's distance. From this position, it is possible to affirm the non-penetrational mechanics which result from the rejection of inference, to the point where the connection between two objects or events is undecidable. In other words, causality is the subject of scepticism, if it is taken as the mechanics of a forced action of one body *onto* (impulsion) or *into* (penetration) another; "we can never penetrate so far into the essence and construction of bodies, as to perceive the principle, on which their mutual influence depends. 'Tis their constant union alone, with which we are acquainted" [p.400]. It is clear from the use of lexis in these quotations, that Hume draws a kind of link between the idea of a mechanical penetration and a theoretical penetration. Not only is causality considered as the action of one body depositing an essence of motion into another, but also in the sense of the action of the theoretical imagination perceiving an essence as a true substance of a body. The moment of Humean scepticism is close to that of Smith's determination of philosophy not as an inference, a mental forced entry of a substance but as a means of creatively making mental links, connections between objects, events, etc.: the active writing of an intertext. Here, Smith avoids even the question of causality which Hume has raised, in that, while Hume defines causality as inferred, and therefore in a sense created, Smith's theory of

the imaginary machine has as its regulatory component the very concept of creation.

The complicity of creation in Smith's theory of the ear, which neither raises the question of causality nor vision (whether impulsional or penetrational), points towards a different framework from any of the other writers considered here. In the theory of audition as laid out in Smith's essay *Of the External Senses*, even the methodological preoccupation with axiological thought is rejected. This is not to infer that his theories of touch or vision, for instance, are not worked through imaginary axes, but rather to assert that two models of perception are assembled non-oppositionally; one based on an axiological distinction of an "inside" and an "outside", and thus capable of operating according to a logocentric dialectic, and another based on an affirmation of immanent surface as distinct from internality and externality. In this he continues the line which Malcolm opened in the *Treatise of Musick* where two models are elaborated but not oppositionally negotiated. Once more, we find Smith using *sonos* to transgress sympathy and move towards a more radical theory of the affect.

In the sense of touch, Smith writes of the fact that pressure or resistance immediately sets up a concept of externality. Pressure is therefore "not merely an affection of my hand, but altogether external" [*Of the External Senses*, p.135]. Equally, the theory of vision given here is derived very directly from Berkeley's *An Essay towards a New Theory of Vision* (1709), and thus cannot significantly dispense with the concept of externality and internality, or the attendant possibilities of causality and

penetration^[9].

What is remarkable is the space which Smith devotes to the sense of *hearing*. For a start, it occupies a whole section to itself (unlike most other treatises within the Cartesian tradition of perception), proceeding to describe a model of audition devoid of visual-penetrative lexis. Every sound, according to Smith, is naturally felt "*as an affection of our Ear*" [p.143]. Sound does not exist along an axis which has its ends inside and outside the ear, it is not an essence which has been deposited in the ear there from outside, inseminated by a more virile term in an act of entelechation. Rather, it exists more as a component of the ear, as a mode of it, an integral constituent of its surface, just as the affectivity of instrumental music operates non-causally within the context of our "original passions". This immediately distinguishes Smith's theory from the oppositional conceptions of spatiality which operate from Descartes through Rousseau. While Smith concedes, like Descartes, that sounds are produced by bodies at a distance from the mind, unlike Descartes, he asserts that the "real" sound, the actual affective sound, "can never change its place, it is incapable of motion" [p.143] in the sense of motion throughout a concrete space. Sound is an *a*-ffect of the ear, not an *e*-ffect of a body external to the ear; the ear is the sole locus of sound. To conceive otherwise, in an absolute opposition of sound and sensation, is to posit internality-externality. From there, as with Descartes' oppositional axiology, there must first be a theoretical penetration of the ear's surface

[9] Smith writes of Berkeley's theory of vision that "I have scarcely anything to add to what he has already done [...] Whatever I shal [sic] say upon it, if not directly borrowed from him, has at least been suggested by what he has already said." [*Essays*, p.148]

in order to establish the locational axis, to infer the "inside" and the "outside" of the situation, thus allowing the passage of a penetrating essence through the inferred duct.

As with Smith's adoption of the imaginary machine of the original passions, which transgressed this issue in relation to the theory of causality, so too the adoption of a wholly mechanized ear transgresses the two penetrational mechanisms of the Cartesian or Rousseauist ear. Smith's proto(pseudo)-deconstruction of the oppositional axis which establishes the possibility of the penetrational duct is stated in the formula: "The real sound, however, the sensation in our ear, can never be heard or felt anywhere but in our ear, it can never change its place" [p.143]. Thus, the transgression of the penetrational axis is achieved by the transgression of the axis which Descartes established between "sound" and "sensation": the "real sound" *is* "the sensation in our ear", and *nowhere else*. For Smith, it is only a question of an immanent surface, not of a mobile essence which penetrates a body's surface as an insemination of the external into the internal.

The spatiality of the ear is assembled according to its own specific locus; "The ear can feel or hear nowhere but where it is, and *cannot stretch out its powers of perception*, either to a great or to a small distance, either to the right or to the left" [ibid., emphasis added]. The ear is not the locus of Reason, it cannot infer causes behind immanent phenomena. Inference, the analytical, rational power of penetrating a surface conceptually in order to "get inside" it, to the "heart of the matter", and so forth, is a tool which the ear does not possess, and has no intention of possessing, indeed, in this sense, has no intentionality *per se*.

The ear is a surface which is in contact with other surfaces, and its experience of other surfaces comes only through a mediation of provisionally proximate surfaces. The ear is not penetrated, does not receive sound as an action of a passive receptacle, but produces the affect known as sound upon its own surface, indeed, as a mode of that surface. This constitutes the difference between Smith's theory and that of Rousseau's - the perceptual organ does not penetrate and cannot be penetrated, it is not an all-seeing eye with access to a transcendental realm, behind the material world, or an all-penetrating voice, or a penetrated receptacle, but simply an organ of limited perceptive powers which is constituted by its surfacial quality and the vibrational connections which its surface makes with other surfaces in the immanent locality.

Ironically, Rousseau himself provides us with an excellent example of the inability of even the most structurally invasive voice to actually achieve a penetration. In the *Letter to d'Alembert*, he describes the failure of a theatrical voice which is backed up by all of the political weight of the law and the state;

The laws can determine the subjects of the plays, and their form, and the way to play them; but the laws cannot force the public to enjoy them. The emperor Nero sang at the theatre and had all those who fell asleep put to death; still he could not keep everybody awake. And the pleasure of a short nap came close to costing Vespasian his life. Noble Actors of the Paris Opera, if you had enjoyed the imperial power, I should not now complain about having lived too long. [*Letter to M. d'Alembert on the Theatre*, p.22]

Here, the issue of melodic law is introduced into the consideration of the theatrico-political voice. The ultimate legislator attempts to penetrate the souls of an audience and yet his projected melodic essence

meets with and is halted by the inhibiting action of surface. His ontological vanity requires all those bodies to feign reception, and the penalty for not participating in this model of direct origination is severe; for refusing colonization by this imperial semiotic model, for proclaiming supplementary independence from it (aesthetic U.D.I.), one is put to death. Refusing capture invites annihilation, for the claim to originarity must be either worshipped or challenged, and the refusal to participate is considered the severest challenge to authority. To disinvest in the economy of power is anarchism (that which is without *arkhē*), and to disinvest in the semiotic aesthetic which Nero proclaims is in itself a political act punishable according to the most rigorous of imperial legislation.

The audience undoubtedly finds Nero's compulsory song boring, and yet to externalize that affective position, to demonstrate the failure of brute power to capture in essence, to do no more than fall asleep, is to demonstrate the failure of the laws to fully penetrate the audience and successfully command them to experience the directly intended phonic message. This demonstration of the actual powerlessness of the laws to fully achieve what they proclaim is what constitutes the necessity of the annihilation of the anarchic body and its suggestion of sonic affectivity. The establishment by the anarchic body of its own independent constitution of affectivity, the rejection of the phonic command, is a rupture to the universal power of Nero's melodic command. Liberty creates a harmonic abyss, a difference between source and goal, the interruption of the teleological certainty which allows the voice to directly influence the passions of the soul. The introduction of the semiotic interval breaks the dictatorial bond between voice and passion, and embarrasses the laws

which proclaimed the melodic unification to be possible. Thus, the seemingly mere crime of falling asleep during the emperor's song must be met with death. Sleep is the threat of an organ's absence from the organism, its autonomy, a high form of anarchy which is no less political for being aesthetic. Indeed, with the word autonomy, we are led to the connection of the concepts of law and melody in the Greek term *nomos*. Autonomy is the establishment of a series of independent *nomoi* against the imperialism of the originary *logos* – one sings one's own laws, becomes a melodic *nomad*, transgressing the laws of a centralized melodic originarity.

This anti-trope of concepts is of further significance in the work of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari: "there is an opposition between the *logos* and the *nomos*" [*A Thousand Plateaus*, p.369]. Deleuze/Guattari point to further political resonances within the concept of *nomoi*: "It is a vital concern of every State not only to vanquish nomadism but to control migrations and, more generally, to establish a zone of rights over an entire 'exterior'" [ibid., p.385]. In this context, the body of Vespasian is the "exterior" territory which Nero's *logos* must penetrate and thus semiotically invade its internal hinterland in order to reproduce itself there in a representation. Against this, Deleuze/Guattari argue for "a nomadism of true nomads, or of those who no longer even move or imitate anything [...] an assemblage that makes thought itself nomadic" [ibid., p.24]. This nomadic form of Imaginary Machine is considered in greater detail in Chapters 9 & 10.

In the same way that Vespasian's falling asleep is the greatest threat to the penetrational power of the emperor's voice, so too Smith's car operates without the ontological division of an inside and an outside. There

is nothing to uncover, nothing to invade or capture, unlike the penetrational semiotic which always presupposes this locational axis. Rather than placing itself within the economy of this axis, Smith's ear represents a total disinvestment in it, and a reinvestment according to a non-axiological economy of pure immanent surface.

The significance of this radical affirmation of the ear's specificity raises a blockage between a conception of the mind as internal, and of sound as external. Vespasian's unconsciousness provided a shield against the emperor's *logos*, across which its attempt to inseminate the mind was disseminated across further surfaces, according to a mechanics of harmonic proportions. Such an action on the part of Smith's ear ruptures the self-proximate continuity of phenomena and consciousness, and requires a repositioning of the determination of the mind as receptacle.

Even Locke recognized this important question, which reaffirms the difference between the ear and the eye, and despite his lack of interest in following this question through to any significant discoveries, there is a short passage from the *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* which demonstrates the dynamics involved;

How often may a man observe in himself that whilst his mind is intently employed in the contemplation of some objects, and curiously surveying some ideas that are there, it takes no notice of *impressions of sounding bodies* made upon the organ of hearing, with the same alteration that uses [sic] to be for the producing the idea of sound? A sufficient *impulse* there may be on the organ, but, it not reaching the *observation* of the mind, there follows no perception; and though the *motion* that uses to produce the idea of sound be made in the ear, yet no sound is heard. Want of sensation, in this case, is not through any defect of the organ, or that the man's ears are less *affected* than at other times when he does hear; but that which uses to produce this idea, though *conveyed in* by the usual organ, not being taken notice of in the understanding, and so *imprinting* no idea on the mind, there follows no sensation. So that wherever there is sense or perception,

there some idea is actually produced, and present in the understanding. [Essay, p.120]

Here, Locke continues to trace through the lexis of the penetrative semiotic, while admitting that it is incapable of a full, direct, and absolute control over the mind or passions. He finds that such situations as Rousseau suggests in the form of Vespasian are able to effectively block phonocentric essences. However, he maintains the existence of the duct through which sound passes, through the body of the ear, and even into the body of the mind. The process by which this causal essence registers no effect is necessarily mysterious; sound enters by the usual passage, and yet no sensation is forced into existence.

As we can see in Smith's approach to the Theory of Ideas, however, a demystification of this distribution of phonocentric power may be achieved if the lexical framework of penetration is transgressed, opening towards the possibility of sonic considerations assembling a pragmatics of consciousness. At this point, not only does sound become mechanized, and not only does the ear redefine its role as an organ independently of the organism, but so too the concept of mind becomes instrumentalized.

6.5 Surficial Accumulation

The problems of phonocentrically residual lexis begin to break down with Smith's approach to the constitution of components of an Imaginary Machine. Of affective sounds, he writes that, because they "have no extension, so they have no divisibility", calling upon the concept of self-proximity in an entirely different fashion to its function for Rousseau. [*Of the External Senses*, p.144] Precisely because they have no inside and no outside, because they, as the ear itself, are pure surface upon surface,

they cannot be penetrated, they are not divisible in the traditional sense at least; one cannot *cut into* them. They are self-proximate in a non-determining and non-determined way. Smith's determination of sounds, then, are by these strategic ruptures distinguished from melodic ontologies.

What constitutes the distinction between these semiotic ruptures and the phonocentric penetrations of supplements is the hinge upon which the whole radical indeterminacy of Smith's system operates. With the concept of the undeconstructed supplementary series, the mechanism of linkage between terms is the penetration of one term by the previous term, with each term taking a "male" determination in one direction, and a "female" in the other, each passing an essence to the next down a communicatory chain. Even Peirce describes the semiotic chain, despite its infinitude, as ensuring that "*the torch of truth is handed along*" the series. [*Principles of Philosophy*, p.171] The theme of fire as logocentric *ousia* remains within this most proto-post-structural of theories, and fails to move completely beyond the framework of essential penetration. The concept of the rupture, however, such as Vespasian's unconsciousness, is not the rupturing of the entity, but the dislocation of the very mechanism by which entities penetrate each other. The introduction of the extreme, deconstructed supplementarity of the surface with its modes creates slippages of surfaces across each other. This rupture is that which truly has *always already* occurred, and is the mechanism which allows the constitution even of the supplement, but in so doing, creates its *impenetrability* as much as its inability to form stable chains. At this point, the Derridean supplement has become the surface mode. The instability of

the intermediate chain is a significant factor in the connectivity of modal surfaces, and is a component also of Hume's critique of causality. The instability of the connections of intermediate chains is demonstrated by Hume with regard to his causal scepticism; "In a word, then, every effect is a distinct event from its cause. It could not, therefore, be discovered in the cause, and the first invention or conception of it, *a priori*, must be entirely arbitrary." [*An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, p.30] As with Smith's Imaginary Machine, connections between objects or events are created as components of philosophy. The Peircean *torch of truth* which smoulders yet in Derrida's *grammatology* is blown out by its own enlightened breath.

With Hume in particular, we return to the question of the connective mechanics of modes upon the immanent surface. In this, it may be useful to make a distinction between the concept of division which has been applied with regard to supplementary action, and the concept of accumulation. The manner of "divisibility" in Smith's surfaces can be understood as "*a certain composition and decomposition*" of the modes of a surface: "In a concert of vocal and instrumental music, an acute and experienced Ear readily distinguishes all the different sounds which strike upon it at the same time, and which may, therefore, be considered as making up one sound." [*Essays*, p.145, emphasis added] This "compound" sensation expresses the coincidental temporal connectivity of "the moment" which has already been described^[10]. Now, however, the "vertical"

[10] Berkeley has a similar conception of vertical hearing when he writes; "Sounds, for example, perceived at the same instant, are apt to coalesce, if I may say so, into one sound: but we can perceive at the same time great variety of visible objects, very separate and distinct from each other." [*An Essay Towards a New Theory of Vision*, p.51]

aspect of the affective surface is fully positioned. Affects are arranged vertically, accumulated, and this constitutes their composition. Their "divisibility" is to be taken as meaning their vertical connectivity according to the accumulation of modes across a surface, where the difference between "mode" and "surface" is only a matter of where the invisible connecting chains of the imaginary machine are traced; a matter of pragmatics, a *nomadic*, *nominalistic* definition of a body's limit - an intertextual field.

Beginning with Smith's concept of the "certain composition and decomposition" of sounds on the surface of the ear, we can go further than this; it is a question of harmonic chains which can not only be established, but also broken, and re-established in a different form, without ever destroying any components. In this sense, machines can be "destroyed", but only by a pragmatic action of dis-assembly. The possibility of re-assembly is always there. Smith's machine cannot be "killed" in the same way that Rousseau's organism can, and for that reason alone, Rousseau is right to fear the annihilation present in the existence of the abyss of absence. Equally, Rousseau's theory is not an attempt to harmonize nature and theory, but to authentically represent a true reality (the *contradictio in adjecto* which Derrida picks up on); it is an attempt to reduce the space between theory and reality, to bring them into absolute proximity. Smith, on the other hand, is harmonizing the two, bringing them into a machinic relationship which is as nominalist as it is instrumentalist in both the musical and the philosophical senses.

Smith's connection of Nature and Theory can also be read as occurring entirely within the immanent surface of Nature. In this way, the

"divisibility" of Smith's machines by actions of composition and decomposition should be understood as the orientation and reorientation of concepts, and not as an authentic description of objective matter; we have already noted the transgression of the concept of Truth which occurs at the point of disinvestment in penetrational semiotics and representational deception. Smith's Imaginary Machine itself is located upon a surface of immanence, and is therefore reflexively connected with what it images: Theory is a part of Nature. In a machinic system, there is no subjectivity or objectivity, only specific affectivities and connectivities, and so the decomposition of a machine is simply the redefinition of a concept - its reconnection into another machinic system. The philosopher and lawyer John Millar^[11] hinted at this approach to theory when he wrote of Smith's work that "the most useful part of metaphysics, arises from an examination of the several ways of communicating our thoughts by speech, and from an attention to the principles of those literary compositions which contribute to persuasion or entertainment." [quoted in Dugald Stewart's *Account of the Life and Writings of Adam Smith, LL.D.*, in Smith's *Essays*, p.274] Phonocentric determinations of language aside, which are almost requisite for the period of this passage's composition, Millar nevertheless points to Smith's grounding of philosophy, through his nominalist instrumentalism, in a consideration of language as a means of tackling metaphysics. Yet, as we have seen, philosophy is not offered up by Smith as an enlightened meta-discourse of a Platonic order. J.C. Bryce comments on the notion of the

[11] One of Smith's students who became Professor of Law in Glasgow University.

connective chain of theory that "Smith is concerned with this on the strategic level just as contemporary writers on Milton and Thomson were on the imaginative." [Introduction to Smith's *Rhetoric*, p.13] This elision of not only the literary and the philosophical but more crucially, the musical as well, will be recognized as a Derridean, as much as a Smithian trait, and in many senses, we can read Smith as locating himself upon a similar theoretical surface as that outlined by Derrida - "It may even be that these questions are not *philosophical*, are not *philosophy's* questions. Nevertheless, these should be the only questions today capable of founding the community, within the world, of those who are still called philosophers." [*Writing and Difference*, p.79] As Derrida paraphrases the Saussurean position, "Semiology, then, is a part of the theory of the imagination." [*Margins of Philosophy*, p.76] For Smith, however, semiology would be in no position to act as the analytical meta-discourse of the imagination, since it is itself a by-product of that of which it attempts to speak.

The composition, decomposition, and recomposition of concepts, of modes and surfaces, is what constitutes the impenetrability of Smith's sounds, ears, passions and minds. An ear is undoubtedly an organ, but the "mechanization" of this organ which Smith achieves ruptures the penetrational continuities of the organicist semiotic, dissociating it from the concept of the *organism*. With regard to "division", all that can happen to such machinic organs - components - is that they are reconstituted in other forms. The division of which they do not admit is the division which forms an organ of the act of penetration. In other words, their divisibility comes from their own affective specificity, it comes from "within", or

rather, according to the provisional compositional tensions which constitute their surface at that moment.

Within this conception of composition, we begin to notice the refractive capacity of all these concepts within the Imaginary Machine. The boundaries between each term become a matter of intertextual pragmatics which are only ever provisionally assembled within the Imaginary Machine, and as we have noted already, the Imaginary Machine itself is only a compositional component of the general system of Nature which it imagines - whether this natural system is taken as, in one assemblage, "the whole machine of the world" [*Theory of Moral Sentiments*, p.289], or in another distribution, "the immense machine of the universe" [ibid., p.236]. In this way, the composition of a body in itself is a network of connective chains as much as its position in the overall machine with respect to the other bodies. At all levels in this Imaginary Machine, it is always a matter of connectivity, and of the differences in connective capacity which assemble affective networks. It should not be overlooked, however, that Smith is dealing with a specific set of phenomena - sound, temperature, taste - and these phenomena are distinguished from others; "It is sufficiently evident that this composition and decomposition is altogether different from that union and separation of parts, which constitutes the divisibility of solid extension." [*Essays*, p.145] Smith is providing us with two Imaginary Machine alignments here; the sonic model which operates according to the composition and decomposition of affective capacities, and a solid model which operates according to the union and separation of penetrative capacities.

Not only the disinvestment of the internality-externality axis (which

the concept of the impenetrable surface points to) indicates the deconstruction of oppositional space, then, but more significantly, the very multiplicity of connections available to any given mode or surface. In this sense, it is not a question of the deconstruction of space as differential, the rejection of the difference between two spaces, but precisely the multiplication of differences to a point where the ontological move of limiting the field to two territories loses its grip on the movement of a vast complexity. The generative capacity of the Imaginary Machine multiplies spatialities as a subsidiary action of its more crucial interest in the diversification of connective capacities.

The acoustic connectivity which is considered here can be conceived as a kind of timbral organization where there is a change of spectral texture at work constantly. The morphology of this texture should not be considered continuous in itself, however, but capable of any kind of motion. Equally, this timbre might have no fundamental, or at least the possibility of several likely candidates. The change of relationships within this timbre are also to be understood along the lines of Smith's composition and decomposition of the modes of a surface, the connection and disconnection of any number of components. In this sense, ontological time becomes organized not by the same means, but as the same thing as its opposite, space; harmony "is" rhythm, and so forth. It is a question not of an object's location on a spatio-temporal grid such as the musical score is ordinarily conceived as, but a question of the affective connectivity of surfaces which operate independently of each other in a non-causal sense, and also can be linked together in an imaginary machine by invisible intermediary chains which articulate themselves in any given geometrical

direction, not just horizontal or vertical. With the immanent concept of timbre, the analytical concepts of space and time are not synthesized, but become irrelevant to the consideration of the connection of modes upon a changing surface of instability.

As Smith writes, the ear is the sole "*locus*" of sound, or rather, sound is a mode of the ear-surface. From this statement, it follows that the connective relationships between sounds are relationships of the assemblage of modes upon the ear's surface. It is upon this surface that the connections between sounds are assembled, and arranged into various configurations. This mechanism can be called *otosynthesis*; the means of connection upon the ear, where synthesis is not understood as the synthesis of a duality into a unity, but rather, the assemblage of modes into any number of intermediate chains of connection such as Smith elsewhere suggests. This is not the synthesis of dialectics – the synthesis of two ends of an axis into a mid-point or the compression of the axis into only one of its poles. Otosynthesis is a means of describing Smith's multivalent articulation of any number of modes and types of modes as they occur as components of the ear machine. The ear which operates by otosynthesis, however, cannot be a surface of which a mode is the imaginary machine, for the ear has no imagination; its connective mechanisms operate on different lines. The ear is literally, a hearing machine, and nothing more elaborate than that.

The synthesis which the ear produces is never stable or finalized; it has no *telos* in that it is characterized by an *occurrence* rather than a function or goal. Each connection is always operating under the possibility of disconnection or reconnection, and any connective network, any timbral

surface which can be assembled from the available modes is as likely as any other to an ear which operates according to its own affective production. Just as otosynthesis occurs without penetration or capture, it also operates without being guided or driven. Otosynthesis is a mechanism which operates as a connective mode of the ear-surface, under a certain morphology of connections, and no where or when else. The ear is only the ear, and its connection to acoustic vibration is only precisely that; at no point is there an entry of an essence through either of these two affective surfaces, from one direction or another. A process of stimulation occurs which involves not the creation of a set of objects in or behind either surface, but involves the production of a certain configuration of extant modes into a connective network. Nothing is passed along a line in otosynthetic production, nothing is created or destroyed, but simply reconnected according to a different configuration. Configurations are assembled and disassembled, but can always be reassembled or modified into other configurations. This all represents the connective mechanism of otosynthesis, and establishes it according to a different logic to semiotics. The ear does not receive; the ear connects itself.

Otosynthesis is a mode of Smith's analogical, explicatory or articulatory hinge which relates specifically to the diverse connectivity of the aural experience. With its corollaries upon other surfaces of the Imaginary Machine, it assembles a mechanism whereby the metaphysical determination of music which aesthetics puts forward can be "deconstructed" and replaced by a truly differential configuration of modes on the musical machine's surface. We can potentially read it as a

theory which dispenses with the metaphysical tools of spatio-temporal axiology which Derrida remains tied to, and bypasses the risks of collapsing back into a position where all the attendant concepts of dialectical entelechation, penetrational ductility, and so forth, reconstruct themselves or at least threaten to do so at every juncture. In one sense, it multiplies the articulatory hinge beyond the strictures of axiology, and in another, positions connectivity in a surfacial mode which potentially renders penetrational semiotics powerless. Yet it does not represent any kind of *finalized provisionality*: it should not be forgotten that although Vespasian can certainly fall asleep during Nero's song, the emperor is nevertheless empowered by the laws to put him to death; it may be the case that even if one withdraws the affective organ from the effective organism, the organicist programme can still be restored by a drastically final cadence. At this juncture, it becomes very much a question of the political alignment of the "structural politics of harmony", a question of the distinction between logocentrism and a certain dislocational form of aesthetic "autonomy": the *auto-nomos* declared within the *otonomy* of the machinic ear.

CHAPTER SEVEN

THE VOICE OF UNI(S)ON

Truan yw gennyf, gwedi lludded,
Goddef gloes angau trwy anghyffred,
Ac eil trwm truan gennyf fi gweled
Dygwyddo ein gwŷr ni ben o draed
Ac uchenaid hir ac eilywed
Yn ôl gwyr pybyr tymyr tydwed,
Rhufon a Gwion, Gwlon a Gwlged,
Gwŷr gorsaf wriaf, gwrdddyng ngaled.
Ys deupo i'w henaid hwy wedi trined
Cynnws yng ngwlad nef, addef afneued.

- *Y Gododdin*, Aneirin (c.600)

CHAPTER SEVEN

THE VOICE OF UNI(S)ON

7.1 "...the speech of angels..."

There is a sensuality in Rousseau. Combined with such an intellectual gift as his, it makes pictures of a certain gorgeous attractiveness: but they are not genuinely poetical. Not white sunlight: something *operatic*; a kind of rosepink, artificial bedizenment. [*Lectures on Heroes*, p.325]

Strangely through all that defacement, degradation and almost madness, there is in the inmost heart of poor Rousseau a spark of real heavenly fire. [*Lectures on Heroes*, p.324]

Thomas Carlyle's *Lectures on Heroes and Hero-worship* (1841) on the one hand condemns Rousseau as degenerate, and on the other claims that he was nevertheless capable of being otherwise. Carlyle mistrusts the "artificiality" of Rousseau, as much as Rousseau distrusted the artificiality of Rameau's harmonic theory. For Carlyle, Rousseau attempted the correct metaphysical programme, and yet failed to deliver its final result. In this sense, there is a close intertext between Derrida's assertions that Rousseau failed to provide a truly phonocentric theory, by virtue of the systematic rupture represented by the supplement, and Carlyle's assertions that Rousseau was corrupted by the materiality and artificiality of the age in which he lived. Rousseau, Carlyle contends, is "not white", but "something operatic". The choice of lexis here is significant, if read in conjunction with Carlyle's short essay *The Opera* (1852). Here, the question

of a phonocentric determination of music returns, once more in an analysis of the operatic; music is not pure sonic affectivity as was the case for Smith, but an expression of something *beyond the surface* of the world; "Music is well said to be the speech of angels; in fact, nothing among the utterances allowed to man is felt to be so divine." [*Opera, Essays* Vol.III p.509^[1]] Music is not material, but spiritual. Neither is it sonic, but phonic. Indeed, it is an "utterance" privileged above all others. With "the speech of angels" we have the clause from which all the rest can be derived, in a bivocal definition of music as phonic and as non-material. The conception of music as material and actual which harmonic theory was moving towards in the writings of Malcolm, Rameau, and Smith has been replaced by Carlyle's transcendental return to specifically phonic *logos*. Music "brings us near to the Infinite" [ibid.], it is a means of transporting the mind out of the realm of the material and towards a transcendental goal. In this, Carlyle not only rejects the materialism of the Enlightenment, but does so with a re-vitalized logocentrism which goes beyond the dichotomous failures of (Derrida's) Rousseau.

The transcendental Infinite which is established here also holds a mapping-over of biological images for Carlyle; the act of audition is likened to that of vision. Once more, a familiar (Cartesian) theme returns, and again, Carlyle extends its remit. The Infinite is reached according to a glimpse afforded us by sound; "we *look* for moments, across the cloudy

[1] *The Opera*, in *Essays* Vol.III. Note that, with the exception of *The French Revolution, Past and Present*, *Sartor Resartus*, and the *Lectures on Heroes and Hero-worship* all subsequent references to Carlyle's works are drawn from the *Critical and Miscellaneous Essays*. A single collection is here used as the source for sake of convenience, since Carlyle's works were extensively reprinted throughout the Nineteenth Century, in several countries, and in several languages.

elements, into the eternal Sea of *Light*, when song leads and inspires us." [ibid., emphasis added] In *hearing*, we *look*, we *see*, by the action of inspiration which is conducted through the channels of our ears. Song "inspires" us, the breath of the gods is transmitted through the singing of the angels, it is breathed into us through our ears and endows us with the ability to see their realm of the Infinite for a brief moment. Our glimpse of the eternal is temporary, afforded us by the temporal art of music, which, among all the arts, all the "utterances" which Man is "allowed", is thus the most "divine".

For Carlyle, it is also a question of *Nature*, and the destiny of the *Nation*. A proper use of music is the mark of a nation's serious attitude towards the eternal realm; "Serious nations, *all nations that can still listen to the mandate of Nature, have prized song* and music as the highest; as a vehicle for worship, for prophecy, and for whatsoever in them was divine." [ibid., emphasis added] As the gods are of Nature, so their judgement is passed down to "Man" through "her" voice, the voice of angels, and the nation which hears Nature's voice is the nation which expresses that mandate through their song. Yet the mortal ear must have an interpreter to bring the law of the gods from the songs of the angels, and this interpreter is the singer, who is "a *vates*, admitted to the council of the universe, friend of the gods, and choicest benefactor to man." [ibid.] This hermeneutic, *vatic* singer is the prophet to the serious nation, and gives it access to the natural law of the gods, is the privileged medium of the mandate which inspires the nation, in a knowledge of the universal council's rulings. The *vatic* singer is the carrier of the divine *pneuma*, the breath of the gods, and brings it to benefit "Man" by passing it on to its

final goal. This goal is the realization of the will of the gods; "Tyrtaeus, who had a little music, did not sing Barbers of Seville, but the need of *beating* back one's country's enemies; a most *true* song, to which the hearts of men did burst responsive into fiery melody, followed by fiery *strokes* before long" [ibid., p.510, emphasis added]. This is the final goal of the divine mandate; the serious nation which properly uses music is commanded to realize its *destiny in conflict* with other nations. It must establish ontological difference between itself and its neighbours, and it must use this power to annihilate Others, to establish its own *logos* within their independent *nomoi*. This is the dialectics of violence.

The vatic singer delivers this message, the warriors of the nation are inspired by the melodic transmission of celestial *pneuma* into a burst of "fiery melody", melody which realizes the full force of the divine breath, and then this whirlwind of fire is transformed into warlike action. It is at this point that the mandate of melodic natural law is complete. The warriors follow their melodic fire with a rhythmic fire across the bodies and land of their opponents. "Fiery strokes" are beaten into other nations, and these beats are direct transpositions of the rhythm of the divine melodies. This is the rhythm of capture and annihilation.

The whole entelechy is completed, from the original celestial song which prophesies the nation's destiny and inspires it to act towards that goal, to the transformation of spiritual melody into the material rhythm of war, but all the while, the war rhythm being guided by the divine song, and striving towards the *telos*, the final goal, which has been prophesied for this serious nation.

Hence, nation struggles with nation over rival claims of access to the

spiritual light of prophetic melody. Philosophy is at its most Platonic here, in aiding the nation in its ascent towards melodic enlightenment, but not all philosophies can lead to true Vision – Rousseau, for instance, is "not white sunlight", and as Derrida writes, "If light is the element of violence, one must combat light with a certain other light, in order to avoid the worst violence, the violence of the night which precedes or represses discourse. [...] The philosopher (man) *must* speak and write within this war of light" [*Writing and Difference*, p.117] Following this conceptual trope through in Carlyle, it is crucial to acknowledge that much rests on the *political* dimension in his *aesthetics*. As Edward Said points out, this side of Carlyle is all too often ignored: "There is, I believe, a quite serious split in our critical consciousness today, which allows us to spend a great deal of time elaborating Carlyle's and Ruskin's aesthetic theories, for example, without giving attention to the authority that their ideas simultaneously bestowed on the subjugation of inferior peoples and colonial territories." [*Culture & Imperialism*, p.12] Yet Said is sceptical regarding the teleological causality which Carlyle claims for his prophecies, and cautions against an over-deterministic interpretation;

Carlyle did not drive Rhodes directly, and he certainly cannot be 'blamed' for the problems in today's southern Africa – but it is genuinely troubling to see how little Britain's great humanistic ideas, institutions, and monuments, which we still celebrate as having the power ahistorically to command our approval, how little they stand in the way of the accelerating imperial process. [*Culture & Imperialism*, p.97]

When one engages with Carlyle's aesthetics of song, it is hard to avoid the existence of this imperial authority, and any reader of his writings in general will find it difficult *not* to come across specifically imperialist politics. Yet not only in relation to the non-British cultures

which Said indicates - a parallel thesis which will appear in the margins of our current reading is that Carlyle is also engaged in a series of circumlocutory positions with regard to his *own* culture, if we read against the grain of both his and subsequent determinations of him as "English" and not Scottish. Indeed, his attempted adoption of an English identity is in itself an indicator of his belief in its superior imperialism. As R.D. Laing writes, "The colonists not only mystify the natives [...] they have to mystify themselves." [*The Politics of Experience*, p.49] It is the idea of an anglicized Scotland-within-Britain which Carlyle wishes to save through his melocentric prophesies^[2]. Significantly then, the image of the *vates* derives from a *Celtic*, rather than a *Germanic* Golden Age^[3], but as will become gradually clear, Carlyle is engaged in a tumultuous relationship with concepts of race and politics, at once denying and affirming the Celtic specificity of Scottish culture. Sometimes his textual strategies amount to a re-rooting of the Celtic in the Germanic, absorbing them within a great Saxon organicism. At other points, his assault is more direct. True to his Presbyterian heritage, one does not have to look far for an example of more specifically *Germanic* dimensions; according to Carlyle, his theory of divine melodic prophesy finds its model par excellence in Lutheran psalm.

He it was, emphatically, who stood based on the Spiritual
World of man, and only by the footing and miraculous power

[2] For an excellent (if necessarily dated) sociologically-oriented account of these dynamics, see *Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development, 1536-1966* (1975) by the American scholar, Michael Hechter.

[3] As Strabo writes, commenting on the artistic-religious castes of Ancient Celtic Gaul, "The bards [*bardoī*] are singers and poets, the *vates* [*ouateis*] interpreters of sacrifice and natural philosophers, while the druids [*druīdai*] in addition to the science of nature study moral philosophy." [*Geographia*, iv, chap.4, §4]

he had obtained there, could work such changes in the Material World. As a participant and dispenser of divine influences, he shows himself among human affairs; a true connecting medium and visible Messenger between Heaven and Earth [*Luther's Psalm*, in *Essays*, Vol.II, pp.3/4]

Luther, then, achieves through the medium of divine song what Rousseau, in his "operatic" nature, failed in. Yet, it is nevertheless also significant that Rousseau harks back to *his* Protestant origins in various idyllic images of pastoral virtue linked with the binding masculinity of Genevan psalm-singing: "One of their most frequent amusements is to sing psalms in four parts with their wives and children; and one is amazed to hear issuing from rustic cabins the strong and masculine harmony of Goudimel so long forgotten by our learned artists." [*Letter to d'Alembert*, p.62] Perhaps Rousseau here refers to Claude Goudimel's settings of the Genevan Huguenot Psalter of the 1560's, but what is evident is that, despite the action of harmonic structures within them, their divine subject matter, presided over by the familial patriarch binds the mother and children within the law of a "strong and masculine harmony", a harmony which is thus opposed to the ontological weaknesses of supplementary action. No doubt, this is the side of Rousseau which Carlyle wishes had been more thoroughly evident.

For Carlyle, Luther provides a more thoroughly originary model of the *connection* between the Divine and Material worlds - he is the medium who stands at the point of their union and uses the body of his song to allow divinity to flow in an *in-fluence* of vital energy into the dead matter of the fallen world. He is the point at which spirit and life enter, penetrate into, mute matter.

Carlyle is at pains to point to the real locus of Luther's inspired

genius; "With words he had not learned to make pure music [...] in tones, only through his Flute, amid tears, could the sigh of that strong soul find utterance. [...] Nevertheless, though in imperfect articulation, the same voice, if we will listen well, is to be heard also in his writings, in his Poems." [*Luther's Psalm*, p.4] The phonocentricity of Luther's psalms, then, comes not so much through his literal or even his literary voice, but through the articulation of sound itself as an "utterance" - Luther's music *per se* has a "voice", distinguishable from the actual voice, and this divine "voice" pervades also his poems and other writings. Hence, Carlyle operates a double phonocentrism when writing of song - there is a celestial voice, not necessarily connected to the material voice, and it lies at the centre, the heart of all productions of genius, articulating great art through its connective proximity to the celestial world. At the centre of all music is song.

Such it was, Carlyle writes, "in Greek, Roman, in Moslem, Christian, most of all in Old-Hebrew times" [*The Opera*, p.509], in the times of Tyrtæus, Sophocles, Æschylus, and David. Yet the time of David's psalm (the historical origin of Luther's psalm, and thus the golden age of its genesis) has gone, its melody is lost, and now, in our fallen age of materialisms, we can only *read* it: "To sing it attempt not, for it is impossible in this late time; only know that it once was sung. Then go to the Opera, and hear, with unspeakable reflections, what things men now sing!" [*ibid.*, p.510]

7.2 "...fiction and delirium..."

The opera of 1852 is a fallen art for Carlyle. His visit to the Haymarket Opera fills him with "unspeakable reflections" on the state of the world, and with a nostalgia for more divine days. This opera house becomes a paradigm of all that is degraded in British culture, all that is false, dishonest and material. Money has come to represent the superficiality of opera, there is no longer any soul in music, it is all expenditure and philistinism. Instead of celestial music, he finds "Lustres, candelabras, painting, gilding [...] a hall as of the Caliph of Alraschid, or him that commanded the slaves of the Lamp" [*Opera*, p.510]. The one "*true* song" is now replaced by a foreign god, an exotic heathen image whose only power comes through material luxury, "regardless of expense" [*ibid.*]. In what should be the centre of London's power, its artistic vatican, there is no incense, only cheap exoticisms, no vatic singer, only a fallen singer –

the Italian baritone, Filippo Coletti, degrading his genius^[4]; "stamped by Nature as capable of far other work than squalling here, like a blind Samson, to make the Philistines' sport!" [ibid., p.511] The moment of catastrophe, blindness, loss of Vision, and therefore loss of access to the divine, is near.

The opera even operates through a visual degradation, and debases the very concept of Vision. The ballet corrupts the nature of the human body: "Motion peculiar to the Opera; perhaps the ugliest, and surely one of the most difficult, ever taught a female creature in this world. Nature abhors it" [ibid.] This dance is not natural, not originary, but a mere supplement to the original nature of the body: it is not in unison with the origin, but stands at a distance, an interval, from it. It has moved from the unison to the harmonic. Vision is a matter of the internal world, and can

[4] The presbyterian narrative of papal corruption and supplementation of the original religion of the "Old-Hebrew" is operative within this religious metaphor; religion has become debased by the supplementation of direct communion with God by the material representation of the Pope. The presbyterian argument is often one for an authentic relationship with God, although this is normally expressed through a de-centralization and democratization of religious power, leaving the subject in control of their own worship. Carlyle's interest in presbyterianism is precipitously balanced between the argument for authentic communion and the argument for supplementary institutional devolution, and gravitates towards the former. In this text, Carlyle images Coletti (1811-94) as a fallen Pope, guilty of the same material corruptions. According to the New Grove, Coletti had proved an unpopular replacement in 1841 for his colleague Tamburini, the public favourite at Her Majesty's Theatre, London, and his appointment had resulted in riots. However, Coletti's position was more comfortable there when Tamburini defected to Covent Garden in 1846. Coletti's *forte* was Verdi, and he retired in 1869. 1852, however, was the year in which the director of Her Majesty's Theatre, Benjamin Lumley (1842-58) finally decided to close the theatre due to lack of support ensuing from various scandals and the fact that most of his best singers had now followed Tamburini to Covent Garden (However, Lumley reopened the theatre in 1856). The context of Carlyle's visit, then, was the demise of the theatre in the midst of general hostility towards singers such as Coletti, and undoubtedly, his vitriolic attack would have had its effect on public opinion.

only be induced through the hermeneutic administrations of the vatic singer. Mere sight cannot accomplish Vision, since the object of this Vision is not material, but celestial. Only the inspiration of divine melody can achieve true vision, and so all these material sights, whether the lavish decoration of the hall or the unnatural motions of the dancer can only interrupt the mandate of nature's voice. "Wonderful to see; and sad, if you had eyes!" [ibid., p.512] If you had eyes to *truly* see, eyes to see beyond the mere appearances which disfigured the original divinity of music, eyes which could burn away matter and touch the essence, eyes which could contract the intervals of harmonic proliferation back to the unity of the originary unison. Such are the eyes which Carlyle assembles here; *musical* eyes.

Further, and Carlyle begins to realize that music had been displaced from its mandatory centrality to opera, that the "Rhythmic Arts were a mere accompaniment" [ibid.] (and note the emphasis on the temporal dimension, rather than the harmonic). Music had become peripheral to the pleasure of the situation, rather than its cause; the origin itself had been intervallically inverted into a harmonic of the social graces of the occasion. The natural order of operatic ontology is transgressed. Here, Carlyle sees the ultimate debasement of the origin take place; "Young beauties of both sexes used their opera-glasses, you could notice, not entirely for looking at the stage." [ibid.] The audience are not here to hear the celestial voice, and thus to *musically* see the eternal realm, but to *materially* see each other - it is a social, not a properly spiritual scene. Not even the harmonic materiality of the dancer is seen, and this removes the seer even further from the musical origin, turns the phonic origin into a harmonic of the

oplic, unhooks the fundamental and inverts the true interval between source and accompaniment. Music is no longer the voice at the centre (the phonocentric *logos* of Greek theatre and vatic prophecy), but a peripheral amusement; the ontological order has been transgressed.

This inversion of the natural order achieves a dissonance, only to compound yet further the deceptive traits which are beginning to emerge, the dishonesties which Carlyle is here to see through. Even the beauty of the onlookers in each other's eyes is false, and complicitous in the disunified heterophony of the situation as a whole: "certain old Improper-Females (of Quality), in their rouge and jewels, even these looked some *reminiscence* of enchantment [...] and, in fact, I perceived that Coletti and Cerito and the Rhythmic Arts were a mere accompaniment here." [ibid.] The impropriety of these "Improper-Females" derives from the material nature of their frivolous decoration, which echoes the decor of the hall in the exotic jewellery of some foreign bordello, where money attempts to buy a slice of the celestial, and yet only procures a base matter. Coletti, the fallen singer, no longer vatic hermeneut, is the slave of the "macassar Chatabangues and his improper-females past the prime of life!" [ibid., p.513] Coletti, who has been bought, captured, by the owner of this improper property, is now made to perform as a mere accompaniment to material profanity, he has been "chained [...] to the wheel of Prince Mahogany's chariot" [ibid.]. Here Carlyle reaches a point of no longer believing that such a singer could have ever had any ability with "the Melodies Eternal" [ibid.]. Coletti has now fully lost eternity, he exists now only in the temporary, fallen world, and is a slave to the extravagances of a foreigner, a black prince.

Coletti has been transformed, disfigured, by the transience of decoration, he too has become exotic, harmonically foreign to the vital melodic unity of the origin which should incite the serious nation to its destiny. Carlyle's lexis is extreme: "Wretched *spiritual Nigger*, O, if you *had* some genius, and were not born a Nigger with mere appetite for pumpkin, should you have endured such a lot? I lament for you beyond all other *expenses*." [ibid., emphasis added] Coletti, who is no longer connected to the divine Infinite, who has become so harmonically distanced as to lose all proximity to the origin, the root, is now nothing but property - both spiritually and materially. The cause of his fall is precisely his loss of the visionary glimpse of Spirit. Without this he is not only spiritual slave, but bodily slave. Pumpkin is no substitute for, no authentic representation of the pure white ambrosian milks of the speech of angels. Carlyle here suggests an ontology where there are two forms of *nigger*; the one material, such as the Black Prince Mahogany, and the other who is even further debased by being owned by this material *nigger* - ie. the *spiritual nigger*. Coletti is capable of Spirit, but in selling his capability to the material world, thus becomes even more objectionable to Carlyle than the material itself. As Coletti's owners are lavishly exotic, so he is basely exotic, with the most base of material desires - the pumpkin of the

"Nigger"^[5]. The real perversity of the situation for Carlyle is that his noble white vatic singer has fallen to the point of the "Nigger" of the black prince. The white enclave of the speech of pure white angels has been scandalized. Coletti is the *white nigger*, and represents the ultimate threat to Carlyle's image of music as inspiring the serious nation directly from the

[5] Just as elsewhere, Carlyle's culinary images determine the "Irish poor-slave" as having only an appetite for potato. Carlyle's obsession with Ireland no doubt stems from his upbringing in the Covenanting Presbyterian enclave of Dumfriesshire, and often takes almost hallucinatory turns: "The wild Milesian features, looking false ingenuity, restlessness, unreason, misery and mockery, salute you on all highways and byways. The English coachman, as he whirls past, lashes the Milesian with his whip, curses him with his tongue; the Milesian is holding out his hat to beg." [*Chartism*, p.271] The image of the Irish as supplementary other is clear here, in the lexis of falsity, deception, and so forth. Carlyle suspects the representations which the Irishman makes to the coachman as dishonest. They are false representations. The whole network of the "spiritual Nigger" image is brought out in the argument against Jamaican independence: "To have 'emancipated' the West Indies into a *Black Ireland*: 'free' indeed, but an Ireland, and Black! The world may yet see prodigies; and reality be stranger than a nightmare dream. Our own white or sallow Ireland, sluttishly starving from age to age on its act-of-parliament 'freedom,' was hitherto the flower of mismanagement among the nations: but what will this be to a Negro Ireland, with pumpkins themselves fallen scarce like potatoes! Imagination cannot fathom such an object; the belly of Chaos never held the like." [*The Nigger Question*, p.467] Carlyle here establishes onto-culinary differences between his "Saxon" race and the Celtic or Black African (and thereby also ignoring the diversity of all three, and imposing a genetic univocity upon them). This ontological distinction then paves the way for a dismissal of the supplementary independence of these cultures, and a statement that, since they are inherently base, they must be captured or eradicated. Such is the action of ontological difference when brought to bear in politics. As Edward Said writes, Carlyle's writing on such subjects "is not obscure, or occult, or esoteric. What he means about Blacks he says, and is also very frank about the threats and punishments he intends to mete out. Carlyle speaks a language of total generality, anchored in unshakeable certainties about the essence of races, peoples, cultures, all of which need little elucidation because they are familiar to his audience. He speaks a *lingua franca* for metropolitan Britain: global, comprehensive, and with so vast a social authority as to be accessible to anyone speaking to and about the nation. This *lingua franca* locates England at the focal point of a world also presided over by its power, illuminated by its ideas and culture, kept productive by the attitudes of its moral teachers, artists, legislators." [*Culture & Imperialism*, p.123]

melodic breath of the gods; the "eternal Sea of Light" has been darkened - we are imprisoned in Plato's Cave.

Further, and Carlyle finds that even this divine melodic breath has been disgraced, and that music itself in this fallen age without heroes has become truly a medium of deception and madness, a medium of "fiction and delirium" [ibid., p.510]. The gods which are worshipped in this deceitful artistic vatican are but shadows of the likes of pure-white and Hebraically Proper David and his divine psalms; "And Rossini, too, and Mozart and Bellini -- O Heavens! when I think that Music too is condemned to be mad, and to burn herself, to this end, on such a funeral pile,- your celestial Opera-house grows *dark* and infernal to me!" [ibid., p.513, emphasis added] According to Carlyle, opera has been infiltrated by a band of "spiritual niggers", from Rossini and Bellini to Mozart^[6]. The madness of music is a result of its loss of Vision, it has fallen from the height which gained it access to that glimpse of the Infinite with which it endowed warriors with the breath and rhythm of fire, the power of flamy *pneuma*, in all its blinding whiteness. Music has become dark, negroid, "Improper" along with those "Females" who are owned by the Dandy, Marquis, Black Prince, or Foreign Dignitary. Indeed, music has now been chained to their chariot, to the wheel of their debased temporality, and no longer signals the gateway to the eternal temporality of the Infinite. This is music's madness - "the

[6] The imaging here of Mozart as a "spiritual nigger" is significant when one connects this to the imaging of Burns discussed later. Both Mozart and Burns are known for their promiscuity, drinking, Freemasonry, and vast outputs. Both tend towards the ideals of the French Revolution which Carlyle so hated, and towards the idea of egalitarianism. For Carlyle, however, while he describes Burns as a potential genius of Spirit brought down by the debasing influence of a materialist age (the connection with Rousseau and Coletti is also significant here), Mozart appears not to have been so worthy of reappropriation for this aesthetics of Spirit.

shadow of Eternal Death" [ibid.], the negation of the eternal life of the celestial realm. For Carlyle, it is a matter of *black-and-white*.

The Haymarket Opera is the centre of the swirling vortex of absolute ontological absence. Here is not a site of Vision, for Death's "bottomless eye-socket" [ibid.] pulls all down into the depths of the abyss of pure negation, "down towards Falsity, Vacuity, and the dwelling-place of Everlasting Despair" [ibid.]. This vacuity, the absence of this artistic vacuum which endows the theatre with the aspect of an all-devouring, vacant eye-socket, signals the departure of the warrior; "if you ask me, Why heroes are not born now, why heroisms are not done now? I will answer you: It is a world calculated for strangling of heroisms." [ibid.] The image of calculation, of Number and therefore division, harmonicity and supplementarity, is significant here, for this introduces Carlyle's critique of the Enlightenment philosophy which has resulted in the spiritual barbarity of the opera-house.

Carlyle would replace all of this with the speech of angels and the acts of the warrior hero of the serious nation, the nation which hears and understands the mandates of the gods' natural law. His desire is to see "Populations of stern faces, stern as any Hebrew, but capable withal of *bursting into inextinguishable* laughter on occasion:- do you understand that new and better form of character?" [ibid., p.514, emphasis added] Here Carlyle betrays a certain pseudo-presbyterianism - the stern Hebrew face, the face of the serious nation. In this form, however, it is divine laughter which bursts from the warrior's lungs; a war-like laughter, stern and spiritual, full of *pneuma*, and inextinguishable as the fire of celestial melodic vision. It is a divine, virile laughter, a bursting-out of the

spiritual voice against materialist strangulation, against the deceitful materialism of harmony, for Carlyle would have us "abhorring phantasms;- abhorring *unveracity* in all things; and in your 'amusements,' which are voluntary and not compulsory things, abhorring it most impatiently of all." [ibid.]

In this way, Carlyle's article on *The Opera* describes and distinguishes two opposing systems; one which establishes the divine right of the vatic singer, the vocal prophet and spiritual medium who will guide the serious nation to its pre-ordained destiny through the power of melody, and another which captures the vatic singer in order to enslave and debase him, thus cutting off the access which he formerly had to the judgments of the council of the universe, and casting him into the vortex of harmonic intervals which leads downwards to the black abyss. The first system operates by the revelation of the unity and unison of divine truths, and the second by the obfuscation of such truths, and the establishment of a fractured realm of "*unveracity*".

7.3 "...only a flat, continuous thrashing-floor for Logic..."

in the French System of Thought (called also the Scotch, and still familiar enough every where, which for want of a better title we have named the Mechanical), there is no room for a Divinity [*Diderot, Essays Vol.II, pp.459/60*]

For Carlyle, the era of Enlightenment was an irreligious catastrophe, in both Scotland and France. Indeed, his charge against the Scots Enlightenment is that "our culture was almost exclusively French" [*Burns, Essays Vol.I p.258*]. Our "stern Motherland" was at the mercy of the "Mechanical Age", an age when the machine had become a theoretical weapon against the vital soul and soil of the nation. Scotland was under

the insidious influence of French sceptics. The positing of this influence has a distinctly paranoic overtone, and its strange patriotism becomes stranger still when this argument against becoming "a French Colony" [*Burns*, p.259] lies side-by-side with the celebration of "our whole English Existence" [*Heroes*, p.261], by "we English" [*ibid.*, p.353] with "our English blood" [p.198]. He solves the Franco-Celtic infection of Scottish soul and soil by an appeal to the Anglo-Nordic axis, replacing what he sees as Celtic materialism with the organic image of "the living tree Igdrasil", the mythic

world-tree of the Nordic religions^[7] [*Heroes*, p.312].

Carlyle's fear is expressed in terms of a repugnance towards the machine, for with organized industry comes the call for the *laissez-faire* which marks "the time of Adam Smith" [*Chartism, Essays* Vol.III p.287]. The Smithian call for the circulating economy, for industrial equity and

[7] It is important to note, however, that the investment in the organic spirituality of the tree is not limited to Germanic cultures, and is just as prevalent in Celtic metaphysics, as in the determination of the ash tree as the container of souls. Tracing the etymology of the Gàidhlig word for tree, *craobh*, one soon discovers other metaphysical investments, such as that in *craobh-dhruididh* signifying "nobleman", connecting with the verb *drùidh*, "ooze", "penetrate", from which comes the noun meaning "philosopher", giving the English "druid". Equally, in contradistinction to Carlyle's implied imaging of Celtic culture as materialist, many examples of Celtic phonocentrism do indeed exist, as his own image of the *vates* suggests. In Adamnán's *Vita Columbae* (c.690), St. Columba's voice is described as having a penetrative power over great distances, thus reducing the disseminatory effect of spacing over phonic production: "The venerable man, when singing in the church with the brethren, raised his voice so wonderfully that it was sometimes heard four furlongs off, that is five hundred paces, and sometimes eight furlongs, that is one thousand paces. But what is stranger still: to those who were with him in the church, his voice did not seem louder than that of others; and yet at the same time persons more than a mile away heard it so distinctly that they could mark each syllable of the verses he was singing, for his voice sounded the same whether far or near." [*Life of St. Columba*, p.61] Purser suggests a materialist explanation that this was possible through the agency of Eastern overtone techniques, and also connects Ethiopian Coptic chant with the Gàidhlig Salm [*Scotland's Music*, pp.33-6]. Certainly the Islamic influence on Celtic Christianity can be observed in that other product of Iona Abbey, the *Book of Kells*, and more generally, van der Merwe remarks that "so much that is Oriental in character lingered on in the folk music of Scotland and Ireland." [*Origins of the Popular Style*, p.13] A further phonocentric motif, tracing the dual signification of *logos* as "light" and "word", can be read in the late C8th *Miracula Nynie Episcopi*, where St. Ninian, "gave the blind bright light in the place of darkness, he cleansed the swelling leprosy from the scaly body and cured lameness in many men and broke through deaf ears with the prick of his voice" [*The Miracles of Bishop Nynia*, in MacQueen, *St. Nynia*, p.95] Yet, the same hagiographer parodies the idea of the divine inspiration of songs into the devoutly receptive body; "And then the holy man was deemed worthy to eat of the sacred sacrament, and after he had eaten, he belched forth sacred hymns of praise from his throat." [*ibid.*, p.100] Significantly, the humour of this passage is located in the inverted transubstantiation of a spiritual process into a material one.

democracy which characterizes the Whig movement for Carlyle is nothing more than the threat of a Gallic perversion; "why do we ask of Chartism, Glasgow Trades-unions, and such like? Has not broad Europe heard the question put, and answered, on the great scale; has not a FRENCH REVOLUTION been?" [*Chartism*, p.281]. Rousseau, as symbol of the Revolution, is inherently bound up in the machinations of *laissez-faire* in Carlyle's mind, although his objection to the Enlightenment is expressed in similarly organic, anti-machinic terms. This is the paradox for Carlyle; Rousseau, the prophet of the self-proximate and the logocentric, was nevertheless complicitous in the French Revolution, and thus the whole democratic narrative of the machine age. As Derrida demonstrates in *Of Grammatology*, Rousseau's spirituality corrupts itself, places distances at its own origin, and (to transpose Derrida's reading into our current terms) ultimately assembles a *machine* within the *organism* it attempts to create and naturalize. The machine then lacerates the organic body from within. Just as the interval was the *indécidable* for Rousseau, in Carlyle, it is the image of the *machine*.

Carlyle also fears the ongoing assault on Spirit by an age he characterizes as one of "inorganic chaos" [*Heroes*, p.312]. The age of Adam Smith and the Whig machine which brings liberty, which Carlyle calls the democratic "Representative Machine" [*Sartor Resartus*, p.153], is in fact the age of oppression by the very machines of liberation. Rousseau equally fears machinic representation on the grounds of the yawning interval, the abyss between origin and representation, but Carlyle's political objection is not so much to the means of representation as to the more precipitous matter of what will be represented. He considers this to be the legacy

which the French Revolution left for Europe, and now threatens Britain through the "millocratic" proletariats of Paisley, New Lanark, and Lancashire: "Shall we tremble before clothwebs and cobwebs, whether woven in Arkwright looms or by the silent Arachnes that weave unrestingly in our Imagination?" [*Sartor*, p.40] The fear, then, is not only of the actual machine, but also of Arachne's weaving-machine of the imagination. This is the industrialization of thought itself, and therefore of all culture in general.

Carlyle's image of the web also weaves itself into the narrative of the Tarantella. As Alexander Malcolm's use of this narrative demonstrated, the poison of the tarantula is enticed out of the body by the machinic, non-penetrative influences of instrumental music. Malcolm establishes a distinction between this stimulatory model of music and a penetrative model, associated with John Locke's formulation of the Theory of Ideas and Pythagoras' phonic medicine. The stimulatory model can be discerned to be operative within Malcolm's theory, which can be characterized as a machinic approach, and here Carlyle associates such machinism with the technological productions of Arkwright, and the imaginary weaving loom of Arachne, who challenged Athene, goddess of wisdom, to a weaving contest. This challenge is the challenge of the machine against divine knowledge, and it is in this context that Carlyle operates the narrative.

We have, then, harmonic theory's technological Arachne challenging the eternal wisdoms of Carlyle's divine Athene. It is a confrontation of mechanical materialism and onto-theological transcendentalism, and just as Athene destroyed Arachne's clothweb in order to hang her upon it for her

insolence, thereby creating the first spider^[8], so too Carlyle would hope to hang the harmonic machine and the associated call for representational parliament on the products of their own mechanisms, their historical failures as evidenced in the Terror following the French Revolution. In this way, Carlyle will turn the machinic system of non-penetration into a penetrative organism, a spider, which will inject its venom into further organisms. As Derrida attempts to show the machine within the organism, so Carlyle's critique of the machinic "time of Adam Smith" is an attempt to show that the machine cannot exist unless it has actually been an organism from the origin. This is the meaning of Arachne for Carlyle - he decides the fate of his *indécidables* himself.

Carlyle's message is also that the mere material temporality of the technological "Loom of Time" [*Sartor Resartus*, p.125] will be replaced by an aristocracy of Spirit which will have access, through the vatic singer, to the celestial temporality, or eternity. In his lexis this base temporality threatens to destroy pure, undivided spirit. Material time is a temporality which is rhythmic, machinic, divided and dividing. Technological thought destroys religion; "That progress of Science, which is to destroy Wonder, and in its stead *substitute Mensuration and Numeration* [...] and man's mind become an Arithmetical Mill" [*Sartor*, p.40, emphasis added]. The mind becomes the site of machinic accumulation by an intervallic process of addition. Equally, the image of time given here is one of harmonicity, a conception based on numeric mensuration which inevitably yields a spatial temporality. This proportional entelechy which marked the writings of

[8] Thus giving the name *arachnida* to the biological order of spiders, scorpions, etc.

Rameau, Malcolm, and Mason, where space collapses sideways into horizontal time, segmenting it and reorganizing it according to a spatial law in the process, is the "substitution" of religious wonder, adoration, by the action of Number, and its entelechy through harmonic Mensuration. Spatial time is the encroachment of the abyss, the possibility of annihilation and absence, and must therefore be defeated. Carlyle thus calls for a form of meditation which derives from "not mathematics, but that *Mathesis*, of which it has been said many a Great Calculist has not even a notion." [*Novalis*, p.465] In this, Carlyle asserts a form of knowledge which is pure, direct, umbilical, to its object.

In *Sartor Resartus*, Carlyle writes that life is an "internecine warfare with the Time-spirit", and that "other warfare seems questionable" [p.119]. It is not that Carlyle's ontology proposes that space must defeat time, as one would expect if such a statement were made with reference to a Rameauist scheme, for this temporality which must be defeated is itself spatial. Equally, space as such is a base appearance here; "deepest of all illusory Appearances, for hiding Wonder, as for many other ends, are your two grand fundamental world-enveloping Appearances, SPACE and TIME." [*Sartor*, p.159]. As science and machinism destroy religious wonder, so too do the veils of space and spatialized time.

Here, the two ontological axes themselves are defined as harmonics of the true original root of reality, they are determined as illusory *clothing*, obfuscating the internal self of all things. Space and time are "spun and woven" [*ibid.*] by a base, material process, just as the machines of harmonic theory and Arachne are assembled to obfuscate wonder and wisdom, to representationally deceive the senses and the imagination.

Material, harmonic space and time "clothe our celestial Me" [ibid.], are illusory veils drawn over the body of our true divinity which is neither spatial or temporal. Carlyle's move here constitutes his transcendentalism, a post-Kantian appeal to Spirit, a backlash against the "flat, continuous thrashing-floor for Logic" [Burns, p.259] which Kames, Hume, Robertson, Smith *et al*, had assembled in the philosophy of "our own stern Motherland" a generation before [ibid., p.258]^[9]. No longer would stern logic be allowed to thrash reality, to privilege the harmonic over the fundamental, and proclaim with Adam Ferguson that "all situations are equally natural" [Essay on the History of Civil Society, p.8]. The danger of the Scottish Enlightenment was a move towards relativism, towards metaphysical doubt concerning causality and religion themselves, towards a mechanics of the mind, and a denial of all that is extra-material. This was expressed in music aesthetics such as those of Malcolm as a preference for the instrument rather than the voice, harmony than melody, sonic acoustics than phonic hermeneutics.

Carlyle will reassert the "speech of angels" as the true origin in his ontology. He will attempt to reduce the intervallic spaces of instrumental difference and bind all together in a spiritual vocal unison. This unified song will become the source of the universe in a grand revitalization of metaphysics to purge philosophy of scepticism: "In the Pyrrhonism of Hume and the Materialism of Diderot, Logic had, as it were, overshot itself,

[9] And is not the irony here that Kant himself was post-Humean? As he writes himself in the *Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics that will be Able to Present itself as a Science* (1783), "Since LOCKE'S and LEIBNIZ'S Essays, or rather since the beginning of metaphysics as far as the history of it reaches, no event has occurred which could have been more decisive in respect of the fate of this science than the attack which DAVID HUME has made upon it." [Prolegomena, p.5]

overset itself."^[10] [*Characteristics*, in *Essays* Vol.II p.225] The materialist logicians had gone beyond the capacity, the boundary of thought, they had severed it from its true *locus*, introduced an interval between their work and its true origin. Logic had fractured itself, and threatened to fracture the world with it. However, "in that wide-spreading, deep-whirling vortex of Kantism [...] is not this issue visible enough, That Pyrrhonism and Materialism, themselves necessary phenomena in European culture, have disappeared [...] and the word *Free-thinker* no longer means the Denier or Caviller, but the Believer" [ibid.]. In the post-Kantian world, freedom is no longer a function of harmonic connectivity, of distant representation, but of binding oneself to the melodic origin at the root of the world. Freedom is only achieved through listening to the mandate of Spirit through the maternal voice of nature. Freedom is no longer a matter of separation, but of binding, of proximity to the root.

Even the attempts at a presbyterian philosophy of the *sensus communis* such as Thomas Reid assembled could not reinstate Spirit in the

[10] Carlyle, no doubt, calls Hume a Pyrrhonist precisely because of Hume's care in describing the limitations of scepticism in the *Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*. As Hume writes, "The great subverter of *Pyrrhonism* or the excessive principles of scepticism is action, and employment, and the occupations of common life. These principles may flourish and triumph in the schools; where it is, indeed, difficult, if not impossible, to refute them. But as soon as they leave the shade, and by the presence of real objects, which actuate our passions and sentiments, are put in opposition to the more powerful principles of our nature, they vanish like smoke, and leave the most determined sceptic in the same condition as other mortals. The sceptic, therefore, had better keep within his proper sphere, and display those *philosophical* objections, which arise from more profound researches. Here he seems to have ample matter of triumph" [*Enquiry*, pp.158/9] It is not a matter, for Hume, of having a single principle or goal in life, as it is for Carlyle, who would reduce everything to a single essence. Rather, Hume's scepticism functions within certain limits, and has no absolute jurisdiction over all aspects of life – it is no ultimate meta-discourse. In this, Hume's pragmatism is contrasted with Carlyle's dogmatism (as well as the latter's *will to slander*).

form which Carlyle calls for. Reid's philosophy was necessarily trapped in Humean lexis by its very attempt to answer Hume's religious and generally metaphysical scepticism; "The school of Reid had also from the first taken a mechanical course, not seeing any other. The singular conclusions at which Hume, setting out from their admitted premises, was arriving, brought this school into being" [*Signs of the Times*, in *Essays*, Vol.I, p.478]. The mistake of the Reidian formulation of *sensus communis* was its continuation of a Humean concern with the intervallic chains of the imaginary machine; "they let loose *Instinct*, as an *undiscriminating* band-dog, to guard them against these conclusions;- they tugged lustily at the *logical chain* by which Hume was so coldly towing them and the world into *bottomless abysses* of Atheism and Fatalism." [ibid., emphases added] The Reidian move towards instinct could not help but become enslaved by the chain of harmonic connectivity which Hume and Smith had established; theory's harmonic chain had its end in the dark abyss which turns divine song into a material intervallic component within the transient machine.

What was needed was a disinvestment in the whole economy of the Enlightenment. Carlyle dismisses it out of hand when he states that Reid's answer to Hume makes the harmonic chain redundant, and that "the chain somehow snapped between them" [ibid.]. The new approach required, in Carlyle's mind, an appeal to Germanisms as a counter-weight to what he considered "Gallic lownesses" [*Richter and de Stael*, in *Essays*, Vol.I, p.634]. The language of Scottish philosophy, "some broken *Lingua-franca*, or English-French" [*Sartor*, p.169] should shun the Gallic inflection for the piercing edge of analytical Saxon dialect. Carlyle writes "To the eye of vulgar logic [...] what is man? An omnivorous Biped that wears Breeches.

To the eye of Pure Reason what is he? A Soul, a Spirit, and divine Apparition." [*Sartor*, p.39] This is Carlyle's answer to the Enlightenment - it is no longer a question of space's entelechy into time, but a question of Spirit's entelechy into a spatio-temporal web of illusion and false prophecy. In this return to Plato's Cave, however, Carlyle substitutes the effete philosopher-ruler with the virility of the warrior-priest.

7.4 The Spatio-temporal Web

Carlyle's theory of actual time is that it is a debased "Mensuration", debased, that is, by a spatiality which is itself debased and debasing, in its action of "Numeration". This is associated with the theories of the Enlightenment "Logic-choppers" [*Sartor*, p.41], where logic is defined in terms of an intervallic divisibility, and a distortion of reality by the violence of this division. Mensuration divides the phonic origin from its offsprings, separates original Song from the matter of the universe and opens the door to the discordant abyss of the black prince.

The implicit rejection of Number here, as the mechanism of division, is significant for a reading of Carlyle's transcendental origin, the "celestial essence" [*Sartor*, p.127]. In *Sartor Resartus*, Carlyle suggests that this debased temporality can be overcome by the *logos*: "in this so-solid-seeming World, which nevertheless is in continual restless flux, it is appointed that *Sound*, to appearance the most fleeting, should be the most continuing of all things. The Word is well said to be omnipotent in this world" [*Sartor*, p.121]. Here, the sound which achieves the victory of the internecine warfare against mensurated time is the sound of *logos* which falls from the celestial essence and appears in the world by a temporal

paradox as a gateway to the eternal.

In this, Carlyle demonstrates an extreme Rousseauism, and the Gallic reference is further compounded when Carlyle writes, like Rousseau, of the parental voice;

ah! like the mother's voice to her little child that strays bewildered, weeping, in unknown tumults; like soft streamings of celestial music to my too-exasperated heart, came that Evangel. The Universe is not dead and demoniacal, a charnel-house with spectres; but godlike, and my Father's! [Sartor, p.115]

Nature's voice, then, is also the Maternal voice which fills the fallen, divided, transient and mensurated space of the universe, and this space is ultimately that of the Father, not the machine. It is fallen, because it is a space of division, and therefore presupposes and ensures a divided temporality. The celestial Maternal voice, however, can kill time by occupying its base spatiality and extending itself throughout all eternity, thereby reducing space and time to one eternal moment of absolute self-proximity^[11]. The temporality which is material, debased, and arithmetically divided "devours all his Children" [Sartor, p.79], threatens us with the violence of a mensural abyss, we are "swallowed-up of Time" [Sartor, p.111]. This is the chaos, the catastrophe of the material universe, and the threat of the machinic illusion; time is the negative masculine, the feminized masculine, the abyss which practises violence and annihilation.

[11] Just as John Leyden had written of the musical "peasant" in the 1801 *Preliminary Dissertation* on the historic *Complaynt of Scotland* (1548): "He has not learned his favourite airs from a music-master, or in a scientific manner; but he has acquired them in his infancy, in the bosom of his family; and, in their tones, he hears the voice of his mother, of his sister, of his youthful love. There is no fibre of his heart which does not vibrate to some of his well-known strains:- you cannot improve them to him". [p.275] The complicity in the image of the maternal voice of "peasant" culture, with its ontological negative as "barbaric" anti-culture is prevalent throughout much ethnographic writing.

Equally, debased spatiality is imaged as the "cruel Stepdame" [Sartor, p.115], the negative feminine, the masculinized feminine, which acts as the locus of the temporal stepfather's swallowing of all material presence.

The celestial Mother, however, the Mother who is the true origin, and not some debased, supplementary, step mother, can find the lost child and provide him with the ambrosian milks of presence. Equally, the tempest of temporal catastrophe which flows "like a mad witch's hair" [Sartor, p.115], the mensural hair of the evil stepmother, is cast down into its own abyss by the purity of the originary Mother's voice. She makes way for "the clear sunbeam" [ibid.] of the paternal space. The original Mother can in this sense devour the act of devouring, efface effacement, and restore original familial hierarchies.

Carlyle associates the heterophonic, the plural, with the catastrophe: the mother's voice restores univocity to the "din of many-voiced Life" [Sartor, p.115]. The image of dissonance and catastrophe is extended further in Carlyle's description of the plunge "into the jaws of the Devil!" [Sartor, p.90]. The agency of the evil stepfather can be transmitted not only through that of the stepmother, but also through the evil enchantress, the "Duenna Cousin" [p.89] who grounds the "hapless air-navigator" [p.90], he who explores the region of *pneuma*, the seeker of the Maternal melody. This deceitful machinic woman draws the original Man into the abyss, the final jarring dissonance which consumes and divides, lacerates, the body. Here, "thick curtains of Night rushed over his soul, as rose the immeasurable Crash of Doom; and through the ruins as of a shivered Universe was he falling, falling, towards the abyss." [Sartor,

p.90] In this absence which is announced by a dissonant Crash, in the triumph of machinic space and time, the event of a French Revolution perhaps, one hears a "noise as of the Crack of Doom" [*French Revolution*, p.150]. Doom, ontological absence, is presaged by the sound of division, dissonance; the self-proximate melodic origin is "cracked", just as the world is ruptured by the gateway to the abyss.

Following this crash and crack of doom, there is "the laughter of demons" [p.92], until, at the heart of this "dark bottomless Abyss" [p.65], we stand before the "inexorable word, NEVER!" [p.65]. This is the ontological negative of *logos* - the eternal absence which devours all, the dissonant word which breaks all melody and divides all unity; the final "crack".

In this mythic ontology, only the celestial voice of the melodic Mother can avert the collapse into catastrophe and absence by a vocalized assertion of the pure presence of Spirit, a ritual action of singing which re-enacts the structure of the original song: a sacred invocation of the binding power of the origin. This is the means of movement from one ontological layer to another for the questing individual. When this ritual song is performed, then the little lost Carlyle becomes aware that the universe is in fact ultimately the Father's space; the melodic organism defeats, by internecine warfare, the harmonic machine.

Original Paternal space is restored by the Maternal voice, a Maternal temporality which acts as a "Hell-gate Bridge over Chaos" [*Sartor*, p.124]. The presence of melody fills the absence of the abyss, bridges its rupture and ensures material integrity; "there has a Hole fallen-out in the immeasurable, universal World-tissue, which must be darned-up again!" [*Sartor*, p.150] However, this darning is not the work of an Arachnidian

Malcolm. Here, the fissure in the tissue of the world organism is *healed up*, not fabricated. This action of darning is exactly the opposite of that which sets up the illusion of the world machine. The machinations which result in the abyss are overcome by the reduction of the interval, the healing-up of the gap which fissures the integrity of tissue and threatens to rip it apart with the action of a spatialized temporality. This medical image is that which reasserts the proximity of the origin and seals up the space of the machine and the interval of the harmonic chain.

7.5 The Centre of Indifference

Paternalized material space represents the overcoming of distance, the overcoming of the proportional difference which allows the chain of harmonics to act. It is the first step in the winning of the internecine warfare against intervallic time; "the CENTRE OF INDIFFERENCE I had now reached; through which whoso travels from the Negative Pole to the Positive must necessarily pass." [Sartor, p.112] In-difference, non-difference, is the precondition of proximity, of sameness, likeness, authenticity and originality. This is the possibility of Paternal law, achieved through the administrations of the Maternal voice. The mediumship of melody has achieved this middle state of indifference between the two poles of the material world. On the one hand, below, there is the tendency towards machinic ruin. On the other, above, there is the tendency towards organic integrity. Here, in the middle, lies the centre of indifference, a materiality which has been purged of the negativity of the machine and can now look up, towards the organism. It is in this realm that the spiritual relation between melody and matter can be explored - the

entelechy of Spirit into the matter of a stabilized space-time.

Carlyle provides an anthropomorphic image; if "the Universe is majestically *unveiling*, and everywhere Heaven *revealing itself* on Earth, nowhere to the Young Man does this Heaven on Earth *so immediately reveal itself* as in the Young Maiden." [*Sartor*, p.82, emphasis added] The image is of the Spiritual and the Temporal, with the "female" acting as the medium of entelechy for the "male", just as the Maternal voice can act as a barrier to the machinic step-mother's voice and thereby protect the law of the Father from the machinic law of the step-father.

The precise means of this mediumship is "a certain orthodox Anthropomorphism [which] connects my *Me* with all *Thees* in bonds of Love" [*Sartor*, p.82]. Here Carlyle describes the mapping of the universal law of one term onto the body of another. However, the opposition is one of internality and externality; the anthropomorphism involved is the projection by the "male" onto the "female" of the "male" attribute which she lacks, namely, humanity. "She" is the *animalistic object* of an anthropomorphic projection.

The "orthodoxy" of the anthropomorphism which unites these two terms is the article of faith which allows this union of self and Other. Equally, there is within this movement from one ontological layer to another a certain connective insemination of Spirit into animalistic/machinic matter - one term captures the body of the other and bends it to its law, and for its use. This is all expressed in terms of a Pythagorean opposition of the "like" and the "unlike", the same and the different; "it is in this approximation of the Like and Unlike, that such heavenly attraction, as between Negative and Positive, first *burns-out* into

a *flame* [...] thus, in the *conducting-medium* of Fantasy, flames-forth that *fire-development* [sic] of the *universal* Spiritual Electricity" [Sartor, p.82, emphasis added]. The orthodox anthropomorphism, then, by which the entelechal insemination takes place, is also the conducting medium of fantasy.

Imagination is not far away from Carlyle's Spirit, since it is the action of fantasy which endows the *logos*, or *pneuma*, with its ability to "flame-forth" across the space between Spirit and matter, thus reducing that space to a proximate connection. However, unlike the imagination operated within Smith's theory, this is no attempt to harmonize an imaginary machine with the motions of a natural machine. Carlyle's conception of fantasy functions in a similar intermediary capacity to the Maternal melody which acts as a "hell-gate bridge over chaos". This similarity of melody and fantasy is compounded by Carlyle's statement that "Fantasy I might call the true Heaven-gate and Hell-gate of man" [Sartor, p.88]. Fantasy is, then, the bridging act which can open or close the gates of the temporal abyss or the eternal space; just as the threat of machinic absence and annihilation can be averted by the filling of the gap in the world-tissue by the Maternal voice, so the insemination of matter can be realized by the opening of the cloth-webs of space and time by the attractive force of fantasy. This, however, can only be achieved if fantasy is understood as incorporating a certain upward penetration of the illusory cloth-webs of the Smithian machinic world, which allows the downward fall of universal, fiery *logos*, and the reduction of independent *nomoi* to its centralising laws.

CHAPTER EIGHT

THE PENETRATING ORGANISM

Eius flatu facula sopita pro inuidia
Succenditur in Scocia sine ignis materia.

- Office of St. Kentigern,
Sprouston Breviary, c.1280.

CHAPTER EIGHT

THE PENETRATING ORGANISM

8.1 "...penetrate into the eternal Substance..."

Towards this heaven the thought of the writer soars continually with fervour, sometimes even with a kind of despair. It is a reflection of this heaven, the image of the sun in the dew-drops, which he seeks in terrestrial objects. He penetrates the symbol to arrive at the idea... [*On the Genius and Tendency of the Writings of Thomas Carlyle*, in Mazzini, *Essays*, pp.115/6]

In 1843, the same year as Joseph Mazzini published these symbols in the *British and Foreign Review*, we find that penetration is indeed a particular concern of Carlyle's in *Past and Present*. In chapter two, "The Sphinx", there is once more the opposition of Spirit and matter, and the narrative of the necessary penetration of the one into the other; "he who dwells in the temporary Semblances, and does not penetrate into the eternal Substance, will *not* answer the Sphinx-riddle of Today, or of any Day." [*Past and Present*, p.80] The temporary is plural, divided, and therefore distanced, the eternal is single, univocal, and therefore self-proximate. Penetration thus entails the giving-up of the plural, and the adoption of a certain directionality of mind. If one object is the true, then much in the illusory spatio-temporal world must be discarded. Additionally, the illusory nature of the world is inherently bound up with the temporary, temporal aspect of semblance, or representation. It is the unfixed character of phenomena which give reason to distrust them, and

this distrust leads to the fantasy of stasis which paradoxically brings one closer to the truth. The symbolic is penetrated to arrive at the idea and the Ideal.

The image of illusion gains a further image of penetration here, where the illusory image is extended in specifically visual-penetrative terms; the "clear-beaming eyesight" of the virtuous man is "steadfast, severe, all-penetrating, - it is like the *Fiat lux* in that inorganic waste whirlpool; penetrates gradually to all nooks, and of the chaos makes a *kosmos* or ordered world!" [*Past and Present*, p.141] Here, the fire of the eye can burn mere surface away, it penetrates to the essence of things, brings light to the darkness of disorder, and shows the true nature of the world as cosmos.

This action of penetration is followed by a filtration process. The eye discards, burns away, what is inessential, leaving only the essential core. Carlyle names this action of filtration as a sifting; "Would to Heaven that we had a sieve" [*Past and Present*, p.93]. The sieve is required to distinguish the core terms from the inorganic waste. In political terms, it will distinguish his "aristocracy of talent" from common talent "like wheat out of chaff" [ibid.]. It is the "infallible sifting-process; to which, however, no soul can help his neighbour, but each must, with devout prayer to Heaven, endeavour to help himself" [p.94]. That which will be retained as a core term by the sifting process is that which is internally essential, and this is a quality that cannot be endowed, but must be reached from within. The criteria for the sifting are transcendental, and in this context, Carlyle's statement that "Kant is a sort of *Political Reformer*" [*Historic Survey of German Poetry*, in *Essays*, Vol.II p.176, emphasis added] is a

notable preface to the neo-organicist backlash of 1933. It is a high order of ontology which categorizes according to such rules, and its law is "infallible".

Alongside this visual and moral model of penetration, Carlyle develops an aural model. Here, we find the same processes in operation as within the visual model, unmodified with the exception that now, with the full action of *logos* and *pneuma* in operation, the penetration lodges *ousia* within the body of the self. The visual model is an analytical model, one which we can use in order to penetrate the surface of illusion and gain knowledge about the true melodic order of things. With the aural model, however, an entelechy takes place in the form of a descent or fall of *ousia* from the universal origin. "A God's-message never came to thicker-skinned people; never had a God's-message to *pierce through* thicker integuments, into heavier ears. It is Fact, speaking once more, in miraculous thunder-voice, from out of the centre of the world" [*Past and Present*, p.93, emphasis added]. Here again, we have Demosthenes' Thunder, "hurled" from one ontological realm into another, hurling pure Spirit into the material world, the potential void.

This is the "orthodox Anthropomorphism" by which the animalistic "female" machine "unveils" itself for the "male" seer and his analytical, penetrating gaze. With the complicity of the viscosity of analysis, the whole process becomes an ontological strip-tease, a removal of the illusory webs of Arachne's clothing of space and time in order to uncover, or visually penetrate through, see, to the maternal melodic essence at the core of all things.

The materialism of the Enlightenment philosophers, the machinists,

is characterized here by a thick surface skin, a near-impenetrability which only the *logos*, the message of God, can forcefully rupture in order to reach the heart of the subject and destroy its harmonicity by bringing it into direct contact, unified "touching" in Pythagorean lexis, with the origin at the true, transcendental centre of the world, which is melody. Here, harmonicity and the principle of the vibratory chain are swept aside, concertinaed into a single entity, collapsed in on themselves and captured by the compression of the unitary source, pure, undivided Spirit.

8.2 Melodic Essence

Carlyle's theory of Spirit is distinguished from the "ghost in the machine" theories which ran parallel to the more radical materialisms of the Enlightenment, and were announced in the Cartesian moment. He writes: "Alas, poor Cogitator, this takes us but a little way" [*Sartor*, p.30]. Unlike Descartes' "rational soul", Carlyle's Spirit cannot be thought of as having a pseudo-mechanical relationship to the body; while it can penetrate the body, it does so only in order to capture it. For itself, it is not captured within the body as a mere component of that body – it does not have the

possibility of a precise locus in the illusory web of space and time^[1]. It exists only in a transcendental space, and can either be fantasized by the self or can melodically invade the self in order to bring the self closer to it. Spirit thus has its origin, and to an extent its present nature in a transcendental realm in line with the celestial concepts per se of the Hellenic system.

Religion, then, is not defined paganistically as knowledge of the mechanical relationship of space to time, but transcendently as knowledge of the spiritual relationship of self to the "Unseen World or No-World" [*Heroes*, p.186], the world of the melodic voice. Carlyle's invisible realm, however, is to be understood as a true reality – extant, and yet beyond the fringes of the immediate, illusory world. Rather than theoretically harmonizing perceptual chaos (as in Smith) Carlyle attempts

[1] Descartes writes, in the *Discourse on the Method*, that "I described the rational soul, and showed that, unlike the other things of which I had spoken, it cannot be derived in any way from the potentiality of matter, but must be specially created. And I showed how it is not sufficient for it to be lodged in the human body like a helmsman in his ship, except perhaps to move its limbs, but that it must be more closely joined and united with the body" [*Discourse*, p.46]. In this sense, the soul is a separate entity from the general transcendental Spirit, and can lodge itself within the body, connecting in to all the components of the body in a radically mechanical way. Such a chain of components can be discerned in the following passage; "movement is then transmitted to the other ends of the nerves which are all grouped together in the brain around the seat of the soul [...] The result of these movements being set up in the brain by the nerves is that the soul or mind that is closely joined to the brain is affected in various ways, corresponding to the various different sorts of movements" [*Principles of Philosophy*, p.201] Here, the soul has a specific locus in the body, it has a seat in the brain, in a specific place within matter, and is connected to the bodily machine by the brain component. This is what Descartes refers to when he writes above of the insufficiency of simply describing the soul as a ship's helmsman. Equally, the body is capable of acting without the soul; "all the limbs can be moved by the objects of the senses and by the spirits without the help of the soul" [*The Passions of the Soul*, p.224]. In the same way that Descartes' soul does not penetrate every pore of the body, it is equally not omnipotent with respect to it.

to defeat it. In order to achieve knowledge of the transcendental realm of the ontological unison, the harmonic clothing of the seen world must be penetrated; "Pierce through the Time-element, glance into the Eternal." [Sartor, p.160] In this expression of the methodological primacy of the lexis of visibility, Carlyle asserts vision as capable of breaking the surface of the temporal world, rupturing the cloth-webs of materialism, and announcing an action of analysis.

This penetration constitutes the success of the "internecine warfare" to be conducted against the temporal in order to attain the spiritual. This is what the previous "haggard epoch, with its ghastly Doctrines, and death's-head Philosophics" [Past and Present, p.258] could not achieve. Carlyle's project is to re-vitalize ontology, with all the attendant concepts which the Vital entails, and yet all circulating around a musical image;

Musical: how much lies in that! A *musical* thought is one spoken by a mind that has penetrated into the inmost heart of the thing; detected the inmost mystery of it, namely the *melody* that lies hidden in it; the inward harmony of coherence which is its soul, whereby it exists, and has a right to be, here in this world. [Heroes, p.247]

To penetrate into the inmost heart of a thing, then, by an action of the mind, is to penetrate to a central musical essence within the body of that thing. This mental penetration, or analysis, gains its musicality in relation to the object of its penetration. It must have a certain proportional correspondence with its object in order that it can reach and fully comprehend its goal when it reaches it. In this sense, thought is endowed with musicality as its *telos*, its metaphysical goal, which it knows before the commencement of its project, but has not yet attained in reality.

The proportion which musical thought requires in order to attain its

telos is not a logical proportion; there is no room here for a "thrashing-floor of logic" which could never dig beneath the immediate surface; "The meaning of Song goes deep. Who is there that, in logical words, can express the effect music has on us?" [*Heroes*, p.247] The "logical chain" of Enlightenment thought cannot penetrate to the core which is music – this core operates by a musical language, and in this, the full meaning of Carlyle's determination of theory and music becomes apparent.

This theoretical realm of the *logos* and of the *telos* is the realm of Song; the musical thought which can seal the abyss of the machine, and also penetrate the cobwebs of material surface, is the thought which is an "inarticulate unfathomable speech, which leads us to the edge of the Infinite, and lets us for moments gaze into that!" [*Heroes*, p.247] As this speech is Song itself, so Song is also the teleological essence; "All deep things are Song. It seems somehow the very central essence of us, Song" [ibid.]. Song is both *telos* and *ousia*.

Carlyle's "inarticulate" Song is distinguished, however, from the inarticulacy of Malcolm's original instrumental music, which was an expression of a radically sonic specificity signalling the shift from imitative aesthetics to affective capacities.

Carlyle's inarticulate music, on the other hand, is a component of a radically phonocentric move – this music is Song, it is a form of speech, and we even find the Rousseauist theme of "accent" as an organ of the Song organism; "all speech, even the commonest speech, has something of song in it: not a parish in the world but has its parish-accent;– the rhythm or *tune* to which the people there *sing* what they have to say! Accent is a kind of chanting" [*Heroes*, p.247]. Song permeates all the productions of

the voice, and that which distinguishes one people from another is that which produces the specificity of their chanting of the sacred *logos*, the incantation of their relationship to all else which is endowed by virtue of the universal voice, the ontological source. A local accent is constituted by its tonality in relation to the root tonality which, like the maternal voice of nature, generates all tonalities as parts of its own body.

Aristotle wrote of "the tonality of normal speech" [*Poetics*, p.49], but this was a tonality reliant on *rhythmus*, and the correct application of the *pedes metrici*. Carlyle here forms a concept of tonality, and therefore of the specific voice, which is not easily shown to be based on a specifically spatialized, harmonic temporality.

As Rousseau wrote in the *Dictionary of Music* on "Accent" there is an accent of language which "produces the melody particular to a nation", and yet there is also for Rousseau a "universal accent of Nature" which permeates and produces this local accent. In this way, *logos* becomes the prime generator of all things, but specifically music. The appeal to poetry in this move is easily found. As Carlyle writes, "Poetry, therefore, we will call *musical Thought*" [*Heroes*, p.247]. Like Rousseau, he states that *logos* is the essence which is at the centre of all things. Poetry and Song therefore become primary components of the system, and one expects instrumental music, the realm of the specifically harmonic, non-representational and absolutely supplementary, to be derived from the logocentric component. This is what Rousseau attempts when he elaborates his Hellenized theory of pure, undivided Song, the originary synthesis of *logos* with the sonic, and states this to be the origin of the debased supplement which is instrumental music, as well as the origin of all debased

northern forms of language (which is always defined in the lexis of the phonic, since the graphic is yet a further debased supplement). This is also, according to the Derridean deconstruction, precisely what Rousseau fails to achieve, by actually placing a harmonic space at the origin.

Carlyle, it will be noticed, also suggests that there is a harmonicity at play within his theory of the origin, when he writes of the "musical thought" which is the production of the analytical mind which has penetrated to the "inmost" melodic essence of a thing. While this essence is melodic, it is nevertheless "the *inward harmony* of coherence which is its soul" [*Heroes*, p.247, emphasis added]. Yet there is a significant distinction between Rousseau's harmonic origin which is harmonic only by default, and Carlyle's "inward harmony". Carlyle writes of this "inward harmony" in the same tone as he does with the concept of melody. This can be discerned in his admiration for "The Greeks fabled Sphere-Harmonics: it was the feeling they had of the inner structure of Nature; that the soul of all her voices and utterances was perfect music. Poetry, therefore, we will call *musical Thought*." [*Heroes*, p.247] Carlyle previously states that the soul is Song. Here, Song, the voice of Nature, also has a soul, but this soul is harmony.

Rousseau, on the other hand, endows harmony with an aspect of externality; harmony is the "dangerous supplement" to original melody. What Carlyle suggests is the opposite, that harmony is an "inmost", "inward" part of melody; that it is the "feeling [...] of the inner structure of Nature". This harmony is overtly endowed with an aspect of internality. Where Rousseau's harmony is the chain of supplements which the Enlightenment philosophers establish through scepticism and "logic-

chopping", and must therefore be overcome, Carlyle's harmony is an internal part of a self-proximate object. It is therefore not based so much on an expanding arrangement which places its law around things, than a compressing vortex which draws things towards its own locus. In this, it is a harmony distinct from that of Malcolm or of Rameau. Indeed, it is set up in opposition to precisely these theories.

Carlyle's harmony rejects the concept of the interval by aiming at self-proximity. It is under-pinned not so much by a fundamental, as a *root*; in this term, and its accompanying image of the tree, we find Carlyle's theory of harmony as an organ of a fully melodic organism.

8.3 Organic Filaments

It is all a Tree: circulation of sap and influences, mutual communication of every minutest leaf with the lowest talon of a root, with every other greatest and minutest portion of the whole. The Tree Igdrasil... [Heroes, p.261]

Here, the full meaning of Carlyle's determination of harmony as *inward*, melodic, can be read as that not of the *generation* of the fundamental to the harmonic across a spatial interval, but of the *penetration* of all things from the root. A penetrating organism, with the tree as its image. The origin which is a root is not a pragmatic harmonic machine which can change its *locus* depending on the relative harmonic perspective from which enquiry begins. The root is the single origin of all things, in direct univocal communication with all of its offshoots. This communication takes the form not of mutual stimulation, but of a pulsating insemination of essence: "circulation of sap". The sap of the life-tree, the transmissional medium of this ontological *ousia* is the maternal Song which binds the most distant organs of the tree together, overcoming distance,

indeed, penetrating space in order to occupy it and ensure an uninterrupted continuity between parts.

The proximate communication of the organs of the harmonic tree is achieved not by mere analysis, but by motion, a circulation of essence, but also the pulse of the organs themselves according to the rhythm of the sap's penetrative entelechy into their bodies: "The living TREE Igdrasil, with the melodious prophetic waving of its world-wide boughs, deep-rooted as Hela" [*Heroes*, pp.312/3]. The tree *lives*, it is not a machine, but an organism which is endowed with Spirit, with melodic essence. This melody is transmitted throughout the organism as a means of proximate control and coordination of its organs, and results in a rhythmic transposition into the motion of the organism as a whole. This motion is a "melodious prophetic waving" of the organs, it foretells the fortune, the final tuning of the organism's destiny. It presages cadential destiny, or the organism's *telos*. All this is achieved by the uninterrupted, self-proximate flow of melodic essence, binding all organs together in an *inward* harmony, or melodic structure.

Thus, the harmony which Carlyle writes of is of a different order to the harmony of Enlightenment writers. His harmony is inward, compressive, organic, while theirs is outward, expansive, machinic. In this lexis, the Enlightenment represented the threat of the living tree's annihilation, it had "died-out into the clanking of a WORLD-MACHINE." [*ibid.*, p.313] The separation of the root and the bough, the origin and the organ, the introduction of the interval and therefore harmonic connectivity, is what turns this tree into dead, machinic matter - "Whatsoever is noble, divine, inspired, drops thereby out of life. There remains everywhere in life a

despicable caput-mortuum; the mechanical hull, all soul fled out of it." [ibid., p.314] The distinction between these harmonic orders is absolute, and only one can prevail in this internecine warfare of rival ontologies; "'Tree' and 'Machine:' contrast these two things. I, for my share, declare the world to be no machine!" [ibid., p.313, emphasis added] Harmony is a matter of the binding of "organic filaments" [*Sartor*, p.153], not of the dividing of machines into components. This binding, however, is not some analytical after-thought created to explain diverse phenomena. Rather, it is the very process of generation itself; the melodic sap which inseminates all organs is also the principle of the generation and growth of those organs. This is the full distinction between Scoto-gallic materialism and Germanic transcendentalism which Carlyle draws out. For Carlyle, the *historical* origin barely matters. As we know from Derrida's reading of Rousseau, it splits and divides as time progresses, thus sowing the seeds of its own deconstruction and dissemination. Such a mensural debasement of the historical origin results in the higher harmonics of a materialist age evidenced in writers such as Rameau or Smith, who provide rationalizations of harmonic generation, of supplementarity. For Carlyle, then, the historical, generative origin is no ontological guarantee. It is not enough to *derive* all things from a common root - they must be ontologically *penetrated* and bound into a single unified organism. This is not so much a nostalgic return to a historical origin, as a political guarantee of a structural origin.

In his essay *Novalis*, (1826) Carlyle gives an account of Novalis' theory of three developmental stages in philosophy on the path to its full realization. In this schema, the first two historical stages are the

"scholastic" stage and the "eclectic" stage. As Carlyle writes;

It may be observed here that British [sic] Philosophy, tracing it from Duns Scotus to Dugald Stewart, has now gone through the first and second of these 'stages', the Scholastic and the Eclectic, and in considerable honour. With our amiable Professor Stewart, than whom no man, not Cicero himself, was ever more entirely Eclectic, that second or Eclectic class may be considered as having terminated; and now Philosophy is at a stand among us, or rather there is now no Philosophy

visible in these Islands^[2]. [*Novalis*, in *Essays*, Vol.I, p.453]

The first stage is characterized by a separation of philosophy into scolasticism and alchemism, logic and metaphysics, mere mechanics and mere dynamics. Here, the two branches are independent inquiries both

[2] This passage is remarkable in Carlyle's writings not only for its determination of the history of British philosophy as entirely a Scottish affair, but also for its evident respect for his fellow Scots and their productions, particularly Dugald Stewart (1753-1828), Professor of Moral Philosophy at Edinburgh University, and student, friend, and biographer of Carlyle's hated Adam Smith. Carlyle himself had graduated from the city's University in 1814, although he had largely studied philosophy under the metaphysician Professor Thomas Brown, but it may be that his interest in the Scottish tradition here comes from the fact that he had not at the time of publication (1826) yet moved to London. Two positions of Stewart's, however, are likely reasons for Carlyle's uncharacteristically benevolent attitude; firstly, Stewart's admiration of and assistance to Burns when the latter moved to cold, mechanical Edinburgh, and second, his statement on transcendentalism that "whoever at some time of his life has not entertained this theory, may reckon that he has yet shown no talent for metaphysical research." [*Novalis*, p.449] Carlyle, however, admires Stewart's work greatly, and it is worth quoting at length the warm account of this *sensus communis* theorist which he gives in his essay on German literature, if only because of its singularity in Carlyle's writings; "The name of Dugald Stewart is a name venerable to all Europe, and to none more dear and venerable than to ourselves. Nevertheless, his writings are not a Philosophy, but a making ready for one. He does not enter on the field to till it; he encompasses it with fences, invites cultivators, and drives away intruders: often (fallen on evil days) he is reduced to long arguments with passers-by, to prove that it *is* a field, that this so highly prized domain of his, in truth, soil and substance, not clouds and shadow. We regard his discussions on the nature of Philosophic Language, and his unwearied efforts to set forth and guard against its fallacies, as worthy of all acknowledgement; as indeed forming the greatest, perhaps the only true improvement, which Philosophy has received among us in our age. It is only to a superficial observer that the import of these discussions can seem trivial; rightly understood, they give sufficient and final answer to Hartley's and Darwin's, and all other possible forms of Materialism, the grand Idolatry, as we may rightly call it, by which, in all times, the true Worship, that of the Invisible, has been polluted and withstood. Mr. Stewart has written warmly against Kant; but it would surprise him to find out how much of a Kantist he himself essentially is. Has not the whole scope of his labours been to reconcile what a Kantist would call his Understanding with his Reason; a noble, but still too fruitless effort to overarch the chasm which, for all minds but his own, separates his Science from his Religion? We regard the assiduous study of his Works as the best preparation for studying those of Kant." [*The State of German Literature*, in *Essays*, Vol.I, p.67]

operating according to the same method of first principles, but there is a gap between them, a fissure within the body of philosophy. The second stage is characterized by partial fusions of the two sciences, but only results in logical metaphysics or metaphysical logic. As Novalis writes, "the time of misunderstanding begins"^[3] [Novalis, quoted in *Novalis*, p.452]. This is the time of false prophets, of Humes, Smiths, Rousseaus, Diderots, French Revolutions, Chartism, weaving looms, and so on. Novalis writes of the first and second types - "those are heads without hands, these are hands without heads" [ibid.]. This stage is an unsuccessful attempt to unite logic and metaphysics, and the full philosophy is only realized in "the genuine Transcendentalist, or 'Philosopher of the third stage,' properly speaking, *the Philosopher*" [Novalis, pp.452/3]. Here, the "artistic" stage of philosophy, as Novalis calls it, is the moment of the dialectical union of the two philosophies into one organic unit, and is the proof that the division of philosophy, its "Separation indicates, by its existence as such, the possibility of being adjusted, of being joined" [Novalis, quoted, in *Novalis*, p.452]. This "artistic" philosophy is the post-Kantian phase which Carlyle calls for.

Dialectically, then, Carlyle aims to unite the two into one philosophical organism, and this inevitably requires the prioritization of the organic, dynamic model over the mechanistic. "For the spiritual will

[3] The following theory of a certain Dr. Cabanis, in his *Rapports du Physique et du Morale de l'Homme*, is pilloried by Carlyle as an example of the confused "ultimatum of mechanical metaphysics"; "He fairly lays open our moral structure with his dissecting-knives and real metal probes; and exhibits it to the inspection of mankind, by Leuwenhoek microscopes, and inflation with the anatomical blow-pipe. Thought, he is inclined to hold, is secreted by the brain; but then Poetry and Religion (and it is really worth knowing) are 'a product of the smaller intestines!'" [*Signs of the Times*, p.478]

always body itself forth in the temporal history of men; the spiritual is the beginning of the temporal." [*Heroes*, p.277] Thus, the "loom of time" is penetrated by the entelechy of Spirit into matter, and all things become dynamically organic, with the single melody as origin. Carlyle admits of the existence of the mechanical realm, but claims that the ultimate origin of the machine is the dynamic organism. In this move, there is the prioritization of melody (inward harmony) over harmony (outward harmony), and the associated prioritization of the voice over the mechanical instrument.

In listing a series of historical instances where the melo-dynamic organism was the prime mover, he writes of science, art, poetry, painting, sculpture and the Christian religion, that "They originated in the Dynamical nature of man, not in his Mechanical nature" [*Signs of the Times*, p.482], that the Maternal melodic voice had "sent a gifted spirit upon the earth" [ibid.]. The Crusades were for Carlyle, further instances of this organic, vital principle in operation to the full. They too were initiated not by the machine, but by "the passionate voice of one man" [ibid., p.483]. They are an example of Carlyle's "serious nation" fulfilling its destiny through the realization of the "Gods-message", transmitted through the "speech of angels", and interpreted for it by the "vates" or vatic singer, the national prophet and seer. The Crusades are a triumph for the melo-dynamic vocal organism of the serious nation, the nation whose message of destiny is beaten into the bodies of its opponents by the fiery warriors and "unextinguishable" heroes. The triumph of the voice for Carlyle, is the triumph of the "internecine warfare" which the hero wages in his direct access to the origin against a harmonic materialism of separation and division.

8.4 The Original Man

Such a man is what we call an *original* man; he comes to us at first-hand. A messenger he, sent from the Infinite Unknown with tidings to us. We may call him Poet, Prophet, God [*Heroes*, p.219].

Carlyle's "original man" is not a genius in the sense of an innovator of originality, but in the sense of having a privileged access to the melodic origin. This constitutes his "originality", and distinguishes him from all other men. He has direct contact, through his ability to hear-and-understand the "voice of Nature" [*Heroes*, p.265], with the ontological root which is Song, but equally, he is capable of performing a certain "orthodox Anthropomorphism" in his relations with those less Spiritually endowed - he is available to us "at first hand". He is the messenger, the carrier of divine melocentric *logos*, and in hearing the voice of the Gods, is penetrated by their Song, receiving it and allowing it to lodge in his heart, so that when he sings to us, he can likewise penetrate our hearts with that Song, transposed into our mortal register. The Original Man is the warrior, the hero, he is Novalis' full philosopher, the *artist-philosopher* who overcomes the division of the divine and the material, the dynamic and the mechanical, metaphysics and materialism. He is testimony to the organic continuity of ontology, the indivisibility of the universe. He is living proof of the process whereby "man's spiritual nature, the vital Force which dwells in him, is *essentially one and indivisible*" [*ibid.*, p.264, emphasis added]. This vitalism is the binding force which forms man as a branch of the harmonic tree which has melody at its root - it is the dynamic process of life.

Again, with melody as the root of all the inward harmony of the universe, so the Song of a man, his accent, the tonality of his voice, marks

out which branch of the tree he is produced upon; "You may see how a man would fight, by the way in which he sings; his courage, or want of courage, is visible in the word he utters, in the opinion he has formed, no less than in the stroke he strikes. He is *one*; and preaches the same Self abroad in all these ways." [ibid.] Fighting and singing - the two aspects of the self-proximity of the hero, or rather, the self-proximity which his organic origin keeps through his body, forever binding him to the Maternal and Paternal roots of his tree. In singing, the rhythm of this divine melody is translated, interpreted, by this hermeneutic warrior into the strokes, the beating rhythm of war. Music is no frivolity here, it is an essential weapon against matter and its allies. Music is a matter of radical seriousness in this *politics of empire*.

Do away with "inorganic chaos", with "*spiritual paralysis*", with the "*Sceptical Century*", with "moral Doubt", with the "effete world", with the "godless world", and reinstate an "age of miracles" [*Heroes*, p.312]. This is what Carlyle prescribes and its result can be seen in the works of the Hero, whose "Art is not Artifice" [p.265]. The result is a dissolution of the boundary of Art and Nature, just as mechanics and metaphysics are united, their separation ended. Art becomes *naturalized*, it becomes organic, dynamically fused with the root of the harmonic tree: "It grows-up from the deeps of Nature, through this noble sincere soul, who is a voice of Nature." [ibid.] All art, then, has its origin in the melodic root, and the artist is himself [sic.] a branch of that tree, is himself a voice within the Maternal body of nature, absolutely continuous with the Song and the law of the Gods.

This is the context which Carlyle establishes for his writings on the

songs of Robert Burns, both in the *Essay on Burns*, and the fifth part of the *Lectures on Heroes and Hero-worship*, titled "The Hero as Man of Letters. Johnson, Rousseau, Burns." In the latter, he gives the example of the hero organism which could not fully develop, which was held back by the era of the machine, and yet in this, is perhaps a greater hero for standing alone amongst the materialists of the age; "they were Sons of Nature once more in an age of Artifice." [*Heroes*, p.318] The works of these Sons of Nature could have been greater in an age which heard-and-understood their divine Song; "It is rather the *Tombs* of three Literary Heroes that I have to show you. There are the monumental heaps, under which three spiritual giants lie buried. [...] We will linger by them for a while." [*Heroes*, p.303] Just as their works were lacerated, divided, by the machinism which they heroically attempted to defeat, so their bodies lie, not in some noumenal realm of celestial melody, but incarcerated in material tombs, under heaps of the dead matter which, resisting, ultimately consumed them. Carlyle's narrative of Burns' songs and life is a warning.

8.5 The Tomb of the Vocal Organism

Among those secondhand acting-figures, *mimes* for most part, of the Eighteenth Century, once more a giant Original Man; one of those men who reach down to the perennial Deeps, who take rank with the Heroic among men: and he was born in a poor Ayrshire hut. [...] Yes, I will say, here too was a piece of the right Saxon stuff: strong as the Harz-rock, rooted in the depths of the world [...] like the old Norse Thor, the Peasant-god! - [*Lectures on Heroes*, pp.326/7]

For Carlyle, Burns is an Original Man, a son of Nature, a "piece of the right Saxon stuff" who stands alongside, but against the "windy sentimentalism" [*Heroes*, p.317] of Enlightenment Edinburgh, in a heroic struggle of the pastoral and the metropolitan. Burns' rustic "*Sincerity*, his

indisputable air of Truth" [Burns, p.240] is contrasted with the "secondhand acting-figures, *mimes*" of the metropolis, and again it is an opposition of the self-proximate organism and the dividing machine, with Truth as a function of Spirit, and artifice of base matter^[4].

It is also a question of the infection of the whole of Scotland by the machinic virus of Gaul - Burns' tomb, his Fall, is prepared by the dissonant relation between his soul and the soil of his pastoral environment. Kyle is an "inorganic waste", infected by the French-inspired revolutionary politics abroad in nearby Dumfries; "no 'pre-established *harmony*' existed between the clay soil of Mossgiel and the empyrean soul of Robert Burns; it was not wonderful that the *adjustment* between them should have been long *postponed*, and his long arm cumbered, and his sight confused, in so vast and *discordant* an economy as he had been

[4] Here it is intriguing to note Nietzsche's later statement that Carlyle is a "semi-actor and rhetorician" [*Beyond Good and Evil*, p.164]; this connects fully into the framework of Rousseau's fear of representational deceit, and the point Rameau makes about the composer as actor. Nietzsche makes the same point of Rousseau as he does of Carlyle; "everything deriving from Rousseau [is] false, artificial, fustian, exaggerated." [*Twilight of the Idols*, p.70] However, Nietzsche's statement cannot be taken merely as an attempt to capitalize on the Rousseauist obsession with honesty. Rousseau associates the presentation of originary simplicity with the state of Nature. Not so for Nietzsche, as this direct critique of Rousseau demonstrates; "Nature, artistically considered, is no model. It exaggerates, it distorts, it leaves gaps. Nature is *chance*. To study 'from nature' seems to me a bad sign: it betrays subjection, weakness, fatalism - this lying in the dust before *petit faits* [petty facts] is unworthy of a *complete* artist. Seeing *what is* - that pertains to a different species of spirit, the *anti-artistic*, the prosaic. One has to know *who one is*..." [*Twilight*, p.71] In this sense, Nietzsche's "complete artist" not merely knows Nature, but also knows their self. This opens up an interval in the artistic process which ruptures the seamless continuity of Rousseauism or Carlylism. Thus, Nietzsche's "honesty", if it can be called such, comes not from a simple univocity, but from a multiplicity which tends to the complex. Just as Nature is chance for Nietzsche, so the Judæo-Christian tradition which Carlyle venerates is a negation of this multiplicitous energy; "What is Jewish, what is Christian morality? Chance robbed of its innocence" [*The Anti-Christ*, p.136].

appointed steward over." [Burns, p.261] The natural proximity which Burns should feel in relation to the soil from which he was generated has been fractured by the age in which that soil produced him. There is no inward harmony, but an interval. Burns is cut off, divided from the originary nourishment of Kyle's soil by the interrupting interval, the discordant relation which not only fractures space, but also postpones the ontological union, fractures time by making it spatial and divided. The celestial empire for which Burns' empyrean soul should breath out the fires of Original Song is denied him by the abyss of the material illusion; indeed, denied by the Original Sin of spatial rupture which Carlyle attacks and which Derrida shows to underlie Rousseau's paranoias. Carlyle defines the inward harmonic adjustment of soul and soil which is the natural state for the Original Man as a "moral manhood" [ibid.]. Here we see the full bond between the concepts of inward harmony, the organism, the vatic singer, and the warrior - they all point to the same heroic entity. This is Burns' potential, and his tragedy is that it is *postponed* by the interruptive force of the machine era.

According to Carlyle, the same was true of English writers of the Enlightenment: "literature was, as it were, without any local environment; was not nourished by the affections which spring from a native soil. Our Grays and Glovers seemed to write almost as if *in vacuo*; the thing written bears no mark of place" [Burns, p.257]. The organic bond of English literature and soil had been interrupted; a space had been introduced between them, or rather, a machinic space which lead to a vacuum. This was a no-space in its inability to receive the circulating sap of the melodic body. What was received instead was the Gallic supplement to the Saxon

origin, for if this interruption was the case with England, it was, "in the highest degree, the case with Scotland. In fact our Scottish literature had, at that period, a very singular aspect; unexampled, so far as we know, except perhaps at Geneva" [ibid., p.257]. The example of Rousseau's native republic which had spawned the French Revolution threatened the same cultural vacuum for Burns in Kyle, with "no mark of place", no signficatory and inseminatory stroke from the celestial realm into the material, sanctioning the soil for the growth of a "serious nation"[5].

Burns' attempt to bond with the spiritual soil of the nation which had lost its seriousness and become frivolous came through a specifically national *locus*: "One small *province* stood open for him,- that of *Scottish Song*; and how eagerly he *entered* on it, how devotedly he *laboured* there!" [ibid., p.259] This is what constitutes Burns' heroism; with no actual soil worth the tilling, Burns penetrates into the province of Song, labouring on *its* originary ground, planting his seed into *its* soil, and cultivating an organic art therein. Burns rejects the *actual*, material potatoes of the actual Ayrshire soil, and fertilizes an *ideal*, vocal organism in an ideal, spiritual soil. Burns is a member of Carlyle's Aristocracy of Talent; "for him

[5] Carlyle continues this passage by denying any Scottish specificity for Hume; "neither had he aught to do with Scotland; Edinburgh, equally with La Flèche, was but the lodging and laboratory, in which he not so much morally *lived* as *investigated*." [Burns, p.258] Carlyle's "Scottish" specificity, however, is based in the assumption of the total cultural and racial assimilation of Scotland into England. His "own stern Motherland" is a Saxon land, not a Gàidhealach or Celto-Anglian land, as his use of the Nordic model of Igdrasil in preference to such Celtic ash-tree myths demonstrates. Hume is attacked by many as anglocentric, and yet for Carlyle his gallicisms far outweigh his Tory Unionism (even though it was a Jacobite, federalist position he held, in stark contrast to the anti-federalism of the late-twentieth century Tory Unionists). Whatever direction Carlyle's arguments against Hume are taken in, they all point to an obsession with viewing anything of consequence in Scottish culture as necessarily injected from outside.

the Ideal world is not remote from the Actual, but under it and within it [...] He is a *vates*, a seer." [ibid., p.244] Thus, Burns bonds himself in a celestial union with an originary soil, under and within, *behind*, the soil of Kyle. He is a vatic singer whose Vision penetrates mere surface to find the eternal beneath the commonplace, and finds this eternity to consist of Song.

This knowledge and skill which Burns possesses thus establishes what he himself described as the phonic affectivity of "old Scotia's melting airs", the airs which form a direct, univocal continuity between sound and soul; "No guess could tell what instrument appear'd, / But all the soul of Music's self was heard; / Harmonious concert rung in every part, / While simple melody pour'd moving on the heart." [*The Brigs of Ayr*, in *Burns: Poems and Songs*, p.232] Here, the sonic instrument is over-run by the penetrative power of the phonic soul of music. The instrument no longer has distinguishable timbre or materiality, it has been captured by the maternal melodic voice, is made part of that body, and now no longer plays, but "sings". This continuous, self-proximate and undivided melodic liquid then penetrates the listening body and "pours moving on the heart". The listening body is thus itself captured and integrated into the maternal body, allowing the paternal *ousia* to communicate directly with the listening soul, to move it in an absolute fashion. The instrument thus becomes a "soul-ennobling Bard" [ibid.] who sings directly into the listener's soul and flawlessly narrates a message, a story where "The Genius of the Stream in front appears", followed by "Sweet Female Beauty", "Spring", "Rural Joy", "Courage with his martial stride", and other characters in an archetypal drama, all directly represented by the

inspiration into the body of the divine *pneuma* of the melody. This is the infiltration of the voice into the instrument, the organism into the machine^[6].

Carlyle writes that such a Song, in all its organic spirituality, is Burns' folk-cantata, *Love and Liberty* (1785), which alternates "recitativos" with Scots Airs. Again, it is a matter of compression, of the inward, centrifugal harmony of the dynamic; "this piece seems thoroughly compacted; melted together, refined; and poured forth in one flood of true *liquid* harmony." [*Burns*, p.255] Here, Carlyle extends Burns' image of the liquidity of melodic motion. Burns' piece is a unified, organic whole, a single entity, complete in itself, "a real self-supporting Whole" [*ibid.*], by virtue of its organic bond with the ontological root which endows it with all the requisite spiritual fluids, all circulating in one motion throughout its body. This Carlyle defines as "the strong pulse of Life" [*ibid.*] which penetrates the listening body and continues its pulsating, inseminating motion even "when the curtain closes" [*ibid.*], such is its binding grip. This process of the organic cantata is a compression of base material space and time into the image of one single, eternal location and instant, absolutely self-proximate and drawing the listening body back to its origin

[6] Just such a colonization of the sonic by the phonic can be witnessed in the engraving from Simon Fraser's *Airs and Melodies* (1816) in plate 2. Here, the Maternal Muse inspires the liquid melodies of the fiddler Niel Gow, and a Gàidhlig *clarsair*, or harpist. Note also the pastorality of the instrumentalist's context, and its elision with Carlyle's orthodox view of Burns' organic *locus*. As John Purser writes, "It is clear from the frontispiece and Fraser's introduction that the ideals of the Temple of Apollo were still very much alive. Niel Gow on the left and a member of the extinct bardic class on the right are crowned with laurels by a muse. In the background, the rural idyll continues untouched by Culloden, or laws against poaching, famine or emigration; and the obedient natives are pictured on the right rowing the tourists of Europe to Fingal's Cave." [*Scotland's Music*, p.197]

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The pastoral organism captures the sonorous body:
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within this great organically harmonic tree. Burns' cantata literally *captivates* its audience in an ontological drama underneath its actual narrative. This Ideal process constitutes the very heart of Carlyle's aesthetic.

In the song *Caledonia* (1789, written to the tune of *The Caledonian Hunt's Delight*), Burns himself moves ontological matters into the narrative of national destiny. Here, perhaps, we can read the motif of the warrior-poet which Carlyle establishes as the context for all his heroic figures. The racial determination of the Scots in *Caledonia* is more Nordic-Germanic than Gàidhealach, with references to Odin as Caledonia's "grandsire", just as Carlyle takes Odin to be the first of his heroes in the *Lectures on Heroes*, and claims him as *the* Scottish pagan god. However, Burns gives an image in the last stanza which relates to the whole issue of national entelechy from the baseness of the ontological axes of space and time which characterize the writings of the Enlightenment philosophers. Burns writes of Caledonia's true *telos* as autonomy not so much from external political control, but from what Carlyle terms the Actual, the illusory webs of materiality. Scotland's true independence will not be achieved through the temporal, but through the spiritual estate;

Thus bold, independent, unconquer'd and free,
Her bright course of glory for ever shall run;
For brave Caledonia immortal must be,
I'll prove it from Euclid as clear as the sun;
Rectangle-triangle the figure we'll chuse,
The Upright is Chance, and old Time the base;
But brave Caledonia's the Hypothenuse,
Then, Ergo, she'll match them, and match them always.

[from *Caledonia*, in *Burns: Poems and Songs*, pp.364/5]

The lexis of the celestial realm's triumph over the material in the internecine warfare of ontology is evident here. Caledonia must become

"immortal", foregoing the base temporal existence, but also defeating Chance. Burns proves this with Euclidian *logos*, "clear as the sun", pointing to the Vision of Caledonia's "bright course of glory", of a spiritual balancing in order to realize the national *telos*. Caledonia is initially caught between the two ontological axes of chance and time, two abysses which threaten to swallow her body and soul, but which she breaks out from, becoming the golden triangle which ascends beyond the grey matter of the axial rectangle towards eternity and immortality^[7]. In this spiritual realm, Caledonia cannot be defeated in her retreat from the temporal. Burns is perhaps less confrontational and more nostalgic than Carlyle in the methods they propose, but nevertheless, the ontological war is the same fight for both. Burns has a nostalgia for the time of the warrior-poet, when "soul-ennobling Bards heroic ditties sung" [*The Brigs of Ayr*], whereas Carlyle calls for the new warrior.

[7] However, in the context of Burns' actual political views (rather than reading him within the over-determined context of Carlyle), one could easily assemble a quite *other* reading of the Caledonian hypotenuse. The idea of breaking free from the structure of the Cartesian graph becomes particularly significant in the next chapter. There, the theories of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari suggest the possibility of breaking not only the graph, but the whole of ontology through the musical *line of flight*.

8.6 "quartered on the scaffold"

Storys to rede ar delitabill,
Suppos that thai be nocht bot fabill

- *The Bruce*, John Barbour, 1375.

Fy on Fortoun, fy on thy frivoll quhele,
Fy on thy trust, for heir it hes na lest.
Thow transfigurit Wallace fra his weil
Quhen he trustit for til haif lestit best.

- *The Wallace*, Blin Harry, c.1470^[8].

The *interval* between Carlyle and Burns is at its most political over the historiographical positioning of what is perhaps (along with *Auld Lang Syne*) the most famous of Burns' contributions to James Johnson's *The Scots Musical Museum* (1787-1803). In *Bruce's Address to his Army* (1793), more commonly known as *Scots Wha Hae wi' Wallace Bled* (Scots Who Have With Wallace Bled), Burns overtly adopts the voice of the national prophet *himself*. Yet the question to be put to Carlyle's reading of the song is *which nation?*

Here is the full passage on *Bruce's Address* in the *Essay on Burns*, replete with the requisite apocrypha of all Romanticist determinations of post-Ossianic Scotland:

Why should we speak of *Scots, wha hae wi' Wallace bled*, since all know of it, from the king to the meanest of his subjects? This dithyrambic was composed on horseback, in riding in the middle of tempests, over the wildest Galloway moor, in company with a Mr. Syme, who, observing the poet's looks, forbore to speak, - judiciously enough, for a man composing *Bruce's Address* might be unsafe to trifle with. Doubtless this stern hymn was singing itself, as he formed it, through the soul of Burns; but to the external ear it should be sung with

[8] These two passages could be transposed into English as follows: "Stories to read are delightful, / Even if they be nought but fable"; and "Fie on Fortune, fy on thy frivolous wheel, / Fie on thy tryst, for here it has no endurance. / Thou transfigured Wallace from his weal / When he trysted to have endured most."

the throat of the whirlwind. So long as there is warm blood in the heart of Scotchman or man, it will move in fierce thrills under this war ode; the best, we believe, that was ever written by any pen. [*Burns*, pp.252-3]

Here, Carlyle speaks of a reverential abstinence of speech - Syme forbears his own vocal ejaculations in deference to the more seminally virile whirlwinds of Burns which have not their *acoustic* sign, but a *visual* sign of melodic stirrings in the poet's blood and soul. In the middle of the external tempests, and in the absence of signs presented to the external ear, Burns forges the musical organism within himself, his *prima materia* being that which *sings itself*, is communicated, to him.

Let us now turn specifically to the political question of the nation, which (as Edward Said points out) is never far from Carlyle's aesthetics. Of the post-Burnsian scene, he writes that,

Among the great changes which British, particularly Scottish literature, has undergone since that period, one of the greatest will be found to consist in its remarkable increase of nationality. Even the English writers, most popular in Burns's time, were little distinguished for their literary patriotism, in this its best sense. [*Burns*, p.257]

In the context of many other passages, we are clearly to construe that Carlyle considers Burns song in general to be recoverable within the context of a *British*, rather than Scottish nationalism. Certainly, he writes against the contextualization of Burns within the Jacobite or Jacobean traditions, and argues that his true genealogy stems from an English, Tudor root; "We might write a long essay on the Songs of Burns; which we reckon by far the best that Britain has yet produced: for indeed, since the era of Queen Elizabeth, we know not that, by any other hand, aught truly worth attention has been accomplished in this department." [*Burns*, pp.255/6] In Carlyle's reading, one discounts Burns declaration that "the

Scottish Muses were all Jacobites" [*Notes on Scottish Song*, pp.4/5] Indeed, with reference to two specifically Jacobite precedents, Carlyle claims that despite having only "the rhymes of a Ferguson or Ramsay for his standard of beauty, he sinks not under these impediments: through the fogs and darkness of that obscure region, his lynx eye discerns the true relations of the world" [*Burns*, p.237]. For Carlyle, the negroid darkness of a Jacobite Scotland does not hinder the penetrating eye of the poet who can burn away such surfacial illusions to discover the "right Saxon stuff" which constitutes the truly transcendental origin.

Yet to locate *Bruce's Address* within a British nationalism would be to logically imply that the song constitutes a hymn to *civil war*, and therefore internal *division* and the threat of an intervallic rupture within an organic political unity. In Carlyle's reading of the *Address*, then, the

stakes are high indeed^[9]. For this reason, a further contextualization of the song from other sources will be necessary in order to determine exactly what Carlyle's historiographic strategy achieves.

The melody which Burns chose for this song operates a specific positioning of the Scoto-gallic relationship throughout history, and one which Carlyle does his best to ignore and even efface. The medieval melody *Hey Tuttie Tattie* is traditionally associated with the victory of Wallace at Bannockburn in 1314, the decisive moment at which the expansionist interference of the English Edward II began its decline. Subsequently, the Declaration of Arbroath was signed, in 1320, declaring that Scottish

[9] And is it not extremely ironic that Carlyle, in his attempt to locate an aesthetics of originarity and unity chooses a songwriter from the ballad tradition? As is well known, the ballad is one of the most intertextual genres there is. Not only does each tune have as many variants as there are performers to perform it, but often, as in the case of much of Burns' practise, fragments of lyrics will be collated from diverse sources, and also the same lyric will appear arranged to different tunes. Further, the concepts of *interlanguage* and the *creole continuum* from post-colonial theory can be applied to the tradition in Scotland (cf. Ashcroft et al's *The Empire Writes Back*, pages 66 & 44 respectively). Here, as Hamish Henderson has noted in his term *Ballad-Scots*, the practise of folk singers is to use a "flexible formulaic language which grazes ballad-English along the whole of its length, and yet [...] may be said to include English and go beyond it." [*Alias MacAlias*, p.53] A post-structural theory of Ballad-Scots can easily be assembled around the idea of *différance* understood as the self-difference of a text from itself under certain conditions of *difference within repetition*. Hence, the use of the "same" melody for each verse nevertheless yields a difference-from-itself as each new line of lyric forces the melody into variation from its previous form. Linguistically, this difference within repetition can be seen to operate through the concept of the creole continuum between various Scots forms of a word, but also their counterparts and substitutions in English. Hence, the following examples transcribed from Alison McMorland's rendition of *The Cruel Mother*: "She's burieth them *where* nane cuid see" transforms on repetition into "She's burieth them *whaur* nane cuid see" (ie. passage from English *where* to Scots *whaur*); "Ye *didnae* gie us cou milk an reid wine" transforms to "Ye *didna* gie us cou milk an reid wine" (Scots *didnae* to Scots *didna*); further on McMorland shifts from *fer* to *for*, and *must* to *maun*. Thus, at all levels, the form of the Scots ballad transgresses itself - musically and linguistically. Nevertheless, Carlyle would probably answer this case against *structural* unity by invoking the theme of *essential* unity.

sovereignty would never again be compromised. According to John Purser, the melody's operation as a political icon then makes the Gallic connection with its adoption in France through the Scots regiments who aided Joan d'Arc's victory over English interference in French political autonomy in 1429 - when her army took Orléans, the melody accompanied the reoccupation of the city by French and Scots forces [*Scotland's Music*, p.63]. All of this (and more) lies before Burns' use of the melody to celebrate the wish for self-determination as it manifest itself in 1793. According to Ellis and Mac a' Ghobhainn, the melody then becomes the symbolic fulcrum of the transformation of Scottish radical politics from *Jacobitism* to *Jacobinism*, from the royalism of the 1745 to the French-inspired republicanism of the 1790's Friends of the People, the United Scotsmen, and later the Radical Riots of 1820^[10] [*The Scottish Insurrection of 1820*, passim]. Further, Christina Bewley and Marilyn Butler both claim that Burns wrote the song as a protest following the infamous trial of the republican leader Thomas Muir [*Muir of Huntershill*, p.85, and *Romantics, Rebels & Reactionaries*, p.37, respectively]. What is even worse for Carlyle's reading, however, is the widespread tradition that *Bruce's Address* has specific political intertexts with the French Revolution

[10] Indeed, according to Ellis and Mac a' Ghobhainn, during the various Radical meetings of 1819, *Hey Tuttie Tattie* was used (as it is today) as the anthem of the proposed independent Republic. The riots in Paisley on 11-09-1819 followed a meeting of Radicals which was inaugurated by the melody's rendition by a band from Nielston. At a similar demonstration in Airdrie soon afterwards, an entire republican-nationalist band was arrested by the Unionist authorities for playing this melody.

itself^[11].

Carlyle's re-alignment of these specific political traces can be seen to stem from passages such as the following, where he invokes the powerful spectre of Andrew Fletcher of Saltoun:

It is on his Songs, as we believe, that Burns's chief influence as an author will ultimately be found to depend: nor, if our Fletcher's aphorism is true, shall we account this a small influence. "Let me make the songs of a people," said he, "and you shall make its laws." Surely, if any Poet might have equalled himself with Legislators on this ground, it was Burns. [*Burns*, p.257]

Carlyle's misquotation here at once invokes and reinscribes the radicality of Fletcher's statement^[12]. Fletcher, as an M.P. in the last sessions of the Scottish parliament was directly opposed to the ratification of the 1707 Treaty of Union. In this context, Carlyle's appropriation of him

[11] cf. Thomas Crawford in *Boswell, Burns, and the French Revolution*, p.59, although William Donaldson expresses scepticism regarding the connection between the royalism of the song and any possible republicanism [*The Jacobite Song: Political Myth and National Identity*, p.87]

[12] The precise nature of the misquotation suggests that Fletcher views the rôles of the songwriter and the legislator as somehow complementary. However, the passage in question, from Fletcher's *An Account of a Conversation Concerning a Right Regulation of Governments for the Common Good of Mankind* (1704), actually reads: "I said, I knew a very wise man so much of Sir Chr-'s sentiment, that he believed if a man were permitted to make all the ballads, he need not care who should make the laws of a nation." [*Regulation of Governments*, p.109] Fletcher's determination of song here suggests more that it makes legislation redundant. Song is here a political act in itself, one which has a powerful hold over the minds of a nation. Burns himself echoes this sentiment when, in a letter delineating his own opposition to the Act of Union, he writes "When Political combustion ceases to be the object of Princes & Patriots, it then [...] becomes the lawful prey of Historians and Poets" [*Letters*, quoted in *Jacobite Song*, p.84]. In both Fletcher's and Burns' statements, we find not that song and law are complementary, as Carlyle's misquotation suggests, but that song is more powerful than law; in short, that cultural power outweighs legislative power, and is capable of usurping its place when legislation reneges on its responsibilities. Culture becomes the *locus* of "Political combustion", as Burns put it, when a society is deserted by its political institutions.

as "*our* Fletcher" is an example of the penetration of the deviant political supplement, and its disempowering resolution back into the structure of the centralizing organism. Yet the absorption of Fletcher is a mere prelude to the following;

A heroic Wallace, quartered on the scaffold, cannot hinder that his Scotland become, one day, a part of England: but he does hinder that it become, on tyrannous unfair terms, a part of it; commands still, as with a god's voice, from his old Valhalla and Temple of the Brave, that there be a just real union as of brother and brother, not a false and merely semblant one as of slave and master. If the union with England be in fact one of Scotland's chief blessings, we thank Wallace withal that it was not the chief curse. Scotland is not Ireland: no, because brave men rose there [*Past and Present*, p.80]

The subsequent historical ironies with respect to the statement concerning Ireland aside, we find Carlyle here asserting a patriotism with respect to the Scotland of the British Union - a "part of England". For Carlyle, the Union is "one of Scotland's chief blessings" precisely because of Wallace's previous, Nordically-defined resistance to it. Now, not only will it be hard to fit Carlyle's theories of Irish submission into recent history, but, particularly in the context of the new historiography which is gaining increasing ground in Scottish scholarship, the contention that Wallace and Bruce were somehow preparing the ground for the Union will appear remarkable. Carlyle would appear to be arguing from a position which defines the 1707 Treaty of Union as the logical conclusion of the 1320 Declaration of Arbroath. For Carlyle, *this* political unison is the divine message of national *telos* which Wallace "commands still, as with a god's voice" from Valhalla, and which is *inspired* "through the soul of Burns". Freedom is not supplementary here, but originary - through a binding to the centre, and only through this, can one escape, in Burns' words,

"Chains and slavery". In all of this, Carlyle achieves an ideological assimilation of precisely that which opposes his politics. "Free-man stand, or free-man fa'", indeed. Carlyle penetrates and absorbs the supplement.

8.7 The Full Organism

In Carlyle's schema, Burns' songs are generated by inward harmony, they are branches of the world-tree Igdrasil. In truly organic Song, there is "no separate faculty, no organ which can be superadded to the rest, or disjoined from them" [ibid., p.249]. Here we have the full artistic organism which penetrates and annihilates, makes war on aesthetic materialism. The spread of its fibres throughout nineteenth and early twentieth century European culture can hardly be exaggerated, from Beethovenian symphonies and Wagnerian opera, to Schenker's graphic analyses. All organs of these tree-like structures relate univocally to each other according to a single organic principle; the penetrational entelechy of Spirit into matter, and the prophetic narration of this process through the medium of celestial song. This song announces the ultimate goal of the organism, its *telos* or final cadence, upon which the organism will be completed, and yet our teleological knowledge of its full form, its destiny, ensures that the organism is always fully present, always whole in the mind of those with melodic Vision, those who can hear-and-understand the divine mandate. In carrying the full form of the organism in our minds, prior to its temporal completion, we defeat base temporality and are carried into the realm of an eternal temporality. In this noumenal realm, the organism exists fully-formed prior to, during, and after its entelechy into the real space which we inhabit. Our experience of that organism in real

time is our opportunity to catch a fleeting glimpse of its true, Ideal, transcendental existence.

Carlyle holds that we who are privileged listeners to this Song must realize the mandate which it sets out for the ultimate *telos* of our nation, which must become serious enough to fulfil the teleological prophesy. Our nation's final cadence is only reached when all the opposing rhythms of our distant neighbours have been made proximate to our own, for we are the chosen few who have been given the rhythm of the gods. It is our destiny to strike this rhythm into the machinic bodies of our enemies. This is the politics of the phonocentric moment.

Thus, we read and *do not hear* Carlyle's message to the serious nation. It proves difficult to deconstruct according to the same strategies as those which Derrida assembles in *Of Grammatology* for dealing with the phonocentric theories of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, for Carlyle deals directly and violently with the concept of the harmonic interval. His aim is not to sing a nostalgic lament for some glorious phonocentric past, such as Rousseau sings, but to announce a new warlike organism, an organism of empire, which can easily be used to affirm the imperial right of the British Union. This is Carlyle the Unionist patriot and patriarch, who will annihilate the attempt to establish the politics of the interval which has resurfaced so many times in the twentieth century, and which much of eighteenth, in its own, politically repressed and culturally traumatized way, also called for.

Clearly, this is more developed a position than Rousseau's mere paranoia when faced with the abyss. Carlyle confronts the abyss directly, and provides weapons for its annihilation. While he calls for a revitalized

phonocentric ontology which can be compared with Rousseau's, he nevertheless takes Rousseau to task on the grounds of representational politics. Where Rousseau prescribed a parliament in which all communication was phonic and not graphic, where direct speech ensured authentic communication, he had not attacked the representational chasm at a deep enough level. Carlyle goes beyond Rousseau's self-contradicting attempt and prescribes the full demise of democracy. This is to be replaced by an aristocracy of warrior prophets who will guide the nation not through political oratory, but through the mandate of nature expressed in Heroic Song.

Carlyle deals directly and successfully with the concept of "Separation", of the harmonic interval and the supplement. Indeed, he reorients the very concept of harmony from the expansiveness of the Enlightenment definition to an inwardness which aims to capture or annihilate everything within its reach.

His aesthetics of the vocal *unison* are also the politics of the *Union*, of the Empire, and the rhythm of his transcendental song is the rhythm of that empire's wars. How can this semiotic be disrupted, and a call made for a universal de-universalization, affirming not only the *aesthetic*, but also the *political* interval? It is not a question of war, as Carlyle's theoretical investment implies, but precisely a total disinvestment in the economy of capture and annihilation; it is a question of the affirmation of liberties, of new connectivities. Joseph Mazzini wrote in 1843 that "Mr. Carlyle comprehends only the *individual*; the true sense of the unity of the human race escapes him." [*Essays*, p.124] Yet Carlyle perceived a unity beneath the illusory appearance of the human race, as Emerson knew when he wrote

to him that "You shall wear your crown at the Pan-Saxon Games with no equal or approaching competitor in sight, well earned by genius and exhaustive labour, and with nations for your pupils and praisers." [quoted in ed. George, *Essay on Burns*, p.xvii] For Carlyle, it was a question of determining the poets of the nation, along with Burns, as "a piece of the right Saxon stuff: strong as the Harz-rock, rooted in the depths of the world [...] like the old Norse Thor, the Peasant-god!" [*Lectures on Heroes*, p.327] This, Carlyle would have said, is a higher unity than the collective.

As Carlyle bases his image of the *serious* nation on the teleology of the final cadence of prophetic song, could this be deconstructed with an image of the *humorous* nation which has *no cadential closure* and, indeed, *no territorial enclosure*? How far can we disinvest in ontological difference, and reinvest in *différance*; a harmonic politics? By what means could we sing together, but the while, singing our own songs^[13]?

Reflect for a moment on the image of authentic representation which occurs in the Rousseauist moment of logocentrism. Derrida (like Smith) describes it clearly as a form of *mirroring* - the re-presentation of a present object which nevertheless subverts the idea of an origin:

There is no longer a simple origin. For what is reflected is split *in itself* and not only as an addition to itself of its image. The reflection, the image, the double, splits what it doubles. The origin of the speculation becomes a difference. [*Of*

[13] In the words of a Bob Marley song, "We refused to be / What you wanted us to be / We are what we are / That's the way it's goin to be" [*Babylon System, on Survival*, 1979]. However the quotation from Marcus Garvey on the album cover invokes a Carlylean image: "A people without the knowledge of their past history, origin and culture is like a tree without roots." [ibid.] Is it possible that the image of the tree can become more mobile, less centralized than it is in the hands of Carlyle, whose tirades against the "Black Ireland" which would result from Jamaican independence were so rooted in all of the resonances of his favoured term "nigger"?

It is this theme of endless folding back onto differing selves which Carlyle attacks in Rousseau as "not white sunlight: something *operatic*; a kind of rosepink, artificial bedizenment." [*Lectures on Heroes*, p.325] Carlyle's programme is indubitably to seal up these fissures and make the organism whole once more. As John Lyons comments;

Carlyle, however, has the mirror turn into a window, and a window that looks out not on the world or nature, but into the artist himself. He says that Shakespeare's works "are so many windows through which we see a glimpse of the world that was in him." [*The Invention of the Self*, p.220]

In other words, Carlyle strips away the artificial reflective material which works behind the glass of the mirror – this material which works as the origin of the supplementary cancellation of the origin. In Carlyle, the sign becomes wholly opaque to those with vision, the sign is *clear* mediation between the prophet and the "thing itself"; we do not experience the mechanics of representation, but the organics of direct connection.

Yet other representational problems come to light within the image of the mirror – Rousseau is not as dangerous a supplement as can be imagined. If the mirror is not made opaque, but has its intervallic nature fragmented further – if we shatter the mirror – how can the essence of the origin be maintained? Just such an *insight* which will have ramifications in the following chapter, and which presages Carlyle, was made by John Ireland in Book 6 of his *Meroure of Wyssdome* (1490);

tak a merour / richt litle and ane als mekle as a hous / and
put a man befor tham baith / thar sal appeir / bot the figur
of a man in ilkane / and the man is bot ane / thocht the figur
and similitude be diuers / bot and thou brek the merour in
mony partis / the figur will appeir in ilkane of the partis /
Richt sua and thar war ane hoste / als gret as a hous and ane
vthir als litle / as it that we wse the body of ihesu contenit in
baith war all ane / and thocht ilkane of thame war diuidit in

a hundreth thousand partis / the body of ihesu war vnder
thame / bot ane^[14] [Johannes de Irlandia's *Meroure of Wyssdome*, Vol.III, p.33]

Here, we have a most translucent example of what Richard Rorty has termed *Glassy Essence*^[15]. It would seem that within an intervallic fragmentation of a greater order than even Rousseauist reflection – even if one shatters the mirror completely, one may still claim to achieve a unity through the penetration of a univocal spirit into all things: the body of Christ maintains its unity *within* a diversity.

At this point, it becomes a severe question of method. If Carlyle's organism of Spirit is to be dissected effectively, affectively, we must arm

[14] "Take a mirror right little and one as large as a house and put a man before them both. There shall appear but the figure of a man in each even if the man is but one, though the figure and similitude will be diverse. But if you break the mirror into many parts the figure will appear in each of the parts. Right so even if there were a host as great as a house and another as little as it that we use to contain the body of Christ in, both were all one and though each of them were divided in a hundred thousand parts the body of Christ was under them but one" [trans. Sweeney-Turner]. As Craig McDonald writes, "The image of the shattered mirror, which he attributes to St. Augustine, raises interesting questions, not only as to the host's ability to carry the body of Christ in its entirety, which is Ireland's immediate point, but, given the title of Ireland's work, the ability of a text to reflect its source or the idea it is meant to convey and explain. We might be tempted to ask how successfully the *Meroure* itself reflects the tenets of wisdom to the reader, or, if we take the approach of some modern critics, whether there is anything to reflect at all." [*Mirror, Filter, or Magnifying Glass? John Ireland's "Meroure of Wyssdome"*, p.448] However, the debate around the referent in post-structuralist theory is identified by Christopher Norris as part of an ongoing argument between realism and nominalism [*The Truth About Postmodernism*, passim]. In this context, see Alexander Broadie's positioning of Ireland's work within the broadly nominalist tradition of "The Circle of John Mair" and its influence on Enlightenment thinkers like Hume [*The Tradition of Scottish Philosophy: A New Perspective on the Enlightenment*, passim].

[15] In *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* (1980), Rorty writes of "the image of man as possessor of a Glassy Essence, suitable for mirroring nature with one hand, while holding on to it with the other." [*Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, p.123] Incidentally, Rorty tangentially derives the term from the title of an essay by C.S. Peirce: *Man's Glassy Essence* (1892).

ourselves with defensive strategies beyond what Derrida has to offer in *Of Grammatology*. Rousseau has already done most of the work for Derrida by leaving a network of fissures within his organisms. Carlyle is somewhat more determined than that in his weeding out of the interval; he has given birth to the organs of metaphysical war and created the organism of the vocal warrior. But which direction should we proceed in?

CHAPTER NINE

PROLIFERATING ROOTS

Arbor Saeculorum: A great tree and its branches, spreading right and left, suggest the twofold aspects of each historic era, temporal on one side, spiritual on the other. The tree has its roots amid the fires of life, and is perpetually renewed from them; but the spirals of smoke which curl among its branches blind the thinkers and workers of each successive age to the thought and work of their precursors.

- *A First Visit to The Outlook Tower*,
Patrick Geddes, et al, 1906.

CHAPTER NINE

PROLIFERATING ROOTS

9.1 Reversing Towards the Root

'Tree' and 'Machine:' contrast these two things. [*Heroes*, p.313]

We have already noted Carlyle's relation of the processes by which the "original man" is organically produced from the spiritual body of a specific national soil. This organism operates according to an umbilical binding of all organs through the circulation of a celestial melodic essence. Carlyle has given birth to this organism precisely in order to penetrate the illusory surfaces which Adam Smith's machinic era attempted to establish as a means of de-vitalising signification. Like Vespasian's unconsciousness, Smith's aesthetics lead to an interruption of semiotic essential flow. Like Arachne, the Scottish Enlightenment wove a web of materialism around its underlying reality.

In a Derridean mode, we could embark upon a deconstructive programme which would tackle Carlyle over the same (or at least very similar) issues to those of Rousseau. We could in this manner attempt to deconstruct the original melodic essence by showing its own illusory, surfacial movements. However, Carlyle's ruse complicates such a neat programme, by attacking the very ruptures within Rousseau which Derrida hooks into. Carlyle is very aware of the particular fissures which entail the

self-deconstruction of Rousseau's quest for the origin. Where Rousseau proposed that all stems from a single root, Carlyle dictates that deviation from the imperatives of that root must be counteracted not only in the aesthetic sphere, but also in the *political*. As Edward Said has noted, we do not have to resort to complex textual excavations in order to find Carlyle's ideological agenda. Carlyle overtly offers a programme of re-binding the fissures which intervallic metaphysics attempt, and this is expressed violently, whether in racial, metaphysical, or semiotic terms.

Even so, we could still show the deconstructed supplement at work in Carlyle. Yet as should by now be clear from our lengthy and often circuitous sojourn with the concept of intervallic connection so crucial to Derridean supplementarity, the interval itself is a highly plural structure - and not necessarily always within the sense of pluralism. Derrida's version of harmonic theory is not taken so much from harmonic theory itself, but via Rousseau's paranoid reading of it. We can therefore ask the question of whether or not Derrida engages with Rameau, or Rousseau's Rameau (and it should always be borne in mind that the Rameau in *Of Grammatology* is in fact Derrida's Rousseau's Rameau). Derrida makes a great deal of significance from the points in Rousseau's texts where harmony is temporarily admitted (fissure), but what shape would *Of Grammatology* take if Rameau was engaged directly, and deconstructed specifically at the points where *melody* is introduced (sealant)?

The question is this - if deconstruction is the engagement with an opposition, the destabilising of that opposition, and "finally" its displacement, then why should we necessarily "end" by effectively valorising one of the original terms, albeit in a new "deconstructed" form,

under erasure and all? In other words, could we not destabilise the origin-supplement relation by working on the structure of the origin in order to deconstruct the ontological residues which are risked in the supplement? Is this a reversal of the Derridean project or not, and if so, is the reversal *symmetrical*? If the supplement is not as debased as Rousseau suggests, then perhaps the origin is not so originary as Carlyle suggests - the significant corollary of this, however, is that if Derrida shows the supplementary nature of the origin, perhaps there is an originary aspect of the supplement, as a certain reading of Smith can establish. Ultimately, though, we are still bound by the shadowy threat of dialectics if we accept any dealings with the connection of just *two* terms. The possibility of re-closure is always present^[1].

[1] This problem can be illustrated by a political example. If we were to consider the deconstruction of Carlyle's melodic version of imperialism, it may be tempting to cite the strategy of decentralisation. Such a proposal was made by Andrew Fletcher during the debates around the emergence of the British state in the Scottish parliaments of 1703 onwards. His argument against an "incorporating union" between Scotland and England involved the concept of radical decentralization not only at the British level, but also at the national level, with several regional state structures within each country. This proposal for "leagued governments" was to be extended throughout Europe (effectively, a "Europe of the Regions", pre-empted by almost three centuries). In terms of its introduction of intervals within the body of a unified state, Fletcher's proposal could be seen as the introduction of a supplementary movement of politics. The problem lies in a comparison of the directions in which the citizens of the state can face. It is evident that the British Unionist state is "deconstructed" by such intervallic federalism. However, the "deconstruction" of one state apparatus is simply followed by the reconstruction of another state apparatus at another level. In this way, a deconstruction is followed by a reconstruction, and the citizens are still left within the binding action of a state. This is indubitably one of the great problems for the intersection of post-colonial theory and deconstruction: disinvest in one layer of hegemony not by disinvesting in hegemony itself, but by reinvesting in another currency in the same market. The supplement becomes another origin; dialectics threaten to close movement once more, to stabilize what was only a provisional movement. One modulates, only to discover another fundamental attempting to find its cadence.

Let us therefore engage Carlyle's aesthetic organism not by approaching the supplement, but from the opposite direction, taking a more risky route, still in a direction away from the root, but by attempting to throw ourselves directly towards it.

9.2 Musical Roots

The tree and root inspire a sad image of thought that is forever imitating the multiple on the basis of a segmented or higher unity. [*A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, p.16]

In their two collaborative texts, *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (1972), and *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia II* (1980), the Parisian philosopher Gilles Deleuze and psychoanalyst Félix Guattari deliver a post-structuralist critique of the traditions of European thought. In *A Thousand Plateaus*, this critique opens with a contrast between the structural model of the tree and the multiplicitous processes of post-structuralism, a contrast which can easily be positioned to give a critique of Carlylean organics.

Deleuze/Guattari's interest in multiplicity is bound up with the plural nature of their authorial conjunction, but also the psychoanalytic concept of schizophrenia. *A Thousand Plateaus* opens: "The two of us wrote *Anti-Oedipus* together. Since each of us was several, there was already quite a crowd." [*Plateaus*, p.3] For them, multiplicity requires a certain mode of engagement different from that which can be applied to the tree model. In a tree, all of the pathways of signification are strictly determined. In explaining the structure of a tree, then, one can only engage at the beginning, or at least at one of a set of predetermined beginnings. For instance, in an organic account of harmonic theory, one

would first delineate the fundamental root; to begin with an explanation of dissonance makes no sense unless one can compare it to the root which defines its significance in the whole structure. Deleuze/Guattari term this mode of engagement a *tracing* - one follows a specific path through a structure in a linear fashion, because the structure itself is ordered through the principle of linearity.

On the other hand, there is the mode of engagement which can be characterized as a *mapping*. On a map, there are no necessary points of engagement - one can begin at any point, and stroll through a terrain to reach any other point. Rather than moving in a specific direction, one can walk in circles, spirals, retrace steps, go left, right, backwards, forwards, etc. With this form of engagement one is free to wander, to be a *nomad* in this terrain, declaring autonomy from the idea of roots and centres, establishing one's own *nomos*^[2]. As Carlyle writes in *The Nigger Question*, "In all human relations *permanency* is what I advocate; *nomadism*, continual change, is what I perceive to be prohibitory of any good whatsoever." [Essays III, pp.778-9] The first step away from Carlylean organicism and rootedness in general, then, is to map the "continual change" which constitutes the condition of "nomadism". Yet, in terms of writing, a map is difficult to make. Writing is (in the form currently being used at least) a linear activity. Any attempt to explain the theories of Deleuze/Guattari will necessarily have to *trace* a particular line through their texts (which themselves remain linear). Although a certain point will mark our

[2] Derrida aligns *nomos* with the supplement, while also recalling the more structural resonances of the term: "Let us now persist in using this opposition of nature and institution, of *physis* and *nomos* (which also means, of course, a distribution and division regulated in fact by *law*) which a meditation on writing should disturb" [Of Grammatology, p.44]

beginning, and another our end, the arbitrary nature of these points must be acknowledged – with Deleuze/Guattari, engagements of the current type are necessarily poised precipitously between the trace and the map.

This problem of critical engagement yields one of the first of many differences with Derridean deconstruction which we will encounter in the work of Deleuze/Guattari. Just as Derrida is always at pains to show that the action of the supplement is always already fissuring the structures of language, with Deleuze/Guattari, the inverse also becomes a problem. Just as the attempt to write a map leads to an arbitrary form of tracing, the linearity of writing leads us into a position where the serial delineation of concepts threatens to over-structure thought, to turn a multiplicity into a tree-like organization. Care is therefore necessary: "It is a question of method: *the tracing should always be put back on the map.*"^[3] [Plateaus, p.13] There are, then, two forms of book – one which operates through a tracing, and one which maps a field;

A first type of book is the root-book. The tree is always the image of the world, or the root the image of the world-tree. This is the classical book, as noble, signifying, and subjective organic interiority (the strata of the book). The book imitates the world, as art imitates nature: by procedures specific to it that accomplish what nature cannot or can no longer do. [Plateaus, p.5]

Here we read of a similar form of book to that which Derrida outlines

[3] Derrida's conception of the *trace* is markedly different, and has many resonances of a tracing on a map: "We must begin *wherever we are* and the thought of the trace [...] has already taught us that it was impossible to justify a point of departure absolutely. *Wherever we are*: in a text where we already believe ourselves to be." [Of Grammatology, p.162] In this conception of the trace *on the map*, is also the idea of writing as a furrow on a textual field. Elsewhere, Derrida writes of a linearity which is fixed, rather than mobile: "The end of linear writing is indeed the end of the book, even if, even today, it is within the form of a book that new writings – literary or theoretical – allow themselves to be, for better or for worse, encased." [ibid., p.86]

in *Of Grammatology* as "the book of Nature and God's writing" [p.15]. The "root-book" is indubitably what Carlyle intends to write through the highly reductive "harmony" of his melocentric politics – in his attempt to hermeneutically interpret the Book of Nature, he will "accomplish what nature cannot or can no longer do" and heal up the intervallic fissures which Rousseau's "artificial" interpretation left open. This requires the "strata of the book", the structure of *imitation* which operates through significance as an interior binding of segments, an *inward harmony*, as Carlyle puts it.

Deleuze/Guattari take issue with the vatic bibliomancy of imitation: "contrary to a deeply rooted belief, the book is not an image of the world. [...] Mimicry is a very bad concept, since it relies on binary logic to describe phenomena of an entirely different nature." [*Plateaus*, p.11] Further, if the binary nature of imitation is acknowledged, then it can quickly lead us into the kind of originary processes which we have already identified as complicitous in the Pythagorean concept of cosmogenesis:

The law of the [root-] book is the law of reflection, the One that becomes two. [...] whenever we encounter this formula, even stated strategically by Mao or understood in the most "dialectical" way possible, what we have before us is the most classical and well reflected, oldest and weariest kind of thought. [...] Binary logic is the spiritual reality of the root-tree. [*Plateaus*, p.5]

In this context, it is significant that Nietzsche (whose precedence for post-structuralism is well-known) writes that "the need for belief, for some unconditional Yes and No, Carlylism if I may be excused the expression, is a requirement of *weakness*." [*The Anti-Christ*, p. 172] For Nietzsche, Carlyle becomes the veritable paradigm for the intellectual "weakness" which demands binarism, and such Nietzschean themes indeed

prepare the field for much of the Deleuze/Guattari argument^[4]. They

[4] More specifically, Nietzsche accuses Carlyle of assembling a philosophy of "pessimism as indigestion" [ibid., p.67]. Further, he writes in a damningly Carlylean tone: "I have read the life of *Thomas Carlyle*, that unwitting and involuntary farce, that heroic-moralistic interpretation of dyspepsia. – Carlyle, a man of strong words and attitudes, a rhetorician from *necessity*, continually agitated by the desire for strong faith and the feeling of incapacity for it – (in this a typical Romantic!) The desire for a strong faith is *not* the proof of a strong faith, rather the opposite. *If one has it* one may permit oneself the beautiful luxury of scepticism: one is secure enough, firm enough, fixed enough for it." [Twilight, p.74] Here, Nietzsche appears to make a tangential reference to Carlyle's attack on Hume and concludes that perhaps Hume (whom Nietzsche also criticizes – cf. *Beyond Good and Evil*, p.164) had more philosophical fibre than Carlyle by the very fact that he was a sceptic. Nietzsche continues in this passage by either mistakenly assuming Carlyle not to be Scottish, or by attempting to insult him by a stigmatized association. "Carlyle deafens something within by the *fortissimo* of his reverence for men of strong faith and by his rage against the less single-minded: he *requires* noise. A continual passionate *dishonesty* towards himself – that is his *proprium*, because of that he is and will remain interesting. – To be sure, in England he is admired precisely on account of his honesty... Well, that is English; and, considering the English are the nation of consummate cant, even appropriate and not merely understandable. Fundamentally, Carlyle is an English atheist who wants to be honoured for *not* being one!" [ibid., pp.74/5] It is intriguing here to note the use of the term dishonest for describing Carlyle, particularly when Nietzsche's music aesthetics as extant in *Nietzsche Contra Wagner*, and in *The Case of Wagner*, assemble a line of thought whereby Wagner's work is considered to be bad music because it is dishonest towards the listener, Brahms' because it is dishonest towards itself, and Bizet's is to be considered excellent because it is too ignorant to be deceitful. Equally in this passage, the musical metaphor of Carlyle's dialectical *requirement* of noise is significant, particularly given Carlyle's positioning of a musical metaphor of pure unison consonance at the centre of his ontological framework. Again, the point is being made that the One requires the existence of the other in order to continually reassert its law upon the other. Such means of operating philosophy are what Nietzsche calls "the *religious* way in the manner of Carlyle." [Twilight, p.98] In *Beyond Good and Evil*, after assaulting Hume and various English theorists, Nietzsche writes that "What is lacking in England and always has been lacking was realized well enough by that semi-actor and rhetorician, the tasteless muddlehead Carlyle, who tried to conceal behind passionate grimaces what he knew about himself: namely what was *lacking* in Carlyle – real *power* of spirituality, real *depth* of spiritual insight – in short philosophy." [Beyond Good and Evil, p.164] However, at this point, we can discern more of a Carlylean mode to Nietzsche than just rhetoric and punctuation – Nietzsche is here claiming for himself that very spiritual grounding of philosophy which Carlyle attempts to assemble. In the continuation of the above passage, Nietzsche
(continued...)

assert that the root-book, and any other structural model which relies on the connection between only two terms, always lies at the border of dialectical territory, and risks tripping over the line. The examples which Deleuze/Guattari cite range from the grammatical tree in linguistics, to the "tree of delusion" in psychoanalysis^[5], and so forth. One could easily extend this list into musical trees, Schenker's graphic analysis being the most obvious, but also the tonal system in general, and even serialism demonstrate tree-like structuring. The central point is the *apparent* universality of this ethnocentric form of structuring; "It is odd how the

[4](...continued)

also makes for the moral high ground of a musical ontology, in which he not only runs the risk of becoming Carlylean, but also Wagnerian, in the use of explicitly musical metaphors for philosophy itself. Not only do the English have no actual music, but this is connected to their unphilosophical nature; "But what offends in even the most humane Englishman is, to speak metaphorically (and not metaphorically), his lack of music: he has in the movements of his soul and body no rhythm and dance, indeed not even the desire for rhythm and dance, for 'music'" [*Beyond Good and Evil*, p.165]

[5] The famous example which Deleuze/Guattari expound in *Anti-Oedipus* (the title in itself declares open-season on dialectical structures) is that of Freud's interpretation of the schizophrenic German judge, Daniel Paul Schreber. Deleuze/Guattari here extend the kind of radical anti-psychoanalysis of R.D. Laing, who claimed that it is not schizophrenics who are ill because of their inability to function in society, but society itself which is ill because of its inability to accommodate schizophrenics. Deleuze/Guattari propose what they call *schizoanalysis*, which attempts not to annihilate schizophrenia, but to accelerate it as a signifying process in general, and one which ruptures unitary structures, and occasionally, even signification itself. Thus, rather than interpreting Judge Schreber's visions as illusory, Deleuze/Guattari point to their signifying and affective power: "Judge Schreber has sunbeams in his ass. *A solar anus*. And rest assured that it works: Judge Schreber feels something, produces something, and is capable of explaining the process theoretically. Something is produced: the effects of a machine, not mere metaphors. A schizophrenic out for a walk is a better model than a neurotic lying on the analyst's couch. A breath of fresh air, a relationship with the outside world." [*Anti-Oedipus*, p.2] Here, we find the replacement of the Freudian model of the neurotic by the post-structuralist model of the schizophrenic: a replacement of the dualistic by the multiple.

tree has dominated Western reality and all of Western thought, from botany to biology and anatomy, but also gnosiology, theology, ontology, all of philosophy ...: the root-foundation, *Grund, racine, fondement*." [Plateaus, p.18] From the rooting of harmonics in the fundamental to the grounding of developments in thematic reasoning, it is the tree image which provides the central term from which all else stems. From the Latin root *arbor* we can characterise this structure as an *arborescent* model, and this leads us again to the root of ancient Greek thought in the oppositional table: "The Tree is the knot of arborescence or principle of dichotomy; it is the axis of rotation" [Plateaus, p.212]. The tree is a point where separate threads are bound together into one organism (as in Carlyle) and structured according to a centre and its Others (as in Rameau): it controls terms by arranging them across an axis and subjecting them to the law of one point on that axis (as in Rousseau).

If such arborescence constitutes the structure of the "classical book", operating according to a One-Other, or Subject-Object axis, with all Others given as debased representations or secondary imitations of the One, then the same is also true of the Classical period *per se* in music;

the artist's only cry is Creation! Creation! The Tree of Creation! An ancient wooden flute organizes chaos, but chaos reigns like the Queen of the Night. The classical artist proceeds with a One-Two: the one-two of the differentiation of form divided (man-woman, masculine and feminine rhythms, voices, families of instruments, all the binarities of the *ars nova*); and the one-two of the distinction between parts as they answer each other (the enchanted flute and the magic bell). [Plateaus, p.338]

It is easy to continue with other examples which stem from Deleuze/Guattari's arborescent image of magic flutes, to continue with any number of operatic scenes which are played out in the space around the

tree, whether structural, metaphorical, or actual. The woodland hunting scene is a true archetype. In the instance of Wagner, we have a massively resonant arborescence, and all specifically within the image of Carlyle's *Igdrasil: der Weltesche*, or World-ash. Indeed, the twilight of the gods, *Götterdämmerung*, opens with the Norns' narration of how the world is entering the Fall since *Igdrasil* was broken, made intervallic, to form Wotan's spear, in turn broken by Siegfried's sword, which was drawn from *Igdrasil*'s body itself, and so on. A supplementary series developing from an originary fissure, presaging the Fall from the original order. Yet Deleuze/Guattari also point to the shift from Classicism to Romanticism as that from the root to the ground: Romanticism is the cry of "the Earth, the territory and the Earth!" [ibid.] Yet territories require peoples, races; Carlyle reinscribed his nation as Saxon as opposed to Celtic, and so too Wagner sucks in the Cymric myths of Arthur and Tristan, absorbing them too into the Germanic body. What is at stake in Wagner is no longer the racial root (*racine* in both senses) of a single nation, but the national root of a whole ground - Europe is German within this nationalism, but never without more originary universal roots. As Deleuze/Guattari write, "The territory is German, the Earth Greek." [ibid., p.339] Contrasting two forms of nationalism within this moment, they state that;

nationalism is everywhere in the figures of romanticism, sometimes as the driving force, sometimes as a black hole (fascism used Verdi much less than nazism did Wagner). The problem is a truly musical one, technically musical, and all the more political for that. The romantic hero, the voice of the romantic hero, acts as a subject, a subjectified individual with "feelings"; but this subjectified vocal element is reflected in an orchestral and instrumental whole [*Plateaus*, p.341]

With the original noble savage Ossian at the helm, Romanticism

discovered its fundamental territory - the vocal subject, full of *Geist*, whose spiritual melodies are represented, followed, by the masses of the orchestra. *Der Volk* and their hero, and the representation of the folk, the capture of the music of the folk: "everything is put in terms of a people and the forces of a people" [p.340]. Thus Carlyle ends his Rectorial Address with a quotation from Goethe, whose poetry he calls the "marching-music of the great brave Teutonic Kindred" [quoted in *Froude's Life of Carlyle*, p.591].

As soon as the Pastoral had modulated into the region of the People and of purity, as soon as Rameau was read by Genevan Rousseau as French against Italian, as soon as English Addison claimed a superior Latin origin than the modern Italians, as soon as Ramsay read in Scots against the English and the Italian - as soon as music and literature were defended from foreign incursions, the ground of the Romantic was written^[6]. Yet whether we consider the harmonic branches and melodic roots of Classicism or the subject-object territories of Romanticism, the basic structures of arborescence are intact. To be sure, they are organically developing, but always through the dialectics of progress. A progression always rooted in the same essential tonality. For Deleuze/Guattari, arborescence and tonality are to be read within the same structure;

In the tonal or diatonic system of music, laws of resonance and attraction determine centers valid for all modes and endowed with stability and attractive power (*pouvoir*). These centers therefore organize distinct, distinctive, forms that

[6] For Addison, see his comments that modern English writers resemble the Classical writers "much more than the modern Italians pretend to do" [Strunk *Source Readings*, p.513] For Ramsay, see his farewell poem to the composer James Oswald on his departure for London, in *The Scots Magazine*, October 1741 - after listing a number of popular tunes, he writes of the lure of the "false Sicilian air", etc.

are clearly established for a certain amount of time: a linear, codified, centered system of the arborescent type. [*Plateaus*, p.95]

Harmonic theory, then, presents us with an arborescent model: well-structured plants all circulating fundamental essences in structural proportion with each other. Tonality provides us with an image of music as a well-ordered garden - nature tempered by art, nature reaching its true *telos* in ordered form. The gardener digs down to the roots, yet in doing this, inevitably penetrates the ground, *grund/racine/urbar*, and manipulates an even more fundamental reality. Deleuze/Guattari call this the *plan(e) of organization*, and also the *plan(e) of development*: a combination of the notions of plan and plane; in other words, a plane subjected to the organization of a plan - a surface manipulated into a structure. This structure, however, is one which lies *behind, beneath, above, within* the actual surface of the musical garden - its precise location in relation to reality is not important, except that the real exists in a dimension supplementary to it, so that the originary plan(e) is always prior to it and generating it, giving birth to it as a compositional principle;

The tree is given in the seed, but as a function of a plan(e) that is not given. The same applies to music. [...] There is a transcendent compositional principle that is not of the nature of sound [...] Is not Stockhausen also obliged to describe the structure of his sound forms as existing "alongside" them, since he is unable to make it audible? [*Plateaus*, p.266]

Stockhausen has many knots of arborescence in his work, particularly in relation to matters onto-theological. For him, music itself is a form of arborescent plan(e) abstracted from organic reality; he writes that it is the "abstract form of processes which bring about the life of organisms." [*Towards a Cosmic Music*, p.89] Within this conception of music as a distillation of the essences of the world, we can also see that his

organizational plan(e) does not necessarily include organisms such as weeds: "I think that a planet like ours is a kind of garden. There is still a lot of work to be done over the course of millions of years in order to transform the planet into a pleasant, aesthetically beautiful, and well-organized place." [ibid., p.93] Indeed, he sees his work as a component of this gradual movement towards a world-*telos*, and has distilled the structure of this evolution into the plan(e) of ideas behind the meta-Wagnerian opera cycle, *Licht*. This idea of light as pure *Geist* and developmental goal is expressed in the necessity of nurturing a "timeless validity in order to counter destructive relativity" [ibid., p.101], yet this timelessness should not lose sight of the idea of "history with its demands that spirit be manifested in music" [p.108], and also of "the integrating Spirit" [p.109]. Stockhausen also attempts a return to the ultimate musical root: "I'm not a specialist in Pythagoras but what I've come across here and there seems to be the outcome of a unified world concept" with everything "obeying just a few universal laws out of which diversity develops. [...] I'm just a mouthpiece, a trail-blazer in whom this emerging current manifests itself in music." [ibid., p.109] How *Carlylean* is this *branch* of Modernism.

There are, then, not only musical gardens which operate according to the principles of tonality. Atonal music, too, can operate according to a plan(e) of organization. In this sense, dissonance in itself is no guarantee of a deconstructing situation, just as the harmonic supplement can reconstruct itself into a point of arborescence. From this position, we can ask what is at stake in the image of the tonal tree? Deleuze/Guattari suggest that "we do not need to suppress tonality, we need to turn it

loose." [*Plateaus*, p.350] How, then, shall we approach this loosening, and where will it lead, if not to dissonance? If it is a question of a musical arboriculture, then it is also possible to consider how our organizing planner nurtures consonance, and weeds out dissonance. Certainly, one of the points of departure which Deleuze/Guattari make as they plough their way through the map of sound is a statement by Boulez relating to "a seed which you plant in compost, and suddenly it begins to proliferate like a weed" [quoted in *Plateaus*, p.519, n.8]. In this context, the weedy proliferation referred to comes from a composer of atonal musics, but such images are widespread. For instance, the anonymous author of the Sixteenth Century treatise *The Art of Music* writes of "the gardin of music" which consists not only of the "plesand plantis of concordance", but also of "all kind of wyld weydis, that is to say, all barbur and onformall puyntis" [barbarous and unformed points]. The former should be "plantit" in the garden, whereas the latter are to be "utterly exterminat", weeded out by the composer [quoted in Ross, *Musick Fyne*, p.173]. Francis Hulcheson and Alexander Malcolm refer to concordances as culinary delights, and certainly one would not wish to eat a weed – that is, unless one were one of Carlyle's discordant barbarians, such as the Irish peasant. Carlyle states absolutely that "All Poor-Slaves are Rhizophagous (or Root-eaters)" [*Heroes*, p.172], and here we find another point of intense resonance in this web of images – Carlyle specifically associates the "barbur and onformall puyntis" of the social garden with what Deleuze/Guattari determine as the enemy of the tree-root – the *rhizome*. However, if we are about to partake of a weedy, rhizomatic meal of "Potato [...] and *Potheen*" [ibid.], then we would do well also to recall a further

deseccration of spiritual soil which was carried out by the Scottish Enlightenment. Wordsworth, in truly Carlylean mode, gives us an appropriately rhizomatic image, writing disparagingly of its lack of a literary plan(e) of organization, and the temptation "to think that there are no fixed principles in human nature for this art to rest upon." -

This opinion seems actually to have been entertained by Adam Smith, the worst critic, David Hume not excepted, that Scotland, a soil to which this sort of weed seems natural, has produced. [Essay^[7], in *Poetical Works*, p.746]

If being a weed can not necessarily be achieved through even the most supplementary of dissonant intervals, if this attempt to dislocate from the root can just as easily result in being arborified at another level into one of Stockhausen's plan(e)s of organization, then perhaps we must graft ourselves onto other forms of horticulture than that of the root. If Wordsworth and Carlyle are correct, then it may once more be a question of certain affects from the Enlightenment. Let us begin to trace our way towards this movement by attempting to map the affects of the *rhizome*.

9.3 Music is a Weed

The rhizome itself assumes very diverse forms, from ramified surface extension in all directions to concretion into bulbs and tubers. [Plateaus, p.7]

This statement serves as a salutary warning against the attempt to summarize all the possible forms or characteristics of the rhizome. Above all, it is a process, and not a structure (or, with Stockhausen, an "*abstract form of process*") - if a rhizome is identified it will be different to all other rhizomes. In this sense, there are multiplicities at work within the rhizome

[7] This arborescent propaganda is ironically given a most Derridean title: *Essay, Supplementary to the Preface* (1815).

which, indeed, constitute it and are produced by it. The rhizome thus has no underlying plan which can be traced. Rather, it has characteristics which can be mapped. There is no specific point at which we *must* enter the structure of the rhizome, there is no beginning as such, no point of origination. Not one root from which all else stems, but a whole system of roots (which can also be described as stems), indeed, nothing stems *from* anything else, or is rooted *in* them. Rather, the particles of the system graft themselves onto each other, continually making new connections: "unlike trees or their roots, the rhizome connects any point to any other point, and its traits are not necessarily linked to traits of the same nature." [Plateaus, p.21] In this sense, the rhizome does not even provide stability within its own instability; there is no "structure" of instability in a rhizome. For instance, although the *root* requires structuring, an organizational plan(e), it can nevertheless find itself being connected to a *rhizome*, and even overwhelmed within a rhizomatic system; "there are knots of arborescence in rhizomes, and rhizomatic offshoots in roots." [Plateaus, p.20] Rhizomatic movement can begin to occur at any point, but can also become arborified at any moment. For present purposes, it will be enough to consider only one of these possibilities: "if it is true that it is of the essence of the map or rhizome to have multiple entryways, then it is plausible that one could even enter them through tracings or the root-tree" [Plateaus, p.14] In other words, if the Western tonal system in music represents an example of arborescence, then how can we begin to place ourselves within the rhizome from the position of the harmonic root? At what point does the root lose its centrality and become a rhizome in a decentred system?

Deleuze/Guattari hint that the move from the *tonal* to the *modal* can be a step towards the rhizome: "It is true that the minor 'mode' gives tonal music a decentered, runaway, fugitive character due to the nature of its intervals and the lesser stability of its chords." [*Plateaus*, p.95] In this emergence of decentralisation, we begin to move away not only from the central organising plan of tonic-dominant relationships, but also begin to hear echoes of true modalities, taking us away from European territories, and beginning to manifest certain "phantoms of the Orient". Perhaps we can hear these phantoms which Deleuze/Guattari allude to in the Aeolian modality of the *natural* minor scale, or even more resonantly in the augmented second (minor third) between the flattened sixth and the raised seventh of the *harmonic* minor. Perhaps we can also hear these echoes in the increased instability of structure in the *melodic* minor, but certainly, in all of this, musical minority begins to take on a multiplicitous aspect in comparison to the rigidity of the major scale. Not only a multiplicity of forms for that minority (natural/harmonic/melodic), but also a dual and conditional arrangement within one of those forms (melodic ascending - descending)^[6].

Yet, we are only beginning to scratch the rhizomatic surface with the minor modes. One can indeed trace away from the root towards "dissonances" other than Stockhausen's planned structures, and even characterize this movement in spatial terms - "tempered chromaticism has an even greater ambiguity: stretching the action of the center to the most distant tones" [*ibid.*]. However, as we have seen, even if we manage to snap

[6] Deleuze/Guattari do not provide this elaboration themselves, but tracing through the maps of their theories, one cannot help but find such resonances.

the centralising action as we stretch it, an arborifying Carlyle or Stockhausen can still come along and plant us firmly back in the ground. Deleuze/Guattari suggest an active resistance in answer to such forced arborification. One form of resistance lies in the movement from "*tempered chromaticism*" towards the concept of "*generalized chromaticism*". Here, we "turn back against temperament, affecting not only pitches but all sound components - durations, intensities, timbre, attacks [...] By placing all its components in continuous variation, music itself becomes a superlinear system, a rhizome instead of a tree". [*Plateaus*, p.95] In this field, it is no longer a question of oppositions between melody and harmony, of the origin of one in the other, or even the possibility of one always already fissuring the other or being closed by it. There is no longer any bi-polar axis to be concerned with overthrowing.

According to Deleuze/Guattari, "what constitutes arborescence is the submission of the line to the point." [*Plateaus*, p.293] This principle of rooting has particular significance for the way in which we conceptualize musical structures, and here we can begin to discern further resonances with the whole problematics of Derridean supplementarity;

Musical representation, on the one hand, draws a horizontal, melodic line, the bass line, upon which other melodic lines are superposed; points are assigned that enter into relations of counterpoint between lines. On the other hand, it draws a vertical, harmonic line or plane, which moves along the horizontals but is no longer dependent upon them; it runs from high to low and defines a chord capable of linking up with the following chords. [*Plateaus*, p.295]

The structure of the score, then, arborifies the possible relationships of musical parameters. While linearity is achieved, it is always within the grid of the Cartesian graph, an x-axis and a y-axis, melody and harmony lines: root-lines and tree-lines. These lines are not "free", but

are tracings connecting points (and thus are lines segmented into points), joined together at the ultimate root-point of origin *o*. The linearity of the score is "the submission of the line to the point". In Derrida's approach to the time-space axis in Enlightenment music theory, it was suggested that the *originary supplement* would loosen the geometric rigidity of the origin-root structure. The hinge of *différance* became effectively a mobile origin (supplement at the origin), displacing the staticity of the x-y articulation at the origin *o*, allowing the connection of the two lines at any *other* point. In Deleuze/Guattari, however, the question is not so much one of the axiological articulation of two root-lines, but the picking up of the multilinear "lines of flight" which inhabit the areas between the arborescent lines. One way in which it is suggested that tonality can be "freed", then, is to break with this arborescent principle, to free the linearity of the theme, turning it from a rooted connector of points into a freely-moving, rhizomatic line; "Opposed to the punctual system are linear, or rather multilinear, systems. Free the line, free the diagonal: every musician or painter has this intention. One elaborates a punctual system or a didactic representation, but with the aim of making it snap, of sending a tremor through it." [*Plateaus*, p. 295] It is not a matter of disposing with the structure of the score, then, so much as subverting its rigidity, not allowing oneself to become rooted to the arborescence which it will attempt to impose upon sound. In the "snapping" of the score-tree, its roots are severed, and as soon as this occurs, new shoots will rhizomatically proliferate in all directions. These offshoots produce a disorganized system of multilinearity (and here, we have the possibility of a non-ontological reading of the *hypotenuse* of Burns' *Caledonia* more in accord with Burns',

than Carlyle's politics).

It is easy to imagine this as a compositional possibility, since the arborescence of the tonal system and of Stockhausen have already been mentioned, but when Deleuze/Guattari write of the freeing of the diagonal by "every musician" they do not mean merely the compositional field. Performance, too, can be a rhizomatic activity. For instance, "even a rubato by Chopin cannot be reproduced because it will have different time characteristics at each playing." [*Plateaus*, p.271] Differences in performance speeds, then, can begin to throw weeds into the musical garden, begin to break up the planned ground, snap roots and encourage rhizome growth; "There are no points or positions in a rhizome, such as those found in a structure, tree, or root. There are only lines. When Glenn Gould speeds up the performance of a piece [...] he is transforming the musical points into lines, he is making the whole piece proliferate." [*Plateaus*, p.8] The rubato-rhizome is undoubtedly one way in which a performer can snap a root-line, but this temporal, horizontal root-line is only one of the axes of the Cartesian graph. In this sense, rubato is only one possible beginning of the weedy proliferation of arborescent structure. If a fully rhizomatic situation is to be reached, it is clear that disruptions will have to occur not only on the temporal axis, but also on the harmonic. String players utilize such techniques under the heading of *intonation*, and even a cursory experience of such a performer as the 'cellist, Paul Tortelier will be enough to understand the rhizomatic principles involved in using rubato with intonation in order to snap

arborescent axes^[9].

Further, and even the articulated relationship between the vertical and horizontal axes will have to be snapped in order that a multiplicity of freely-moving lines can sweep them up in a general movement. Deleuze/Guattari write of the point where this is achieved as a chaotic moment, where everything is at stake^[10]. This is the moment at which music is produced, and we move from the representational codes of the score to the affectivity of sound: "In a multilinear system, everything happens at once: the line breaks free of the point of origin; the diagonal breaks free of the vertical and the horizontal as coordinates; and the transversal breaks free of the diagonal as a localizable connection between two points." [*Plateaus*, p.297] In this manner, the snapping of the roots of musical geometry give rise to a nebula of moving lines, and Deleuze/Guattari characterise this nebula as the *sound block*. The sound block evidently has no locality as such, since it has been freed from the coordinates of the graph which function to place, or to plant the block in a ground, whether harmonic or melodic, and to re-graft the lines to a root. The sound block, being without coordinates, origin, or *telos*, is effectively composed of a middle or *milieu* – a line which is not subjected to the point, whether this point be at a beginning or an ending^[11]. From here, we can trace through Deleuze/Guattari's mapping of the sound block to discover

[9] In particular, hear Tortelier's recording *Bach: The Six Cello Suites* (1983), where his use of rubato and intonation are more than Chopinesque.

[10] For another rare example of a theoretical discussion of the moments of performance, see David Sudnow's phenomenological analysis of his own learning of jazz piano, in *Ways of the Hand* (1978).

[11] Deleuze/Guattari use all the resonances of the term *milieu*: middle, amidst, middle course, environment, (social) underground.

another identity, since "a rhizome has no beginning or end; it is always in the middle, between things, interbeing, *intermezzo*." [Plateaus, p.25] Very clearly, then, we can read the sound block as a rhizome, a collection of lines of flight away from their previous identity as an organic system of roots. Here, we are also within the theoretical milieu of Kristeva's intertextuality.

However, the performance milieu of the sound block is not the only point where music can become weedy. Deleuze/Guattari also point to the ruptures and points of proliferation in musical form itself (indeed, the enthusiasm that they show for musical examples and models leads one to wonder whether they view music as perhaps the rhizome par excellence); "Music has always sent out lines of flight, like so many 'transformational multiplicities,' even overturning the very codes that structure or arborify it; that is why musical form, right down to its ruptures and proliferations, is comparable to a weed, a rhizome." [Plateaus, p.12] Music is a weed, then, but in many different ways; there is a multiplicity of weeds which can be grown in the field of sound. Just as rubato or intonation in a performance can begin to snap temporal arborescence, so too musical form *per se* can become composed of lines of flight from arborescent coordinates, and one can consider "continuous variation" from the viewpoint of a tonal style, too: "Rediscover Mozart, and that the 'theme' was a variation from the start." [Plateaus, p.309] In other words, just as a root can begin to proliferate into a rhizome, so too the theme can be heard not so much as the *ground* on which the development is situated, or as its motivic origin, but as a part of the variation process *already begun*.

From the point of view of its position within an *arborescent*

structure, the theme can be described as a line which is fixed between two points, say, anacrusis and cadence, but also as between two axes – the vertical and the harmonic. If we approach such a fixed line, we can only hope to trace it, to delineate its teleological movement from beginning to end (always reciting the prime directive of arborescence: *in principio erat*).

The idea of thematic variation as potentially taking either an arborescent or a rhizomatic mode is clear in the performance practices which affect the form of a *plobaireachd*. One begins, of course, with the *ùrlar*, or ground, and then proceeds through a series of variations which are often more rhizomatically than organically related to the *ùrlar*^[12]. However, the crucial point is how to end the piece: (1) often, one ends on the highest point of proliferation, the *crunluath*^[13]; (2) just as "traditionally", one can then return to the *ùrlar*, thus closing off the intervening variations as simply the means of connection between an originary point and its self-identical *telos*; (3) a further rhizomatic complication, however, is that one can also *repeat* the final *ùrlar* while walking out of the hearing of the audience, thus giving the impression of a disintegration of the *ùrlar* into the rhizomatic field of ambient sound. It is this articulation of formal arborescence by performance-rhizomes which aligns *plobaireachd* with Deleuze/Guattari's assertion that "it is a question

[12] The Gàidhlig *ùr* in this context should not be confused with the Germanic *ur* which one finds in terms such as *ursatz* or *urtext*, although the associations are arbitrarily very close: *ùrlar* comes from *air* (upon) as an intensive prefix to *làr* (ground).

[13] This term can also signify a seal, but is comprised of the two elements *crùn*, meaning "crown", and *luath*, meaning either "swift"/"nimble", or as a noun, "ashes".

of *method*": by either refusing the return to the origin, or by returning only in order to further displace it, *piobaireachd* performance practise always takes the tracings of organic structure within it and puts them "*back on the map*". This is what constitutes the *différance* of *piobaireachd* - the difference with a repetition, an identity made across time to *differ from itself*.

Deleuze/Guattari themselves list instances from Boulez, Beethoven, Schumann, Wagner, and so on, as points where the form-rhizome begins to proliferate. In order that this occurs, however, there must be an arborescence in place to rupture, as in the examples from the performance of Chopin and *piobaireachd*. Once more, their example is in the field of the temporal: "Ravel and Debussy retain just enough form to shatter it, affect it, modify it through speeds and slownesses. *Bolero* is the classic example, nearly a caricature, [...] that preserves a minimum of form in order to take it to the bursting point." [*Plateaus*, p.271] It is clear, then, that to a high degree, the affectivity of the rhizome depends on the rigidity of the root. Nothing can be broken, no lines of flight can be sent out, no sound-rhizomes can overgrow the garden's "plesand plantis", unless we begin with arborescent organisms which can be made to collapse under their own weight, become "deconstructed", through our weedy proliferations.

Yet the difference between this approach to the planned axiology of the score, where all lines are thrown into rhizomatic blocks, and Derrida's exacerbation of a single axial line should not be underestimated, particularly at those points of connection where the two methodologies appear to be at their most commonly articulated. Surely we can read the following as an oblique (perhaps *diagonal*) reference to the action of the

harmonic supplement; Deleuze/Guattari write of "a *sound block* that no longer has a point of origin, since it is always and already in the middle of the line; and no longer has horizontal and vertical coordinates, since it creates its own coordinates" [*Plateaus*, p.296]. For the sound-rhizome, the sound block, there is no origin, it is always-already in the position of an *intermezzo*. Into this, it is we could almost read the action of the supplement. Certainly, the supplement has a rhizomatic relationship to the origin in Derrida's deconstruction of Rousseau; it displaces singularly through multiplicitous movement, it puts things into circulation, cuts away fundamental structures as far as it can, even if, as we have seen, it always runs the risk of merely repeating the origin at higher levels, of falling into an endless regression of serial dialectics. Even *the* most intervallic, most supplementary, and *least* penetrational aspect of harmonic theory which has been considered above, that of sympathetic vibration, or, in more general terms, the affectivity of sympathy in Smith's moral aesthetics - even the merest concept of a common *resonance* of one term with another runs arborescent risks according to Deleuze/Guattari: "Resonance, or the communication occurring between the two independent orders, is what institutes the stratified system." [*Plateaus*, p.57] This, indeed, is the limit of the concept of the supplement. How can we ensure that harmonics, however intervallic, do not merely become re-rooted, if their meaning as harmonics is in terms of their relationship to a root, indeed their very signification is in terms of the idea of the sign, however displaced, and when even sympathy implies a certain gravitational tendency towards re-rooting, even with its radically *mildest* hint of unison, identity of understanding?

With Deleuze/Guattari, we have seen that proliferation is not merely a matter for the consonance-dissonance axis, or even the melody-harmony axis. All parameters can be swept up in rhizomatic movement, but the fact that the rhizome must be actively nurtured, and that although its reality is one of being always-already in the *intermezzo* (nevertheless relying on an arborescent point from which to fly), leads one to wonder where we can go after the rhizome-supplement has been established. From certain points of view, the rhizome itself can be read as a semi-arborescent form, not fully broken and flying; "There are knots of arborescence in rhizomes, and rhizomatic offshoots in roots. Moreover, there are despotic formations [...] specific to rhizomes, just as there are anarchic deformations in the transcendent system of trees" [*Plateaus*, p.20]. In this, Deleuze/Guattari diagonally confirm the critique of supplementarity that our lengthy sojourn with harmonic theory provided. Once we have established the supplement, it can all too easily become re-originated, re-rooted, particularly in the field of dialectics which stems from the Pythagorean oppositional root. What is even more significant, however (as the example of Carlyle shows) is that there are many who will attempt actively to provide political attempts to re-root us. In this light, our attempt to locate ourselves upon a post-structural field becomes one not so much of *proving* what is out there as a supplementary movement, or a substitute for a previously acknowledged universality, a universal non-universality. The certainty of uncertainty is no longer so certain. Other approaches will have to be explored - how do we actively keep the supplement in continuous opening, if this is what we desire? "Once a rhizome has been obstructed, arborified, it's all over, no desire stirs; for it is always by

rhizome that desire moves and produces. Whenever desire climbs a tree, internal repercussions trip it up and it falls to its death [*Plateaus*, p. 14]. If the rhizome-supplement is truly an *intermezzo*, and if it follows the proliferation of the root-origin, then what happens on its other side – what are its proliferations once it has de-arborified a structure?

9.4 Synthetic Milieu

The method of composing with twelve tones substitutes for the order produced by permanent reference to tonal centres an order according to which, every unit of a piece being a derivative of the tonal relations in a basic set of twelve tones, the 'Grundgestalt' is coherent because of this permanent reference to the basic set. Reference to this set offers also the justification of dissonant sounds. [...] They are natural and logical outgrowths of an organism. And this organism lives as vitally in its phrases, rhythms, motifs and melodies as ever before. [*My Evolution*, in *Style and Idea*, p.91]

We may say long live Chabrier, as opposed to Schoenberg, just as Nietzsche said long live Bizet, and for the same reasons, with the same technical and musical intent. We go from modality to an untempered, widened chromaticism. We do not need to suppress tonality, we need to turn it loose. [*Plateaus*, p.350]

Leaving the ground of Schönbergian *developing variation*, we arrive in the conceptual milieu of Deleuze/Guattari's *continuous variation*, achieved through a *widened chromaticism*. This constitutes the shift from organism to rhizome. It is not a matter of an increasingly supplementary shift from the root towards a dissonant harmonic; Schönberg will reappear and make us develop according to a plan(e) of organization, such as the *series* (and does the Derridean *supplementary series* not resonate here on a necessarily metaphysical plane?). As Deleuze/Guattari point out, we are just as likely to be able to plant weeds in a modest rubato as in a disintegration of the tonal system. The problem remains, that weeds are

nevertheless *planted*. All that has happened is that we have discovered some of the more remote regions of the same old system. In a developing variation we still proceed according to a schema on a supplementary plan(e), indeed, a Platonic plan(e) which will serve to manipulate or articulate surface *Style* from the perspective of a transcendental *Idea*. The movement of this articulation will inevitably be dialectical. Plato and Schönberg: two Ideas of the transcendent, two variations developing from the same Ideal root, two manifestations of what Nietzsche termed *Carlylism*^[14].

In a *continuous variation*, however, chromaticism need not be limited to pitch. Gradual shifts can occur between categories, blurring boundaries, and beginning to demonstrate not so much the intervals which differentially separate, but the proximities which are passed through in a differential *glissando* – a movement between, through the *milieu*, the *intermezzo*, no longer charting the interval as a *gap* (as in Rousseau and even passages of Smith), but mapping bodies within its space. Here, we

[14] In her book, *Developing Variations: Style and Ideology in Western Music*, Rose Rosengard Subotnik, while remaining essentially Schönbergian, transfers herself from the concept of *Idea* to that of a critique of *Ideology*, inspired by the dialectical articulations of Critical Theorists such as Adorno. While in her preface and endless endnotes, she seems at pains to suggest that her methodology has changed through a more recent "exposure to a French way of thinking" [p.xxii] (and continually hints that the sequel will be titled *Deconstructive Variations: Music and Reason in Western Society*), she nevertheless provides an excellent insider's view of the concept of developing variation: "a process whereby a musical element subjects itself to logical dynamic change while simultaneously retaining its original identity, thus overcoming the contradiction between identity and nonidentity. [...] Development is the process through which the musical subject demonstrates its self-generated powers as it 'goes out,' in dialectical terms, from itself into the generalizing world of Other or object – through which it demonstrates, in other words, its freedom in objective reality." [*Developing Variations*, p.20] It is in this sense, that the "musical subject" arborifies itself as a point of structure in a root-line, rather than a *milieu* or a line of flight.

reach a new form of connectivity. According to Deleuze/Guattari, a *machine* is required to achieve this movement through bodily states: "A synthesizer places all of the parameters in continuous variation, gradually making 'fundamentally heterogenous elements end up turning into each other in some way.' The moment this conjunction occurs there is a common matter. It is only at this point that one reaches the abstract machine" [*Plateaus*, p.109] The synthesizer is the *abstract machine* which is capable of picking up a rhizome and taking it yet further from the structure of the rooted organism. Unlike the idea of the supplement, which introduces spacings between other supplements as a form of serial connectivity, the synthesizer sets the structured parameters of sound into a potentially continuous variation, where elements transform themselves from one state to another. Whereas transitions in a series occur with movement *from* one term *to* another, the synthesizer can hook into any term and *transform* it smoothly *to become* any other. In the relatively simple parameter of pitch, this occurs quite simply as a glissando - (1) on the one hand, *serially*, we can *supplement* Eb with A by *substitution*, putting A *in the place of* Eb, but (2) on the other, in a continuous variation, Eb can slide into *becoming* A *itself*; the transformation occurs *in the same body*, shifting from one "place" to another, where "place" now signifies more of a difference in *constitution* than in physical space. However, if the idea of the synthesizer is transferred to the connections between parameters (as even the arborescent Stockhausen found in *Kontakte*), a pitch can be slowed down until it transforms into a pulse - both operating according to a "common

matter" of frequency^[15].

Let us consider an extension of this transition from the vertical through to the horizontal, harmonic to melodic, in an example drawn from Deleuze/Guattari. As we have seen from Derrida's critique of Rousseau, the opposition between melody and harmony can also be transposed into an opposition between the voice and the instrument, and even as far as the organism and the machine. Derrida obviously aligns himself theoretically with the harmonic supplement, and thus implicitly with the instrumental machine, whether we view this from the position of the Moderns' anti-Ancientism, or Adam Smith's conceptual chains which harmonize reality. Deleuze/Guattari, although with a certain Smithian intertext perhaps more substantial than Derrida, nevertheless approach the problem from a quite different, and less provisionally oppositional angle: "The Voice-Music relation proposed by Rousseau, on the other hand, could have taken not only phonetics and prosody but all of linguistics in a different direction." [*Plateaus*, p.96] They argue that, to be sure, as long as the voice is defined as the carrier of song, it operates according to the values of self-proximity

[15] Although Stockhausen found this process of synthetic transformation in many compositions, it is almost always tempered by arborescence; his concept of serialism as a means of achieving *mediated* gradations between categories is directed towards discovering not an immanent surface but an underlying reality such as Carlyle saw. This transcendental reality is achieved through dialectical balances between differences arranged and ordered along a bi-polar axis; "Serialism is only a way of balancing different forces. In general it means simply that you have any number of degrees between two extremes that are defined before starting to compose a work, and you establish a scale to mediate between these extremes. [...] Serialism tries to go beyond collage, beyond the incoherent multiplicity of things. It tries to find unity without destroying the individual elements, and that means to interconnect, to - yes, to try to balance out the different aspects of sound. [...] I'm trying to go beyond collage, heterogeneity and pluralism, and to find unity: to produce music that brings us to the essential *One*." [*Towards a Cosmic Music*, pp.7/12]

that Derrida identifies in Rousseau, and that it acts as a signifying subject to be accompanied by its instrumental objects. However, when the voice becomes "tied to timbre", then this self-proximity (which will inevitably tend towards *knotty arborescence*) will rupture and proliferate into a voice-rhizome, revealing "a tessitura that renders it heterogenous to itself and gives it a power of continuous variation: it is then no longer accompanied, but truly 'machined'" [*Plateaus*, p.96] This reading of Rousseau does not place his arguments along an oppositional axis between two points to then demonstrate the inability of his writing to conform consistently to that over-coded structure. Rather, it is a reading of Rousseau which assumes a theoretical heterogeneity from the start. The result is that the definition of music within the terms of a close connection between voice and sound allows the slippage from organism to rhizome, always remembering that there are indeed points of arborification within the rhizome, as much as lines of flight within two axes. Just as the synthesizer is an abstract machine which can transform sound particles into each other, this conception of the voice begins to lead into a field where not only musical parameters elide, but "where the synthesizer and the instrument speak no less than the voice, and the voice plays no less than the instrument." [p.96] If there is a "common matter" which allows these elisions to occur, it is like a matter-stream which the machinic assemblage (whether defined as a synthesizer or as a cellist's hand creating rubato or vibrato) can hook into, manipulating sound-rhizomes, and allowing them to proliferate further in an "immanent continuous variation" [p.97]. While Smith's conception of theory as an Imaginary Machine is based on the harmonization of chaotic elements into some form

of order, the Deleuze/Guattari abstract machine (as represented by the synthesizer) is precisely not an intervallic machine, but one which attempts to pick up rhizomes and begin to relocate them on a common surface where difference is defined not *spatially*, but in terms of *specificity*. The abstract machine finds a term and pulls it away from its roots, snaps its arborified line of developmental variation, allows it to establish its own coordinates beyond the axiological graph, and sets it into continuous variation as a line of flight. However, one significant parallel remains between Smith and Deleuze/Guattari - just as Smith describes theory as an Imaginary Machine, so too Deleuze/Guattari describe philosophy itself within the terms of their abstract machine, a machine which, although abstract, is not a product of the imagination, but an actual machine;

The synthesizer, with its operation of consistency, has taken the place of the ground in a priori synthetic judgement: its synthesis is of the molecular and the cosmic, material and force, not form and matter, *Grund* and territory. Philosophy is no longer synthetic judgement; it is like a thought synthesizer functioning to make thought travel, make it mobile, make it a force of the Cosmos (in the same way as one makes sound travel). [*Plateaus*, p.343]

With Deleuze/Guattari, then, we have moved from a plan(e) of organization, through the collapse of its organisms, through the milieu of weedy proliferation, and into another field, that of *synthesis*. This field is not a ground or an *a priori* plan(e) - it does not organize, plan, or structure before the event. Equally, it does not exist as a supplementary dimension produced by, or even transcending actuality. It has no arborescent interest in coordinates, or, for that matter, in dialectical syntheses. With it, we move from synthesis as planned development

towards synthesis as free variation^[16]. The abstract machine of the synthesizer composes philosophy or music on a field consisting of a *common matter*, which it sets into *continuous variation*. In this, we have also moved from the concept of variation as organic development towards variation as heterogeneity; from the unity-within-contrasts of the organicist Romanticist aesthetic, towards the contrasts-within-alleged-unities of a certain (non)aesthetic of Otherness.

[16] This distinction is also made (to a different end) by Stockhausen, who defines process as "a development towards something"; in other words, development is teleological. This he contrasts with the idea of variation, by emphasising the possibility that development is a *mysterious* teleology, in that we should not be able to tell where we are going, but once we are there, it makes linear, logical sense; this "is not the case with variation. Of course you can say: 'If I constantly proceed by leaps and bounds in a Suite, I don't know where I'm heading either.' That may be so, but I don't have the feeling either of any sense of necessity, of the later deriving from the earlier and vice versa. The idea of growth is not present. Diverse things are simply assembled alongside one another, and this does not involve a totality moving towards some goal." [*Towards a Cosmic Music*, p.103]

CHAPTER TEN

THE SOUND FIELD

Hinadin hodindro hinhodin hiodintro hintradredro
hinadin hodindro hintradredro hinhodin hiodintro
Hintradredro hinadin hodindro hinhodin hiodintro
hinadin hodindro hintradredro hinhodin hiodintro
Hintradredro hinadin hodindro heen deen daendo hinhodin hiodintro

Hinadin hodindro hinhodin hiohodintro hindaen deendo
hinadin hodindro hindaen deendo hinhodinodintro
Hindaen deendo hinadin hodindro hinhodinodintro
hinadin hodindro hindaen deendo hinhodinodintro
Hindaen deendo heen deen daendo hinhodinodintro

- Urlar, *Crosanachd an Doill*, Campbell Canntaireachd MS.

CHAPTER TEN

THE SOUND FIELD

10.1 Towards Immanence

If metallurgy has an essential relation with music, it is by virtue not of the sounds of the forge but also of the tendency within both arts to bring into its own, beyond separate forms, a continuous development of form, and beyond variable matters, a continuous variation of matter: a widened chromaticism sustains both music and metallurgy; the musical smith was the first "transformer." [*Plateaus*, p.411]

Within this allusion to Pythagoras' discovery of harmony through the transforming machines of the smith's forge, we can discern a definition of the chromatic which is only tentatively sounded in Smith's Imaginary Machine. Here, Deleuze/Guattari compare sound to metal as two media which are malleable through the transformative abstract machine of the musician and the metallurgist. In each art, one is faced with a surface of undifferentiated matter – the "common matter", which an abstract machine can hook into and manipulate. Deleuze/Guattari write that "metallurgy is the consciousness or thought of the matter-flow, and metal the correlate of this consciousness" [*ibid.*], and reading this sentence analogously, we can begin to consider music as the consciousness of the sound continuum, and equivalently, sound as the unconscious of music. Consciousness is

produced from the unconscious sound-stream^[1] through the agency of musical abstract machines, such as the voice or the synthesizer. As we will see, however, this unconscious is not a plan(e) of origination such as Freud's conception. It does not pre-exist the musical conscious as the origin of its surfacial movements, but has to be actively *composed*. As Deleuze/Guattari write, Freudian psychoanalysis (like most *musical* critique which also falls under the heading of "analysis"), claims that surface phenomena are produced from "a genetic axis or overcoding structure, and makes infinite, monotonous tracings of the stages on that axis or the constituents of that structure" [ibid., p.13]. These forms aim to uncover an originary substructure (unconscious, ursatz, pitch-class set, etc.), and, to coin a term, can be put under the heading of *arche-analysis*. The alternative which Deleuze/Guattari propose is *schizoanalysis*, which

[1] The conception of fluid here is not at all the same as that in Carlyle, who posited the circulation of melodic essences which penetrate throughout an entire system to bind all units together as an organism. The flow which Deleuze/Guattari suggest here is not in the sense of penetrational flows, or the semiotic spurts of phallogocentrism, but more in the direction of what Luce Irigaray suggests in *The "Mechanics" of Fluids*. Again, it is a question of sound and signification, in establishing the phallogocentrism of traditional theoretical discourse, the "*mechanics of solids*": "And yet that woman-thing speaks. But not 'like,' not 'the same,' not 'identical with itself' nor to any x, etc. Not a 'subject,' unless transformed by phallogocentrism. It speaks 'fluid,' even in the paralytic undersides of that economy. Symptoms of an 'it can't flow any more, it can't touch itself...' Of which one may understand that she imputes it to the father, and to his morphology. *Yet one must know how to listen otherwise than in good form(s) to hear what it says.* That it is continuous, compressible, dilatable, viscous, conductible, diffusible,..." [*This Sex Which is Not One*, p.111] "Fluid - like that other, inside/outside of philosophical discourse - is, by nature, unstable. Unless it is subordinated to geometrism, or (?) idealized. Woman never speaks the same way. What she emits is flowing, fluctuating. *Blurring.*" [ibid., p.112] Following the general drift of this theoretical milieu, one could claim that Others (and not only of gender or sexuality) are rhizomes until they become arborified as Objects in opposition to a controlling Subject. In other words, it is the shift from the indefinite article (*an* Other, one among many) towards the definite article (*the* Other, one in opposition) which represents arborification.

"rejects any idea of pretraced destiny" [ibid.]. Unlike the arche-analytic search for unity in an originary plan(e) of organization (tracing back to the root), schizoanalysis is the moving among surface multiplicities (mapping the rhizomes);

In both psychoanalysis and its object, there is always a general, always a leader (General Freud). Schizoanalysis, on the other hand, treats the unconscious as an acentered system, in other words, as a machinic network of finite automata (a rhizome), and thus arrives at an entirely different state of the unconscious. [*Plateaus*, p.18]

Against the Freudian conception of the unconscious as the producing origin of the conscious, then, in schizoanalysis, "the issue is to *produce the unconscious* [...] the rhizome is precisely this production of the unconscious." [ibid., p.411] Unlike music analysis which shows a static reality beneath a transient surface, and unlike deconstruction which shows the surfacial movements of an allegedly static reality, schizoanalysis is the active production (rather than merely demonstration) of that surfaciality (and again, note the Peircean intertext): "Schizoanalysis, or pragmatics, has no other meaning: Make a rhizome." [p.251] Let us continue, then, in schizoanalytic mode to consider the point at which the abstract machine takes us *through* the rhizome, and into the production of the unconscious stream of music.

Deleuze/Guattari claim that "metal is neither a thing nor an organism, but a *body without organs*." [ibid.] The same is also the case for sound in its movement beyond the rhizome; sound is neither a thing nor an organism, but a "body without organs": the rhizome represents the loosening of root-structures (a first point of organic collapse), but as we have seen, nevertheless still contains knots of arborescence as provisional points within its coagulations of lines of flight. An abstract machine,

however, can begin to further loosen these flying lines, and place all of the elements on a single surface of continuous variation. This surface has *body*, but is not an *organism* - there is no structural development which serves to organize its organs into a tree. Sound, like metal, is a *body without organs* ("BwO"), and to an extent, the rhizome itself can be read as a BwO; "the sound block is the *intermezzo*. It is a body without organs" [p.297]. The rhizome represents the moment at which the musical organism loses its organizational tree structure, and becomes a sonorous body breaking free of coordinates. Its organs are placed in a new relationship to each other; rather than stemming from a common root, or *developing* from each other, they begin to continually vary from each other, according to the operation of abstract machines. It is in this sense that the BwO can be seen as "without organs";

It is not at all a question of a fragmented, splintered body, of organs without the body (OwB). The BwO is exactly the opposite. There are not organs in the sense of fragments in relation to a lost unity, nor is there a return to the undifferentiated in relation to a differentiable totality. There is a distribution of intensive principles of organs, with their positive indefinite articles, within a collectivity or multiplicity, inside an assemblage, and according to machinic connections operating on a BwO. [Plateaus, p.165]

Here we read the attempt to distinguish the BwO from a merely anarchic or chaotic miasma. If it does represent one stage in the "deconstruction" of the organism, a stage "beyond" rhizomatic proliferation, then it highlights the fact that deconstruction is not a question of a simple fragmentation of unity, or of an approach to the merely homogenous. Because the surface of the BwO is operated on by any number of abstract machines, there is in a sense an assemblage, or network of machinic connections which works against the stratification induced by

organics, and encourages lines of flight to develop within their own field of coordinates. Once more, lines of flight do not exist as tracings within pre-established coordinates on a Cartesian graph, but constantly vary as they make their own mappings of a BwO's surface. Cartography rather than Cartesian graphology. In this, the "organs" of the BwO take on the aspect of *intensities within a field*: "forms become contingent, organs are no longer anything more than intensities that are produced, flows, thresholds, and gradients." [p.164] At this stage, we begin to approach sound as an immanent multiplicity, a body which is not an organism, but a BwO whose surface is full of sonic lines of flight – a garden full of weeds. Each of these rhizomes upon the BwO arises from its surface through the action of an abstract machine. In a musical BwO, for instance, one can produce a sound-rhizome with the aid of a synthesizer, setting each line of flight in variation with itself and others. When the voice or the synthesizer is considered in relation to timbral transformation, they effectively set up the timbral parameter as a BwO. This body can then become a field of intensities which constantly evolve, where "forms become contingent" on their line of flight between different states. In the move away from coordinates in an axiological space, or graph, the abstract machine which assembles the BwO takes sound from the *extensional* towards the

intensional^[2].

The BwO causes intensities to pass; it produces and distributes them in a *spatium* that is itself intensive, lacking extension. [...] It is nonstratified, unformed, intense matter,

[2] There have been certain arguments which claim a stylistic specificity for these two terms, centring in on the concept of timbre; characteristically, the argument runs that Western Classical music is essentially extensional, by virtue of its developing variation procedures, and adoption of standardized timbral structures, all of which are placed within the axiology of notation, whereas Popular musics are essentially intensional by virtue of their inflexional approach to timbre which is considered untranscribable. Andrew Chester's article in *New Left Review* 62 (July-August 1970) makes this claim with an ontology designed to stratify music into distinct categories of Classical-Jazz-Rock; "Western classical music is the apodigm of the *extensional* form of musical construction. Theme and variations, counterpoint, tonality (as used in classical composition) are all devices that build diachronically and synchronically outwards from basic musical atoms. [...] Thus a basic premise of classical music is rigorous adherence to standard timbres, not only for the various orchestral instruments, but even for the most flexible of all instruments, the human voice. Room for interpretation of the written notation is in fact marginal. [...] Rock however follows, like many non-European musics, the path of *intensional* development. [...] The history of jazz is largely a transition from one to the other" [*Second Thoughts on a Rock Aesthetic: The Band*, pp.78/9] This theory has more recently been criticised by Richard Middleton in *Studying Popular Music* [pp.116/7], who cites Peter van der Merwe's *Origins of the Popular Style* as a demonstration of the intertextuality of the supposedly discrete categories of Folk, Jazz, Popular and Classical, although Chester himself mentions (in a footnote) that electroacoustic music is an example of classical intensionality. However, as we have seen with various examples provided by Deleuze/Guattari above, there are intensional, rhizomatic aspects accessible at many points within Classical music *per se*. Even Schumann, for instance, can be found to operate rhizomatic lines of flight which break extensionality: "the madness of Schumann: the cello wanders across the grid of the orchestration, drawing its diagonal, along which the deterritorialized sound block moves" [*Plateaus*, p.297] Specifically in terms of timbre, Deleuze/Guattari provide several examples from contemporary music, including Berio's *Visage* and Dieter Schnebel's *Glossolalie* [p.96]. Middleton's reading of van der Merwe can also be read as yielding *extensional* styles within the Popular, such as "Victorian parlour song". The latter is thoroughly dealt with in Derek Scott's *The Singing Bourgeois: Songs of the Victorian Drawing Room and Parlour*, which continuously attests a stylistic and generic multiplicity: "The desire to categorize a particular portion of all this as 'Victorian parlour song' by reference to an arbitrary selection of musical and literary criteria has created a 'parlour song' consensus in its own way as misleading as the 'folksong' consensus attacked by Dave Harker. It is to avoid such categorization that I call this book *The Singing Bourgeois*." [*The Singing Bourgeois*, p.viii]

the matrix of intensity, intensity = 0; but there is nothing negative about that zero, there are no negative or opposite intensities. Matter equals energy. [*Plateaus*, p.153]

At this point, the BwO begins to resonate with all the transformational intensities of contemporary physics, which in itself draws a line of flight across the classical opposition between matter and energy, leaving behind a full BwO of the cosmos. Within this "entire" BwO, however, we have all of the BwOs which constitute the BwO of music, of philosophy, and so on. Each BwO can be considered as a field of *intensities*, a field of rhizomes in continuous variation on the same surface of a common matter, whether this common matter is considered as a generalized sound-stream, a timbral field, etc. This brings us to the meaning of the book's title: *A Thousand Plateaus*; "A plateau is a piece of immanence. Every BwO is made up of plateaus. Every BwO is itself a plateau in communication with other plateaus on the plane of consistency. The BwO is a component of passage." [*Plateaus*, p.158] Thus, just as the organic field is structured into *strata*, the field of immanence is a-structured into *plateaus* - the difference between solid and fluid relationships. And if resonance as sympathetic vibration can be seen as "what institutes the stratified system" [*Plateaus*, p.57], represents the beginning of the arborification of the BwO, then the plateau can be seen as "a continuous, self-vibrating region of intensities", much like Smith's otosynthetic ear. [*Plateaus*, p.22]

In this way, the BwO can be described as a *field of immanence* - a site for the individuation of rhizomatic intensities, and this distinguishes it radically from the idea of a plan(e) of organization. Indeed, Deleuze/Guattari also refer to this field of immanence as the *plane of consistency*. While the organizational plan(e) is inherently bound up in the

identity of the organism, the plane of consistency is a body without organs^[3]. While the plan(e) operates through structuration, in the *plane*, "there is no structure, any more than there is genesis" [ibid., p.266]. This is the immanent field of intensities in continuous variation, or continuous individuation. In other words, the field of immanence is the garden full of rhizomes: the field of musical weeds which tug at the roots of the ontological tree, whether those roots are considered to be melodic or harmonic. On this field, we find "haecceities, affects, subjectless individuations" [p.266], and this is a significant lexical conjunction for Deleuze/Guattari to make. At this extreme location beyond arborescence, not only do we find ourselves in the immanent milieu of de-structuration, but this is all expressed through an association between the Enlightenment concept of the *affect* and John Duns Scotus' concept of *haecceitas*: "the plane of consistency contains only haecceities, along intersecting lines." [p.263] The distinction, then, between a plan(e) of organization and a plane of immanence is the difference between teleological structures and

[3] The connection between the BwO and the idea of a plane of consistency, within the context of a non-organicist field can also be found to an extent in Lyotard's concept of the "great ephemeral film", the spreading-out of which is given in the graphic opening of *Libidinal Economy*: "Open the supposed body and spread out all its surfaces: not only the skin with each of its folds, wrinkles, scars, with its great velvety planes" [*Libidinal Economy*, p.1 (MS. translation by Iain Hamilton Grant)]. This gradual opening out of a body as an introduction to libidinal economy becomes a contrast to the "organic body of *political economy* (itself initially assembled from differentiated and appropriated parts, the latter never being without the former)" [ibid., p.2]. Equally, it is a demonstration of the fact that there is no "libidinal theatre" – in other words, no "representative chamber" [p.2] within a libidinal economy.

affective haecceities^[4]. In this way, the rhizome, the line of flight, indeed, the whole movement which ruptures structuralism becomes encapsulated as much by Scotian *haecceitas* as by Derridean *différance*. Perhaps more so, since it has already been suggested that the Deleuzian/Guattarian version of post-structuralism can be seen as going further in several respects than the Derridean version. It should also be noted, however, that one of Derrida's crucial precedents, C.S. Peirce, takes an almost Deleuzian/Guattarian interest in *haecceitas*, calling it the "ultimate fact" of differential specificity. [*Principles of Philosophy*, p.221] For Peirce, it is also a question of the relationship between *haecceitas* and *indeterminacy* as "facts not calling for and not capable of explanation."

[4] Wordsworth's critique of the weedy Smith and Hume could not be more resonant here, but if we can add Duns Scotus to the list of Caledonian rhizomes, then perhaps there are also aspects of the original "dunce" to be unearthed through further Deleuzian/Guattarian readings of the Enlightenment. The concept of the Nature-Culture opposition so crucial to Rousseau is rejected on the plane of immanence: "We therefore call it the plane of Nature, although nature has nothing to do with it, since on this plane there is no distinction between the natural and the artificial." [*Plateaus*, p.266] In a parallel move, but from 1767, Adam Ferguson writes against the whole series of Rousseauist concerns which characterized much Enlightenment thought, whether in terms of time, place, culture, class, etc.: "If we are asked, therefore, Where the state of nature is to be found? we may answer, It is here; and it matters not whether we are understood to speak in the island of Great Britain, at the Cape of Good Hope, or the Straits of Magellan. While this active being is in the train of employing his talents, and of operating on the subjects around him, all situations are equally natural. If we are told, That vice, at least, is contrary to nature; we may answer, It is worse; it is folly and wretchedness. But if nature is only opposed to art, in what situation of the human race are the footsteps of art unknown? In the condition of the savage, as well as in that of the citizen, are many proofs of human invention; and in either is not any permanent station, but a mere stage through which this travelling being is destined to pass. If the palace be unnatural, the cottage is so no less; and the highest refinements of political and moral apprehension, are not more artificial in their kind, than the first operations of sentiment and reason." [*An Essay on the History of Civil Society*, p.8] Note also the emphasis on the individual as a *milieu* in a passage between states: a specifically Deleuzian/Guattarian concern, which also links Ferguson in with Deleuze's text on Spinoza - *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy*.

Indeterminacy affords us nothing to ask a question about; haecceity is the *ultima ratio*, the brutal fact that will not be questioned." [ibid., p.221] Following on from this, Peirce moves from a consideration of ultimate specific differences towards a critique of philosophy as totalizing meta-discourse;

we must reject every philosophy or general conception of the universe, which could ever lead to the conclusion that any given general fact is an ultimate one. We must look forward to the explanation, not of all things, but of any given thing whatever. [*Principles of Philosophy*, p.222]

In this rejection of the Platonic tendency, Peirce calls for a return to Scotus' idea that "the ultimate specific difference is simply to differ from everything else"^[5]. It is the *this-ness* of entities which should be studied, and not their derivation from a source located upon a plan(e) of organization.

[5] Although he could hardly have predicted the contemporary Parisian interest in Scotus some 650 years after the original dunce taught there, Peirce is well aware of his significance within the age-old debate between the realists and the nominalists (which Norris claims is also the basis of the contemporary scene - cf. Chapter 1), writing that he "first stated the realist position consistently, and developed it with great fullness and applied it to all the different questions which depend upon it. His theory of 'formalities' was the subtlest, except perhaps Hegel's logic, ever broached, and was separated from nominalism only by the division of a hair." [*Principles of Philosophy*, p.79] Further, "the Scotists had almost undisputed supremacy in almost all the Universities having gained it by their superiority in logic. They therefore appeared as the old fogeys whom the Humanists had to fight. The latter called them Dunces after their master Duns Scotus. But for the first generation of the Renaissance a Dunce was far from meaning or suggesting a stupid person. The title rather conveyed the idea of a man so skilled in debate on the wrong side as to be a terror to the pure humanist upon whom he might fall." [ibid., p.418]

10.2 Two Silences (Soundproof Rooms and "The Great Cock Question")

It is undoubtedly John Cage who first and most perfectly deployed this fixed sound plane, which affirms a process against all structure and genesis, a floating time against a pulsed time or tempo, experimentation against any kind of interpretation, and in which silence as sonorous rest also marks the absolute state of movement. [*Plateaus*, p.267]

In Cage's compositional abstract machine, the plane of immanence is the site of composition. In his work, an attempt is made to connect in with the field of sound as a distribution of intensities, each charting their own individuation as components of that surface. For Deleuze/Guattari, Cage's music is *haecceitas* in sound - affective process. On the sound field, there is no spatiality as such, and thus no opposition between presence and absence, no possibility of a dialectics of presence or even of its deconstruction: "silence as sonorous rest". Thus one can only map speeds and slownesses in the processes of *haecceitas*, rather than tracing developments from sound to no-sound^[6]. Cage's conception of silence, then, provides an image of the sound field at a moment of relative rest. The field does not disappear in silence, its sounds merely slow down, without negating the general process of continuous variation. For Cage, silence

[6] This mapping of motions is named by Deleuze elsewhere as ethology: "Spinoza's ethics has nothing to do with a morality; he conceives it as an ethology, that is, as a composition of fast and slow speeds, of capacities for affecting and being affected on this plane of immanence. That is why Spinoza calls out to us in the way he does: you do not know beforehand what good or bad you are capable of; you do not know beforehand what a body or a mind can do, in a given encounter, a given arrangement, a given combination." [*Spinoza: Practical Philosophy*, p.125] Deleuze then continues to consider ethology within the context of "a plane of musical composition, a plane of Nature [...] Uexküll, one of the main founders of ethology, is a Spinozist when he first defines the melodic lines or contrapuntal relations that correspond to each thing, and then describes a symphony as an immanent higher unity that takes on a breadth and fullness ('natural composition'). This musical composition comes into play throughout the *Ethics* [Spinoza's]" [ibid., pp.126/7].

became not an empty space, but a BwO at rest. His experience in the anechoic chamber demonstrated that merely to be alive is to produce sound, to be always within a sound milieu; at the very least, even if all else is erased, the ear is always connected to the sounds of the nervous system and the blood in circulation. Cage's silent room was full of sonic intensities, with the body as a machinic assemblage of the field of immanence. Merely to be alive is to be necessarily placed within an immanent milieu in the sound field. Hence, the famous "silent" piece which, while composed empty, yet fills up with unplanned sounds - we are always already in the middle of our own continuous performance of 4'33", continuously destratifying beyond its temporal structure^[7].

There is another form of silence, however, which attempts to submerge the plane of immanence below a ground, and turn it into an organized plan(e). It is highly significant, for instance, that while Carlyle's silence was planned in opposition to Cage's and was composed of a desire to annihilate sound, it nevertheless yielded the same practical results. Richard Garnett referred to "his nervous horror of noise", and this fear of rhizomatic proliferation makes a stark contrast with Cage's acceptance

[7] Although the piece is conceived as being in three movements, and has an ostensibly stipulatory length implied in the title, Cage viewed the idea of this apparent arborification of immanence as a structure to be continuously rhizomed: "SST: 4'33" *doesn't necessarily last that long, does it? So how long is the 'Binkies' new version?* JC: We don't know, 'cause they're using 'inner clock'. SST: *Right, so they're just deciding on the spot.* JC: They won't decide, they'll just do it. Each one will make three silences, and leave the performing area after the third silence. They'll come in, also, individually, not as a group, and when no-one is there, they'll have finished. I think it might last somewhere between 5 and 10 minutes, rather than 4'33". SST: *Right, but it's nevertheless been programmed as 4'33".* JC: Yes, David Tudor once said that he saw no reason why a piece called 4'33" should last four minutes and thirty-three seconds." [John Cage and the Glaswegian Circus, p.3]

[*Life of Thomas Carlyle*, p.103]. As we have seen, Carlyle's obsession was with a melodic origin, but one so pure that to trace one's way back onto its arborescent plan(e) was to first pass from sound to light and then to essence and spirit. Thus, the attempt to reach this origin begins with the weeding out of unwanted sounds. This took an extreme turn with Carlyle, and Froude's *Life* documents this nervous horror with many instances. Firstly, we have the problem of the *neighbours* at Cheyne Row, whether the "the young lady next door [...with...] her fatal piano" [*Froude*, p.431], or Ronca, the neighbour whose coughing made Carlyle "annoyed at the mere noise of it!" [quoted in *Froude*, p.521] Yet the invalided Ronca's noise proliferated further into what Froude names "the great cock question [...]" Morning after morning the horrid clarions blew." [*Froude*, p.519] After complaints, Ronca supplements his stock with further cocks, until Carlyle bursts out, flaming-forth in a terrible vatic song of war, that "'Those Cocks must either withdraw or die,' he cried. 'That is a fixed point'" [*Froude*, p.519] The neighbours were not the only "horrid clarions" which had to be brought to an arborescent "fixed point" – the street was also full of sound-rhizomes; "Organ-grinders never ceased to plague Carlyle" [*Froude*, p.688]. More often than not, the machinic grinder of Carlyle's hearing-organs was "a vile yellow Italian" [quoted in *Froude*, p.519]. As Sophie de Morgan recalled: "I have seen him rush out of his house in his morning wrap, sending a torrent of words, not descriptive of the state of the blest, over two Italians who were playing an orchestration opposite." [*Threescore Years and Ten: Reminiscences*, p.231] Finally, in 1853, Carlyle organizes a plan(e) to combat such aural weeds, and at great expense attempts to build a silent room, whose only windows look skywards,

towards the light-filled heavens. But...

Ach Gott! I am wretched, and (in silence) nearly mad! [...] Masons (who have already *killed* a year in my life, in a too sad manner), are again upon the roof of the house, - after a dreadful bout of resolution on my part, - building me a SOUNDLESS ROOM! "The world, which can do me no good, shall at least not torment me with its street and backyard *noises*." [...] I seem to be sinking inextricably into Chaos. [quoted in *Froude*, p.521]

The noisy chaos continues, and the soundless room - the final solution for the "great cock question" - fails to exclude the weedy field of immanence. As Jane Welsh Carlyle wrote, "Alas! and the silent apartment has turned out the noisiest apartment in the house." [quoted in *Froude*, p.520] For Thomas, however, the silent room becomes a truly "dreadful enterprise, that proved, the *chaotic* element throughout: - a true *Satan's Invisible World Displayed*." [quoted in *Froude*, p.520] The failure of the *plan* to make the audible inaudible results in a making visible of satanic immanence - Carlyle singularly fails to penetrate beneath the surfaces of the actual. Immanent surface becomes a barrier erected before the truth of underlying reality. The attempt to make essences visible reveals only further substances. Smith, who also writes of the "chaos" of immanence, would attempt a harmonization of these sounds, using his Imaginary Machine to provide chains of meaning. Carlyle, however, has no desire for a coming-to-terms with the actual, attempts to annihilate it, and fails miserably. This failure effectively amplifies, increases the intensity, of his experience of dissonance - heavenly melody is not made manifest, and he is left in dread of a hellish manifestation. Carlyle's soundless room, then, engenders a fear of the immanent because it demonstrates the same principle to him as Cage's anechoic chamber - one cannot escape sound, one is *always already* in the *milieu* of the *sound field*. For the aesthetics of

arborescence, this is a chaotic, even satanic result, but for immanence, it is not the triumph of one oppositional term over another in any sense; it is in fact, what Peirce described as the brute fact of *haecceitas*.

Given that Carlyle's attempt to assemble silence as an anti-sound is based on the attempt to submerge the plane of immanence below a ground, and arborify it into a plan(e) of organization, the question arises as to what his failure represents in terms of the relationship between arborescence and immanence. Does his failure represent the symmetrical opposite of his attempt? Deleuze/Guattari hint that the plan(e) may not be so much one of a naturality of the idea of organized structure. The plan(e) of organization may in fact turn out to be a violent act towards the plane of immanence: "As Cage says, it is of the nature of the plan(e) that it fail. Precisely because it is not a plan(e) of organization, development, or formation, but one of nonvoluntary transmutation." [*Plateaus*, p.269] The plan(e) of organization is the attempt to master *haecceitas*, mould it into structures which it would not have otherwise found. In this way, the plan(e) becomes more one of metaphysical suppression, and as such, encounters *resistances*. Rhizomes will always continue to re-emerge from beneath the ground, so that the idea of the plan(e) "must necessarily fail for it is impossible to be faithful to it" [*Plateaus*, p.269].

The "metaphysical" play between the two planes can thus become the site of a more actual, compositional play; "Certain modern musicians oppose the transcendent plan(e) of organization, which is said to have dominated all of Western classical music, to the immanent sound plane, which is always given along with that to which it gives rise" [p.267] Boulez' distinction between the smooth and the striated becomes implicated here, with the

smooth operating as a form of BwO, and the striated as an organizational plan(e): "the smooth is a *nomos*, whereas the striated always has a *logos*, the octave, for example." [p.478] Deleuze/Guattari pick up on the distinction between *nomos* and *logos* as that between the *nomadic* movement of a line of flight, and the *logical* development of lines within a tree-structure. To adopt a smooth *nomos* is to vary one's position continuously;

the striated is that which intertwines fixed and variable elements, produces an order and succession of distinct forms, and organizes horizontal melodic lines and vertical harmonic planes. The smooth is the continuous variation, continuous development of form; it is the fusion of harmony and melody in favor of properly rhythmic values, the pure act of the drawing of a diagonal across the vertical and the horizontal. [Plateaus, p.478]

Thus, the striated is the operation of the axiology of the score, the arborescence of musical structures, the adoption of the *logos* which encourages closure at the octave, but also allows the division which the whole debate between Rameau and Rousseau was based on. In this sense, it is also the precondition of Derrida's deconstruction in *Of Grammatology*. The alternative is the diagonal line of flight: "Smooth space is filled by events or haecceities, far more than by formed and perceived things. It is a space of affects" [p.479]. The smoothness and consistency of the field of immanence of sound – the BwO of sound – is a field of sonic haecceities.

According to Deleuze/Guattari, Boulez' compositional abstract machine is concerned not with a single form of space, a choice *between* the smooth *or* the striated, but with "the communication between the two kinds of space, their alternations and superpositions" [Plateaus, p.478]. Equally, they claim that as a historian of compositional technique, his interest is in showing examples of the composer who "invents a kind of diagonal running between the harmonic vertical and melodic horizon." [Plateaus, p.296]

However, Boulez himself has described the compositional relationship between the two axes not as a rhizomatic displacement, but within specifically arborescent lexis: "Pitch and duration seem to me to form the basis of a compositional dialectic, while intensity and timbre belong to secondary categories." [quoted in Wishart, *On Sonic Art*, p.7] Ironically, it is Trevor Wishart, perhaps the most Deleuzian/Guattarian of English composers at least, who has delivered the most intense critique of Boulez' arborescent tendencies, and which we can oppose to the reading which Deleuze/Guattari make. In his *On Sonic Art*, Wishart proposes a compositional shift from the *lattice-oriented* geometry of the score towards the ideas of *continuum* and *stream*. This is achieved through a substitution of the model of discrete pitch structures by the model of timbral multi-dimensionality, much as Deleuze/Guattari suggest in the shift from strata to plateaus^[8].

Thus, we can ask of the relationship between the plan(e) of organization and the plane of immanence – "which Boulez?", the *rhizomatic Boulez* of Deleuze/Guattari's reading, or the *dialectical Boulez* of Wishart's? If Cage's work with silence represents the plane of immanence, and if Stockhausen's work represents the plan(e) of organization, then Boulez could be placed between these two planes, but in what form does the

[8] A further irony, however, is that Wishart provides a highly phonocentric critique of the idea of writing, which he blames for the rise of the arborescent structure of the score: "Writing, originally a clever mnemonic for recording the verbal part of important speech-communications between real individuals, soon grew to such a degree as to dominate, to become normative upon, what might properly be said. Divorced from the immediate reality of face-to-face communication, it became objectivified [sic], generalised, and above all, permitted the new class of scribes (whether priests, bureaucrats or academics) to define and control what might 'objectively' be meant." [*On Sonic Art*, p.8]

Boulez milieu appear? Does the middle ground represent the becoming-BwO of the organism, or the being organized of the body of immanence? As we have seen, a certain pseudo-deconstructive path can be traced between these two planes, one which initially unearths the rhizomatic movements of the structural root, turning them from points on a graph into lines of flight outwith the axiology of the graph, these lines coagulating into sound-blocks, or sound-rhizomes proper, and gradually, through the agency of an abstract machine such as the synthesizer or the voice, these sound-rhizomes can be set in truly continuous variation not only from each other, but also from themselves. At this moment, we have reached the field of immanent sound, the sonic BwO, with the sound-rhizomes blending through a common matter into a network of intensities on a common surface - a field of *haecceitas*. If we were in a simply deconstructive mode, the gradual flattening out of sound onto this field would perhaps represent our anti-*telos* - our goal would be this system of non-goals, and we would affirm the nature of experience as that which lies in the milieu or middle, rather than the origin or the *telos*. However, just as Deleuze/Guattari can be read as having developed a version of supplementary *différance* within the rhizome, and then to have extended the programme towards a fully surfacial immanence, so too they reject the idea of the originary supplement. If we were to take the plan(e) of organization as the origin and the plane of immanence as the ultimate supplement, then there would always be the danger of reading the plane of immanence as some form of hyper-origin. One step towards seeing how Deleuze/Guattari deal with this issue - which in a Derridean system would threaten the return of closure - is to consider the possibility that although we can certainly move from

arborescence to immanence, the converse is also just as certainly true. If this will return us to a meta-dialectic between two planes, we will have to retrace our steps carefully^[9].

10.3 Return from Immanence

In the pseudo-deconstructive movement from arborescence to immanence, the concept of the abstract machine provided a crucial moment of passage from the post-arborescent rhizome towards the field of common matter. The abstract machine, then, is a mechanism for movement from one state to another; it "plays a pivoting role." [*Plateaus*, p.142] However, it is certainly not the only form of machine which Deleuze/Guattari theorise, and it is also not the only machine which can act as a pivot between states. While the synthesizer effectively opens a rhizome up to further possibilities of non-arborescent transformations, other machines exist

[9] As was noted in Chapter 1, Jean Molino refers to the concept of immanence in *Musical Fact and the Semiology of Music*. Significantly, Molino makes reference to the concept of music as a "polymorphous reality" [*Musical Fact*, p.113], and alludes to the idea that "there is never a self-contained, stable system" [*ibid.*, p.121]. Yet rather than affirming a multiplicity of *plateaus* on a *plane of immanence*, such as Deleuze/Guattari propose, Molino opts for the more rigid model of "stratifications of strata" [*ibid.*, p.148]. In other words, there are three strata within the musical "symbol" constituting the semiological "tripartite division". Molino defines the "immanent" level as "an *object* - matter subject to form" [p.130]. Here, the confusion of immanence and stratification becomes evident. For Deleuze/Guattari, immanence is not a question of matter-form constructs - "instead of imposing a form upon a matter: what one addresses is less a matter submitted to laws than a materiality possessing a *nomos*." [*Plateaus*, p.408] However, Molino then goes further down the structuralist path by invoking dialectics itself: one first separates off the "neutral", "immanent" level from the other two strata, establishing "a description of the phenomena in which the conditions of production and reception of the message are not involved" [*Musical Fact*, p.146]. This, of course, is the equivalent of isolating a piece of immanence from the general plane of consistency - in other words, stratifying a plateau, imposing a form upon an intensive materiality.

which are capable of reversing the process: "*Machines are always singular keys that open or close an assemblage, a territory.*" [Plateaus, p.334] In this context, and with many resonances of Smith's mechanics, we can trace towards the concept of the *desiring-machine*; "Desiring machines are binary machines, obeying a binary law or set of rules governing associations: one machine is always coupled to another. The productive synthesis, the production of production, is inherently connective in nature: 'and...' 'and then...'" [Anti-Oedipus, p.5] It is all a matter of connection. Just as in Smith's imaginary mechanism of the intervallic chain, desiring machines align themselves into sequences which create larger and larger connected networks until all that we hear is "the continual whirr of machines" [Anti-Oedipus, p.2]. Equally, we can note that the mode of connectivity operated by the desiring-machines is, like Derridean supplementary logic, an additive one - not the conjugation of the verb "to be" which one expects from originary thought (and the attendant ontological copula of the "is"), but the conjunction achieved through the spatio-temporal articulation of the "and...and then...". Deleuze/Guattari term this additive connection *productive synthesis*, or simply the *production of production*.

However, the concept of the supplement was derived, somewhat circuitously, from the mechanisms of harmonic theory, and it has been shown above that within the harmonic interval, there is often a relationship to the fundamental root. This is the process by which sound is divided into structures of consonance and dissonance, resulting in a basically ontological system. Carlyle, for instance, even managed to incorporate the image of harmony within his determination of melody, by

concentrating on precisely this organization of harmonics within the law of a most tree-like root. Deleuze/Guattari point to precisely this aspect of intervallic chaining in claiming that: "Desiring-machines make us an organism" [*Anti-Oedipus*, p.8]. In this, we can see a repetition in a new lexical register of the critique of the supplement^[10]. This critique can be written from a reading of harmonic theory, but also from transposing the originary opposition of melody-harmony into the opposition voice-machine. Such a critique has been traced above.

Deleuze/Guattari implicitly but continually move us from pseudo-Derridean situations towards alignments more redolent of a post-structural reading of Adam Smith's specific theory of the ear. Just as we can read Smith's theory as an attempt to move from deep structures to surface resonances, Deleuze/Guattari describe a point of collapse for the system of the resonating desiring-machines. The very great desire for continual connection, disconnection and reconnection results in the fact that "desiring-machines work only when they break down, and by continually breaking down." [ibid.] (In this we can discern a similarity with the "necessary" failure of organizational plan[e]s.) The continuity of the supplementary permutation of terms inevitably results not only in the assembly of specific networks, but also in their disassembly - "The automata stop dead and set free the unorganized mass they once served to articulate." [ibid.] We have already seen in Smith that connection is also a matter of articulation, and that articulation was the hinge by which

[10] As we have already seen above, just as the supplement and the rhizome have an intertext, so too, the rhizome is inherently bound up with the concept of desire: "it is always by rhizome that desire moves and produces." [*Plateaus*, p.14]

objects from a chaotic miasma are aligned together in harmonic chains. Smith's chaotic miasma, can be read (given certain lexical provisos) as this "unorganized mass" which the desiring machines articulate in binary fashion^[11]. Just as the desiring-machines are based in production through connection, they can also connect themselves into an anti-production, and this is the disjunction of the harmonic system which occurs at the point of contact with the field of the immanent BwO:

An apparent conflict arises between desiring-machines and the body without organs. Every coupling of machines, every production of a machine, every sound of a machine running, becomes unbearable to the body without organs. Beneath its organs it senses there are larvae and loathsome worms, and a God at work messing it all up or strangling it by organizing it. [*Anti-Oedipus*, p.9]

The BwO is no organism, because an organism represents an organization and hierarchization of organs, a *series* of defined relationships which determine the functions within the whole of the components. An organism is thus created by the desiring-machine which cuts into, penetrates the BwO, slices it up into separate organs, assigns functions to these organs, and then aligns them structurally according to stratified functions: the desiring-machine turns plateaus into strata. According to Deleuze/Guattari, the "opposition" of the organism and the machine, which constitutes Carlyle's retort to Smith, relies precisely on the reflexivity of the two within the opposition. While the organism is inherently bound up with the plan(e) of organization, the machine also partakes of the stratification, the intervallic movements and penetrations

[11] But let us also not forget that Carlyle describes the plane of immanent "noise" as a "chaos", in line with Smith's usage. The distinction between the two, then, is not in their definition of the "out there", as much as in their approaches to the value of the "out there" and their subsequent solutions to its chaos - Smith harmonizes, Carlyle melodizes.

which occur in the construction of arborescence^[12]. It is the very existence of the metaphysical interval which is at stake in this opposition, and thus also the opposition between harmony and melody, instrument and voice, and so on. Organics needs the existence of the interval in order to produce its closure, while the organicist desiring-machine needs the concept of penetration in order to slice immanence up into intervallic units. Viewing mechanics from the vantage point of organics, harmony represents a structural swerve away from the ultimate penetration of essences required for the binding of organs into a singular organism. In this sense, it is a step towards immanence, and in this capacity we can cite an abstract machine such as the synthesizer. Nevertheless, while the synthesizer can take sounds and begin to place them on the plane of consistency, from the other direction, it can be seen as the beginning of the segmentation of the immanent field. Thus, it is effectively the penetration of the BwO by the

[12] One of the few anglophone musicologists to cite Deleuze/Guattari (although only acknowledging Guattari in parentheses) is Richard Middleton, who devotes around half a page to them out of some 300 in *Studying Popular Music*. He first characterizes them, along with Lyotard, as simply "philosophers of desire", and incorrectly summarizes their position as one which merely "sees the human organism as a collection of 'desiring-machines'" [*Studying Popular Music*, pp.258/9]. Associating this with the more crass concepts of desire in the rock scene of 1968, Middleton labels it as a component of a generally "vulgar Freudianism" [*ibid.*], apparently unaware of the radically anti-Freudian ramifications of a book titled *Anti-Oedipus*. However, Middleton also appears to run the risk of confusing the concepts of the desiring-machine and the BwO. He claims that "a writer like Deleuze [sic], flattening the dialectic into congruence, can picture the body as a machine" [*ibid.*, p.287]. These misunderstandings on Middleton's part evidently stem from his own arborescent view of the idea of the situation: "Adorno's (1976: 52) view is preferable to this; at least he acknowledges the organic/mechanical dialectic" [*ibid.*, p.294]. However, do not Deleuze/Guattari point to the fact that the machine occupies a position within the arborescent ground of the strata? In particular, their statement that "Desiring machines are binary machines" [*Anti-Oedipus*, p.5], would appear to problematize Middleton's reading, before we even take on board their assertion that "Desiring-machines make us an organism" [*Anti-Oedipus*, p.8].

desiring-machine in order to introduce intervals and harmonic organization which produces the organism.

However, "the body without organs is not the proof of an original nothingness, nor is it what remains of a lost totality" [*Anti-Oedipus*, p.8]. Equally, the BwO is not an undifferentiated origin such as that which Rousseau has proposed, since such an origin is precisely the central term in an organism. The BwO is not originary, but merely one stage in a continually refracting process. While it can be positioned as "prior" to the action of the desiring-machines, and be acted upon by them, it can also be produced as the collapse of their mechanisms.

Just as the unconsciousness of Vespasian provided an interruption of the Emperor's semiotic flow, so too the BwO represents the disjunctive interruption of phonocentric organization and control;

In order to resist organ-machines, the body without organs presents its smooth, slippery, opaque, taut surface as a barrier. In order to resist linked, connected, and interrupted flows, it sets up a counterflow of amorphous, undifferentiated fluid. In order to resist words composed of articulated phonetic units, it utters only gasps and cries that are sheer unarticulated blocks of sound. [*Anti-Oedipus*, p.9]

This repulsional BwO (Vespasian as an abstract machine which constructs a sonic field of immanence) represents the attempt to disrupt the structures of semiotics which connect together the concepts of sound and meaning, signifier and signified. This disruption, however, does not occur through the mechanism of the interval, as a reading within Derridean supplementarity suggests. There, we have the image of the division of an undifferentiated mass, and an originary articulation of spacing within the self-proximate. In order that the interval operates, however, it must reconnect that which it divides, and thus risk the collapse of the system

back into unity – division risks dialectics, the machine risks the organism. This is the risk which a harmonic supplementarity takes, and it is the condition of the binary-oriented desiring-machines. It is the stratification of the BwO into ontologically differential layers (signifier, signified, etc.) which is achieved by the dividing-machine.

On the nomadic surface of the BwO, there is no place for the *logos* to unproblematically take root within the proliferation of *nomoi* (although it can divide and rule the BwO by force). The BwO stands in a certain opposition to the concept of stratification.

To the strata as a whole, the BwO opposes disarticulation (or *n* articulations) as the property of the plane of consistency, experimentation as the operation on that plane (no signifier, never interpret!), and nomadism as the movement (keep moving, even in place, never stop moving, motionless voyage, desubjectification). [*Plateaus*, p.159]

Thus, the system faces in two directions. On the one side, we face the plan(e) of organization (Carlylean "*permanency*"), on the other, the plane of immanence (Carlyle's "*nomadism*, continual change" [*The Nigger Question*, pp.778-9]). Our means of passage from one to the other in either direction is determined by the forms of abstract machines which we assemble. An abstract machine such as a synthesizer "places all of the parameters in continuous variation" [*Plateaus*, p.109], and thus rhizomatizes roots towards the common matter of immanence. On the other hand, a desiring-machine can slice up the body without organs into separate bodies-as-organs, and then stratify those organs (organize them), and thus finally "make us an organism" [*Anti-Oedipus*, p.8]. In fact, the two planes are locked in a continual struggle; "The plane of organization is constantly working away at the plane of consistency, always trying to plug the lines of flight [...] Conversely, the plane of

consistency is constantly extricating itself from the plane of organization, causing particles to spin off the strata" [*Plateaus*, p.270]. Here, we have the image of one plane flying away from the other, which is constantly in pursuit. While the plane of consistency pulls particles away from the plan(e) of organization turning them into lines, the plan(e) responds by pulling lines back down to be rooted as points. On one end of this system, there is a field of immanent sound constantly pulling away from, for instance, a compositional plan which attempts to stratify it according to the structure of the series, the structure of tonality, or even simply the axiology of the score. The real question becomes one of the precise, technical relationship between these two planes. As Deleuze/Guattari write, "why does the opposition between the two kinds of planes lead to a still more abstract hypothesis?" [p.269]. Yet they trace their way even further down this path when they claim that;

In fact, the opposition we should set up between the two planes is that of between two abstract poles: for example, to the transcendent, organizational plane of Western music based on sound forms and their development, we oppose the immanent plane of consistency of Eastern music, composed of speeds and slownesses, movements and rest. [*Plateaus*, p.270]

So if there is actually an *opposition* between two abstract poles – the transcendent and the immanent – are we not dealing merely with a new repetition at another level of the same oppositional structure which we have been tracing throughout? If this is so, then is it also the case that musical events are merely the product of some dialectic between these two planes (as Boulez suggests despite Deleuze/Guattari's reading)? At this juncture, we have reached perhaps the greatest point of convergence between Derridean deconstruction and the post-structuralism of Deleuze/Guattari. Just as the reliance of harmonic supplementarity on the

dissonant relation to the root always already threatens closure as much as *différance*, and thus a merely dialectical difference, so too the opposition of two forms of planes potentially threatens to provide a closure at a further level. Deleuze/Guattari provocatively write that "we invoke one dualism only in order to challenge another." [*Plateaus*, p.20] As we will see, however, this invocation is potentially more provocation than even provisional dialectic. The question is overtly acknowledged: "Have we not, however, reverted to a simple dualism by contrasting maps to tracings, as good and bad sides?" [*Plateaus*, p.13]

It is then argued that while a rhizome can indeed be re-rooted, and that even the lines of flight which coagulate to form a sound block can be separated back out and reconnected to points on a graph, the deconstructive reversal of this arborescence, the movement towards immanence, is "not at all symmetrical" [*ibid.*]. In other words, to view the becoming-immanent of sound as the absolute structural reversal of arborification is to mistake the crucial distinction between the *tracing* of terms and their *mapping*. The "structure" of becoming-immanent is precisely *not* the form of point-to-point tracing which is effected by a simple, symmetrical reversal of the teleological programme of a return to the root. To move from an immanent multiplicity back towards a plan(e) of organization inevitably involves the tracing back to a single originary point. That root will have a transcendental structure, remaining identical no matter how many times one traces back to it. The nature of the immanent plane, however, is not static - it is a continual flux, its surface contains haecceities, and yet has a certain haecceic movement in itself. The nature of the "abstract pole" of immanence is continuous variation, and so the

distinction between the two planes is not that between "two opposed models", but that between static *model* and continual *process*; "It is a question of a model that is perpetually in construction or collapsing, and of a process that is perpetually prolonging itself, breaking off and starting up again. No, this is not a new or different dualism." [*Plateaus*, p.20] In this way, what one reaches is not a series of structurally organized strata, but a continually varying network of *plateaus*, endlessly re-composing themselves and each other, relating concentrically rather than in a single line between points. Once more, as with Smith, a certain refraction is evident as one term elides with another: "A plateau is a piece of immanence. Every BwO is made up of plateaus. Every BwO is itself a plateau in communication with other plateaus on the plane of consistency. The BwO is a component of passage." [*Plateaus*, p.158] Here a distinction is made between the plane of consistency and the BwO. This distinction does not hold in the usual, structural sense of distinction. As we have seen, the plane of consistency "is" a BwO, and vice versa. However, BwO's are both composed of and compose plateaus. Several BwO's, then, as themselves plateaus, can compose another BwO. In this way, the questions; "Does the plane of consistency constitute the body without organs, or does the body without organs compose the plane? Are the Body without Organs and the Plane the same thing?" [*Plateaus*, p.507] - have no permanent meaning. Our only means of distinguishing different BwO's, or planes of immanence, are inherently transitory, as soon as we move into immanence. Thus, the distinction between the plan(e) of organization, say a Platonic Ideality, and the plane of immanence, or to coin a phrase, the *plateaunic actuality*, becomes, as Deleuze/Guattari hold, non-symmetrical. One cannot

trace one's way towards immanence, since, as soon as one realises one's placing as a milieu within immanence, there is no originary point, and no point of *telos*. There is thus no axis to traverse.

It is the distinction between the middle and the ends. With Carlyle, we saw how it was possible to attempt the grounding of immanence in a transcendental silence; "all we need to do is to sink the floating plane of immanence, bury it in the depths of Nature instead of allowing it to play freely on the surface, for it to pass to the other side and assume the role of a ground" [*Plateaus*, p.269]. Although this particular project of Carlyle's failed, it can be shown how arborescence can potentially be forced into a position of success. However, even this success will be transitory, as the *model* of arborescence is continually put into variation by the *process* of immanence. Again, symmetry is not present: in order for the plan(e) of organization to take control, a plane of immanence is *submerged* - *below* the surface. The *non-symmetrical "opposite"* of this, where the plane of immanence returns, is achieved when the plan(e) of organization is *put into the middle* of a non-spatial, intensive "surface". In other words, the success of arborescence is based on the establishment of an above-below axis, whereas the success of immanence is un-rooted in the continuous variation of a pseudo-spatiality. In other words, although the limit of the success of arborescence would be the annihilation of immanence (impossible, and hence the "failure" of all plans), the success of immanence is not based in the annihilation of arborescence, but simply in the incorporation of its *duality as one instance within a generalized multiplicity*. Structures still occur, but as knots within a field, knots which occasionally suck their rhizomatic neighbours into a centralized system,

yet will inevitably fragment and dissolve back into the general immanence at any given moment. Conceived as a transient principle within a process, then, arborescence would not "fail" as a necessary experience (the Deleuzian/Guattarian reading of Boulez may amount to just such a conception: the dialectic as localized and not as a general rule). However, as we saw with Carlyle's "failed" plan, the "failure" to produce an anti-transience, effectively the loss of its possibility, resulted in even more emotional torment than the desire to establish it in the first instance.

At another level, if we considered the de-processing of the field of immanence, we can see that we move from the "generalized" plane of consistency through the plateaus towards the strata. If we can call each specific plateau a "piece of immanence", and if all plateaus, whether planes, BwO's, rhizomes, or whatever can thus be seen as "pieces of immanence", then it follows that even organized plateaus - strata - are simply "pieces of [structured] immanence". In this sense, consistency is immanent even to structure: "The plane of consistency is always immanent to the strata; the two states of the abstract machine [eg. synthesizer or desiring] always coexist as two different states of intensities." [*Plateaus*, p.57] The abstract machines themselves, then, can also be read as plateaus/pieces of immanence/intensities within the general milieu of the plane(s) of consistency. The relativity of terminology in this field depends upon the position from which any given situation is considered. Just as an abstract machine can be read from two directions - its opening or closing of an assemblage - it takes on two states in itself, and thus potentially forms two different states of intensity. To be able to differentiate between intensities upon the plane of consistency, it is always already the case that a certain

tracing has been drawn across its map, but equally, the structural divisions within a plan(e) of organization always already imply potentials of motion and change.

Derrida's claim is that structures always already rupture. This follows from the fact that they are produced by the extension of a *point* of self-consistency - a univocal origin. In *Of Grammatology*, it is enough for Derrida to have strategically shown the self-rupturing of the self-consistent. Deleuze/Guattari also question the ideality of a univocal point of origin. Yet they also claim a certain univocality for the field of consistency: "it is necessarily a plane of immanence and univocality" [*Plateaus*, p.266]. The distinction is that this plane of univocality is, firstly, not a point but a field, and secondly, is not originary. However, in order to proceed from this plane towards an originary plan(e), rupture is also necessary (the slicing-up of the BwO by the desiring-machine). In this sense, *the undoing of both planes is the introduction of the interval*. Derrida demonstrates a limited movement away from the arborescent plan(e). Deleuze/Guattari demonstrate several movements between both planes, and in both directions.

For the plateaunist, it is always "a question of method: *the tracing should always be put back on the map*." [*Plateaus*, p.13] This marks the connection between plateaunism and deconstruction - not only is the stage of reversal merely provisional, but displacement is acknowledged as neither end, non-end, or an-end. In a sense, the plateaunist can claim that immanence is always already in place, but the divergence with Derridean deconstruction comes at the point where the plateaunist acknowledges the ability of the originary organism to return: it is always already possible

for re-rooting to take place, and this can be accompanied by force, political (Carlyle) or methodological (Stockhausen), or even by default (Smith). It is therefore a question not of merely deconstructing, but of actively resisting reconstruction: "it is so important to try the other, reverse but nonsymmetrical, operation. Plug the tracings back into the map, connect the roots or trees back up with a rhizome." [*Plateaus*, p.14] From the spatio-temporal logic of the supplement - and of the desiring-machines and the Imaginary Machine - which establishes the "and...and then...", we relocate at the a-location of the BwO, the plane of consistency. In immanence, we have not an articulation of space and time (*différance*), but a non-spatial surface, an *intensive* "spatium" (here, the trace-structures of language try to re-root the attempt to "map" the intensional). The logic of the "and" is thus established, outside of the idea of a seriality and (hence) direction of time:

move between things, establish a logic of the AND, overthrow ontology, do away with foundations, nullify endings and beginnings. [...] The middle is by no means an average; on the contrary, it is where things pick up speed. *Between* things does not designate a localizable relation going from one thing to the other and back again, but a perpendicular direction, a transversal movement that sweeps one *and* the other away, a stream without beginning or end that undermines its banks and picks up speed in the middle. [*Plateaus*, p.25]

There is a choice to be made, and Deleuze/Guattari constantly canvass our support to choose the flight away from roots towards immanence, all the while reminding us that attempts will be made to ground this flight. The political is thus elided with the aesthetic, just as much as it is in Carlyle or in Rousseau, but here for quite alternative reasons: "There is always something genealogical about a tree. It is not a method for

the people."^[13] [*Plateaus*, p.8] Deleuze/Guattari acknowledge that it is not just enough to point to immanence or to unearth it, or even to be self-satisfied and claim its actuality (de-centred verity); one must actually *compose* it, in all the multiple senses of that verb, and full realization that arborescence will always be pulling one back into the centre: "We ourselves were unable to do it. We just used words that in turn function for us as plateaus." [*Plateaus*, p.22] Pieces of immanence, assembling, disassembling, splitting, melding, with two directions for each action, towards an arborescent univocity with its claims to originarity and control, or towards an immanent univocity with its claims to nothing and everything. Mapping these processes is what constitutes the activity of schizoanalysis: not the quest for the unity beneath the multiple, but the movement between multiplicities.

In more basic terms, what we approach in post-structuralism is the difference between opposition and difference; while opposition presupposes difference, the reverse is not symmetrical – difference does not presuppose opposition. Equally, while opposition is also a reduction of difference to a binary relation, difference only ever *begins* with the number two, but then rapidly expands from that moment into an extant multiplicity.

[13] Michel Foucault writes in his preface to *Anti-Oedipus*: "The Christian moralists sought out the traces of the flesh lodged deep within the soul. Deleuze and Guattari, for their part, pursue the slightest traces of fascism in the body." [*Anti-Oedipus*, p.xiii] Notably, Foucault elsewhere writes "Perhaps one day, this century will be known as Deleuzian." [quoted in Carroll, *Paraesthetics*, p.198]

10.4 Wildly Rigorous

As we have seen, Deleuze/Guattari are not an instance of the "wildness" that Christopher Norris accuses post-structuralism of. Indeed, the flight from structuralism which they represent has many intertexts with the idea of a *rigorous deconstruction*; their concept of *destratification* demands a certain degree of care. "Staying stratified - organized, signified, subjected - is not the worst that can happen; the worst that can happen is if you throw the strata into demented or suicidal collapse, which brings them down on us heavier than ever." [*Plateaus*, p.161] Destratification - the movement from the strata towards the plateaus - is not the sign of an abdication of responsibility, but a reason for sobriety, and "much caution is needed to prevent the plane of consistency from becoming a pure plane of abolition" [*Plateaus*, p.270]. According to Deleuze/Guattari, "wildness" risks a number of undesirable BwO's, such that the crucial question is: "How can we fabricate a BwO for ourselves without its being the cancerous BwO of a fascist inside us, or the empty BwO of a drug addict, paranoid, or hypochondriac?" [*Plateaus*, p.163] Following this line of thought, one could easily turn the question on the various theories which have been considered above. For instance, what of the surfacial repulsion of phonic penetration represented in Chapter 6 by a Smithian reading of the Vespasian situation? Deleuze/Guattari comment on a similar example that "this *repulsion* of desiring-machines by the body without organs [...is...] the real meaning of the paranoid machine: the desiring-machines attempt to break into the body without organs, and the body without organs repels them, since it experiences them as an over-all persecution apparatus." [*Anti-Oedipus*, p.9] It seems that the declaration

of one's own *nomos* must be handled carefully if one is not to risk, with Vespasian, the construction of a paranoic system, completely cut off from circulation.

Different types of rhizomatic movement have different affective capacities, their own modes of *haecceitas*, as a simple comparison between the two great indeterminacy-rhizomes of John Cage will show: *music* and *mycology*. While there is inherently a mode of indeterminacy involved in which fungi a mycologist will be able to *collect* on any given foray, the *compositional* (culinary) methodology necessarily requires arborescence (unlike musical composition) in order to control these most rhizomatic of plants: "if you use indeterminacy in connection with the gathering and eating of mushrooms, you might kill yourself." [*John Cage's Practical Utopias*, p.471] However, it is clear that there is no *carte blanche* available within musical composition either, if the equivalent dangers are also to be avoided here. As Deleuze/Guattari write, the principle of rigorous methodology must be extended into the musical compositional field, too:

Sometimes one overdoes it, puts too much in, works with a jumble of lines and sounds; then, instead of producing a cosmic machine capable of 'rendering sonorous,' one lapses back to a machine of reproduction that ends up reproducing nothing but a scribble effacing all lines, a scramble effacing all sounds. The claim in that one is opening music to all events, all irruptions, but one ends up reproducing a scrambling that prevents any event from happening. All one has left is a resonance chamber well on the way to forming a black hole. [*Plateaus*, p.344]

In the attempt to create a truly *sonorous body*, the manipulation of sonic lines of flight must ensure that they do not merely result in an empty arborescence, an empty representation, a re-sonance. The destratification of representation does not entail a mere antithetical negation - to do so entraps the sonorous body within a *dialectical* struggle against

representation, and reformulates it as a negative term. What is required is the transgression, not the transcendence, of structure.

In a similar manner, an irresponsible performance of Cage can easily turn into a black hole, becoming pointless or even worse (*and many do*). As Cage has complained;

last night, *Five* was played incorrectly. I didn't enjoy it. I'll tell you quite frankly; I was unhappy, even disturbed. It was actually improvising - it had nothing to do with my work. I know what Karlheinz Stockhausen would have done; he would have shouted 'STOP!' Now why wouldn't I do that? This morning, I knew perfectly well what I should've done. I should've interrupted them and explained to the audience that the piece was not being played correctly [*John Cage and the Glaswegian Circus*, p.5]

Indeterminate performance techniques, in their rhizomatic, haecceic process, are matters for *increased* rigour, and not its inverse. What one attempts through this *rigour* is to avoid turning the sonorous body towards a state of *rigor*. Equally, while a certain level of rhizomatic movement will enhance (even be necessary in) a performance of Bach or Chopin, too much will inevitably entail a certain pointlessness. Turning the arborescent structures of the score into lines of flight is not achieved through a lack of respect to the *haecceitas* of the piece - one does not proceed by destroying style and throwing the piece into an aesthetic black hole. Destratifying Chopin's *Preludes* for piano does not mean turning them into an empty representation of Cage's *Preludes* for prepared piano. On the contrary, it means carefully and precisely hooking into the lines of flight which the piece assembles as its very "this-ness". In this, one does not leave *technique* behind; in fact, one relies all the more on its rigour: "Your synthesis of disparate elements will be all the *stronger* if you proceed with a sober gesture, an act of consistency, capture, or extraction that works

in a material that is not meager but prodigiously simplified, creatively limited, selected. For there is no imagination outside of technique." [Plateaus, p.345] Just as deconstruction does not imply a destructive negativity, so too destratification does not result in a plane of obliteration. Rather, the imaginary machine with which one assembles a field of immanence must be constructed according to a precise technical rigour.

IN(-) CONCLUSION

I suppose it is written that any one who sets up for a bit of a philosopher, must contradict himself to his very face. For here I have fairly talked myself into thinking that we have the whole thing before us at last; that there is no answer to the mystery, except that there are as many answers as you please; that there is no centre to the maze because, like the famous sphere, its centre is everywhere; and that agreeing to differ with every ceremony of politeness, is the only "one undisturbed song of pure concert" to which we are ever likely to lend our musical voices.

- *Virginibus Puerisque*, Robert Louis Stevenson, 1881.

IN(-) CONCLUSION

DIALECTS OF IMMANENCE

the choice between two strategies:

a. To attempt an exit and a deconstruction without changing terrain, by repeating what is implicit in the founding concepts and the original problematic [...] one risks ceaselessly confirming, consolidating [...] that which one allegedly deconstructs. The continuous process of making explicit, moving toward an opening, risks sinking into the autism of the closure.

b. To decide to change terrain, in a discontinuous and irruptive fashion, by brutally placing oneself outside, and by affirming an absolute break and difference. Without mentioning all the other forms of *trompe-l'oeil* perspective in which such a displacement can be caught, thereby inhabiting more naively and more strictly than ever the inside one declares one has deserted, the simple practise of language ceaselessly reinstates the new terrain on the oldest ground. [*Margins of Philosophy*, p.135]

In the precipitous year of 1968, Derrida outlines two deconstructive strategies which are also risks of deconstructive failure – reconstruction. How does one break with metaphysics, ontology, dialectics? Either one works on them from within their own terms, or one attempts to make a clean break, jumping sideways into a new field. However, by both manoeuvres, one is defined in terms of a relation to that which one allegedly leaves. For instance, either: (a) ontology collapses under its own weight and produces *différance* (all the while risking a dialectical return to ontological difference); or (b) in leaving ontological territory, one risks locating in its that which *is not* ontology, the nonbeing of ontology (again risking a dialectical relationship to ontology as its *antithesis*).

In Chapter 1, it was shown that a rigorous deconstruction, although

flaunting its relationship with a host structure, should not be reducible to it. In Chapter 2, Derrida's deconstruction of melody was shown to invoke the concept of harmony as the *indécidable* in Rousseau's ontology, and thus the deconstructed harmony of supplementarity was produced as its unwanted but inevitable by-product: the originary supplement. The question was not so much of how far Derrida escaped the structures of Rousseau's ontology, but the far more pressing issue of what his precise relationship was to the concept of harmony. He did not delineate this as fully as that of "writing", and given this (quite understandable) deficit in his text, it was easy to argue that the grammatological programme was subject to a very real risk of attack from this angle. From that point on, it was argued that not only could "harmony" itself be construed as a dialectical system, but that it could also be seen to operate through the logocentric action of a penetrating semiotic essence. The "result" of that tangentially Derridean reading was the realisation in the context of Smith that if the penetrational element of harmony was dropped, it was possible to assemble a form of sympathetic vibration which presupposed a certain deconstructed *autonomy*, and thus originarity. In other words, it was shown that, if the penetrational semiotic can be disrupted by the intervallic supplement, it could equally be disrupted by the action of a "self-vibrating region of intensity" such as the Smithian ear-plateau. Through a consideration of Carlyle's attempt to revise the Rousseauist moment precisely as a guard against the kind of attack Derrida launches, it was shown that penetrations both theoretical and political could be perpetrated in order to actively suppress the interval. Equally, Carlyle proposed a thorough-going penetration of the surfacial concepts of

Smithian autonomy. All of this was achieved through the closure represented by an *inward*, rather than *outward* conception of harmony - unison as *telos*, actively fought for. Under the weight of such violent closure, the adequacy of the Derridean field was thrown into question: even if the text of ontology could be held to self-deconstruct in the hands of a Derrida, would this be of any consequence to the warrior fighting to bring about the origin as *telos*? Equally, by this stage, so many versions of harmony and melody had been delineated that the simple allegiance of the supplement to the harmonic and the origin to the melodic could not hold. Neither could the extension of this opposition into the field of the machine-organism opposition suggested at further lexical registers by the opposition of Carlyle to Smith. Finally, Deleuze/Guattari's account of survival under and resistance to the idea of the organism was invoked as an active supplement to the Derridean notion that the text of ontology self-deconstructs: the field of immanence must be actively maintained, since there will always be those attempting to bind its plateaus into a stratified organism.

Yet despite the potential setbacks for deconstruction represented by the threat of reconstruction, it is a question of necessity for Derrida: "It goes without saying that these effects do not suffice to annul the necessity for a 'change of terrain.'" [*Margins*, p.135] The means which he proposes is a further problematization of the field - the combination of the two strategies outlined above which threaten at every point to be a reconstitution of "intrinsic" and "extrinsic" analysis;

A new writing must weave and interlace these two motifs of deconstruction. Which amounts to saying that one must speak several languages and produce several texts at once. [...] what we need, perhaps, as Nietzsche said, is a change of

"style"; and if there is style, Nietzsche reminded us, it must be *plural*. [*Margins*, p.135]

Certainly, a radical multiplicity of strategy is one of the most commented-upon characteristics of *A Thousand Plateaus*, and the ghosts of Nietzsche can be heard laughing throughout its labyrinthine passages. Equally, however, the multiplicity of Deleuze/Guattari's style can hardly be said to be generated entirely through the weaving and interlacing of only "these two motifs" of Derridean deconstruction.

Perhaps one of the problems of deconstruction specifically as it is laid out in *Of Grammatology* is a certain negativity which is adopted in relation to Rousseau. No doubt this derives from the necessity of engaging a whole range of morally-charged issues in Rousseau's text – since Derrida must operate at a level immanent to the text, it is perhaps no surprise that he begins to take a "deconstructed" moral tone himself. We read of Rousseau's paranoias, perversions, and so on. One gets the feeling that Rousseau is wrong in some way; what Derrida demonstrates is Rousseau's failure – the failure of originary logic to contain its Other. To be sure, Derrida does this in order to demonstrate the principle of supplementary affirmation, the joyous Nietzschean play of the world, and so forth, but we only reach this affirmation through the provisional stage of a reversal of Rousseau's terms – the positivity of negation. Hence our affirmation is afflicted with the shadow of its own provisional negative. This is the problem of erasure: the deconstructed supplement nevertheless goes under the same name as its undeconstructed self (hence the always already of the "scarequotes").

Worthy of note in this context is the famous critique by Paul de Man in *The Rhetoric of Blindness: Jacques Derrida's Reading of Rousseau*

(1971). Under the aegis of the deconstructive claim that the text contains its own self-deconstruction, de Man claims that the "fissures" in Rousseau are in fact anything but aberrations which threaten to annihilate an increasingly paranoid system: indeed, they are precisely the *point* of the system. Hence, "There is no need to deconstruct Rousseau" [*Blindness and Insight*, p.139];

Why does he [Derrida] have to reproach Rousseau for doing exactly what he legitimately does himself? According to Derrida, Rousseau's rejection of a logocentric theory [...] "could not be a radical rejection, for it occurs within the framework inherited from this philosophy and of the 'metaphysical' conception of art." I have tried to show instead that Rousseau's use of a traditional vocabulary is exactly similar, in its strategy and its implications, to the use Derrida consciously makes of the traditional vocabulary of Western philosophy. What happens in Rousseau is exactly what happens in Derrida [*Blindness and Insight*, p.138]

In the "light" of this "insight", what is at stake in *Of Grammatology* is a certain disingenuous attempt to read Rousseau in the same way that he reads metaphysics, whilst denying *his* ability to move beyond its structures. As we have seen, Derrida elsewhere openly acknowledges the problem of "his own" failure to lexically and conceptually escape from metaphysics. The question for de Man is, then, one of why Derrida is so hard on Rousseau, when he (Derrida) is potentially at least guilty of the same failure?

As David Wood writes, "'erasure' is no protection" [*The Deconstruction of Time*, p.311]. Yet, according to Wood, "the fact that deconstruction cannot do it does not mean that it cannot be done in a way responsive to its insights." [ibid.] The "it" referred to here is indubitably not the same "it" which Christopher Norris reads as the *truth* of deconstruction. Norris hopes for a "less sceptical and troublesome"

conclusion for deconstruction than that offered by such post-structuralists as Deleuze/Guattari [*The Truth About Postmodernism*, p.224].

Perhaps this is the crucial strategic difference between Derrida and Deleuze/Guattari: instead of a certain negativity (no matter how provisional) with respect to the host text (such as Rousseau), the plateaunic approach is more one of identifying the *indécidables* as affirmational within the host text as such. The focus is thus not so much on the strand of tradition which attempts to *inhibit* the points of structural rupture, but on the strands of traditional thought which have at various moments attempted to *release* it. Thus, with Deleuze/Guattari (and particularly in Deleuze's "own" texts) we find an alternative canon set up which includes a series of *minor philosophers*, or *philosophers of minority*: "The notion of *minority* is very complex, with musical, literary, linguistic, as well as juridical and political, references." [*A Thousand Plateaus*, p.105] We have already noted the *majority* of the tonal and the *minority* of the modal, the dissonant, etc.; the *minority* of Cage in preference to the *majority* of Stockhausen. Equally, in the plateaunic cannon (not canon) of *minor philosophers*, we find such as Duns Scotus, Spinoza, Hume and Bergson, through to Nietzsche. In the context of the current programme, we could add to this list Adam Smith in particular. Indeed, it was in the Deleuzian/Guattarian context that the readings from Smith were given in Chapters 5 and 6, "prior" to direct engagement with Deleuze/Guattari themselves. Perhaps, then, if it is a question of deconstruction inhabiting and therefore being subject to the movements of a specific text, it simply

becomes a strategic matter of which kind of text one engages with^[1].

The term "deconstruction" often takes a negative orientation. The vernacular negativity of the term can be provisionally dismissed for its conceptual inelegance, but the more technically-assumed negativity cannot be denied in the context of so many statements such as those of Derrida currently under consideration. The former negativity is (technically) a non-problem, the latter is precisely a component of the whole problematic. If we wish to radically interrogate structure (for instance, to show the failure of structuralisms to maintain their own self-integrity), then there are all too many texts which we can target in an endless regression of what will inevitably be seen as opposition (and thus, as Spivak has pointed out, recoverable to the canon's insipid rate of absorption). If, however, we choose a moment within the ostensibly logocentric "epoch" which itself represents an attempt to move through structure (no matter how limited this attempt is), then perhaps this moment can be subject to a deconstructive acceleration: not necessarily within deconstruction "itself", but (with Wood) "in a way responsive to its insights." In this manner, the *problematic* of being caught up in what one uses to demonstrate a delimited field becomes less of a *problem*.

There are ramifications for this approach within the field of critical

[1] This is not to unproblematically assume Deleuze/Guattari as "deconstructors", although they sometimes blur the distinctions themselves, as in the following passage, where one of their models of *destratification* is specifically associated with *deconstruction*: "regarding the active or practical notions of *decoding*, of *deconstruction*, and of the work as a *process*, the reader is referred to the excellent commentaries of Daniel Charles on Cage" [*Anti-Oedipus*, p.371] Note, however, that "deconstruction" as *decoding* is not used here in the sense of *analysis* (the uncovering of fundamental codes), but in the sense of "the idea that there is no longer any code." [ibid.]

musicology. Much of what could be placed under this heading has tended to take as its point of negativity the tradition of criticism and theory which asserts the values of aesthetic autonomy and absolute music (McClary, 1991^[2]; Citron et al, 1993; etc., etc.). Often, however, the relationship between the "autonomous" and the "social" is defined as one of opposition or conflict and therefore subject to dialectical resolutions of one kind or another (Molino 1975; Middleton 1990; Subotnik 1991; Shepherd 1991; Moore 1993; etc). Perhaps the most forceful critique of the absolutes of autonomy from a declared *deconstructive* position has been provided by McClary. She has, for instance, written of the necessity for showing rhetorical and narrative structures to be operative within absolute music, these narrative structures operating through the conflict between a One and an Other which is controlled by means of a dialectical "Master Narrative" [*Feminine Endings*, p.55]. Her project is to delimit this dialectic, and to deconstructively demonstrate the operation of differentials within "autonomous" instrumental music. McClary argues that aesthetic autonomy attempts to inhibit the concept of the *affect*, to reduce the corporeality of music not only by rejecting the voice in a move towards the instrumental, but by negating the possibility of representational codes within instrumental music itself. Hence, she uses rhetorical/narrative codes within the instrumental as a deconstructive lever to displace the claim that

[2] McClary refers to the work of Lorenzo Bianconi as a pretext to this move (*Feminine Endings*, p.35; Said also refers to McClary's reference here - *Musical Elaborations*, p.xvi). In several respects, the current text could further cite the work of David Johnson as a "common sense" approach to the problem not only of autonomy-vs-social, but also high-vs-low culture distinctions. Ironically, Johnson's thesis derives in large part from a broadly *empirical* approach to the highly intertextual *praxis* of Enlightenment performers, composers and audiences in C18th Edinburgh: cf. *Scottish Fiddle Music in the Eighteenth Century*.

music operates entirely outwith the social field.

However, as we have seen with the simplification of the field which Derrida relies on, there are not unproblematic distinctions to be made, and if we consider the distinct moves away from Rousseau which are suggested by Derrida, Smith and Carlyle, we can see that several problems emerge. In (Derrida's) Rousseau, a reaction against the instrumental is the claim that its mode of representation is inauthentic, essentially non-representational. However, as Derrida shows, it is precisely the inauthentic nature of sonic representation which can be used as a deconstructive lever against the whole edifice of Rousseau's obsession with mimesis. In Smith, the concept of the affect is turned to a highly energized form of supplementary connection which exceeds the idea of representation to the point where the *originarity* of an instrumentally-induced affect is (deconstructively) extreme. Indeed, Smith's reinscription of the affect (which can be read as the negation of Rousseauist representation) is in fact an argument along the lines of Deleuze/Guattari against representation in general. This is achieved by asserting what in some sense can be read as an aesthetics of autonomy, if "autonomy" is read in a "deconstructed" form as the *auto* of the nomad's own *nomos*. With Smith, we are in the field of the *auto-nomos* - even the *otonomy* of the ear: the *nomadic* law of that which is not organically tied to a self-expanding centre of signification.

Yet there is another ("undeconstructed") aesthetics of *autonomy-as-such*, which reinscribes the whole problematic of representational penetrations and essences, circulations of semiotic flows. With Carlyle, we move against the Smithian forms of *auto-nomos* and *otonomy*, and deny the power of the intervallic or haecceic affect in order to reassert a further,

brutally energised form of originary logic. With Smith, we are in the region of an autonomy which presupposes a generalized field of specific differences, but with Carlyle we are in the centre of an autonomy which presupposes a unified field where difference is defined as opposition to a central law. Two forms of autonomy – one achieved through the sonic affect, the other through phonic representation reduced to pure presence by force.

Just as Smith's form of the *auto-nomos* can be described within the terms of Deleuze/Guattari's "self-vibrating regions of intensity", or plateaus, so too it can be linked in to various ostensibly indeterminist statements by John Cage. For instance, when asked specifically about "music which 'speaks' – intentional music", Cage's answer was that;

a sound by vibrating does what is its nature to do: it acts like a sound, instead of acting like a word, or something that it isn't. It acts like something that it is, which is the vibration. [...] we don't know what music is or could be, but we imagine that it could be paying attention to vibratory activity, and that's not such a slight thing to do. [*John Cage and the Glaswegian Circus: an interview around Musica Nova 1990*, p.5]

Here, Cage maps a space which has an intertext both with indeterminacy and the allegedly purely aesthetic, *yet specifically within the context of a critique of phonocentrism*. Both Smith and Cage tend towards the Deleuzian/Guattarian concepts of plateaus, of bodies without organs, and, more profoundly, the concept of generalized immanence.

Thus, there are two ways in which the idea of a non-representational sonic affectivity can be constructed or read: autonomous in the sense of an organicist aesthetics of spirit; or autonomous in anything *but* the pure sense – the sense of the self-declared *nomos* by a multiplicity of nomadic affects upon an immanent surface: a plane of *haecceitas*. In our attempts

to deconstruct logocentrism by showing its gestures towards representation, we would do well to recall Derrida's deconstruction of the logocentrism of representational song, and the fact that this is carried out through a gesturing towards the very practises of instrumental music which allowed the transcendental departure into the concept of absolute music. However, the deconstruction of sonic autonomy through the acceleration of representational ruptures is *not* a symmetrically opposed or reversed operation to the deconstruction of phonic representation through the acceleration of sonic ruptures. Equally, it is not necessary that we somehow unite the two operations through the action of a dialectic. It is always a question of strategy.

In deconstruction, one works within the framework in order to open it out into a plane of immanence. It is upon that plane that a new form of synthesis can take place - not that of the resolution of opposites, but the synthesis which occurs within the "thought synthesizer", the sound synthesizer, or the "happy new ears" of John Cage and Adam Smith. In dialectics, one moves within a limited sphere where the resolution of opposites constantly acts to recapture elements at a perceived periphery, restoring them to the control of a universal meta-language rooted in the *logos*.

In following the movement of a deconstruction, one exchanges the *dialectical* for a multiplicity of *dialects* - no longer a unified sphere of signification according to a central term, but an immanent field of multiple differences. In moving from transcendence to immanence, we exchange opposition for *différance*, identity for *haecceitas*, the voice of uni(s)on for the sonorous body.

APPENDICES

and yet, this conceptualising. Creating a distance already. Only a couple of days since the first sounds and now here he was attempting to get away from it, from the actual physicality of them. That was hopeless. That was the kind of thing he always seemed to be doing nowadays. The totality of it: the totality of it; the way the sounds had been the other night, or was it last night, the way the actual sounds had been, that was it - that was that!

- *A Disaffection*, James Kelman, 1989.

APPENDIX 1

NOTES SUPPLEMENTARY TO EPIGRAPHIC MATERIALS

The following supplementary notes include translations and glossaries of terms from certain texts quoted above which are not in English. Most of the quotes in Scots are comprehensible to the reader of English not only in terms of sense, but also poetically and idiomatically, simply with the aid of a glossary. However, in order to shorten each individual glossary, some basic points of Scots can be stated here:

- (1) the plural often takes the form *-is*, rather than simply *-s*;
- (2) the past tense is often indicated by *-it*, rather than *-ed*;
- (3) verb forms can take the suffix *-and*, or *-an*, as well as *-in* and *-ing*;
- (4) the English vowel *o* often remains in its older northern form, *a*, as in *warld* for *world*;
- (5) the English *-ght* remains in the earlier germanic form *-cht*, as in *thocht* for *thought*, and *richt* for *right*;
- (6) in Middle Scots, the more latinate *quh-* has not yet given way to the Modern *wh-*, as in *quhen* for *when*;
- (7) the vowel *ou* is pronounced *oo*, as in French.

John Duns Scotus, p.iv:

the ultimate specific difference is simply to be different from everything else

See also the note on MacDiarmid below.

Adam Smith, p.iv:

From *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, p.145. This anti-dialectical sentiment is considered in Chapters 5 & 6, which deal specifically with Smith's work. See also the note on MacDiarmid below.

Hugo Ball, p.v:

The instrumentalization of the voice! Taken from what Hans Richter [*Dada: Art and Anti-Art*, p.42] named as Ball's first "abstract phonetic poem", *Gadji Beri Bimba* (1916). Lines 11-12 read as follows:

gadjama bimbalo glandridi glassala zingtata impoalo ögrogöööö
viola laxato viola zimbrabim viola uli paluji maloo

Stanza 30:

quilk - which
mappamound - Lat. *mappa mundi*
seiss - seas
saule - pun on two senses of soul, and sole.

Stanza 31:

leirit - learned
tonis proportionat - proportioned tones, ie. harmony.
duplare - Lat. *dupla*, harmonic proportion 2:1, or octave.
triplare - Lat. *tripla*, 3:1, perf. 12th, or compound 5th. Naturally, the first two *tonis proportionat* to *leir* would be the *duple* and the *triple*, the first and second harmonics of the natural harmonic series.
emetricus - according to H. Harvey Wood's notes in his edition of Henryson, there are two possible meanings, both with Greek etymologies and neither certain: (1) proportion; (2) of or relating to measure or measuring. Perhaps, after learning the basic proportions of tonal harmony, Orpheus is now learning the second branch of harmony - temporal proportion, or simply *metre*, the possibility of dividing the basic pulse into bar-groupings. More simply, perhaps, the basic beat which announces the division of time by a regular ratio? Wood also suggests a scriptal error based on the Greek term *epitritus*, which would give the proportion 4:3, and thus the perfect fourth. This would give one line of text referring to octave, fifth and fourth, and therefore makes a certain amount of poetic sense. However, there is another way of deriving poetic sense from this stanza, if we accept the rhythmic translation of the term. Henryson would be unlikely to confuse a more obviously rhythmic term for a harmonic one. Equally, as will become clear, Henryson will make a claim that the intervals and proportions in this stanza can be used to generate further *symphonyss*, or intervals, including the perfect fourth.
enolius - Gk. *hemiola*, the proportion 3:2, or in harmonic terms, the perfect fifth. One then questions why Henryson would use two terms for the perfect fifth (*duple* and *enolius*) unless he was attempting some form of flowery redundancy. Given that the term follows a possible indicator of temporal organisation (*emetricus*), we could interpret this hemiola as the medieval *rhythmic* device, where, in 6/4, for instance, a division of the bar as two groups of three is replaced by three groups of two, ie. two dotted minims giving way to three minims.
eik - also
quadruplait - Lat. *quadrupla*, the proportion 4:1, which tonally, would give the interval of 2 octaves. However, if *emetricus*, *ennolius* and *quadruplait* form a rhythmic, rather than harmonic series, then the last term could simply be "quadruplet", or four in the time of three. Thus, as with the harmonic series of octave-fifth, Henryson would be describing a rhythmic equivalent of the harmonic series, beginning with the basic pulse, or metre, and then moving into more

complex rhythms: the alternation of metrical principles, and then the subdivision of smaller, sub-metrical durations. This interpretation also makes poetic sense - in the first, harmonic series, the second term (*duplare*) has the proportion 3:2, and thus the rhythmic hemiola (*ennolius*) becomes, through exactly the same proportional numbers, the temporal equivalent of the perfect fifth. In this poetic exploitation of a symmetry which reduces two musical phenomena to one underlying proportional rule, Henryson is being both learned and very much of his time.

epoddeus - Gr. *epogdous*, difference between 4th & 5th, ie. Maj.2nd, 9:8. Henryson refers to its affective quality as *rycht hard and curius*. In other words, dissonant in comparison with the previously-mentioned consonant intervals.

thir - these

sex - six

componyt - composed

clerkis - scholars

N.B. Stanza 31 can thus be translated into (unpoetic) English as follows (if we also ignore idiomatic translations of terms such as *rycht* and *clerkis*, and retain the original grammar):

"There learned he tones proportioned, / as octave, fifth, and metre, / hemiola, and also the quadruplet, / wholetone right hard and curious; / of all these six, sweet and delicious, / right consonant five heavenly symphonies / composed are, as clerks can devise."

The names of the five heavenly symphonies, or combinations of sound, are listed in the subsequent stanza.

Stanza 32:

diatesserone - Gk. *dia tessarōn*, 4:3, perfect fourth.

wiss - know

dyapason - Gk. *dia pason*, 2:1, octave.

semple - simple

dowplait - double

dyapenty - Gk. *dia pente*, 3:2, perfect fifth.

dyss - dis-, or double, as in Cassiodorus' delineation of intervals in the *Institutiones* (c.550-562), where he describes "the consonance disdiapason, that is double diapason" [*Source Readings*, p.89]. Thus, "dyapenty, componyt with the dyss" is a disdiapente, or two perfect fifths, ie. major ninth.

makis - makes (make)

multiplicat - multiplied

mellefluat - mellifluous

N.B. It is significant that in this stanza, Henryson moves away from Latinate terminology to describe intervals and towards Greek forms. It will be noticed that the Greek *dia* means through. In this connection, *dia pente*

can also mean *through* a fifth, ie. a scalar run through the interval^[1]. In this way, Henryson has moved from the static Latinate harmonic concepts which represent intervals in purely spacial terms, towards an emergent form of melodic construction in the scales between two notes. Here we can thus read, yet again, the narrative of spacial harmony's proportional entelechation into the rhythmic realm, to form melody. As we can read in the last line of the stanza preceding the quoted passage, melody is the educational *telos* of Orpheus' passage through the intervals between the planets: "Thus from the hevin he went onto the erd, / Yit be the way sum melody he lerd." (*lerd* = *leirit*). In this, Henryson's poetic structure which describes Orpheus' learning of music theory from abstract proportions through harmony and into melody forms a direct analogue of Alexander Malcolm's ontology of harmony as laid out in his *Treatise of Harmony* some 230 years later. Surely this realisation, and the sheer music-theoretical complexity and density of this poem lead one to question precisely on what terms we should accept Henryson's statement in stanza 33 that "in my lyfe I cowth nevir sing a noit". He evidently had an acute theoretical knowledge, even if he does disavow any practical ability with the voice -or is this merely the conventional rhetorical device of self-deprecation? Many sources refer to him as a dominie in Dunfermline, and according to Wood, Henryson taught at the Sangschule of the Benedictine Abbey (although, notably, John Purser does not make any reference to a Sangschule in Dunfermline at all in *Scotland's Music*, and accepts Henryson's self-deprecation uncritically [p.64], despite the fact that he quotes exactly the same three stanzas discussed here). A half-century later, this particular Sangschule produced the composer John Angus, whose work appears in both the Wode Partbooks, and the 1635 Psalter. Surely, it would be worth considering the possibility that Henryson, aside from teaching grammar in the Sangschule could have taught music at some stage, perhaps even have written on music? As recent experiences in Scottish musicology have demonstrated, stranger things have happened.

Hugh MacDiarmid, p.2

ha'e - (hae) have
 hauf - half
 aye - always
 whaur - where
 ken - know

Lines 141-144 of *A Drunk Man Looks at the Thistle* (1926). MacDiarmid here asserts the distinction between resolving an opposition at a mid-point, and accelerating an opposition outwith its own limits in order to show its structure as that of a loop - lines 153-156 read: "For I've nae faith

[1] Although it should also be noted that the author of *The Art of Music* clearly uses these Greek-derived terms in a harmonic sense: "Quhat is ane canone? It is ane institutione of noittis or wordis direckit be the arbitrar of the compositor schawand be diverss signis the augmentation and diminucion of figuris and be exmplis of resolutione opynnand the enigmatéis of abscur tenoris and sangis, quhilkis be diapenthe, diatessaron, and diapason sangis or tenoris up or down for thair propir placis harmonicall dois deduce and remov." [*An Anonymous Scottish Treatise*, Vol.II, p.83]

in ocht I can explain, / And stert whaur the philosophers leave aff, / Content to glimpse its loops I dinna ettle / To land the sea-serpent's sel' wi' ony gaff." (ocht - aught; stert - start; ettle - intend; sel' - self; gaff - babble) This idea of a loop was next delineated in *To Circumjack Cencrastus* (1930), and as MacDiarmid wrote: "Cencrastus is the fundamental serpent, the underlying principle of the cosmos. To circumjack is to encircle" [quoted in *Whaur Extremes Meet*, p.150]. In this sense, the idea in *Thistle* is to *circumjack* an opposition. The question is then one of whether or not the traditional reading of this movement as dialectical is final. MacDiarmid himself presents a range of possibilities, claiming, for instance, that the "Caledonian Antisyzygy" and the "Dialectical Process" were "one and the same thing" [ibid., p.153]. However, his passion for Nietzsche is also well-known, and fits in with various statements he made concerning the Scotist concept of *haecceitas*, such as his claim to be "constantly on the *qui vive* for every trace of that peculiar individuality which Duns Scotus called *haecceitas*" [ibid., p.80]. A further potentially anti-dialectical passage which has extreme resonances of Gilles Deleuze's *Coldness and Cruelty* is to be found in lines 513-516: "Masoch and Sade / Turned into ane / Havoc ha'e made / O' my a'e brain." (ane - one; a'e - one: note the split in two forms of the same word) Likewise, Deleuze writes against the "complementary and dialectical unity" [*Masochism*, p.13] represented by the concept of sadomasochism, and proposes a more Scotist approach to psychoanalysis in line with the concept of schizoanalysis outlined in Chapters 9 & 10: "In place of a dialectic which all too readily perceives the link between opposites, we should aim for a critical and clinical appraisal able to reveal the truly differential mechanisms" [ibid., p.14] of Masoch and Sade. The question of MacDiarmid's approach to the connectivity of two terms is complex, as he moves through several forms: dialectics, taoism, antisyzygy, and, as is argued here, potentially even deconstructive approaches. If the latter is taken on board, then the critical tradition built around the work of Kenneth Buthlay's edition of *Thistle*, and also Catherine Kerrigan's study *Whaur Extremes Meet*, requires careful critique, not least because of its philosophical naïveté in assuming that all bi-polar relationships are necessarily dialectical (in a Deleuzian reading, for instance, the Tao is not a dialectic - cf. *A Thousand Plateaus*, p.157, where the Tao is described as a BwO or field of immanence, a non-transcendental plane). It must also be considered, however, that, as Buthlay and Kerrigan point out, MacDiarmid associates the image of the thistle with that of the Carlylean Igdrasil at various points through the poem. In many senses, then, MacDiarmid's *A Drunk Man Looks at the Thistle* engages the vast majority of the metaphysical issues at stake throughout the current text, constantly placing conflicting positions side-by-side. The ultimate question then becomes one of whether or not the whole is merely congealed into a single unity by the naïve dialectics so popular with MacDiarmid criticism, or if he achieves a form of multiplicity on a plane of immanence. Is MacDiarmid really a dialectical materialist or is he in fact a Deleuzian Scotist? Rather than a fully organic world-tree, is the thistle not a weed, a *rhizome*?

David Lindsay, p.46

From the penultimate stanza of the classic play in Metropolitan Scots, *Ane Satyre of the Thrie Estaitis* (1552), p.163.

ilk - each

avance - advance

ga - go

blaw - blow

ane - a

brawll - branle

quha - who

Charles Rennie Mackintosh, p.93

From *Seemliness* (1902), published for the first time in *Charles Rennie Mackintosh: The Architectural Papers* (1990), p.224. These statements resonate with those concerning architecture, music, and masonism in the work of John Clerk, and, by implication, Alexander Malcolm and harmonic theory in general.

James Thomson, p.134

From lines 370-378 of *Spring* (1728), the first of the four poems Thomson wrote under the general heading *The Seasons*, first published as a whole in 1730. The Samian Sage is, of course, Pythagoras, and the "vital scale" is the Great Chain of Being which intervallic ontology assembles. It should be noted, however, that rather than finding "High Heaven" at the subterranean fundamental, one here finds it inverted to the highest harmonic. Nevertheless, in a completely onto-dialectical closure, one would expect to find one's beginning in one's end anyhow.

Thomson's general use of English is also worthy of note. As J.C. Bryce writes in his Introduction to Smith's *Lectures on Rhetoric*, his "highly Latinate diction has often been remarked on: as was that of his fellow-countrymen in his own century. The Scotticisms against which Scottish writers were put on their guard, as by Hume and Beattie, were partly of this kind, and have been attributed to the Latin base of Scots Law as well as of Scottish Education." [in Smith's *Rhetoric*, p.15] If we can say that Thomson's language is alike to "clouds with vernal showers *distent*" [line 146], syne aiblins we micht *interpone* that sicna unforleitand pratticks maun be *indorsate*.

Somhairle Mac Gill-Eain, p.175

In anglophone languages, known as Sorley MacLean. *Craobh nan Teud* translates literally as *Tree of Strings*, but is also one of the Gàidhlig names for the *clàrsaich*, or Gaelic Harp. Mac Gill-Eain's own translation into English of this stanza, no.4, is as follows: "The tree of poetry / is in bands of steel, / in the cleft rocks, / in the notch of anguish: / the green foliage is / under the fierce abusive eye: / the Tree of Strings is / in the

extremity of grief." [*From Wood to Ridge: Collected Poems / O Choille gu Bearradh*, p.51]

Robert Burns, p.176

From stanza one of Burns' *Letter to J--s T--t, Gl--nc--r* (1786), in *Poems and Songs* [pp.179/80]. There are a number of Burns' poems which make reference to contemporary thinkers, but significantly, an earlier poem, *Remorse*, is headed by the statement "I intirely agree with that judicious Philosopher Mr. Smith in his excellent Theory of Moral Sentiments, that Remorse is the most painful sentiment that can embitter the human bosom." [p.27] Perhaps much of the negative critique of Enlightenment thought which Burns delivers in his songs and poetry falls within the context of the traditional genre of poetic back-biting known as the Flyting.

Alasdair Gray, p.216

Lanark, p.494. Anyone who doesn't know their way around Gray doesn't know what postmodern literature is.

Aneirin, p.257

From *Y Gododdin* (c.600). Aneirin was a Celtic bard from the ancient Welsh-speaking kingdom of Gododdin, now the Lothians in South-East Scotland, with its capital at Din Edyn, later translated into Gàidhlig as Dun Eideann, and into Anglian as Edinburgh. The *Gododdin* relates the culture's final great battle to maintain its independence from the pagan Anglo-Saxon tribes of Deira, now Yorkshire. The battle took place at Caltraeth (Catterick), and only three of the Celtic host survived, the poet being one of them. In A.O.H. Jarman's translation, this stanza comes out as: "It is a grief to me, after toil, / Suffering death's agony in affliction, / And a second heavy grief to me / To have seen our men fall headlong. / And long sighing and lamentation / After the fiery men of our land, / Rhufon and Gwgon, Gwion and Gwlged, / Bravest in their stations, mighty in conflict, / may their souls after battle be welcomed / in the land of heaven, the home of plenty." Following this defeat, the Anglian kingdom of Bernicia extended northwards to include the territories up to the Firth of Forth, and it is from the language of these settlers that modern Scots derives. Many of the defeated "Welsh" of Gododdin moved over to the West coast "Welsh" kingdom of Strathclyde, where the poet Taliesin worked, as well as figures such as St. Kentigern and St. Ninian, and, according to some sources, St. Patrick himself. Strathclyde was still Welsh-speaking by the turn of the Twelfth Century, by which time it was a devolved satellite of the Gàidhealach mainstream of Scotland, which had now also overrun the Anglian territories in the South East.

Sprouston Breviary, p.291

Through his breathing, a little torch is soothed from envy, and kindled in Scotland without material fire.

The Saint referred to here is, of course, Kentigern, founder of the city of Glasgow, who was of royal stock from the Welsh-speaking kingdom of Lothian, or Gododdin (cf. previous note). The text comes from a manuscript long known to scholars of Medieval Latin, but only recently brought to the attention of musicology by John Purser's realisation that its poetry was in fact set to a large amount of Celtic Plainchant, with services to Kentigern as the main content. A similarly neglected manuscript is the C13th Inchcolm Antiphoner from Inchcolm Abbey in the Firth of Forth, which has services to St. Columba. The author is currently translating texts from these MSS. into contemporary Scots.

Patrick Geddes, p.332

From Geddes et al, *A First Visit to The Outlook Tower* (1906). A visual representation of the Arbor Saeculorum was published in Geddes' magazine *The Evergreen*, Spring 1895. Geddes, of course, is one of the crucial precedents for both the Green movement and the self-determination movement in Scotland.

Crosanachd an Doill, p.367

This is reprinted in Comunn na Piobaireachd's *Piobaireachd*, Vol.3 [p.98], where the title is translated as *The Blind Piper's Obstinacy*. However, if *crosanachd* is taken not as "obstinacy", but in its other meaning of "satirical poetry", and if we accept the fact that the title actually makes no reference to a piper, then we could perhaps better translate it as *Satire of the Blind*, where blindness also signifies ignorance.

The text given here is in the traditional *cainntaireachd* system of oral notation used by pipers as a means of signifying pitches and ornaments through a conventional system of syllables. Thus, following the Nether Lorn Canntaireachd used as standard by Comunn na Piobaireachd, "hin" signifies a low A preceded by a high G grace note, "en" a low A with a high E grace note, "dan" the same with a high D, etc.

The other main example of the sonic voice in Gàidhealach music is the use of what Smith would have termed "unmeaning" words, such as those to be found at the end of each verse in Mairi Nighean Alasdair Ruaidh's C17th satiric song, *Mairearad nan Cuireid* (Mairearad of the Tricks): "Hi riri o hiri o hi o" [*Gaelic Songs of Mary MacLeod*, p.12]. Such chants can also be found as collective choruses, and the Popular contemporary Irish composer Enya alludes to them throughout her work; they are found, for example, in her English-titled Gaelic song *The Longships*: "Hi-ri-u / Ho-ro-ho / Ho-ri-u / Him-o-ro-ho" [*Watermark*, 1988].

The closing lines of the essay *Crabbed Age and Youth*, in the collection *Virginibus Puerisque* (1881), p.106. Elsewhere in this collection, Stevenson makes a particularly Scotist comment: "The world in which we live has been variously said and sung by the most ingenious poets and philosophers: these reducing it to formulae and chemical ingredients, those striking the lyre in high-sounding measures for the handiwork of God. What experience supplies is of a mingled tissue, and the choosing mind has much to reject before it can get together the materials of a theory." [*Pan's Pipes*, in *Virginibus Puerisque*, p.262] Just as *The Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde* deals with the problematics of dual identities, perhaps there is a case for a post-structuralist reassessment of its antiszygy in the light of such sentiments – building, for instance, on Elaine Showalter's work on Stevenson's sexuality in her *Sexual Anarchy: Gender & Culture at the Fin de Siècle* (1991). But what happens to the idea of the Jekyll-Hyde psycho-duality when we go further than simply pointing to the oft-cited fractured narrative, and place it simultaneously within the milieu of an experiential "*mingled tissue*"? Further, with reference to the theories of Deleuze/Guattari (Chapters 9 & 10), what of the laceration of this BwO by the "choosing mind's" attempt to "get together the materials for a theory" through a process which results in this dualistic assemblage of desires known as Jekyll/Hyde? And what are the consequences for the opposition of machine to organism in Jekyll's perception of Hyde as "something not only hellish but inorganic"? [*The Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde*, p.53] Is this a simple opposition, or a division of difference?

James Kelman, p.417

From *A Disaffection* (1989) [p.9], which traces the collapse of affectivity (social, aesthetic and political) in the life of a schoolteacher, Patrick Doyle. This is most significantly underlined by his discovery of a pair of scrap metal pipes which he takes home to make music, only to become more and more alienated from them, largely through his continual preoccupations with the Pythagorean metaphysics of sound. He continually attempts to inhabit immanence with them, but always comes up against theoretical static: "He looked at the pipe. He sat back down on the settee. He was doing it wrong he had to do it right, the playing, before anything else the conceptualising especially especially the fucking conceptualising the bastards, the fucking fusty webs; he blew a note and it was not correct, he blew a note that was not correct; he was not blowing a note that was correct. He laid down the pipe." [ibid., p.223]

APPENDIX 2

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF SCOTTISH WRITINGS ON MUSIC

Research here is still tentative, and so the informed reader may discover omissions in the following, not least in the case of Gàidhlig texts, none of which are included. The author is still learning the language, and is not yet at a sufficient level to fully engage. This is, however, a major future project, and the omission (not exclusion) requires acknowledgement.

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APPENDIX 3

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APPENDIX 4

MAIN PARA-DOCTORAL PUBLICATIONS

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- (1) List of Editions, Reviews & Conference Papers
- (2) John Cage's Practical Utopias
from *The Musical Times*, September 1990
- (3) John Cage's Glaswegian Circus
from *Music Current*, February 1991
- (4) The Whistlebinkie's Art: A Conversation with Eddie McGuire
from *Cenchrastus*, Spring 1991
- (5) John Cage and the Glaswegian Circus: An Interview Around Musica
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- (6) Composers, Cash and Cosmopolitanism: A Conversation with Thomas
Wilson
from *Cenchrastus*, Summer 1991
- (7) A Contemporary Tradition: An Interview with David Johnson
from *English Dance & Song*, Autumn 1991 (originally in *Music
Current*, September/October 1991)
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Geddes
from *Cenchrastus*, Spring 1992
- (9) Music & Deconstruction: Some Notes on the Usage of a Term
from *Critical Musicology Newsletter*, 1, Dec. 1993.
- (10) Trivial Pursuits? Taking Pop Seriously
from *The Musical Times*, April 1994
- (11) An Cuibhle Mór: Trilingual Terrain in Scottish Political Song
from *The Place of Music: Music, Space, and the Production of Place*,
ed. Andrew Leyshon, David Matless, George Revill, forthcoming,
initial interest from Manchester University Press.

LIST OF EDITIONS, REVIEWS & CONFERENCE PAPERS

(i) Editions:

- Canntaireachd: Articulate Music* by John Francis Campbell, B.f.B., Glasgow, 1989, ISBN 1-871794-04-8.
Scots Folk Song - Lowland Scots Song: Its Interpretation by Marjory Kennedy-Fraser, B.f.B., Glasgow, 1990, ISBN 1-871794-02-1.
Niel Gow's Recovery - A Collection of Scottish Music, B.f.B., Glasgow, 1990, ISBN 1-871794-06-4.

(ii) Reviews, including:

- "Amang the Plesand Plantis of Concordance: Musick Fyne by J.D. Ross; Kinloche His Fantassie; The Scottish Autumn of Frederick Chopin; J.B. McEwen - 3 Border Ballads" - in *Cencrastus*, 1994.
"John Blackwood McEwen: Three Border Ballads" with "Oswald & Foulis: Airs for the Seasons: Scottish Music of the 1700s" - in *M.T.*, 1994.
"New Music From Holland: NM Classics Series" - in *M.T.*, 1994.
"Scriabin Piano Sonatas I-X" - in *M.T.*, 1994.
"Musicology & Difference: Gender & Sexuality in Music Scholarship" - in *M.T.*, 1994.
"Dmitri Kabalevsky: Complete Edition, Vols. 1-8" - in *M.T.*, May 1994.
"The Scottish Autumn of Frederick Chopin" - in *M.T.*, May 1994.
"The Sight of Sound: Music, Representation & the History of the Body" - in *M.T.*, March 1994.
Cambridge Music Handbooks: Bach; Mozart; Mendelssohn - in *M.T.*, Mch. '94.
"The Fine Art of Repetition: Essays in the Philosophy of Music" - in *M.T.*, Feb. 1994.
"A New Celtic Dawn?" - in *M.T.*, Oct. 1993.
"The Roaring Silence - John Cage: A Life" - in *M.T.*, Apr. 1993.
"Fiddle Pibroch: C18th Scottish Violin Music" - in *M.T.*, Apr. 1993.
"Liberating Theory: Music as Cultural Practise; Music as Social Text; Feminine Endings" - in *M.T.*, Aug. 1992.
"A New Tradition: Scotland's Music" - in *M.T.*, Aug. 1992.
"Boulez; Cage; Cunningham; Johns" - in *Tempo*, Sept. 1991.
"Out of the Cage: I-VI (The Charles Eliot Norton Lectures) by John Cage" - in *M.T.*, Jan. 1991.

(iii) Conference Papers, etc.:

- "Music & Deconstruction: Derrida & the Aesthetics of the Interval" - lecture given to the Postgraduate Research Seminar Groups at both Sussex University and Southampton University, November 1993.
"Music & Deconstruction: Some Notes on the Usage of a Term" - inaugural meeting of the Critical Musicology group, Music Dept., Sheffield University, November 1993.
"An Cuibhle Mór: Trilingual Terrain in Scottish Political Song" - University

- College London, Geography Dept., *The Place of Music*, Sept. 1993.
- "Imag(in)ing the Interval: Adam Smith and the Aesthetic Imaginary Machine" - *Music & Cultural Politics*, Music Faculty, Edinburgh University, Nov. 1992
- "The Melo-dynamic Organism: Race and Song in Thomas Carlyle's Essay on Burns" - British Comparative Literature Association *Across Europe*, University of Warwick, July 1992.
- "The Voice of Uni(s)on: Warriors and Mothers in Thomas Carlyle's Theory of Song" - R.M.A. Research Conference, Anglia Poly., Cambridge, Dec. 1991.
- "The Gendered Cadence: Music and its Other (Against Anthropomorphism in Theory)" - *Music and Gender*, Kings College, London, July 1991.
- "Anti-analysis: Towards the Deterritorialization of Structure in Music Analysis" - R.M.A. Research Conference, Oxford University, Dec. '90.

THE MUSICAL TIMES

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John Cage's Practical Utopias
Robert Hartford on Opera today
Frank Martin centenary
Comprehensive Review section

John Cage's Practical Utopias

John Cage in conversation with Steve Sweeney Turner

Cage is a featured composer at Musica Nova in Glasgow this month

John Cage has always been associated with the multiplicity of life – whether in his work as composer, poet, artist or performer, his taste in friends such as Marcel Duchamp, Merce Cunningham, Robert Rauschenberg, Pierre Boulez, Yoko Ono or John Lennon, his approach to methodology in using chance, choice, computers, or the *I-Ching*, or in his interest in mushrooms, Zen, gourmet macrobiotics, or world politics, his personal influence on readers, listeners, lookers, or fellow eaters is always deep. One thing, however, lasts as the ever-present trace of his actions, and that is the all-pervading notion of indeterminacy. Whether in his early elegiac melodies, the famous 'silent' piece, the uncompromising chaos of the 60s, or the more recent ironies of random opera, Cage has always preached a humble approach to the world, reminding us that desires and intentions too often get in the way of experiencing 'no matter what eventuality', and that Joyce's character 'Here Comes Everybody' may, finally, point the way to the new consciousness he hopes for.

It seems to me that one of the problems with indeterminate music may be that we don't really know how to talk about it yet on its own terms; there isn't really a critical discourse to engage with it.

Mmm. Ha ha ha ha. I think it's in the field of anarchy. You can do it there – start there. Read the life of Emma Goldman. Two volumes. *Living my Life*. Ha ha ha . . . The old ideas, the determinist ideas, have to do with the Nineteenth Century, and if you read the book that the Huddersfield Festival put out, it places Boulez, even, in that situation with respect to Beethoven – continuing the main stream. But, uh, there's another way of looking at things, which sees that the main stream has now gone into delta. And beyond that into ocean. And there's a multiplicity of possibilities rather than just one principle one. When I was young there were two ways of going – one was Schoenberg, and the other was Stravinsky. But now you can go in any direction at all, even your own direction.

Yes; in that Huddersfield Festival blurb you were presented as Cage and Boulez: 'Divergent Leaders of The New', which suggests that old situation.

Yeh, it's sort of silly, because it's an idea of Yes or No, and we already agreed that it's more like ocean – many possibilities . . . life is quite, em, complicated.

But when you say 'critical', a 'critical basis', you're speaking of a decision about values, I suppose; but the values exist not outside of us, but inside of us, and particularly in indeterminate work. Maybe the desire is unnecessary, so that we don't need any basis – we have the basis in us already. It's built – in. Ha ha. You can't prove it to anybody, either. But I don't think we need criticism in the first place. You can get to language by going to the beginning of the words about indeterminacy: I've written a good deal about it, so has Christian

Wolff, but you see, the desire to have a language in order to have a criticism is perhaps not necessary; it's related to laws and theory, and so forth . . . and indeterminacy is precisely not related to those things.

Sure, but to establish indeterminacy you have to step back from the traditional values that music has adopted – that is necessarily a theoretical stance, surely?

You're taking a different point of view, yes? Changing your mind from the determinist position to a non-determinist position. The determinist position has been that each performance is an approach to an ideal. Okay? The indeterminist position is that each performance is necessarily what it is, and you'd better listen while it's going on, otherwise you'll miss it. Mm? And I prefer that point of view; I think it's more appropriate to 20th-century living than the other one. The other one has a kind of an assumption of progress towards a non-existent, or an imaginary, goal, rather than the Now-Moment. The indeterminist position is all connected with seeing how things are at the moment when you're experiencing them.

Yes, and the other fine thing about indeterminacy is that so many views are possible! How do you see your notion of indeterminacy differing from others, particularly those in Europe? For instance, people like Karlheinz Stockhausen, Cornelius Cardew, you know?

How we're different? I haven't studied that. I don't think Karlheinz studies what I do . . . and Cornelius is dead! Ha ha ha. So I really don't know what's happening . . .

However, it's often suggested that Stockhausen was influenced by your work, by your visit to the Darmstadt Composition School in the late fifties?

Right. No, I think people know perfectly well what interests them. And at one time Karlheinz and I would talk and exchange ideas. You know the story about the talk about singing? Well, he was writing a song for Cathy Berberian, who I later also wrote for, and he said, 'if you were writing for a singer, would you write music, or would you write for the singer?' And I said, 'I would write for the singer', and he said, 'well that's the difference between us, because I would write music'. So then he wrote this song for Cathy, and he asked her to whistle. And she can't whistle. So that's the difference between us. Hmhmhmhm!

Ha ha ha! So how does your indeterminacy differ from Cardew's?

I don't know, in those terms. He wrote an article against what I was doing, and I never objected to it . . . or never wrote in opposition to it. Later, he saw me in Berlin, and he said, 'I may have made a mistake in writing that article about you'. And I said nothing.

Uhuh . . . Although I've read you polemicising against Cardew in *Conversation Without Feldman* - with Geoffrey Barnard, and it seems that the beginning and the end, to put it that way, is about Cardew, and what you saw as the inconsistencies, or perhaps failures of Cardew's work.

I haven't read that recently . . . We had quite a lot of difficulty toward the end: he was employed, for instance, once, to play a piano part in my piece called *HPSCHD* and he made a point of not doing his work well, and that kind of situation made difficulty for us. It seems to me unprofessional, if you accept payment to do something and then don't do it. I think it actually bound up with my practical side; I found that what Cornelius was doing didn't help the Revolution as much as he would have liked it to help, hm? And it also didn't help music, hm? Because his music became less a discovery and more and more the revival of nineteenth century practises.

But also, in a sense, an analysis of Victorian English music, based on political grounds.

I had liked and followed a great deal of Cornelius's work, and he was a very, uh . . . I really haven't studied my thoughts about that . . . or come to any . . . I don't feel as though I have a point of view, but if I have, I'm afraid it is a little bit against, as you say, in the Geoffrey Barnard.

Uhuh . . . How do you feel about the book *Stockhausen Serves Imperialism*? You know that, yeh?

That's Cornelius, isn't it? I didn't like it. It was an attack on the part of Cornelius against people who were doing their work. And, instead of doing his own work, he got involved in attacking other people who were working. Hm? So that he didn't do himself any good, or them any good. I think . . . it was negative action - that's what I really object to. I think people should act affirmatively and do what they believe. I think Cornelius failed to do that when he attacked other people, including me. And he even said to me that he thought he may have made a mistake, but he didn't admit that it was a mistake to attack Stockhausen. I didn't pay much attention.

Because it wasn't based in . . .

. . . in affirmative action.



Uhuh. How do you reconcile your Utopian 50s and 60s views on affirmative politics with the experience of the last decade?

I don't try to reconcile it with American politics, if that's what you're saying. I've been all along, very clearly against American government. I'm a Thoreauvian anarchist: I don't vote . . . I look forward to the time when no-one else does, either.

Do you not think that there may be certain directions that you could use your vote in that would eventually generate that?

No, no, I don't.

Does that speak more of American politics, or do you think there are possibilities for it elsewhere?

Government in general . . . I think we have more serious problems that government is not able to solve.

You mean ecological, and so on . . .

All those things. We're almost ruining the whole globe in our interest in government. We have I think it is 158 separate governments in a place where there should be only the solution of problems, otherwise we're all going to 'em, skip the . . . whatever it is.

Yeh, so would you be for some kind of world council in that sense?

Not involving politicians, but involving intelligent people. I'm talking about the problems, and solving the problems. And we generally solve problems by getting people who know something about the materials involved. Governments are concerned with power, and money, and neither one of those things is important. The important thing is to keep the thing working. And the solutions to that have been put forward, as I've pointed out in my books; by McLuhan and Fuller, and there may be better, or improved versions of those now. Full never gave a fixed idea, he gave an indeterminate idea, that could change as the possibilities changed. I have no confidence in government, of any country.

I repeat, then, the life of Emma Goldman; it's the basis of my text called *Anarchy*, which is just now published in the Booknell Review . . .

But would you say that in terms of centres of power or that kind of analysis, do you not think that a dissolution, a disintegration, and an increased number of devolving centres of power on increasingly more specific geographical bases would actually be a step towards the kind of thing that you've always talked about? Instead of America, well . . . instead of Washington and Moscow. For instance, within British politics, it's often suggested that Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland become disengaged from Westminster, and so on.

No, it won't do any good. No. The first step will probably be, as it is being, a joining together of differences. Like the joining together of East and West Berlin now. It was in the nineteenth century that all the principalities of Germany formed a nation, and the same thing happened in Italy. We're moving toward a European coming-together, and then what we need is a world coming-together, but not a splitting-apart.

Well, speaking within the Scottish viewpoint, the notion is a holistic fragmentation, basically; independence from England, but within Europe.

I know, the whole thing is so complicated that it doesn't look as though we're going to have the sense to find a solution. But if each person, if each country by separating from one another, they also separated from government . . . but they won't do that. If they would, then I would be all for it. I've already done that as an individual.

Uhuh, but surely, the greater number of centres of power, the less megalomaniac each centre, and the greater the possibility of moving towards that?

Yeh, but implicitly built into the notion of a score is authorship.

Uh, only if it's a fixed relation of the parts, but if there are several parts and there's no fixed relationship, then there's nothing built-in. No fixed relation built in.

But it can still be an influence.

Of course, but it's only because it's practical, that it doesn't in any way determine what happens.

Where would you put improvisation in this, then?

Improvisation is quite another thing and is something that I want to avoid. Most people who improvise slip back into their likes and dislikes, and their memory, and they don't make any ... they don't arrive at any revelation that they're unaware of.



So is your own notion of the function of the composer associated with that of Buddhist disciplines, in that there is an irrelevance in an activity, so that it becomes simply a matter of doing something which requires discipline for its own sake?

Well, I'm not exactly sure that I see eye-to-eye with what you're saying but it's in that direction. It's since 1952, which is nearly forty years ago, I don't write any fixed relation of parts. Ha ha ha! No, I do everything very precisely, and what I'm interested in is having each thing be uniquely itself, and not in terms of improvisation. If I write an improvisation, I, uh, write specific limitations for the improvisation so that it leads the musician into a situation with which he's unfamiliar.

Do you find a correspondence between the notion of the score and that of koan?

A score, you see, is a fixed relation of parts, so I don't see any relation between that and koan.

On the other hand, you've written scores which have been non-fixed relationships of parts.

No, it's a misuse of the word 'score'. A score is a fixed relation of parts. We say 'score' and 'parts', distinguishing the fixed relation with the unfixed. The koan presents a problem which can't be solved, but what I'm doing is giving something that can be done, hm?

It can be done, but that's not the same as a solution, surely.

Why not? Because what it's about is giving directions for the making of music. The koan is involved not with the making of music but the coming to enlightenment, and it's working with mental processes, and I'm not dealing with that. I'm dealing with sounds. It's the difference between going out to the world of relativity, and going ... the koan goes into the absolute. It's involved in Buddhism with enlightenment, and all I've been doing is, uh, working with music.

Sure. So what would you say the function of the score per se is?

I think it's a way of writing to strangers, people whom you don't know, giving them the directions for how to do something when you won't be present. Hm?

So in that sense, you're kind of interested in the notion of presence?

No, I know that I'm going to die, and I won't be here, and I'm writing these letters to people I don't know. Ha ha! Who may be interested in doing what I suggest ... they're almost bound to be.

Why do you say that?

Well, because I've become so notorious. It's almost certain that someone will be interested. I was interested, and it looks as though others will be.


Steve Sweeney Turner, an emergent exponent of the bodhràn, earlier this year directed in Edinburgh a Scottish version of Cage's Roaratorio, entitled Rielibogie - a Jacobite circus on King James VI's dæmonologie.

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MUSIC current

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JOHN CAGE'S GLASWEGIAN CIRCUS

An interview by Steve Sweeney Turner

John Cage was one of the featured composers at last year's Musica Nova in the Cultural Capital. It was his second visit to Scotland to hear the Whistlebinkies perform his *Scottish Circus*, which he wrote for them on his previous trip in 1984. *I asked him how he'd got on with Glasgow's new music festival:*

I'm glad to have been here, and I enjoyed the composition workshops very much. It gave me an opportunity to hear what young people are doing; music which I didn't know. I was also delighted to be able to go to a moor to the north of the city and hunt for mushrooms.

Did you find anything interesting while you were up there?

Oh, I like all mushrooms, and we found some I didn't know, and some I did know. I cooked one of them, which was a boletus. I'm not exactly sure which one, but it was one I knew. It had a tanned cap and a rough stem which had sort of spots on it.

What was your reaction to the music of the other featured composers?

Well, what was so beautifully expressed in Wolfgang Rihm's music is that noise is as welcome as musical sound. A very rich experience comes from getting to know Wolfgang's music as much as I have. I think his music has to do with a love of paying attention to sound very closely. But of the other composers who are here at Musica Nova; I think of James MacMillan's work and Nigel Osborne's work as quite Romantic.

That's interesting, because MacMillan told me that he's quite annoyed at being labelled "Neo-romantic", whereas he saw Rihm's work as bordering on that.

Yes, well, actually these classifications, as you point out, aren't to the liking of the people who're put in them!

Have you ever consciously attempted to be unclassifiable yourself?

No. I don't classify. I don't think I do. I do, I suppose, sometimes; I think of some music as involving something like "speech", and



The Whistlebinkies

that's apt to be Romantic, because it "talks", whereas music which does something is not so apt to be Romantic. By "doing something" I mean being a process which is in action. I think MacMillan has spoken several times about Process Music, so that he probably has a process in mind, and that makes him think of his work as not being Romantic.

It's often said of American music that it's more eclectic than traditional, as is European music. How far would you say that's true of your own work?

I don't think of myself as choosing among a series of possibilities - I'm trying to work just with sound. Eclecticism means to me choosing a number of different things or ways of writing, for expressive purposes, and that your

style is not a single style. But I don't have those purposes. I really want the sounds to be themselves, and to make some kind of discovery. And I think that I'm engaged in that kind of activity. I don't think of it as falling into Eclecticism, or Romantic, or Classicism. Other people would have to think in those terms. For instance, one of the critics, speaking of me in the Glasgow Herald, says that it must be rather odd to be on exhibit while you're still alive. I imagine he means that it must be odd for me, but it's not odd for me - it's odd for him; it's odd for him for me to be on exhibit while I'm still alive! I don't expect to be on exhibit when I'm dead either!

So how did you like the Whistlebinkies' concert?

Well, they're just lovely. They were playing music that they know, but when they were not playing anything, they also did it beautifully! In their performance of 4'33" I wanted to show that a group is not one thing. I asked them to do it as seven individuals. The directions I gave them were that the silences should be between '33" and 2'40", but should be measured by an "inner clock". "Inner clock" is apt to be slower than a real clock. I mean to say, takes longer.

It's also very similar, then, to what you were doing with them in Scottish Circus - taking them all apart from each other.

Right. That's what you might call my "political" attitude; toward society in general. In *Scottish Circus*, I simply asked them to do what they do. Not to do it together, but in circus, so that each

John Cage's Glaswegian Circus (Cont'd)

musician becomes an individual, rather than part of a fixed group. So that they're playing different pieces, and if they find by chance they're playing the same piece, they should play it in a different tempo. I've done that not only with Scottish music, but also with Irish music, in connection with *Roaratorio*.

Do you actually have any Irish blood in you, way back?

Unfortunately not. I'd like some! Cage itself is an English name. I think I have a bit of Scots blood, though I don't know where I got that idea, but the idea I got growing up in the family was that there was some Scottish blood, some French, and possibly some Swedish, because my grandfather's name was Gustavus Adolphus Williamson Cage III.

Were you interested in Celtic Folk music before you did "Scottish Circus" and "Roaratorio", or was it an effect of that?

Well, I didn't have the kind of interest I now have since *Roaratorio* - I got to know much more about it because of that. I had very good musicians to do it, and now the Whistlebinkies want to come to the United States, and if I can see a way to bring that about, I'll do it. I think they'd like to do the *Scottish Circus*, but it would be nice for them to do the traditional music, too. There are a number of Irish bars in New York City that I think would be open to Scottish music! I used to listen to Joe Heaney's singing in one on 14th Street. I liked Mick Broderick's and Judith Peacock's [of the Whistlebinkies] singing, too. They don't sing sentimentally, nor did Joe Heaney. They sing straight, and with some kind of dignity.

Is this something you think characterises Scottish and Irish music in general?

Yes, and it's that quality of people doing their work well, which I admire. I like that social tradition of music, it's just that I don't like all the people playing in the same music together. That's why I made a music-circus for them! You know that I'm devoted to the notion of individuals!

Women in Music

"Beyond Biography" is the title for the Seventh International Congress on Women in Music, to be held in Utrecht (The Netherlands) between May 29th and June 2nd 1991. The pro-

gramme of the congress will include ten presentations of papers on the theme "Beyond Biography", fifteen concerts, meetings and an information centre.

During the congress a meeting will be organised among various women and music organisations in order to found a European network. Common experiences and problems in the field of management and policy and the improvement of contacts between the national organisations will be discussed. The goal is to work towards a European centre for women in music, which can link up with the American branch for the ILWC. For further details, contact: Stichting Seventh International Congress on Women in Music, Swammerdamstraat 38, 1091 RV Amsterdam, The Netherlands.

ENSEMBLE EXPOSÉ

The next concert in the Edinburgh Contemporary Arts Trust 1990-1991 season will take place at 8.00pm on Wednesday 27th February in the Queen's Hall, Clerk Street, Edinburgh. It will feature **Ensemble Exposé** in works by Roger Redgate, Richard Barrett and Peter Nelson.

Ensemble Expose was formed in 1984 by the young English composers, Richard Barrett and Roger Redgate. Since then it has been principally active on the Continent, giving regular concerts and broadcasts in France, Holland, Germany and Sweden. Ensemble Expose also has its own concert season in London and featured recently on BBC Television's *Omnibus* programme. It is attracting a fast-growing following now in this country for its unique instrumental virtuosity and for its commitment to the most challenging of contemporary music. It attracts some of the best young performers in Europe including, in this concert, the young Scottish pianist James Clapperton.

Though both still in their early thirties, Richard Barrett and Roger Redgate are among the leading contemporary composers in Europe, regularly performed and commissioned by the principal European ensembles. Their music displays a special and exhilarating sort of virtuosity, frequently placing the performers in the kind of extreme situations found in the most progressive jazz and free improvisation, though the music is always strictly composed. Their sounds are challenging but also thrilling. The programme includes the first performance of *Fictive Music*, specially commissioned by Ensemble Expose from the Scottish composer, Peter Nelson. This is a dramatic work to a text by the young Irish playwright, Roderick McDevitt. All in all, this concert is a very special musical event.

Leda record Foulis

The Leda Trio, who last March launched the Scottish Music Information Centre's new edition of the *Six Sonatas for Violin and Keyboard* by David Foulis (1710-1773) have recently recorded some of the sonatas for compact disc. The recording, for the Fife-based Springthyme label, will contain Foulis' sonatas in A, E and F major as well as five delightful sonatas from James Oswald's *Airs for the Seasons* (c1755) - *The Lily*, *The Night-Shade*, *The Narcissus*, *The Sneezewort* and *The Lilac*. It will be available later in the



The Leda Trio


spring.

On Monday 18th February at 7.45pm in the Queen's Hall, Edinburgh, the Trio - Peter Campbell Kelly (violin), Kevin McCrae (cello) and Katherine Thompson (piano) - will be performing Kenneth Leighton's *Trio opus 46* with Haydn's *Trio No 39 in G (Hob XV:25 - Gypsy Rondo)* and Brahms' *Trio in B Opus 8*. The Leda Trio has recently commissioned a work from Edward Harper, to be premiered in the Autumn.

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THE CURLY SNAKE No.39



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THE MAGAZINE FOR SCOTTISH &
INTERNATIONAL LITERATURE, ARTS AND AFFAIRS

Eddie McGuire is known not only for his work as a "classical" composer, but also for his long involvement with the folk scene, specifically with the Whistlebinkies, whose latest album has recently been released. In the 'seventies, his classical work gained a wide audience through his chamber music piece Trilogy (Rebirth — Interregnum — Liberation) which claims a pivotal position in his development, not only as a composer, but also as a political animal. His commitment to benefit gigs for causes from Central America to Barnsley has earned him a well deserved reputation for political activism through the performance of music.

The Whistlebinkie's Art

A Conversation with Eddie McGuire

Steve Sweeney Turner

I hear the Whistlebinkies are doing an improvisation under Cage's direction in Musica Nova this year. Yeh, we're going to do the John Cage concert doing a piece ... were you at that improvisation in Edinburgh? No, but I heard about it. Will this be the same kind of thing?

Yes, but hopefully more concrete, more along the lines of a piece which he would put a title to. Going to try and get him to write it down and call it a piece and also maybe ... well, a piece of mine and a piece of traditional music, and we'll do a version of that 4'33" — nobody else seems to want to do it.

A Folk version for ensemble! Will the improvisation take the form of something like "..... Circus On" or an improvisation as such?

No, it'll be a piece in its own right, I think; an improvisation based on his instructions for a traditional Scottish group.

So when you did it before, were you improvising within a Scots Folk musical language?

Yes, the main difference between that and what we usually do it that everyone was playing independently of one another, and all the strands of melody were weaving in and out together; we created spaces for the other instruments to be heard — that was one of his instructions ... but to let the music freely weave, even if it was in different keys.

How far did he restrict the relationships between you?

We were just to stand widely spread; we were to play a certain number of minutes, and take a break for a lesser number of minutes, and play independently. It was more like instructions to be independent, but fitting into the whole at the same time. Well, we'll see if he comes up with any other suggestions, if he's going to make the piece a concrete one. I was interviewing the Irish guys who do Roaratorio with him, and they were saying that in a weird sense Cage has brought something back to the Irish tradition through Roaratorio in its working with a flexibility of rhythms — in a heterophonic sense, I suppose. Noirin ni Riain, the singer, was saying that because of the way that Folk music's been relying more and more on being notated, in comparison with its oral past, with all this kind of fixed 4/4, 6/8, all that very metrical kind of idea about it, what Cage has done through Roaratorio is brought a kind of heterophonic flexibility back to it. Is that something that you felt with this improvisation piece?

Well one comment on what we were doing — Hamish Henderson said, in fact, that it sounded like him walking into one of the earliest Folk festivals that he had gone to, I think maybe Kinross, or Aberfeldy, and hearing all the different Folk musicians playing together at once — different tunes, in different corners of pubs. In fact this idea has influenced a current piece of mine ...

Would this be a Folk or a Classical piece?

Well, it's a combination of both, because the Academy of Music commissioned me to write a piece for their junior orchestra, and I thought I would do a piece called *Scottish Dances* and I'm basing this on a dozen or more tunes that I've written over the past 15 years. But at the beginning I do try and create that image of Folk festival. You come into it in the early evening from a distance, walking over fields, approaching this festival, and you hear the music, the flutes and the fiddles all playing away in the distance and you hear all the tunes sounding at once, gradually getting louder ...

Is this an image that you're putting over, or does this actually happen as the people are walking through the door; I mean does the piece start before the audience arrive?

Oh, no, it doesn't, but it does start imperceptibly, with one high harmonic note on the double basses, and the instruments enter one by one playing different tunes, playing all the tunes of the piece. But eventually, as we get closer to the festival, and into it, we hear each individual instrument doing its own solo, and groups of instruments playing, until we leave at the end of the 15 minute piece, and it's farewell again, and all the mass of sound comes back again and it fades into the distance. So although this piece consists of conventional, traditional Scottish tunes that I have written in that style, it has this framework which is a Cageian idea, so it's both very traditional — combined, or contrasting with those more experimental ideas.

How does the synchronisation of parts work, is that rigid or flexible?

It's all fully written out. Apart from one or two small places, where there's a climatic moment and the whole orchestra is playing wildly, and I just let them go on a bit in their wildness, and a signal of some type brings them to a halt.

This is obviously one way of assimilating the Folk and the Classical in Scotland, but in general, what problems do you encounter in trying to find where to work within these two areas, because you have separate identities

This is the first in a series of interviews with modern composers, conducted by Steve Sweeney Turner. The Second, to appear in *Cenrastus* No. 40 will be with Thomas Wilson.



Eddie McGuire "Burns Night in Moscow"

as Folk performer, and Classical composer? They're coming together more and more in recent years, but at first, maybe 15 years ago, I joined the Folk group and for several years — 1973 onwards — I regarded that as an apprenticeship in Folk music, and they were quite separate.

So were you originally classically trained?
I don't like the phrase .. before the age of 5, my first musical influences would have been my father playing the violin, well, fiddle — he only knew a few tunes — and singing in a male voice choir who did some Gaelic arrangements as well, but I sort of rejected that for Rock 'n' Roll, in my rebellious early years; Elvis Presley, Bill Hailey, and it wasn't until after being in London and going to Sweden for a year, where people asked me to play Scottish Folk music, that I realised that was something I should become more deeply involved with. I started off composing as a hobby, as a separate activity from school music and just by luck I had enough music written of my own accord to get accepted by the Academy of Music in London, which was the only place that did composition as a first study for first year students. When I was there, I wasn't really taught Classical music in the sense that my composition teacher would set me projects to do my own pieces which I brought each week and he observed and criticised them from their own standards. So I could say that I missed out on Classical training, so I avoid saying that I've been classically trained, because there have been so many other influences. It was after leaving to teach the flute and I do play a bit of Classical music now, but it's always been mainly composing my own music and playing Folk music.

Do you ever have the experience, particularly outside Scotland, with your music that has some kind of Folk input, that in the international contemporary music com-

munity there's a kind of condescension towards writing music which is nationally specific in a traditional context?

Well there certainly was in London in the late '60s and the early '70s and in other places in Europe, in Stockholm, for example, at the music academy there, where the main influences on the composers, the main "in" composers were Stockhausen, Boulez, Die Reihe — the music magazine from Darmstadt, people used to study that — and total serialism, and the mathematical approach. Up and coming at that time in the late '60s were ideas of Cage which were quite diametrically opposed to this, em ... it could be termed elitism ... And the new music coming from America in terms of Terry Riley, and Steve Reich, although it wasn't until the mid '70s or the late '70s that I became fully aware of and found a very refreshing influence in Steve Reich. Especially, say, Music for 18 Musicians ... but I was aware and played in Terry Riley's music — for example, In C, in the late '60s — and this started off in my mind a general rejection of total serialism and the Boulez-Stockhausen way, and return to tonality which generally became a world-wide movement.

So in a sense, through that, you found a route toward Scottish Folk music.

Yes, the route has similarities with the Minimalists in America in the sense that their process-music uses small elements which relate to what I would call their own popular music, their own ethnic music which may have its roots in Jazz, Pop music ...

While it's sometimes said that Britain rather than America defines Rock music if nothing else.

Benjamin? ... oh, yeh, I see! Ha ha! Yes, but I wasn't suggesting Rock music so much as the little phrases that are used in Steve Reich's music. I hear these phrases in Copland, sometimes, and in ...

Aaron, or Stewart? Ha ha!

Ha ha. Aaron! And I hear these little phrases in Motown music, and many other American popular music forms. So I — obviously not being American, but Scottish — felt that if I was going to take upon myself this refreshing influence of Minimalism, which I had been doing anyway since the early '70s independently, then the material that would form the bricks of this stuff would be Scottish material which I had become practically involved with anyway and couldn't get out of my mind; sitting beside a bagpipe player in the Whistlebinkies seems to install a sense of drones and pipe phrases, which you can't get rid of. And so that was the basis of my approach to Minimalism, which I went through more of a phase of in the late '70s — early '80s, with pieces like *Quintet*, *Fast Piece 3* for viola and guitar, and some other ones. I made a symbolic gesture in the early '70s of abandoning discordant music and writing a piece called *Twelve White-Note Pieces for Pianos* which just used the white notes of the piano and could be for many pianos, all playing simultaneously. So this was a sort of influence of Cage and of Terry Riley at the time. And from that, I added the spice of discords, here and there, so that in a piece called *Rebirth* which was an earlier piece reborn and what I looked on as a rebirth of my own musical style took these elements of a mixture of tonality with the spice of discordant and serial influences coming through, for dramatic effect.

Would you say, then, that this is where the contemporary Eddie McGuire began?

Yes, I still harp back to those times; I haven't betrayed that freshness, I hope. *Rebirth* was me setting out my ideas; it was supposed also, as well as the rebirth of the musical style of an earlier piece, also to symbolise the revolutionary resurgence of those years — dating from the victory over America by the Vietnamese; I was involved in the anti-Vietnam

War movement when I was a student in London, and *Rebirth* was written during that period, up to 1974. There was a lot of renewal and hope in the world Socialist movement at that time, which may not have kept going — ha ha! — which may have diminished somewhat! ... *completely evaporated!*

Yes, there's been some setbacks! But at that time there was what you might call "Revolutionary Optimism" — it turned out to be rather harder work than one imagined! And there was the formation of new optimistic parties ...

Are we talking about one optimistic Scottish party in particular here?

Oh, no, I was talking about the world Communist movement, ha ha! And the Cultural Revolution in China which turned out to be again, not wholly positive. It did inspire some renewal of idealism, at the time, and that's found in my piece *Rebirth* which was followed by another two pieces — *Interregnum* and a piece called *Liberation* which quotes some Vietnamese Liberation Front themes. So with those pieces, I set out my ideas on the ideal way forward, sort of the Marxist ideal, maybe. I didn't feel obliged to repeat that in every piece thereafter — I don't agree with the idea of *having* to paint a red flag in every painting, as some people in the Cultural Revolution did, so therefore, I have written pieces like *String Quartet*, which develops from a purely musical idea ... various quintets and orchestral pieces, which, although they are abstract music, still, should, for the listener, carry the same inspirational quality as in my more directly idealistic pieces.

so where would you say the political inflection of your music has moved since that optimistic period — I mean we've gone through a very pessimistic period and it looks like it might get even more pessimistic over the next ten years. You were talking about a kind of Internationalist flavour to things at that point ...

Well, I haven't abandoned these ideas; I just feel that the struggle for them is harder now, and that during the years of continual starvation of the Arts, just to be creative was a positive, if not revolutionary step — just to keep that going, to keep the spark alive ... I have not abandoned the strong class feeling that I grew up with, and that has implications for us now following the Year of Culture in Glasgow — my comment on that would be that if you're building a hope of great cultural renaissance, it cannot be built on nothing, and if you've removed all the wealth — creating industry, then the candy-floss culture may collapse sooner than you may think.

It seems like a very much tacked-on surface. I mean, you can't wake up one morning and say "this is a city of culture". You've got to actually build that in history. Not to mention the question "Whose Culture?"

Yes, I think Britain is a proletarian country, but the illusions foisted by the dominant ideology have made people forget their roots and aspire to illusions.

So how do you see Scotland as an insular unit fitting into this broad spectrum?

Well, on the one hand, I'm a strong exponent of Scottish music — traditional music — through the Whistlebinkies and through its influence on the music that I write down, but I make every effort not to allow that to become a parochial, narrow-minded expression, because it's almost as if the music is pointing to the fact that for people in the world, there's one world, because there's such great and deep connections between the expression of the different far-flung peoples of the world — like Chinese pentatonic music has got great similarities with the Gaelic song of the West of Scotland, and the female singing styles are very similar, too. And Peter Cook of the School of Scottish Studies has made us all aware of the bagpipes of India. In a recent trip to Jerusalem with the SNO chorus, Rab Wallace — the piper of the Whistlebinkies — and I visited, and tutored, and played with a Palestinian pipe band who were playing on ancient Scottish bagpipes dating from maybe fifty years ago, which had to be fixed up a bit. But they didn't realise these instruments they were playing were of Scottish origin ... So that amounts to saying that around the world, Folk music, far from being a parochial and nationalistic thing — nationalistic in the narrow sense — is in fact a mind-broadening thing which unites Humanity, because there's so many common connections that go — up to now, maybe — have gone unnoticed, and I think it's our duty as a Folk group, and mine as a composer to point these out in interesting ways. So that comes back to your question about Scotland — my attitude, politically, would be that it should not become a parochial question, or a narrow nationalist question, and I would put the question of class before the question of nationality. So therefore, in the ambulance dispute, in the miner's strike, in the dispute that I was involved in with the BBC orchestra in Glasgow going on strike, solidarity Britain — wide among working-class organisations was the answer, and I think it would be tragic to cut these at the border. It would weaken the working class in its long-term attempt to create a society in its own interest. I'm not so sure if Thatcherism wouldn't prefer the Scottish working class to get out.

It's obvious that Kinnock can't afford it to! Which may be the same kind of thing, in the end ...

So, I feel involved in the various struggles through the coming together of composing and the Whistlebinkies — through the Whistlebinkies we can directly appeal to an audience, and although we don't sing directly politicised songs, our music — instrumental music — has played a role in trade union and other events of struggle.

It's necessarily inherently political — just because of what it is, where it comes from, and who does it ... If I could ask you in a capacity as a spokesman for the Whistlebinkies, do you image yourselves as coming from any particular area of Scotland — for instance, you have a bodhran player. Now that's surely much more of a West coast thing — connecting it with Ireland, or some kind of input of Irish population into an area like Glasgow.

Well, the Whistlebinkies have little bits of uniqueness — ha ha! — and one of them is that we have very varied backgrounds of the members in the group. We come from all over the central belt — Stuart, the concertina player, comes from Edinburgh and works in Linlithgow — he's involved in conservation; Peter Anderson, the drummer, who's the drum major of the Wallace Stone pipe band near Falkirk, and he is a gas safety engineer, and he's taken part in world championship drumming; further to the West, Mick Broderick (bodhran) lives in Arran ... some of the time ... and both Mick and I have one Irish parent; we have an orchestral violin player, and an orchestral harp player with us, and the age groups vary from the early twenties to late forties, and the male and female combination is also quite good. So a wide slice of Humanity is represented in the group. We have slightly varying political outlooks between the members of the group, but we always try to reach a consensus if we're asked to play for various struggles, or various campaigns or things — we have to discuss whether we do it or not.

It seems like a very egalitarian state! We've been talking about things in a very Internationalist context, whilst being within the Scottish tradition and reaching out — in a sense do you see something like the pentatonic scale as an image of a trans-national communion of the proletariat?

Maybe not so specific to one aspect of music, but there's many aspects that form common understanding between the peoples, and music is one of the great non-verbal communicators.

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John Cage at the Glaswegian Circus *Steve Sweeney Turner*

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Steve Sweeney Turner

John Cage and the Glaswegian Circus: an interview around Musica Nova 1990

We would do the interview in the circle. It was clearing-up time after yet another rehearsal in the Henry Wood Hall, Glasgow, and I was following a slow-moving John Cage of 78 years up the stairs as he embarrassingly held doors for me and explained the tight schedule he was bound by. He has now visited the U.K. three times in one year, taking in the Huddersfield, Almeida, and Glasgow's Musica Nova festivals, all in the middle of his usual jet-setting around the world which occupies the greater part of his year. With such tight schedules and a time-consuming specialised diet, it is incredible that he grants interviews at all. His usual answer – based, as ever, in his infamous non-intention – is: 'because people ask me to!' Non-intentionality has been his basic aesthetic position since at least the 1950s, and as I found out, he's still finding fresh nuances there. At least when he's got the time to sit down at his desk. *Why does he do it?*

Why do I do it? Well, this trip is the last one until next June, and it began with the invitation from Mathias Bamert, who I have a friendly feeling for, and so I said 'yes' when he invited me. One thinks that when one accepts an engagement, there'll be time to continue one's work, but I more and more see that that's not the case, and so I will be more inclined to not travel, because I have less time now than I had formerly, and it's harder for me to do simple things like walk! My doctor says I shouldn't carry anything heavy, so now I have a chariot for my luggage, but that means that when I come to stairs, I'm confronted with a serious problem to solve. Also my food takes a lot of time in preparation.

When you're on tour, do you cook all your own food, given the special nature of your diet?

Mhm. But it's simple – just beans and rice; vegetables. I've been invited twice here to Indian restaurants, and I take along a doggy-bag, so I have beans and rice, and curries.

Do you find it's getting easier to accomodate your diet on tour these days?

I think it is easier, yes. Though in Huddersfield, I

became quite ill. I didn't know, actually, what things to put together, and I got to eating muesli which had both dried fruit and nuts, mixed in with the grain, and it turns out that those things are impossible to digest together. Did you know that? So my digestion was getting very poor. I think I'm getting along better on this trip than I did when I was in Huddersfield. But that tour was quite exhausting, going from one part of the world to another, Japan and so forth. But as I've gotten older, I've recognized the fact of where I've chosen to live as being home. I know the dishes in which I cook at home, and I know all the plants that are growing there that I've put around; I feel at home there. And certainly I can do better work there, or more work.

So what have you written recently, in between touring?

I'm currently finishing the *Freeman Etudes*, but I can't take them with me on a trip like this, and I won't get them done until December, so I've taken another piece with me which isn't so complicated. Right now I'm working, I mean even this morning, on a piece called *One*⁷ because it'll be the seventh time I've written for one person, and I'm actually writing for myself to give a kind of performance when I return from this trip. When I do return, I'll have almost immediately to give the performance. So I'm preparing it now!

Is this a vocal piece?

Yes. Now, you see, I vocalise quite a lot; I have arthritis, so I can't play the piano any more, but I can vocalise without any damage to myself! It could involve a bit of theatre, objects moving around. I don't know whether it will. I also wrote a mesostic called *The First Meeting of the Satie Society*.

Is that an invented society?

Yes, and Satie is the principal member! It's a birthday party for him... Everyone brings him a present, and the presents they bring are mesostics!

Does he like them?




Photo: Roger Gordy, Boston, 1988.

Well, he replies. You know – the things he said? I have a list of the different things he said, and after each present he says one of these things, like 'When I was young, people told me: You'll see when you're fifty. I'm fifty. I've seen nothing.'

What kind of influence would you say Satie has had on your music?

I don't know! Because his music was so simple and mine is so complex, so I don't know, but I hope there's some influence.

So how are you writing music these days? You seem to use, more and more, the flotsam and jetsam of history as materials, presented in a new context, juxtaposed with others. Like the Folk music in Roaratorio and Scottish Circus, or the arias in the Europaras.

Well, that's one thing I do do now, this Circus idea, but I'm also using time brackets which are very flexible and also very large so that there's so much freedom of space, you know. What happens happens at a very unspecific time. And it works just beautifully in relation to the other time brackets. I'm very pleased with it. And I think my music has changed.

It strikes me that time is perhaps your main concern out of the parameters of sound.

Uhuh, more than pitch, because, you see, time includes noise. So that that leaves the field open to all kinds of sound, rather than just so-called 'musical'

sound. And a few years ago, I went to Leningrad in Russia, and I met Sofia Gubaidulina, who heard a piece of mine where the musicians used watches, and she said she liked the music, but didn't like the watches, and that I should remember that there's an inner clock. So, when it's practical, I do remember that, and in the case of the *Scottish Circus*, I'm using it. I used it also for a piece called *Two* which is for two pianos, and there the two parts are related not in any fixed way, but by some kind of 'inner clock' that the performers have to use.

Have you stipulated any time restrictions for Scottish Circus?

One-third music and two-thirds silence, or half and half, something like that. But then if you, say, had 20 people doing that, you'd want less music on the part of each one. Probably, the thing to do would be to find what seems to be the right density, and have two factors which you multiply and then come out to the right number. But it's not very fixed, because the traditional Scottish pieces are also changing time-lengths from say three minutes to five minutes, or they're one minute repeated several times. We'll see what happens. The Whistlebinkies are also going to do the silent piece, in a form for a group of people, which is not a single group, but which is seven different people. So they'll come in using not a watch, but what we might call 'the inner clock', and they'll make three silences. That is to say, they'll pick up their instruments and not play them.

4'33" doesn't necessarily last that long, does it? So how long is the 'Binkies' new version?

We don't know, 'cause they're using 'inner clock'.

Right, so they're just deciding on the spot.

They won't decide, they'll just do it. Each one will make three silences, and leave the performing area after the third silence. They'll come in, also, individually, not as a group, and when no-one is there, they'll have finished. I think it might last somewhere between 5 and 10 minutes, rather than 4'33".

Right, but it's nevertheless been programmed as 4'33".

Yes, David Tudor once said that he saw no reason why a piece called 4'33" should last 4 minutes and thirty-three seconds.

Quite! So how do you see the difference in terms of organization between the idea of the 'inner clock' and the idea of division by seconds, and division by crotchets?

Well, the difference is that the watch gives an objective, regular second. We don't know what the 'inner clock' does, but it certainly doesn't give you something outside yourself. And when two

people are doing that together, it becomes probably two different points, not a single point. I don't know, but that's what I think!

So it's a fairly recent development in your work?

It's current!

Do you see your work as progressing through a sequence of different periods? Because it could be said that we're seeing you move from, initially, metric, through objective time schemes, through these time 'windows', up to a kind of subjective time.

I'm not sure that it's different – when I get a new idea, or what I think is a new idea, I discover very shortly that it's a repetition of an old idea. For instance, in working with flexible time-brackets, an action can be made within a particular period of time, and the end within a particular period of time. And while I think of it as being new, it's hard to say that it's different from the rhythmic structures previously.

With the 'internal clock' idea, is it not a danger that desires and intentions, which you're normally very outspoken against, will actually prevail on precise timings, and even lead to someone choosing to act at a certain point to fit in with somebody else at the same time?

Uhuh. It's a very interesting problem, and I haven't yet come to the end of it. I don't know what to do about it, but I'll keep doing a few things until I come to a conclusion.

So how far are you towards working it out?

I don't really know! I remember Morton Feldman wrote some pieces in which three pianos were all playing the same material, but each one at his own speed. And I happened to be one of the pianists for a performance in Berlin, and I played so slowly that I was left behind the other pianists for quite a long period. That stopped Morty from ever writing that way again! So something like that might happen to me, that would oblige me to change. But I'm looking now to the possibilities of letting the clock be 'inner', rather than objective.

It seems to make things more flexible in some senses, because it's very difficult to count time accurately and subjectively. That reduction of precision must appeal to you, but the problem of a kind of improvisation remains, and you're normally against what people mean by 'improvisation', because of its involvement with the performer's taste, memory, and so on.

Now I've found ways of improvising which keep people from doing that. They are things having to do with time, and pitch. If you give yourself a period of time in which you could make, say, one sound in a certain field of pitch, say, then what's

going to happen is something which you don't have in mind, and you just might discover something.

So in a way, it's like providing stumbling blocks for an improviser.

You could say that, yes; making it impossible to just do what you already know.

Discovery is still very important to you then?

It is. My work is experimental, almost always. I'm still doing that. I just look to discover something if I can, rather than reassert tradition. I think the people who are reasserting tradition are involved in speaking, or communicating, and they're not so involved with sound. I think of myself as not being mummified, as one of the critics put it, but as though I'm just as alive now, and will be until I die, as young people who are alive. So that the ideas I have now are not out of date, but are part of the date. So I have no feeling towards conservatism, but always to making some kind of discovery, so that there is still discovery in the air. I think I'm not the only one with that spirit.

Do you find it's getting easier to discover things, or more difficult?

It's getting easier. I can now write quite quickly.

Is that because of methodology that you've adopted?

No. I think it's because of my age.

In what sense?

In the sense of being 78! For instance, I used to search for ideas, but I don't any longer.

So if you're discovering more than you used to, but don't look for ideas any more, what would you say it is that you're searching for now?

I think it's coming close to harmony. You can hear that in my piece called *Five*.

How could it be described as moving towards harmony?

I wouldn't describe it, I'd just do it. It wouldn't be a harmony that has laws – tonic, dominant; but it would be a harmony that includes noise.

A lot of composers are now speaking about trying to recover tradition, rather than discover new definitions per se. How do you view that yourself as a way forward?

It's more like Stravinsky – I've tried to make a discovery. I think of history as remaining the same all the time; having a richness of differences in it. Isn't that what's really true? That we don't all go to the left and then to the right, but that while some of us are going to the left, some are going to the right? Don't you think all of those things coexist? People so often mention the '60s, the '70s, the '80s

– I don't know why it should be in tens! That's rather lazy. People tell me that there's an interest in conservatism now. I take it that conservatism means 'speaking'. At one point I made a kind of distinction for myself between music that 'speaks' and music that 'acts', or does something, and I prefer things that do things rather than speak, and so much music does speak.

When you talk of music which 'speaks' – intentional music – do you mean that it actually achieves or just mistakenly attempts speech?

Well, for the person who uses it to speak, it speaks, I'm sure. In his programme notes, James MacMillan, for instance, tells us what he succeeds in doing, doesn't he? He says, 'this is very convincing'! So if you have that intention, you do everything you can to make it heard. It seems to me, that if you're going to speak, then you should speak. So words of some kind are important.

Would you say that music which speaks acts by default anyway?

No, when I say act, I mean something else. I mean that a sound by vibrating does what is its nature to do: it acts like a sound, instead of acting like a word, or something that it isn't. It acts like something that it is, which is the vibration. So I said towards the end of my talk, 'we don't know what music is or could be, but we imagine that it could be paying attention to vibratory activity', and that's not such a slight thing to do. According to Immanuel Kant, in the *Critique of Judgement*, there are two things that do that, that don't need to have anything else at their basis in order to move us deeply, and that is music, and the other is laughter. Those two things can move us very deeply, simply because they change their vibration.

I find it interesting that you mention Kant's book on aesthetics, given your usual preference for eastern ideas.

Mhm, it's welcome to know that it's quite profound to listen to something which has nothing at its basis! Which is an oriental idea: nothingness, Nirvana, etcetera.

How do you react when performers play your work without committing themselves to a conscientious performance according to the rules you've set for the piece?

Well, last night, *Five* was played incorrectly. I didn't enjoy it. I'll tell you frankly; I was unhappy, and even disturbed. It was actually improvising – it had nothing to do with my work. I know what Karlheinz Stockhausen would have done; he would have shouted 'STOP!' Now why wouldn't




Photo: Wolfram Eder, Germany 1990

I do that? This morning, I knew perfectly well what I should've done. I should've interrupted them and explained to the audience that the piece was not being played correctly, then told the players what to do. They might not have understood, though, and certainly they were rehearsed to do it incorrectly. Whether I would have succeeded, I don't know. But I know that I should have interrupted them.

I've often seen performers take your pieces for vacuous jokes.

I guess music has a good deal to do with one's mind, and if you get the idea that something's a joke, it's hard to change it. The reason it's a joke is because it's not like anything else that they do. I mean, for them, that's why it's a joke. A Dutch musician once told me that when you have a hundred people, which is what you have with an orchestra, it's hard to change that many people's minds. You might be able to change a few of them, but you can't change all of them.

What would you say the performer's responsibilities are?

I don't know what to say... What I've done is to write music, and what I hope is that it will be played as it is written; where there are freedoms, the freedoms are taken there, rather than everywhere. When one writes music, one writes sounds and absence of sounds on the part of that player, and when they don't pay attention to those differences, then it doesn't seem to be something that you want. On the other hand, you can't speak

of their responsibilities. I mean to say that any responsibility that anyone has is either followed or not followed, and very frequently, it's not followed. For instance if I'm cooking, I might burn something; all sorts of things can go wrong, and for different reasons, so you can speak of responsibility, but you don't always get a perfect result. One of the things, actually, that is specific about music, about the performance of music, is that social situation; even if it's a solo, it involves an audience, so that it's got to do with the interaction of people, too. That doesn't happen with painting; the artist can finish his work in his own studio, completely.

Yes, the action between making and receiving is cut off there. This social aspect to music seems to be particularly brought out in your pieces such as Scottish Circus, where the performers are all independent of each other.

Right. That's what you might call my 'political' attitude; toward society in general. I don't vote. I don't like the idea of a bigger number of people winning. Thoreau didn't vote, either; he was opposed to democracy, and so was Schoenberg. He thought it was a very poor idea. You see, he objected to quantity being the controlling factor, rather than intelligence.

It sounds like that could be an almost Nietzschean Schoenberg! Have you ever had any problems about your political ideas?

No, and unlike Thoreau, I pay my taxes, not because I admire government, but because I want to go on with my work and not be disturbed. In my writings, I speak against government, and every now and then, against the government of the United States. Once, the U.S. government thought that my music was oriental, so when they were fighting the war in Indonesia, they took my *Three Dances* for two prepared pianos and beamed it towards Bali to explain to them that we love the Orient! I wasn't paid for it, and I was poor, then. I didn't know where the next money was coming from. I look forward, as Buckminster Fuller did, to the removal of the 153 sovereignties, and the approach to the world as a whole, and the solution of problems that confront all of us, which are now very serious. I was delighted I could drink and cook with the water here in Glasgow. In New York, I have to buy water in which to cook. It seems to me we should recognize that as the real problem, rather than continue letting our leaders fight one another.

You often say things against the idea of nations and traditions, but you enjoy and work with Celtic traditional music. Why's that?

It must be in the blood. Unfortunately, I'm largely

English; I think the name is English. So, as an Englishman, I wish I were Irish! I think I have a bit of Scots blood, though. I'll sound very inconsistent now, but those things are bound up with a kind of social past, rather than the past of individuals, and you know that I'm devoted to the notion of individuals, rather than society, but I'm often inconsistent; I like this social tradition of music. As far as the idea of individuals goes, I like them not so much when they're expressing their feelings, as when their work is ambiguous to such an extent that they leave room for the listeners to make up their own minds about what they're hearing. Which isn't the case, of course, with traditional Irish or Scottish music. You see, when I said that I didn't want to come to the ceilidh, that was because of the fixity, or finishedness of traditional music; it doesn't leave anything for the listener to do, except enjoy it, not in his own way very much, but in the way of the whole society, so to speak. But it is fun. I used to go and hear Joe Heaney singing in a bar on 14th Street in New York; he lived in Brooklyn, and he sang in my *Roaratorio*. He's dead now, but Mick Broderick, who sings in the Whistlebinkies, knew and admired him. I like Mick Broderick's singing, too, and Judith Peacock, who also sings with them. They don't sing sentimentally, nor did Joe Heaney; they sing straight, and with some kind of dignity. It's that quality of people doing their work well that I admire.

I'm surprised to discover your interest in your genealogy, because it's another facet of tradition, surely?

Well, that's what we are in the United States – if we have any past that's back far enough, we like to find out what it was. If we just came from France, or just came from Czechoslovakia, we'd know perfectly well that that's what happened, but if we didn't, then we wonder where we did come from, you know? I've even thought that my grandmother was partly American Indian. Her name was Minnie, and we always thought it was short for Minnie Haha! She had long black hair, which never turned grey; even when she was about to die, she was still just jet-black hair, just like an Indian, and it fell from her head right to the floor, it was quite amazing.

Do you think that this American desire to find their European or other roots is actually an expression of a national paranoia about being American?

Oh, yes, and a certain guilt, if you like, about our treatment of the Indians. Now to that, and our sort of mediocre solution of the Blacks, we add our policeman attitude toward the whole world – it's terrible! I should think sometime people will get angry at the mere sight of us!

Well, certainly in Scotland, with the N.A.T.O. nuclear submarine bases just up the Clyde from Glasgow, and in the Forth, opposite Edinburgh, it explains why there's such a strong nationalist, and anti-American feeling here. Did you know about the bases?

Really? That's terrible, that's really awful. But that's plain stupidity, dangerous stupidity!

So they want Scotland to become independent from England to be equal in Europe? That should be done, I think. As long as there are nations, but I wish there weren't so many nations. Or I mean that I wish that whole idea would disappear. It doesn't show signs of doing that yet, except in commerce and economics; Coca-Cola doesn't care about the boundaries of any nations.

On the other hand, it can be argued that they're just another facet of American cultural imperialism.

Yes, but it's the same with other things, such as French wine; they don't care about the difference between two nations. And Glenfiddich can be anywhere! That's the saddest thing for me – finally to come to Scotland and not be drinking at all. But if I did drink, you see, I go to excess in most things, I just drink too much. They say it's very dangerous for someone who's given it up to have even a drop. He's very apt to give up giving up, then, and with pleasure, so it's better that I don't! Now I don't miss it, really, but it's just strange to have loved it so much and to be where it is... but we can say that it's everywhere! There's no place where single Malt doesn't flow!

So, given your strict adherence to the macrobiotic diet, how did you rationalize your taste for Whisky? Because it's 'macrobiotic' to the extent of coming from grains?

Actually, I thought in those terms, yes! And I also thought that when I drank Guinness in Ireland! Isn't it said to be 'good for you'? But actually, I'm afraid it isn't! Seaumas, the Uilleann pipes player in *Roaratorio*, is dead now – he drank too much Guinness! He could hardly record for me; he had to go to the toilet all the time! Then Joe Heaney died, too. He wasn't drinking any longer, but he

had done, and brought himself close to the grave!

Given your predilection for non-intentionality and so forth, do you have any desires or intentions about your own death?

Well, I don't really see how I can, because it's not a decision that I will be taking. It'll happen regardless of my desires and intentions. I'll just have to accept it however it happens. I wonder if I will...

Are you planning any more pieces which use Scottish or Irish material?

I might, but I'm not, actually. The next piece I may write does have to do with an Irish subject, but it's not Irish Irish; it's out of Joyce, and it's for a festival in Switzerland, where his work and my own work will be the subject of the festival. They've asked me to make a piece about Joyce that connects him with Zurich, where he died, and where he *didn't* write his last work, which was to follow *Finnegans Wake*. It was to be, some people imagine, on the subject of ocean, because *Finnegans Wake* is about the river going to the sea. So my work would be called *Ocean*, and I don't think it would have specifically Irish elements in it, but it would have the ocean elements in it. I've been told of an oceanographic institution in Baltimore where I could go and hear many sounds of the ocean, which I would probably combine with instruments, using this kind of harmony that I call Anarchic Harmony, that can include noises.

You've said that music used to be in a situation of choosing between two streams – Schoenberg or Stravinsky – and now we're in a situation of delta moving out towards ocean. So is this piece trying to achieve that next state – of ocean?

Yes, I must say, it is in my mind, but I haven't thought of it in that context, and I don't think I would make that explicit. I mean to say that I wouldn't make the river, and the delta, and the ocean; I'd just stay in the ocean! Maybe evaporate a bit!

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
THE MAGAZINE FOR SCOTTISH &
INTERNATIONAL LITERATURE, ARTS AND AFFAIRS

Thomas Wilson is American by birth, Irish by descent, Scottish by nurture, and International in inclination. As one of Scotland's most active composers, he has held posts in many major cultural institutions, Scottish and British, as well as having his music heard internationally. November 1988 saw him signing a deal of mutual exchange between the Scottish Society of Composers and the Rostov on Don branch of the Russian Union of Composers, under whose auspices Wilson's Piano Concerto and his Fourth String Quartet received their Soviet premiers that December.

Composers, Cash and Cosmopolitanism

A Conversation with Thomas Wilson

Steve Sweeney Turner



Thomas Wilson

What value would you say society puts on the composer today, in particular, where do they stand as far as life in Scotland's concerned?

Well, it's a very varied situation. Looking at it from a strictly mercenary point of view, and I don't suppose that any composer does look at it like that, otherwise he wouldn't do the job he's doing, but the composer is grossly underpaid for his labours. Society doesn't really value the composer enough to pay him properly. We have considerable help from bodies such as the Arts Council, it has to be said and also from commissioners of our work. In my own case I've been very fortunate – I've been commissioned steadily for the last twenty years or so, since the mid-sixties, but I don't think many people have been as fortunate as I have been in that respect.

I don't think that the commissioning system necessarily operates against what you might call the "spontaneity principle", because if you're sensible about it, you can so arrange matters that you get commissions that you want to get, and turn down the others – if you have a particular yen to write a string quartet, for example, then you let it be known, so to speak, that you want to, and somebody takes you up on it. That's the kind of principle, but it doesn't always work, of course.

The composer's situation as far as Scotland's concerned is very good locally, very good from the point of view of Scotland, because it's extremely active. I can't speak so much for Edinburgh, but I live in Glasgow, and Glasgow's absolutely jumping.

Do you find things have accelerated since Glasgow 1990?

Yes, I think they have to some extent. I don't think anybody's terribly sure quite what direction 1990 might lead in. I think there are some, you might say, reservations about the fact that quite a lot of the major commissions for 1990 seem to have gone to English composers. That hasn't, I think, gone down terribly well in these parts, and I've got a certain sympathy for that point of view, I have to say. However, I think 1990 could well introduce another element into the Scottish composer's existence, which might hopefully last longer than 1990 itself.

As far as the Scottish composer vis-à-vis England is concerned, it's still something of a battle, because, one or two exceptions apart, the English perception of Scottish musicians or composers seems either to ignore them politely or at any rate not to pay attention to them of the kind that I consider they deserve, because we have very good composers living here.



In the context of the Nationalist's overtures to Scotland in Europe do you find that there is a difference between the way that the Scottish composer is dealt with on the continent as opposed to in England?

Oh, I think very much so. Scottish composers in fact are making, increasingly, an impact upon other countries. Their music is being performed there much more widely. My own music's been performed all over the world, really, and it's become increasingly frequent in recent years, in places like Canada and the States, Germany and France, and Russia, Japan, and so forth – these are all beginning to take interest, and there is no sense there of this kind of funny discriminatory Hadrian's Wall – type of principle which seems to operate in the fairly parochial set-up that we have in this country [in which there is no more parochial place than the south-east of England]. However, it's not true of everybody, I mean there are plenty of people down in England who are in fact very interested indeed and have given considerable encouragement to people like myself; I will engage fairly soon upon a trumpet concerto for John Wallace, of the London Sinfonietta, for example. Places like the Cheltenham Festival have played my music, the City of London Festival, the Henry Wood Proms and the B.B.C., of course, in large quantities, and various other establishments like the Royal Northern College and the Guild-hall. These are instances of this principle which I've drawn your attention to operating the other way around, in fact, and they don't perceive it in this segregated way that is nevertheless a fact of life for Scottish composers. I think probably that it's also true to say that the Scottish composer may be doing quite well in some respects at the moment in the sense that people up here, performers up here, are taking an active interest, but we could do with a good deal more than we're getting.

Do you think that one problem in this is that contemporary music is not really getting out and about as much as it could do to do some self-publicity and actually demonstrate to the public that it is available?

Well, I think that's part of it, yes, although in recent years there have been one or two very good musical educators – people who are able to talk to the public about modern music and possibly their own work in particular and engage the public's interest as a result. That plus the fact that all the smaller ensembles – the string quartets, the string orchestras, and individual solo performers – are all, to give them full credit, very interested indeed in what Scottish composers are doing. So I think from that point of view things are quite good, but the financial situation's not right, and if anything it's getting worse, because the restraints imposed by the present Government are such that the Arts are feeling the pinch, all round, and music's no exception.

Do you feel that given the money the Arts Council have, however much that is, it would be more fruitful to share it out in a different way to present policy, which seems to be to aim money primarily at the large institutions in the first instance, and then see

what's left for everyone else?

Well, I suppose that, trying to look at it from their point of view, and have some sympathy for the difficulties that they no doubt encounter, I suppose that is the natural way of doing it. When you have major customers, then they're going to get a major share of the cake, unless you simply say, "well, this major customer's not going to get any more", and that would clearly be a destructive move, too. I mean, nobody wants to see the end of Scottish Opera, or the S.N.O. or whatever. So I don't see any way in which you could do it other than that. What's needed, however, is more money, so that they can in fact still satisfy the needs of the major customers, but also cater for some of the deserving smaller "clients" who need support very much, perhaps even more. At the present time, they are not getting the support that they need; the composer is increasingly getting less support, simply because of the restraints on public money going into the system in the first place.

When more people listen to music than ever before, through records and other electronic media, it seems strange that classical music should be, in comparison with other styles, effectively on the decrease. Do you think there's anything that classical music could learn from the way that rock music, for example, is sold? Because that's what it boils down to, really.

Well, first of all, just to quarrel with one of the things you said, I don't think classical music's on the decrease. If anything, I think it's on the increase, because despite the financial difficulties we've been talking about, the number of performances is growing. Whether or not there are any lessons to be learned from the kind of marketing skills of the rock musicians ... I suppose there are, theoretically, because they're good at it. On the other hand there are all sorts of reasons why it doesn't happen, and one of them is money.

But rock is financially self-supporting, whereas classical music is, by the way things are organised, dependent on subsidy.

That's right; it's either dependent on subsidy, or increasingly, on some form of sponsorship. And that means to say that you have to be dependent, as it were, on the good will of others. But generally, that is the situation we're in, whether you like it or not – that is it. I don't myself think, you see, that classical music and rock music can be compared; that's not to say that I take a lofty view and condescend to the rock musicians, not at all; but what I do say is that there's some kind of difference in capacity to appeal to a wide audience, and that's where the money comes from.

So you think there is fundamentally a root difference, that far more people want to buy rock records than classical records, and go to rock concerts than classical concerts.

Oh, I think there's an obvious statistical difference, that far more people want to buy rock records than classical records, and go to rock concerts than classical concerts.

But you wouldn't say that's reducible to just marketing techniques.

No, I don't think it is, although that aspect could be improved, no doubt. I mean you can sell people anything through skillful advertising, I suppose, but it doesn't seem to me that rock music makes for a bridge into classical music terribly readily.

Do you see any space here for possible interfacing with the means adopted in folk music, particularly in the context of the Scottish tradition and any relation it has to your own work?

Well my own upbringing was strongly influenced by folk music. Although I speak with a pronounced Scots accent, my own antecedents are entirely Irish, though I think of myself as a Scot. I'm an in-comer in that sense, so the Scottish musical tradition, which I admire immensely, is not really my tradition. Having said that, there are, I think, a number of people who are writing in that way at the present time and showing the increased influence of folk music as it's now known – folk music seems now to mean something different to what it did before, i.e. something pretty old which had survived from the past – now it's as it were, hot off the drawing board, very often. Adopting that view of it – that it's going on and being written at the present time – that's quite valid, I think. My feeling about it is quite complicated; I don't want, really, to take some piece of wonderful folk music and tart it up like a piece of classical music, because I think you ruin it in the process.

So you don't see any place for stylistic or even crossovers?

Oh, there's all sorts of room, but the room is not for what you might call explicit carry-over. Having said that, it very much depends on individual cases. When you're talking in general terms such as we are at the moment, you tend to say things such as I've just said and you immediately think of exceptions. I mean I have written arrangements of folk tunes myself, because people asked me to, and I'm reasonably pleased with them.

So how do you place them? Which style would you say they reside in?

Oh, they reside in a style which is compatible with folk music.

What about the National context of your main work?


In some way, I do believe that the music a person writes is deeply influenced at some intuitive, subliminal level by the place in which he lives, and the kind of experience he has had and the culture he participates in. My music is Scottish, simply because I live here, and because I think here, and because I react here, and I would regard that as being an absolute article of faith as far as I'm concerned. So I would say, yes, I do write Scottish music. But if you ask me to prove it, if you ask me to say how it is Scottish, you know, where the "Scots Wha Hae" element is, I'd say, well it isn't there, you've got to look for it elsewhere, in some other aspect, but if you know what you're looking for, you'll find it, because it's there. Of that I have no doubt whatsoever. Does that answer your question?

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A Contemporary Tradition

An interview with David Johnson, by Steve Sweeney Turner

When I visited David Johnson at his Edinburgh flat, I found this stalwart of the Scottish music scene hard at work on yet another collection of fiddle tunes, and more than generous with a variety of caffeine-bearing liquids and excellent Indian cuisine. As we sat in his sparse kitchen watching the curry bubble, he instructed me to ask "the hard questions" which face the contemporary collector of traditional music.

Why should we, at the end of the twentieth century, care at all about this traditional music from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries?

Well, this stuff isn't 'historic' in the way that some types of classical music are; I think that once one gets into traditional music, the division between past and present isn't so great. The past is still alive, and the present is connected to the past. After all, we are the descendants of the people who wrote and played this at the time it was new. We tick in the same way that they did. And the music keeps developing; for example, there's a set of 'The Hen's March Over The Midden' which we've got in the new collection, that's derived from the set in the Jim Hunter book published in 1979, but in the course of the last twelve years, it's had edges rubbed off it, it's had things smoothed out. People have simplified the Hunter version without losing the essence of it, so we're picking up something that's been creatively modified during the eighties, and publishing it again.

In this sense, your work isn't motivated by a feeling of nostalgia which leads you backwards to try and discover some kind of authentic original which should be held up as an unassailable truth, but much more the presentation of a contemporary image of a living genre.

Certainly, yes! And there are bits of creative work which have gone into the

book; the piano accompaniments are my own work, apart from borrowing a few hints from earlier accompaniments.

How would you say that this aspect of your collections relates to your work as a composer per se? Is it on a similar level?

Yes I think they form a spectrum. Obviously, arranging is easier – you're not

Oh, well, enormously. You could sit in a library looking at pieces of music and hearing them in your head until the cows come home, and get all sorts of things wrong. Also, I have to confess that the joys of sitting in libraries have worn off by this time in my life, whereas getting up and playing it to an audience, having the fun of

35. The four-poster bed

Brisk



'The Four Poster Bed' from Book 2 of the collection believed to be of early 18th century English origin, the tune has been 'traditional' in Scotland for several generations. This version from young Edinburgh fiddler Sophie Hay notated in 1990.

* definitely NOT on the belly of the instrument, as traditionally!

starting from a blank sheet of paper in the same way. I think I learn a lot from editing, which feeds my compositions, and certainly being a composer already makes editing a lot easier.

You've also spent a lot of time performing these pieces as a 'cellist with the McGibbon Ensemble; how would you say that practical experience has influenced your research?

meeting people for rehearsals, and finding out what a piece sounds like; this is similar to the fun of having composed a new piece that you haven't heard yet. Finding one in a library and taking it along to a rehearsal and getting it played is very exciting, the feeling of the stuff coming alive, coming off the page.

Your present collection is very eclectic. For instance, as well as the reels and stuff you'd expect, there's also an arrangement for four fiddles of a psalm tune, and so forth. This kind of practical eclecticism seems characteristic of all your work. Where would you say it comes from?

I suppose a general interest in Scotland, and feeling that I myself was not brought up in any one bit of Scotland – this is what comes of being born in Edinburgh; if one had been born, say, in the Western Isles, you'd know you belonged to a particular bit of Scotland, but Edinburgh is "cosmopolitan". From another point of view, this collection is not setting up to be a "national monument", it's not trying to include everything. It's only got quite a small number of tunes in it really. Some volumes run to a hundred tunes, but we've only got twenty per volume. I wanted to make the contents as varied as possible, remembering that some of the users will be young children who are not going to sit down and play a hundred tunes one after another; they're going to have to learn them one at a time rather slowly and perhaps painfully, and I wanted



David Johnson (right) in rehearsal with colleagues Edna Arthur, violin and Bryce Gould, harpsichord.

to make sure that all the tunes were first class, that each one was worth having, and there would be variety.

What contribution would you say these tunes make to expanding the technical repertoire of people learning the fiddle?

I would have thought they'd be very useful. All Scottish fiddle music is good stuff, technically. Playing Scots fiddle music couldn't do anything to anyone's technique except improve it, and we've got them graded, so the book starts with the easy pieces. There are one or two of the transcribed piobaireachds that my violinist colleague, Edna Arthur, has kept saying, "this is a marvellous bowing exercise - we must put this in!" Once you've mastered this, you could play nearly anything. Apart from that, I think it might draw Scottish music to the serious attention of children in the kind of families where they would not get Scottish music thrown at them. Perhaps showing, among other things, that the Scottish way of writing for the violin is just as good as the classical ways, and is nothing anybody need be ashamed of, or try and push into the corner or sweep under the carpet.

Are there any new pieces in the collection?

Yes, there are one or two, actually. The main one is a piobaireachd called 'Fàilte MhicGilleain' [McLean's Welcome], which has come out of a manuscript made in Edinburgh in 1740, in a violin arrangement. This itself is far older than any surviving bagpipe text, and has never been published until now, so here, we're putting something new onto the market which no-one has had access to except readers in the National Library of Scotland.

Do you see yourself as some kind of representative or ambassador for the Scottish Folk tradition?

Not exactly; I think in some ways, I'm simply doing my own thing as a creative artist, using Scottish traditional music as the medium in which I'm doing it. In other ways, making a collection like this would be no use unless it were of use to other people. So it's got to hold together as a collection which lots of people in Scotland would appreciate, would want to use, which would give them things they otherwise wouldn't have, putting my knowledge of the Scottish past to some sort of use, so that it becomes something that will be useful to the people at the other end. Particularly, this is a book for children. In one sense, I suppose I'm trying to make something, give something to the people of Scotland.

David Johnson is the author of Music and Society in Lowland Scotland in the Eighteenth Century, and Scottish Fiddle Music in the Eighteenth Century. His latest collection, Scots on the Fiddle will be published on 1st November in two books: Book 1 (Grade II-IV) at £5.00, Book 2 (Grade V-VIII) at £6.00. Copies can be ordered from David Johnson, 7 Hill Square, Edinburgh.

DAVE JONES

Dave was born in Brecon on 29th December 1940, the second son of a shopkeeper and his wife and grew up with a love of life. He went to Postern and Pendre School and was a member of Brecon Cathedral choir where he developed his love of music and his ability as a singer and musician. He went on to Christ College in Brecon where he played rugby for the First XV and it must have been his influence because, with Dave in the team, Christ College beat Llandovery, their arch rivals for many years, for the first time. After he left Christ College Dave went to work in the laboratory of British Nylon Spinners at Pontypool where he decided that his vocation and future was in teaching so he went on to St. Luke's Teacher Training College at Exeter where he obtained a teaching degree. Whilst at Exeter he met Sandra and like Dave she was a good singer with a love of folk music and dance and they were well regarded as a singing duo in and around the clubs and festivals in the area. Dave was now a member of the EFDSS and it was through that organisation that he met Bill Rutter who was the director and leading light of Sidmouth Folk Festival and this had a profound effect on Dave's future direction in the folk world, for Bill convinced Dave that running anything was just a case of careful planning and putting the right people in the right place at the right time, an art which Dave developed and perfected over the years.

Dave and Sandra were married and Dave got a job at Whitecross School in Hereford and they decided that Ledbury was the place that they wanted to live, so there they bought a house and set up home. At this point Dave decided that the local folk scene, for what it was, needed shaking by the shirt tails and dragging into the 20th century and characteristically of Dave he set about gently persuading and nudging the right people into the right place at the right time and so started the great folk revival in the West Midlands. Dave with the help of a few friends, started up Hereford Folk Club under the auspices of the EFDSS and he and Sandra were two of the resident artists. Out of this Dave and some friends decided to form the Hereford Morris Men and, after a while, encouraged a few of the more geographically distant members to start up clubs in their own areas, which are still going strong today and will remain a testimonial to Dave's ability to encourage others to have a go.

It was then that Dave decided that the dance side of the local scene lacked something, so he and Sandra decided to run a ceilidh in Ledbury which, through their hard work and planning, turned into a very successful series of not only dances but instructionals as well, with some of the country's top instructors being brought in to teach all forms of traditional dance and many hundreds if not thousands of people have these instructionals organised by Dave, to thank for their ability to dance today.

With the arrival of their first child everyone thought that this would curtail Dave's activities, but not one bit, as with everything else Dave just made a list and

the family went everywhere they wanted to and nothing had changed.

During this time Dave and a few like-minded people decided that the time had come to organise themselves into a group that could represent and promote their mutual interest and so the WMFF was born.

Out of the WMFF, Bromyard Folk Festival emerged one night after Dave had been talking to Bill Rutter who encouraged him to have a go, and not being a man to shirk from any challenge in which he believed, Dave sat up all night and planned the first festival. Despite the worries and fears of Dave's peers his meticulous planning and perpetual optimism paid off and today BFF is one of the finest folk festivals in the country and has to its credit started many of the top international folk artists off on the right road to success.

About 20 years ago Dave and Sandra decided that they had outgrown their little house in Ledbury and would like to move to a bigger place where they could bring up their children in more open and spacious surroundings, and so they moved to New Mill House at Putley and had great plans for its restoration and improvement which they methodically and meticulously carried out over the years. Sadly some 10 years ago Sandra tragically died leaving Dave with a young family to bring up, but in all his personal grief and loss he set about planning and re-organising his life to face up to the challenge he could see ahead and to his great credit brought up four fine children.


Some years later Dave met Annie and deciding that they both had a lot in common with the same goals in life, decided to get married.

Throughout all that had been going on, Dave's other passion in life had been quietly and methodically worked on and that was the research into the roots of the Welsh Border Morris Dances and Traditions. Several people had tried to collect these traditions but came upon a stone wall of silence from the old men because they attacked the job from the front, but Dave with his gentle manner and endless patience won these old men over and this enabled Dave to write the first and only authoritative book on the roots of the Welsh Border Morris which is now the finest reference book on the subject.

Dave and Annie now decided that the time was right to renovate Putley Mill. After the usual careful planning they set about the arduous task of renovating the mill with an aim to opening it to the public as a working museum and education centre. And then to complete the family along came Ceinwen. Dave and Annie were then complete.

Very few men in history have left this world a better place than they found it. But Dave was one.

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composers there live very differently from the way we do. For example, materially, they have much more than Scottish composers have; they have a Composers' House, which belonged to a Russian princess who was asked to vacate it in 1917, and it was given over to the composers and writers of Rostov, they have a well-staffed office, sanctuaries, a dining hall, concert hall, practise facilities, beautiful garden, a composers' bus with a diver, so I don't think they realise how well-off they are in comparison to us.

And how did they receive Voyager?

Well, it was well-received. I think they found it quite Avant-Garde, but I don't regard myself as an Avant-Garde composer. I found many of the composers there were writing in quite traditional language – still much use of Folk song, and "stretched" tonalities, as it were.

Is this because of the pressure of Governmental policies, or has that aspect disappeared?

It's hard to say – I think in the past it was, but there's an emergent group of composers who wouldn't have anything to do with that. See, I don't think that music's censored as much as painting, or poetry, or dance; music is the most elusive of the art-forms. You simply can't get a pornographic piano sonata. I suppose a song could be.

When we hear of censorship of music – I'm thinking of Hindemith, his opera *Mathis der Maler* was banned, not because of the chord structures or the rhythmical impetus, but because of the political references, the hero-versus-the-state, and the same music was made into a symphony and didn't offend anyone – I think it's associations beyond music which cause offence to the State.

However, I didn't find any of that in Russia nowadays, I found a very warm atmosphere. No "schools" or anything like that.

What you said about not seeing your own music as Avant Garde - what do you see as the role of traditions or "schools", if you like?

You know, I see much music as traditional music, and I don't think that tradition is a bad word at all. I can't think of any composer before, say, 1960, who, to me, isn't traditional. I don't know how people say, you know, that "Avant Garde" is talking about Varese, or Ives or Schoenberg – these are traditional composers, they were born about a hundred years ago, for goodness' sake!

So what were your own concerns in the 'sixties, given that many people still think of that decade as the most Avant Garde in musical terms?

Did I tell you about the *Piece for Egg*? Well, the *Piece for Egg* had ... you know how you can blow an egg out? And with pipe cleaners, I made these two feet, and eh, put it back in this six-pack of eggs. It was actually escaping from composition, you see; I made a Celtic cross on the lid, and presented it as my piece to my tutor Bentzen, and he opened it and played a few sepulchral chords, and he thought this was great. He said, "Ah, piece for egg! I play it at my next concert!" So then there followed *Piece for Banana*, *Piece for Apple*, I ...

So how do you actually reconcile these kinds of things that were going on in the 'fifties and 'sixties to your present work – I mean in terms of style, aesthetics and so forth – how do you place it?

Well, it's so easy to fall into the trap of comparing it as if it's a species of animal.

It's evolving and getting – God, it's almost nineteenth century – sort of better, somehow! It might be going one step forward and two back, I don't know. When I was in my twenties I used to try and avoid sounding "Scottish", because a lot of the composers of the generation before – no offence, I like their music – wrote "heedrum-hodrum" music for the concert hall. Now I was obviously Scottish, but I wanted an international language. I wanted to acquire a language which wouldn't just talk to people about Jigs and Reels and Strathspeys. I wanted to talk to people in other cultures. Later, in the 'seventies, I began to use ancient psalm singing. I think I was the first composer to use this – the psalm singing of the Free Kirk, where they use a style of heterophony, where they're all singing in unison, but they all embellish the line. And a lot of composers have done this since ... but I think my First Symphony – the slow movement, 1974 – was the first Scottish work to use this in a contemporary way, where I wrote out proportional notation, and had mordents in boxes, and all the rest of it. I was fascinated with this sound which gave a little scope for ... not improvisation, but choice, controlled chance within the line. But I had to be quite sure of my ground ... goodness, I'd used Egyptian melody, and perhaps I was a wee bit worried about seeming parochial. Now I don't care, I'll use a Scottish melody or a Hindustani melody, or whatever, if I like it. But I don't espouse Nationalism. I think Nationalism can be a curse. I would be more for an international egalitarianism. And that aside from music, I think it's stupid to be innately proud of your own nationality. That's the road to hell ...

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MUSIC AND DECONSTRUCTION

Some Notes on the Usage of a Term

Steve Sweeney Turner

[1] Presupponit Parlicue (Intervertit)^[1]

This prefatory *parafling*, or trifling evasion, can be put under the heading of the term *text* in a traditionally literary sense. However, the sense in which textuality is used as a concept in deconstruction is much broader and much less exclusive. As Barbara Johnson has written, "nothing, indeed, can be said to be *not* a text." [*Dissemination*, Introduction, p.xiv] Textuality could be defined as the potential for cross-references; the potential difference of connectivity. And with the connective and cross-referential field coming under the heading of *intertextuality*. However, it should not be assumed that intertextuality is the sole preserve of the deconstructionist. It is, rather, a more prevalent textual condition recognized by many forms of contemporary theory, including post-structuralism and postmodernism in general. This common ground, however, should not be taken as a symptom of an alleged homogeneity of contemporary thought. It is important to make careful distinctions between, for instance, the terms deconstruction, post-structuralism, and postmodernism. These terms are not wholly cognate, although they evidently have significant *intertexts* (for instance, a post-structural situation can "result" from a deconstructive reading of a text; a postmodern technique may be based on an assault upon structure, etc.).

The text which follows, which is here *presupponit* - assumed beforehand - is an attempt to give a compressed reading of the text of the term *deconstruction*. Space allows, however, for only a very specific and rigorous usage of the term, and this will readily be understood to fall under the heading of Derridean deconstruction, rather than Richard Harland's "Anglo-Saxon" version with its emphasis on paradox. The validity of "Anglo-Saxon" in this context is questionable to say the least. The current author would suggest an erasure of the term through a political deconstruction of its over-coded determinism, but neither should we replace it with Christopher Norris' term "Anglo-American" either. What follows is more of an *anglophone* text, with neither an English nor an American vision; an *anglophonic* text which opens with the possibility of decentring the hold of a specific dialect over the whole *anglophone* world - a hold all too often *presupponit* without question^[2] (a possibility nevertheless kept in reserve for the time being). The lead which the *francophone* tradition of deconstruction gives to this proposed *anglophone*

[1] These Scots terms translate as follows: *presupponit* - presupposed, assumed beforehand; *parlicue* - résumé of speeches at close; *intervertit* - intercepted, appropriated to another than the original purpose. cf. the Derridean debates around the paradoxical status of prefaces: "The preface would announce in the future tense [...] the conceptual content or significance [...] of what will already have been written." [*Dissemination*, p.7]

[2] Kindly allow a provisional suspension of the issue of the phonic in general. "Let us proceed slowly", as Derrida has not often said, but written.

tradition leads it in an other direction, indubitably having many intertexts with the Anglo-Saxon version, but nevertheless coming under, as Derrida might suggest, an "other heading"^[3].

[2] Music & Deconstruction

Deconstruction is a current critical term often misunderstood within academic musical circles. I would like to explain its context from the position of being both a deconstructionist and a musicologist.

The term *deconstruction* is often misused as a more impressive (and supposedly trendy) way of saying *analysis*. Let's take a brief look at the definitions we can ascribe to these terms - *deconstruction* and *analysis*.

Ian Bent defines analysis as follows:

Musical analysis is the resolution of a musical structure into relatively simpler constituent elements, and the investigation of the functions of those elements within that structure.
[*Analysis*, p.1]

Note the structural closure suggested by the term "resolution". Note also the implicitly reductive nature of the process whereby this closure is achieved. Bent's comments suggest that analysis is a form of structural and functional summarization of a text, in order to more easily comprehend that text. Analysis is a form of explanation here, setting itself up externally in relation to a text, in order to more or less objectively describe its workings, but this description, through its summarizing process, being also a form of reductive closure.

However, consider the following definition of deconstruction by literary critic, Barbara Johnson (and let us not forget that deconstruction, as with so many contemporary critical practises which tantalize music theorists begins as a literary critical form);

The de-construction of a text does not proceed by random doubt or arbitrary subversion, but by the careful teasing out of warring forces of signification *within the text itself*.
[*Dissemination*, p.xiv]

Here, Johnson makes two significant departures from the concept of analysis as proposed by Bent^[4]. With deconstruction, we are not concerned with the resolution of a text into constituent elements, but with the "careful teasing out" of signifiatory fissures "within the text itself". This location of deconstructive praxis is a significant difference to analytical thought. Deconstruction positions itself not externally to a text, as analysis often does, but at the same level of signification as the text, being, as a process, immanent to that text. Deconstruction does not

[3] cf. Derrida's *The Other Heading: Reflections on Today's Europe*, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, U.S.A.

[4] However, Johnson's remarks preceding this quotation point to a further rupture in the definition of *analysis*, this rupture perhaps evoked through the precise technical meaning of the term in a musical context.

summarize the workings of a text into a static plan, but hooks into the workings of a text, in order to re-work them, creating at the same time a new intertext. Analysis leaves a text intact, creating a new parallel descriptive and summarized text; deconstruction affects a text directly, affecting it through a process of reactivating and re-channelling its signifiatory processes. Analysis is a critical act which has a point of closure, a *telos* or final goal, represented by Bent's concept of "resolution", whereas deconstruction is a process without necessary closure.

In Jacques Derrida's classic text *Of Grammatology*, we can read the standard techniques of the deconstructive process. To summarize (but hopefully to avoid analysis), *Of Grammatology* is an assault upon a certain metaphysical moment which Derrida identifies as a trace throughout most of European (and non-European) thought. This moment he terms *logocentrism*, "the metaphysics of phonetic writing" [*Of Grammatology*, p.3], and deals at length with the writings of the Genevan Enlightenment philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau under the heading of this term. The main focus of Derrida's text is Rousseau's *Essay on the Origin of Languages which Treats of Melody and Musical Imitation* (Paris, 1753). Rousseau's argument is represented by the idea that language is primarily located in a vocal *origin*, and that writing is a debased *supplement* or false representation of speech which, in a sense, castrates the immediacy of the virile voice's power by introducing a dangerous interval between speaker and addressee, by splitting signification into what semioticians describe as the referent and the signifier. Derrida exposes a series of contradictions within Rousseau's theory, and through processes of conceptual reversal, he rewrites Rousseau's theory to stress the importance of the supplement rather than the origin, the signifier rather than the referent. However, this is not a simple reversal, as the concept of the supplement is used to overwhelm that of the origin and include it within its own structure, so that, in other words, the concept of the referent is shown to be a structuralist myth, all referents being in fact nothing more than additional signifiers with yet further signifiers behind them. Thus signification breaks out of its structuralist mode, indeed, breaks out of traditional concepts of structure per se, becoming a vast system of continually moving particles, a process without beginning or end, without origin or *telos*. Signification as constant motion.

If one were in the foolish business of summarization, one could summarize the process of deconstruction as consisting of three stages - engagement, reversal, and displacement:

[1] Engagement - re-energize the internal terms, concepts and processes of the text, identify the metaphysical oppositions upon which the text is based, and hook into their workings. As Derrida has written, one "operates according to the vocabulary of the very thing that one delimits" [*Of Grammatology*, p.xviii]. He characterizes deconstruction as "a discourse which borrows from a heritage the resources necessary for the deconstruction of that heritage itself" [ibid.];

[2] Reversal - reverse the polarity of the text's metaphysical oppositions, having the effect of provisionally maintaining the structure, but destabilizing it from within its own terms. Derrida writes of the oppositional metaphysics which provide the foundations for traditional theories being based on "a violent hierarchy. One of the two terms controls

the other (axiologically, logically, etc.), holds the superior position. To deconstruct the opposition is first [...] to overthrow [*renverser*] the hierarchy. [ibid., p.lxxvii]

[3] Displacement - here the destabilization of the opposition from within carried out during the stage of reversal is extended by using this instability to move beyond the structure of the metaphysical opposition. Derrida describes this stage as "the irruptive emergence of a new 'concept,' a concept which no longer allows itself to be understood in terms of the previous regime [system of oppositions]." [ibid.] In specific reference to his deconstruction in *Of Grammatology* of Rousseau's opposition of origin to supplement, speech to writing, Derrida has commented that the final stage of displacement "allows for the dissonant emergence of a writing inside of speech, thus disorganizing all the received order and invading the whole sphere of speech". [ibid.]

Of Grammatology does however, include sections dealing with the debate between Rousseau and Rameau over the issue of whether melody or harmony was the ontological base line in music, and this debate is shown to be a corollary of that around origin and supplement. For Rousseau, melody, in line with the idea of vocal signification becomes the prime metaphysical generator of music - melody is the natural, vocal origin of music. For Rameau, harmony and therefore instrumental music is the primary element. Here we can see a conceptual clash between the organism represented by Rousseau's originary voice, and the machine, represented by Rameau's instrumental harmony. Derrida draws through the arguments, exposing the attempt by Rousseau to show that melody has a linear, organic structure, rather than a scalar, harmonic one. Rousseau aligns harmony and instrumental music with writing - ie. as a debased representation, or "dangerous supplement" to melody and vocal music. His objection to harmony is due to its intervallic mechanism which corrupts the possibility of direct, organic representation much as writing does, by splitting signification into referent and debased signifier. As with the speech vs. writing opposition, Derrida deconstructs Rousseau's melocentrism^[5] by destabilizing the concept of melody from within its own structural assemblage.

To summarize briefly (and to therefore invite the analytical danger of ludicrous over-simplification), melody is shown to have as its precondition the operation of pitch differences and therefore a harmonic underlay. Once more, the supplement and the signifier are shown to be operative within the body of the fallacious origin or referent. In other words, *there is no referent*, only signifiers in constant intervallic movement.

Effect of deconstruction: both terms of an opposition are derivative of each other (further, and not only each other), regardless of any claims to the contrary encoded into the delineation of the opposition by its author. Deconstruction hooks into this delineation and delimits it. The operation of an opposition is thus shown to be based not on (for instance) the generation or determination of one term by the other, but on an undeclared principle which frames and runs through the opposition. The

[5] *Melocentrism* is Flemish-American critic Paul de Man's term which is a relative of Derrida's *logocentrism* and *phonocentrism*. All three terms articulate the milieu of Rousseau's ontological theory of signification. cf. de Man's *Allegories of Reading*.

ontological difference which the opposition is based upon is itself an attempt to limit what Derrida terms *différance* - spatial and temporal difference (differing and deferring combined). This anti-concept is what Derrida's deconstructions uncover in their delimitation of those traditional theoretical systems which attempt to limit or erase the disruptive force of *différance*.

Thus, we can see that, due its processes being based in concepts of language, deconstruction is perhaps most applicable to music as a critical approach to music aesthetics. Aesthetics is a form of philosophical text constituted by the processes of writing, and is thus open to treatment as a literary construct. Quite how deconstruction can be applied to an actual musical text, a score, is a far more complicated issue than space allows for here, and may in some senses not even be possible anyhow; besides, that's the role of analysis!

Regardless, the reliance of Derrida's deconstruction of Rousseau upon a traditional aesthetic debate within music itself points to interesting intertextual possibilities between the critical theory not only of music, but also of literature and philosophy. The *différance* inscribed within deconstruction is musical.

Perhaps an agenda for a critical musicology could be to hook into the workings of *différance* and its allied concepts in the other fields of post-structuralism and postmodernism. To follow Jean-François Lyotard, thus shifting from deconstruction to the postmodern: "Let us wage a war on totality; let us be witnesses to the unrepresentable; let us activate the differences and save the honour of the name." [*The Postmodern Condition*, p.82] To cadence on another easily-formulated slogan (remembering all the while that slogans and cadences are inherent friends of structuralism^[6]) - *displace the centrality of (the) structural (in) musicology*. This is *critical*.

[6] Such is "our" critical language.

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Steve Sweeney Turner,
"Taigh Nam Bàrd",
109, Essex Road,
Southsea,
Portsmouth,
Hampshire, PO4 8DQ.
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MUSICAL TIMES



TRIVIAL PURSUITS?


Taking pop seriously

IN PRAISE OF FOLLIES:

Wilfrid Mellers & Stephen
Banfield on The Musical

THE UNCUT VERSION

The music of Mauricio Kagel



WITOLD LUTOSLAWSKI

A tribute by John Casken






Popping the question

TRIVIAL PURSUITS?

Steve Sweeney-Turner looks into the chasm dividing serious musicology and popular music



DECONSTRUCT ME IF YOU DARE: MADONNA: COMMERCIAL TRASH OR POSTMODERNIST ICON?

To be a pop theorist is not an imposition on an essentially irrational, Dionysian art-form. It's an *option to be taken up*, on all sides of the communicational divide – as artist, critic or audience.¹

Patrick Kane, lead singer with pop band Hue & Cry, identifies a communication divide between the production and the reception of popular music. Underlying this divide is a more fundamental distinction between critical theory and popular praxis, and Kane's aim is to harmonise the two ('a little metatheory in your messaboogie can surely be no bad thing'²). What is the nature of this division, and how effective are some of the methods for its harmonisation which remain consonant with both musicology and popular music? After a couple of decades of applying theory to this 'Dionysian art-form', where are we now?³

Kane is hardly the first to realise the necessity of bridging the gap; indeed, it is a recurring issue throughout the recent history of popular music studies. It was not always so. In the Enlightenment we can find examples where popular musics are unselfconsciously described in terms of their affectivity as much as 'classical' musics (cf. Adam Smith's *Of the imitative arts*). It seems that the question of the viability of theorising popular music is a modern one.⁴

Perhaps the spectre of Theodor Adorno presides over the divide. As the arch musical Marxist he has sometimes assumed biblical stature for Marxist theorists of popular music, with their frequent obsession with the image of the 'popular-as-proletarian'. How inconvenient then that he attacks popular music thus: 'Popular music, jazz included... does not achieve... a sublimation, but is a somatic stimulus and therefore regressive in comparison with aesthetic autonomy.'⁵ Of course this really amounts to claiming little more than that popular music does not conform to 19th-century Germanic bourgeois values.

For Dave Harker, the arch debunker of such values, there is a need to open a study of popular music with a justification of popular music scholarship – 'Who needs a book on "popular song"? Isn't that one area where we are all of us experts? Won't a book like this degenerate into a spiritual autobiography; or won't it try to lay claim to yet another area of social life for trendy academics?'⁶ (The simple answer in socialist terms is, of course, that academics are workers too). Clearly, Adorno's elision of Marxism and aesthetic autonomy is a headache for the socialist popular musicologist.

But perhaps we no longer require such Marxist guilt in the face of this 'Dionysian' form. At the recent inaugural meeting of the Critical Musicology Group in Sheffield University, popular music studies was described as one of a number of 'more established areas of musical study', along with 'music analysis, music aesthetics (etc.)'.⁷ If this is so, why does the current *MT* editor feel it necessary to commissioning an article on popular music in this ostensibly classical journal? Clearly, communication across the divide is at issue.

The questions are put on both sides of the debate. The real question, however, is one of how musicology can *pop* the question, if by that we mean not only to *put* the question, but also to *explode* its duality, and to frame it within a context unique to the popular, rather than merely importing inevitably hostile contexts?

I will sacrifice everything – rhyme, reason, sense, sentiment, to catchiness. There is, let me tell you, a great art in making rubbish acceptable.⁸ The sentiments of music hall songwriter Felix McGlennon would seem to be an admission from within capitalism that Adorno was right. But does popular music consist solely of such 'sacrificial rubbish' strewn across the inauthentic altar of the capitalist mass-media? McGlennon's extension of Adorno's concept of the 'popular-as-proletarian' appears to fall into the pattern of 'proletarian-as-trivial'. But as even Adorno acknowledges, popular music is not generically homogeneous. What he refused to accept was the possibility of an *aesthetic* as well as *generic* heterogeneity, although he does admit that some consider jazz to partake of aesthetic autonomy ('contrasting Beethoven and jazz – a contrast that has already become undefinable for some musicians'⁹). If we consider the possibility of an 'art-vs-pop' divide within the popular itself (based on autonomy-vs-function, serious-vs-trivial, or any other similar formula) then it is easy to find its proponents within the jazz field, such as Avril Dankworth:

pop music has only the slenderest direct connection with jazz. Pop music is popular. It is the 'music of the people'... Jazz is not for the masses: it is a minority interest – just like 'classical' music.¹⁰

For Dankworth, McGlennon's conception is correct, but jazz, with its aspirations of concert hall obscurity, difficulty, and exclusivity, steps beyond music hall popularity. And although Adorno's quotation above comes from a 1970 text, and Dankworth's from 1968, they both avoid the similar implications of the new approach to aesthetic autonomy represented at that time by progressive rock.¹¹ The significance of progressive rock in this context is that, much like jazz before it, it set up an 'art-vs-pop' axis within the popular itself. In other words, not only to divide jazz from popular,

but to extend the division to within Dankworth's definition of 'pop' itself. As Andrew Chester wrote,

The biggest obstacle in the path of rock criticism is the notion of *pop*... Pop denotes a cultural, not an aesthetic object... For rock, the struggle for artistic autonomy was won by the mid-'sixties!¹²

These arguments around the aesthetic status of both 'jazz' and 'rock' as distinct from 'pop' were not so much a case of a Marxist debate around authenticity, whether racial or class-based, but one around the traditionally bourgeois concept of autonomy. The new rock aesthetic can be argued to be derived from 'middle-class' 'art-music' values – large-scale forms; structural complexity; rhythmic, tonal and textural innovation; virtuosic performance; the 'heavy' issues of metaphysics, psychoanalysis, humanity, ideology, etc. (cases in point would be King Crimson, Yes, Pink Floyd and Frank Zappa).

The complexity of this music is not in question to anyone who has ever attempted to transcribe a Frank Zappa guitar solo. Irish *sean-nós* or Japanese shakuhachi are easy by comparison. Indeed, it is possible to view this complexity as a popular analogue to the contemporary line traversed by the Total Serialism–New Complexity axis, with, for instance, Stockhausen, Fernyhough and Zappa occupying a pseudo-druidic status. However, is *complexity* a valid criterion in deciding whether or not progressive rock, jazz, etc. are 'serious' enough to merit academic study? If it can be argued that some popular genres involve such 'classical' values, then surely we can fairly unproblematically plug them in to our extant classically applied discourse?¹³ And would this mean we can still reject 'trivial' pop music?

Some students and lecturers of popular music do indeed appear to follow just this line of thought, whether consciously or not. My own experience of teaching on a BA degree in popular music is that the most vocal students often prefer to study Zappa than Madonna, and others have noted the same. Alf Björnberg indicates that the Danish university's approach to popular music is inevitably based on the valorisation of aesthetic autonomy due to its obsession with the analysis of notation, and that curriculae should balance between the 'musician attitude' and the 'scholar attitude'.¹⁴ Again, we come up against the division between practice and theory outlined by Kane. If the 'scholar attitude' can be found in our university approaches to popular music, however, so can its inverse.

The anti-analytical attitude of popular music *users* (and many students remain little more than this) is by now practically proverbial. Kane alludes to the 'fuck analysis – let's dance!' attitude, and points out that this in itself is a theoretical position.¹⁵ However, taking anti-analysis as a theoretical position, Meltzer argues for a more radical possibility in such conceptual nihilism:

'So what?' is... a fine aesthetic judgement for two reasons, because it sums up a valid experience and leaves the work itself untarnished... In fact, why not judge art by its sheer stubbornness, defiance of any and all objectification?¹⁶

Indubitably, Meltzer comes close to post-structuralism in this statement, but it remains the position of a theorist and hardly deals with the untheoretical pseudo-nihilism of a hostile 'musician attitude'. Evidently, neither Kane nor Meltzer have ever tried these arguments out on a group of popular music students suffering from

an attack of such an 'attitude'. If they had, they would know that it still provides no reasons against the anti-analytical drive. What is needed is not only a rationale for introducing musicology into the popular field, but also one which accommodates the reverse position. Hostilities will be encountered on both sides of the divide, and any argument for a popular musicology will have to be able to justify itself in two directions at once. From one point of view, popular music (even including jazz


and rock) is too trivial to study, and, from the other, the act of study is irrelevant to a form of music which has done very well so far without the help of the academy. So how do we reconcile such 'culture clash'?¹⁷

The concept of triviality has been central not only in the objection to the academic study of popular music, but also to the arguments of those popular music scholars who seek to valorise a specific popular genre by associating it with erstwhile 'classical' values, thus raising it to a 'classical' status. Normally those who argue for the study of 'trivial' pop music (that which is not necessarily structurally complex in harmonic terms, etc.) have tended to identify its significance in social terms. It was just such an attempt to place rock music sociologically¹⁸ which prompted Andrew Chester to proclaim rock's aesthetic autonomy,¹⁹ 'relative' though he claimed that to be. Simon Frith is an interesting example of such a shift, claiming in the late 70s that popular music's meaning was a function of its consumption,²⁰ but moving on to call for a consideration of the more technical aspects of popular music.²¹

At present, the battlelines are being drawn within popular musicology to begin to displace the traditional hegemony of sociological approaches and attempt to deal directly with what Allan Moore has described as the 'primary text' of popular music.²² While analytical approaches to this 'primary text' are as yet relatively undeveloped in relation to those designed for classical music, attempts have been made to import classical analysis into the popular field. This is possible if one takes care in choosing an appropriate combination of analytical model and popular genre; Richard Middleton even accommodates Schenkerian analysis to popular music:

There seems no reason why Schenker analysis could not be applied to popular songs governed by functional-tonal processes: nineteenth century types, for example, or most Tin Pan Alley Songs.²³

Other examples of such cross-over application can easily be imagined, but several questions arise from such development away from sociological hegemony towards musicology *per se*. Middle-



ton (following Peter van der Merwe²⁴) stresses the connections between the popular and the classical not in order to valorise the one by its association with the other, but in order to ask questions about musicology in general. Middleton, however, is not arguing for a 'melting-pot theory' but rather a 'dialectical approach' where connections are made between both popular and classical genres and theories.²⁵ Indeed, his notion of a truly critical musicology is one

which is completely circumscribed by the concept of *dialectics*.

I would like to agree here with Middleton that the liberal-humanist melting-pot is not an intellectually challenging strategy, and also I would like to agree that we require a critical approach to musicology itself. However, I would suggest that the crucial point of engagement is not that of dialectics, but of *deconstruction*.²⁶ Until we have adequately questioned the assumptions which underpin the musicological divide we are hardly in a position to orientate ourselves. Dialectical critique may allow new formations to occur, but dialectics are always subject to the possibility of relatively simple deconstructions themselves.

To begin with, as is well known, if we deconstruct the theoretical milieu surrounding the concept of 'trivial' pop music we simply find a bourgeois theory of aesthetic autonomy attempting to valorise itself by subjugating a form of music which is in fact simply different, rather than necessarily of a lower value. As we also already know, to accept the characteristics of 'trivial' pop music as valid expressions of an aesthetic, and to approach them analytically, is also to question music analysis as a discipline. If our current analytical techniques are inadequate to the task of engaging with 'trivial' pop pieces, then perhaps they tell us less about classical music than a more mature form of analysis might. In this way, to elaborate Meltzer's earlier point, if we consider 'trivial' pop's 'sheer stubbornness' in the face of analysis, then this can lead to a crisis within and deconstruction of the analytical programme. How 'trivial' is pop music then?

Madonna is a figure who indubitably comes under the heading of the term 'pop', rather than 'rock' or anything else, and her music is often held up as precisely an example of pop music's 'triviality', whether in terms of its alleged lack of authenticity or its commercial success. Indeed, many would apply McGlennan's self-critique to it. Significantly, though, Madonna has recently been attracting considerable attention from various aspects of contemporary theory, mainly of the postmodern variety and in relation not to her music but to her stage acts, visual representations, lyrics, etc. One musicologist however who has specifically discussed the music of this pop icon is Susan McClary. McClary works towards the deconstruction of Western musical discourse in

general, whether popular or modern, whether theoretical or compositional, and she has argued that Madonna's song 'Live to tell' in particular engages compositionally with the deconstruction of certain rhetorical oppositions encoded within the structure of western harmonic practice.²⁷ Equally, she argues that the minimalist 'art-pop'²⁸ musician Laurie Anderson deconstructs concepts through their ironic postmodern juxtaposition with binaristic harmonies. Not wishing to confuse deconstruction with postmodernism, however (the two terms are not cognate), there is a great deal to be said for the direction in which McClary is moving. In approaching the problem of the musicological divide from a deconstructive position, she has neatly outlined the power of 'trivial' pop to question the tenets of 'serious' theory; she effectively underlines that a specific pop piece may be in fact a reading, or deconstruction of, the allegedly universal values and associations of European tonal rhetoric.

However, we must be careful here not to take these points as general – the claim is not that pop music as a genre deconstructs the whole European tradition. Deconstruction is not in the business of making totalising statements; the role of deconstruction is precisely to interrogate such constructs. Its strength lies in its refusal to fall back into stable generalities; it offers *one* means of disassembling the communicational divides between popular and classical theory and practise.²⁹ Not in order to throw the whole into a single homogenised mass, but to find routes of passage between the various points in the remarkably differentiated mess which we call 'music'.

Further, and the specific character of musical signification which has been at the basis of the arguments around aesthetic autonomy presents different problems to those encountered in the more travelled fields of deconstruction, whether philosophical, linguistic or political. If such a direction is taken up, musicology stands a decent chance not only of updating itself, but of advancing the boundaries of cultural theory in general. We may yet again find ourselves with the Paterian idea that 'all art tends toward the condition of music'.³⁰ If we do, then this time, it will not be within the strictures of 'absolute music', but within the conceptual milieu of post-structuralism. Let the silence roar forth.

Notes

1. Patrick Kane: *Tinsel show: pop, politics, Scotland* (Edinburgh, 1992), p. 62. 2. *Ibid.*, p. 36. 3. This association of the popular and the dionysian, which Kane suggests (and which was also enacted by Jim Morrison in the 60's), is notably argued against by Richard Meltzer, who asserts that 'Nietzsche's Dionysiac revelry has been utterly surpassed by the rock 'n' roll frenzy.' (*The aesthetics of rock* [New York, 1970], pp. 24–25). 4. This is not to imply, however, that the attendant prejudices of Enlightenment discourse are not operative within this inclusiveness. In a significant passage dealing with the Ancients and Moderns issue, Smith is inclusive in his movement through 18th-century instrumental 'art' music, Scottish and African 'folk', and ancient Greek vocal music (Adam Smith: 'Of the nature of that imitation which takes place in what are called the imitative arts', [London & Edinburgh, 1795] in *Philosophical subjects* [Indianapolis, 1982], pp. 208–9). Yet the association of folk praxis with the ancient Greek is designed to position the former as the *historical* past of urban modernity (and therefore partaking of the civilization of the Golden Age), but simultaneously as an outmoded remnant of pre-modern origins, as a *structural* precursor to modernity (and thus barbaric). These two aspects implicitly align themselves in Smith's text by the

following formulae: Scots folk = Golden Age; African folk = savage prehistory. Thus, while both folk styles merit aesthetic reflection, and Smith can acknowledge the specific affectivity of each style *in the same language* as he describes Corelli, Pergolesi, Marais, Destouches, Lully or Handel, there is nevertheless a characteristic ethnocentrism encoded within his Enlightenment discourse. This is the classic structure of the ethnocentrism which has pervaded the entire history of the western critical engagement with both non-western musics and (in a sense even more insidiously) those musics of the west practised by what, at the end of the 18th century, Johann Gottfried von Herder termed *der Volk*: the cultures at once the vital roots of the racial/national tree, but also its dark, subterranean past – both spiritual origin and primitive material. 5. Theodor W. Adorno: *Aesthetic theory* (London, 1984), p. 170, my italics. 6. Dave Harker: *One for the money: politics and popular song* (London, 1980), p. 9. 7. Allan F. Moore, Dai Griffiths & Eric Clarke, eds.: *Critical Musicology: invitation letter to inaugural meeting* (1993). 8. Felix McGlennan: 'A chat with Felix McGlennan' in *The Era*, 10 March 1894, p. 16. 9. Adorno: *op. cit.*, p. 170. 10. Avril Dankworth: *Jazz: an introduction to its musical basis* (London, 1968), p. vii. 11. Allan F. Moore: *Rock: the primary text – developing a musicology* (Buckingham, 1993). 12. Andrew Chester: 'For a rock aesthetic' in *New Left Review*, no. 59 (1970), pp. 83 & 87. 13. And with detailed full score transcriptions of progressive rock pieces now available, their analysis according to classical techniques is increasingly possible. For instance, Barnes Music Engraving's transcription of *Queen: greatest hits II* is 347 pages long and reaches up to 16 staves on tracks such as 'Innuendo' (Woodford Green, 1992). 14. Alf Björnberg: 'Teach you to rock?: popular music in the university music department' in *Popular Music*, January 1993. 15. Kane: *op. cit.*, p. 62. 16. Meltzer: *op. cit.*, pp. 12–13. 17. John Shepherd: *Music as social text* (Cambridge, 1991), p. 199. 18. Richard Merton: 'Comment' in *New Left Review*, no. 59 (1970). 19. The often divisive debate around the categories of pop, rock, jazz and classical can be summed up by two short passages from Andrew Chester: 'Is rock music a genre which cannot compete with, for example, Western classical music as an aesthetic object, for want of formal complexity, and so needs the consolation prize of social significance that Merton holds out? I believe this is a capitulation to bourgeois ideology' (Chester: 'Second thoughts on a rock aesthetic: the band' in *New Left Review*, no. 62 [1970], p. 78). 'Rock is an art form in its own right with its own rules, traditions and distinctive characteristics. It needs no gift pass from Dizzy Gillespie in order to enter the gates of musical immortality' (Chester: 'For a rock aesthetic', p. 86). 20. Frith also wrote along these lines as late as 1983, in the introduction to Craig McGregor's *Pop goes the culture* (Lane Cove, NSW, 1983): 'The starting-point for all pop criticism must be that pop is a culture of consumption – we're dealing with commodities' (p. 1). 21. Simon Frith: *Music for pleasure: essays in the sociology of pop* (Cambridge, 1988). 22. Moore: *op. cit.* 23. Richard Middleton: *Studying popular music* (Milton Keynes, 1990), p. 193. 24. *Origins of the popular style: the antecedents of 20th-century popular music* (Oxford, 1990). 25. Middleton: *op. cit.*, p. iv. 26. I should point out here, that I am using this term in its strictly technical, philosophical sense, rather than the somewhat banal vernacular usage which seems particularly current in the 'Anglo-American tradition' of theory. I use the term not in the sense of 'analysis', but to refer to the Derridean method of the engagement, reversal and displacement of a text's metaphysical oppositions (Steve Sweeney-Turner: 'Music and deconstruction: some notes on the usage of a term' in *Critical Musicology Newsletter*, no. 1 (1993)). 27. Susan McClary: *Feminine endings: music, gender, and sexuality* (Minnesota, 1991). 28. If I may be allowed to coin another term. 29. I do not offer up deconstruction here as a total panacea for all of musicology's ills once-and-for-all, but as *one* of many possible routes for further development. 30. Elsewhere, I argue that deconstruction itself is intimately related to, if not caught up in some rather basic concepts from Enlightenment music theory. I refer the reader to Derrida's deconstruction of Rousseau (Jacques Derrida: *Of grammatology* [Baltimore, 1976]), where the clash between the rival ontologies of melody and harmony becomes one of the sites of production of Derrida's classic deconstructionist concept of *différance* (Steve Sweeney-Turner: *op. cit.*).

An Cuibhle Mór

Trilingual Terrain in Scottish Political Song

Steve Sweeney Turner

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An Cuibhle Mór

Trilingual Terrain in Scottish Political Song

[1] Context: "Aneirin Sang It"

Truan yw gennyf, gwedi lludded,
Goddef gloes angau trwy anghyffred,
Ac eil trwm truan gennyf fi gweled
Dygwyddo ein gwŷr ni ben o draed

- *Y Gododdin*, Aneirin, c.600 A.D.^[7]

Aneirin's *Gododdin*, written around 600 A.D., represents the first song which has survived from the geographical area now known as Scotland, and across the surface of this opening moment of historical articulation, the politics of language are inscribed. This "oldest Scottish poem", as Kenneth Jackson has put it [Jackson, p.ix], is not, however, written in Scots or even Gàidhlig, but in an early form of Welsh - a Northern dialect known as Cumbrian - spoken throughout Southern Scotland during most of the first millennium.

The political function of Aneirin's song was to record the final pivotal defeat of the Welsh Celts of the Lothians against the Anglian and Saxon invaders of the South. Throughout the C7th A.D., the political administration of South-East Scotland was increasingly annexed by the Angles of Northumbria, and the subject Welsh culture was gradually pushed back to the other Scottish "Welsh" kingdom of Strathclyde, with its capital at Dumbarton, or Din Brython - Fortress of the Britons.

If, in C7th South-East Scotland, Anglian was becoming the language of power, and Welsh was becoming increasingly the language of a subject population, then subsequent invasions and migrations complicated the situation further by the opening centuries of the Second Millennium. In a study of the place-names of West Lothian, John Garth Wilkinson describes the extant language pool there in the C12th as consisting of the following, in likely order not of population of speakers, but of political status;

LATIN, in the church; NORMAN-FRENCH, by the nobility; an early form of MIDDLE ENGLISH, by their servants and others; GAELIC, by some landowners; and CUMBRIC, possibly still spoken in parts of this area [...] - if not, it was probably spoken in neighbouring Strathclyde and Peeblesshire until around 1200. It is just possible that some NORSE was still in

[7]

It is a grief to me, after toil,
Suffering death's agony in affliction,
And a second heavy grief to me
To have seen our men fall headlong

(trans. A.O.H. Jarman)

use [*West Lothian Place Names*, p.5]^[8]

Inscribed across the geo-linguistic map of Scotland are traces of political and cultural struggle, recorded in place-names, in folklore, but also in literature and law. For instance, in William Dunbar's famous late-15th Scots poem, *The Flyting of Dunbar and Kennedy*, his autobiographical character berates, in quite racist terms, a poet from the then Gàidhlig-speaking South-West (this territory being no longer Welsh-speaking). The Gàidhlig speaker is described as "Iersch brybour baird, vyle beggar with thy brattis, / Cuntbittin crawdoun Kennedy"^[9]. And of Gàidhlig itself, Dunbar's character remarks that "Ane lawland ers wald mak a bettir noyis"^[10].

Such linguistic prejudice has often been translated into political action, however, with the many punitive laws against Gàidhlig as a medium for State education. In the late 19th, for example, it was possible for Gàidhlig children to have their necks and wrists clamped in heavy wooden blocks for the crime of using their own language at school^[11].

None of this, of course, takes account of the civil wars, invasions, and capitalist exploitations which have helped to hinder some languages in Scotland and promote others.

At the initiation of these processes of struggle, lies the text of Aneirin's *Gododdin*, a song in a language no longer even considered Scottish. However, this fourteen-hundred year-old song connects three concepts: language, music and cultural struggle, three concepts which survived Aneirin and his culture to remain lodged in the cultural nexus of Scotland throughout history. As Hamish Henderson has written;

Scotland, like Switzerland, is - and seems always to have been
- a 'multi-ethnic' country, and the various strands of its
popular tradition necessarily reflect this chequered linguistic
past. [*Alias MacAlias*, p.78]

This paper concerns itself with the nexus of concepts thrown up in Aneirin's *Gododdin*, not so much in relation to their etymological past, but in terms of the linguistic practices current in contemporary popular song. Scotland's three contemporary languages will be taken in turn - Gàidhlig, Scots, and English.

[8] Perhaps the main legacy of the Cumbrian language in contemporary Scots (beyond place-names) is the usage of the word "yin", meaning one, also surviving in Northern English agricultural dialects from Cymric times as "yan".

[9] Irish thief-poet, vile beggar with thy brats, / Cunt-infected coward Kennedy

[10] A Lowland arse would make a better noise.

[11] As Kenneth MacKinnon writes, "The passing of the 1872 Education Act marks an important turning point for the recognition and use of Gaelic within the education system. Under the new regime, the use of Gaelic was actively discouraged in the schools. The appointment of English-speaking or English teachers was common - as was the punishment of children for speaking Gaelic in schools. The device of the *maide-crochaidh*, a stick on a chord, was commonly used to stigmatise and physically to punish children speaking Gaelic in the schools. Its use is reported as late as the 1930s in Lewis." [*Gaelic - A Past & Future Prospect*, p.75]

[2] "Taisbean do chanan"

Runrig's *Sraidean na Roinn-Eorpa* - *Streets of Europe* - gives an image of Gàidhlig's place in the world of the late C20th. It begins;

Chuir mi mo chul ri Lunnain
An samhradh air m'aodann
'S mi air sraidean mor na Roinn-Eorpa

*I have put my back to London
The summer on my face
And I'm on the great streets of Europe*

An image of the Gàidheal, rejecting London and all it represents (political constriction - Europhobia, colonialism, the imperial past, etc.), rejecting this for a multilingual Europe where "am Babel ur", the new Babel opens up freedom for the Gàidhlig language;

Thusa tha meanbh, bi ladir, bi alainn
Taisbean do chanan, bi buan

*You that are small, be strong, be beautiful
Reveal your language, be everlasting*

This is one of Runrig's many programmes: *taisbean do chanan* - reveal your language. The very act of writing in this language, regardless of the political content of that writing, signifies at the political level in itself. Simply to write, to sing in Gàidhlig, is an act of protest against marginalization, protest against the denial of basic language rights, protest against the old self-colonizing ideologies which proclaim the language dead, irrelevant to contemporary concerns. As Sorley Maclean, also a native of Skye^[12], advanced Gàidhlig poetry wholesale into the Modernist moment and beyond, Runrig performed the act of injecting Gàidhlig into contemporary forms of popular song - the Rock album, the Rock video, the spectacle of the large-scale stadium gig, etc.^[13]

Perhaps the most significant track in the sense of a politicized signification in otherwise "neutral" lexis is *An Cuibhle Mor* (The Great Wheel). Here, the image is one of time's wheel turning across the landscape of the world, and of Scotland. Gearing down from the global to the personal (a favourite technique of Sorley Maclean's), the song opens an image of journey. The text is printed as prose:

(in Runrig's own translation) - *Tonight the road reaches out
before us and the present time is the only time we have. Many*

[12] Raasay.

[13] For instance, in 1991, the album *The Big Wheel* reached no.4 in the U.K. album charts within one week of its release, achieving Gold status within a month (it should not be forgotten, however, that Runrig consistently feature higher in the Scottish Network Charts than in the U.K. charts). Equally, in the same year, Scotland's fastest-selling concert ever was their one-day Beltane (Midsummer) concert by Loch Lomond to a crowd of 50,000, soon followed by two nights on the Esplanade at Edinburgh Castle.

*are the days that have gone. The wind blowing through the
dust of the earth. Many are the days that the sun rose on us.
Standing in the barley when we were young. Joyful. Joyful.
Running through the fields as they grew. Ripe. Golden.
Looking towards the open skies waiting for the journey.*

This journey, however, is one of the validation of experience through language – a taxonomic affirmation of the Gàidhlig landscape throughout the whole of Scotland. For Gàidhlig speakers, the experience is one of a secret knowledge shared amongst initiates – for the non-Gàidhlig speaking Scot reading the lyrics along with a first hearing, it is a journey through well-known lands through a foreign and yet eerily familiar vision. In simple one-word sentences, Runrig stab out the nomenclature of a secret and yet readily apparent geography, but a geography which soon overflows its borders and carries the listener beyond the present and back into the realm of the Great Wheel^[14];

Glaschu. Dun Eideann. Inbhirnis. Sruighlea. Steornabhagh.
Obar Dheadhain. An Gearasdan. Dun Deagh. Lunnainn.
A'Ghearmailt. Eirinn. Ameiriga. An cuibhle mor cuibhle mor.

*Glasgow. Edinburgh. Inverness. Stirling. Stornoway.
Aberdeen. Fort William. Dundee. London. Germany. Ireland.
America. The great wheel great wheel.*

Here, the anglicization on erstwhile Celtic place-names in Scotland is reversed, and a Gàidhlig line is drawn across the impositions of English language maps of Scotland. It is an act of reclaiming a whole culture, a listing of its nodal points in the landscape, and a restoration of their actual, hidden identity.

However, as is common amongst many contemporary Rock musicians in Scotland, Runrig are often involved in more directly political work. From their 1988 album, *The Cutter and the Clan*, the opening track, *Alba* (Scotland) bears witness to the feelings of many following the previous year's general election, in which the Tories were returned to power in Scotland yet again, purely on the basis of their comparatively massive English constituency. *Alba* calls for a socialist Scotland, all the time tugging at Gàidhealach memories of the long struggle for land rights;

Ach 'se sealleadh leointe is gann
Tha an seo aig ceann thall an linn
Talamh alainn nan daoine
Fhathast an lamhan duine no dithis

Which, in their own translation is *"But it's a wounding and a hollow*

[14] The image of the wheel is, of course, significant throughout Celtic culture, and other contemporary bands also make use of its associations. In Capercaillie's 1991 album, *Delirium*, the Celtic wheel provides an image for the album cover, but also enters into a polemic against the de-Gaelicization of the Gàidhealtachd. In an English-language track, *Waiting for the Wheel to Turn*, the image of the wheel as temporal trace of Gàidhealach culture is as evident as in Runrig: "Here come the Clearances my friend / silently our history is coming to life again / We feel the breeze from the storm to come / and up and down this coast / we're waiting for the wheel to turn".

sight / Here as we reach the end of the century / The beautiful soil of the people / Still in the hands of the few". Of more direct relevance to the constitutional issue, the song continues to describe the lack of democratic accountability in the Tory administration, which refuses to re-establish the Scottish parliament on any basis;

Cuibhlean stolda mu dheas
Na fasaichean a tuath
An taigh-mor falamh an Dun-Eideann
Gun chumhachd gun ghuth

*Wheels at a standstill
The wastelands in the north
The empty House in Edinburgh
Without authority without voice*

Again, after the 1992 general election, when 75% of Scottish voters voted against the Conservative Unionists, and for parties which proposed constitutional remedies, Runrig are again writing of the empty Parliament Buildings on Calton Hill^[15]. In *Ard* (High), however, the message is one of hope;

Ard: blar nan daoine
Ard: guth is saorsa
Ard: tha sinn gluasad
Gu h-ard theid sinn suas

*High: the struggle of the people
High: a voice and freedom
High: we are moving
Upwards we will reach*

Despite constant setbacks to the constitutional movement which the elections of the eighties and early nineties merely summarize, Runrig's position is to attempt not so much an overt criticism of the establishment as an inspiration of the ascendant establishment^[16].

However, it cannot be said that Runrig write purely in Gàidhlig. It is surely a significant commercial fact that, as Gàidhlig bands become more popular, the proportion of their first-language tracks gradually reduces. In Runrig's case, the breakdown across the years (excluding instrumental tracks) is as follows:

[15] Refurbished and awaiting their occupants since the 1979 Devolution Referendum, when the Westminster government ignored a majority vote for devolution. These empty and yet democratically empowered buildings are a potent symbol for the constitutional movement, symbolizing both the intransigence of Westminster, and the apathy of elected Scottish M.P.s.

[16] It should also be noted that Runrig are not S.N.P. activists, but ardent Labour supporters, and are thus at least in the party-political sense, aligned with devolution, rather than independence. However, many Labour supporters do indeed advocate independence, but have a revulsion for the S.N.P., and his party-position did not stop singer Donnie Munro being one of the signatories of the Artists for Independence group prior to the 1992 general election. Other members included Pat Kane of Hue & Cry (and the S.N.P.), Ricky Ross of Deacon Blue, and writers such as Liz Lochhead, Alasdair Gray, and James Kelman to name but a few.

<i>Runrig Play Gaelic</i> (1978)	11 out of 11
<i>Heartland</i> (1985)	4 out of 11
<i>The Cutter & The Clan</i> (1988)	2 out of 10
<i>Searchlight</i> (1989)	2 out of 12
<i>The Big Wheel</i> (1991)	2 out of 10
<i>Amazing Things</i> (1993)	3 out of 11

This is hardly impressive when compared to Welsh language bands such as Jess, or Llwybr Llaethog, whose 1990 album *BE? (WHAT?)* works exclusively in Welsh, the only English coming from ironically placed samples. While most of Runrig's Scottish (let alone their international audience) have little knowledge of Gàidhlig, it surely remains the case that their reputation is as standard-bearers in the struggle for the continuation and expansion of Gàidhealach culture. Perhaps the power of Capital is at work even within the revolution?

Taisbean do chànan gu dearbh - reveal your language indeed.

[3] "include English, and go beyond it"

Given the fact that Scots is still - in all its heterogeneity of modes - the majority language of Scotland, it is ironic that it receives less institutional recognition than the comparatively minor language Gàidhlig. For instance, while it is possible now to receive a State Primary education through the medium of the Gàidhlig language, there is no structure in place to provide the majority of Scottish students an education through their own native tongue. Equally, while we now have Gàidhlig medium T.V., radio and newspapers, no such media are available in Scots. Strangely, the representation of the language in the Rock arena is also limited, particularly considering the vast corpus of Folk song which has been a mainstay of the language (along with its literature) for centuries.

The linguistic status of Scots is also a painfully lengthy moot topic^[17]. For instance, is one speaking a language in its own right, or merely a dialect of English, when one says "A umnae owre fasht wi

[17] Malcolm Youngson, in an article in Chapman's MacDiarmid Centenary Issue, opened with the following assault against MacDiarmid: "Let us be clear: there is no such thing as a Scottish language. It is true that in Scotland certain words and usages prevail that are not common to standard English, but this does not make it a language." [*A Plea for Respite From the "Aiblins" School*, Chapman 69/70, p.91] Despite the non-academic nature of the author of this article (this was his first publication), and despite the fact that the grammar of the first sentence implies that Gàidhlig does not exist either, such arguments must be taken seriously. One real problem, however, is that Scots suffers far too often from being pronounced upon by writers who do not speak Scots, who also persistently believe that "people don't speak like that, really." Little academic credibility would be accorded to a scholar who pronounced on the merits and demerits of Cantonese with no working knowledge of the language. However, Professor A.J. Aitken writes (in English) of Scots, that "its linguistic distinctiveness, its occupation of its own 'dialect-island' bounded by the Border, its individual history, its own dialect variation, its varied use in a remarkable literature, the ancient loyalty of the Scottish people to the notion of the Scots language, as well as the fact that since the sixteenth century Scots has adopted the nation's name - all of these are attributes of a language rather than a dialect. Manifestly Scots is to be seen as much more than simply another dialect of English." [*The Concise Scots Dictionary*, p.xiii] Surely this whole debate is ontology at its most defunct - regardless of whether or not Scots is accorded the status of language or of dialect (along with all languages and all dialects, it is both), both sides in this argument use the term Scots, and recognize the existence of a specific linguistic practise which is labelled within its taxonomy. Scots exists as a praxis, and this can be agreed regardless of its institutional status.

thon"^[18]? The problem increases as we move from the field of spoken Scots into what Hamish Henderson has defined as "Ballad-Scots" - the formal mode of Scots reserved for epic Folk Ballads and so forth. Henderson describes Ballad-Scots as a linguistic praxis which "grazes ballad-English along the whole of its length, and yet remains clearly identifiable as a distinct folk-literary lingo." [*Alias MacAlias*, p.53] In other words, Ballad-Scots is an example of a form of "bilingualism in one language" [ibid.] which "may be said to include English and go beyond it." [ibid.] The following stanza, from the ballad *Thomas Rymer*, gives some idea of this "bilingualism in one language";

But ye maun go wi me now, Thomas,
True Thomas, ye maun go wi me,
For ye maun serve me seven years,
Thro weel or wae as may chance to be.

[Child 37A]

Here, we have interpolations of English into the body of Scots, in such substitutions as "go" for "gang", "now" for "nou", "seven" for "seiven", "years" for "year", and, most noticeably, "to" for "tae"^[19]. The strength of Henderson's argument comes from his comparisons of the language usages of folk singers when *singing* as compared to *speaking*, and his research yields results such as those given above.

In the contemporary ballad of a Clydeside shipbuilder who joins the Communists in the Spanish Civil War, *Jamie Foyers*, by Ewan MacColl, we can follow a similar process to that in *Thomas Rymer*. The following is a transcription of Dick Gaughan's version, from the album *Dick Gaughan Live In Edinburgh*;

There wesnae his equal at work or at play
He wes strong in the union to his dying day
He wes grand at the fitba, at the dance he wes braw
Aye, young Jamie Foyers wes the floer o them aw.

He come hame fae the shipyard, tuik aff his workin claes
Oh, A mind the time weel in the lang simmer's days
He said, "Think na lang, lassie, I'll come back again"
But Young Jamie Foyers in battle wes slain.

Here, the same bilingual process can be observed, with the Scots basis using English forms: "work" for "wark", "strong" for "strang", "to"

[18] I am not overly bothered about/taken with that.

[19] The present author would deliver this stanza as the following: But ye maun gang wi me nou, Thomas, / True Thomas, ye maun gang wi me, / For ye maun serve me seiven year, / Thro weel or wae as may chance tae be.

for "tae", "come" for "cam"^[20]. Gaughan's version of this song has a denser distribution of Scots forms than Henderson might describe as Ballad-Scots, and one reason for this may be the strong political sentiment which Gaughan portrays. Nevertheless, it can still be seen that (a) there are certain simple substitutions, and that (b) only two words are used which do not have direct timbral correlates in English: "mind" for "remember" and "braw" for "fine/splendid/brilliant". This latter characteristic is, it could be argued, a further general characteristic of Ballad-Scots - ie. it is actually quite rare to find a large number of words which cannot be transposed from Scots to English by simple changes in spelling and/or pronunciation. We have here a linguistic practise operating very much in the space between two languages^[21].

We can also find further examples of Henderson's "bilingualism in one language" in contemporary popular songs in Scots. For instance, in Michael Marra and Rod Paterson's *The Bawbee Birlin* (The Spinning Sixpence), we can again follow a very similar process as that in the medieval ballad quoted above;

O the time will come so the auld man said
When the servant slumbers in his mester's bed
If he's no ower busy working overtime instead
A' for the birlin' o' the bawbee o't

Here, we have "so" for "sae", "working" for "workin"/"warkin"/"warkan" etc., "overtime" for "owretime", and "instead" for "insteid". Here, we have a high degree of anglicized forms. As much as anything, the

[20] Here there will inevitably be objections raised, and these objections will be based in the fact that there is no officially-enforced orthography in Scots in the education system or elsewhere, as a brief glance at *The Concise Scots Dictionary* will demonstrate. For the forms of words discussed above, the following are entries typical of the issue: "wark &c (chf n), wark &c (chf v), work 16-; werk 1a14-e20 (chf n), wurk 1a16 (chf n), 19- n 1 = work 1a14-." "strang, strong 1a16- adj, adv = strong 1a14-." It would also be possible to replace "think" with "hink" in the Lothian dialect at least.

[21] This is perhaps even more true of the classical traditions, in both poetry and song. For instance, in *Lyk as the dum solsequium* (Like as the dumb sunflower) by the 16th court songwriter Alexander Montgomerie, we can see a further form of bilingualism;

Lyk as the dum
Solssequium
With cair ou'reum
Doth sorrow when the sun goes out of sicht,
Hings doun his head
And droups as dead
And will not spread
But louks his leavs throu langour of the nicht.

Here, we have the substitutions of English "goes" for "gaes" or "gangs", "not" for "na" or "nae", and "but" for "bot". However, more significantly, Montgomerie uses "head", "dead" and "spread" for "heid", "deid" and "spreid", while no doubt expecting that the Scots forms would be those pronounced by the singer. This semiotic split between the notated form of a word and the performed form can be followed more clearly in the anonymous *Pleugh Sang* of the same period, where we have the following visual non-rhyme;

For to deliver me be the heid
The old ox Trip-free he be dead.

- which nevertheless is performed as "heid" / "deid" (later in the same song, the Scots form "heid" is replaced by the rhyme in English forms "pleugh-head" / "Mowdie bread", again, to be sung with Scots "ei").

This aspect of literary Scots which is, however, notated with English forms, provides a further complication to the whole consideration of the bilingual space between Scots and English which is represented by Ballad-Scots.

song derives a Scottish feel from its setting to Niel Gow's classic C18th folk tune *A Farewell to Whisky*, as well as the political nuances which recall Robert Burns's song, *A Man's a Man, For a' That*, again, from the C18th.

In Marra's own *O Penitence*, we even find two further modes of Henderson's "bilingualism in one language". Since the gradual decline of Metropolitan Scots over the last couple of centuries, one of the mainstays of the poetic and song traditions in Scots has been the use of local dialects of Scots. In *O Penitence*, for example, we have the vernacular Scots form "fae" in place of the more literary "frae" (from), and also substitutions of "haid" for "heid" (head), "thur" for "their" (their), etc. The use of local dialect here alongside otherwise Standard Scots has a further significance, however, as the song bears witness to the 1651 massacre in Marra's home town of Dundee propagated by the English Cromwellian invader General Monk. A local story has it that a boy from the town gave Monk all the information he needed regarding defense positions and, and Marra here interprets the feelings of the boy's father. In this context, the bilingualism of the switch from English "devil" referring to General Monk, to the Scots "deil" referring to the narrator's son, is significant. The actual "deil himsel" is approached in the narrator's own language, used effectively to set the English phrase in quotation marks, denying the English language's ability to bear witness to the Scot's experience.

O Penitence O Penitence
O harsh eternity
Though Monk may hae the devils hands
The deil himsel he sprung fae me

In other words, in song, Scots often makes use of English practices, but continually recontextualizes them within its own terms. Henderson's concept has resonances within the writings of French theorists Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari. In their text *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, they posit a conception of language where the distinction between language and dialect becomes problematized;

The very notion of dialect is quite questionable. Moreover, it is relative because one needs to know in relation to what major language it exercises its function: for example the Québécois language must be evaluated not only in relation to standard French but also in relation to major English, from which it borrows all kinds of phonetic and syntactical elements, in order to set them in variation. [*Plateaus*, p.102]

In the case of Scots, one needs to acknowledge its connections not

only to English (which are primarily in terms of an *almost* common root^[22]), but also to Gàidhlig, C16th French, and Norse (not to mention Middle Dutch, etc.). If linguistic praxis is not fixed at any point, but is a matter of Henderson's process of mutual "grazing" of practises against each others' flanks, then the idea of a fixed ontology in language becomes meaningless. Language can only be defined in this manner according to its institutional status on the one hand, or its political usage on the other;

Even politically, especially politically, it is difficult to see how the upholders of a minor language can operate if not by giving it (if only by writing in it) a constancy and homogeneity making it a locally major language capable of forcing official recognition (hence the political role of writers who assert the rights of a minor language). But the opposite argument seems more compelling: the more a language has or acquires the characteristics of a major language, the more it is affected by continuous variations that transpose it into a "minor" language. [*Plateaus*, p.102]

In other words, the "bilingual" process described by Henderson in Ballad-Scots, and which we have seen at work in Michael Marra's songs, can be set in the context of Scots being an institutionally "minor" language on the "British" level, which, through literary, musical and politically vernacular practises, nevertheless assembles itself as a "major" language at the national, Scottish level, to the point that it perhaps not so much grazes English along *its* side, but is *itself* grazed by English as a "minor" language which sets Scots in continual variation from itself. Equally, Scots as a "major" language is set into variation by its own sub-groupings of

[22] The American literary critic Nancy K. Gish writes "Braid (Broad) Scots is not a dialect of English; it developed from Northumbrian Old English as modern English developed from Midlands Old English." [*The Gender of Modernism*, p.278] In fact, the division to the roots goes further down the bough - modern Scots has its basis in Anglian, whereas modern English has its basis in Saxon: both derive from similar Dark Age Germanic tribes, which in England combined to form the Anglo-Saxon nation from which contemporary England is derived via Norman invasion and alteration. However, in Scotland, the Anglians who had previously displaced the Welsh-speakers of the Lothians (cf. *Y Gododdin*) were incorporated within the Celtic proto-federal construct which became Scotland under Gàidhlig rule. Shortly after the C14th War of Independence, however, the last all-Gàidhlig parliament was held, and the Anglian ethnic group slowly began to take the political fore, by now naming themselves by the nomenclature of the Gàidheals - these Anglians had now become "Scots". Gàidhlig was still being called Scots until around the C16th, however, when the "Inglis" of the Scottish Anglians in the South-East finally took the title "Scots", hence the present name of the language (even if it also goes under the names of Lallans, and of the Doric).

"minor" languages, such as Marra's Dundonian dialect^[23]. In this sense, there is no meaningful ontological distinction between a "language" and a "dialect". As Deleuze and Guattari point out, "There is no language that does not have intralinguistic, endogenous, internal minorities" [Plateaus, p.103] - even dialects have their sub-dialects, and even languages belong to larger language-groups. In this line of thought, then, ontological definitions are only ever institutionally determined, are subject to precarious shifts and reversions when one political superstructure supersedes another^[24], and are ultimately incapable of bearing witness to the constant mobility of linguistic praxis.

[3] Throw the "R" Away?

I've been so sad
 Since you said my accent was bad
 He's worn a frown
 This Caledonian clown
 I'm just going to have to hesitate
 To make sure my words
 On your Saxon ears don't grate
 But I wouldn't have another word to say
 If I flattened all the vowels
 And threw the 'R' away

If it is possible to consider Scots song in the context of a

[23] In an interview with the present author, Marra said the following about his song *O Penitence*: M.M.: "I never at any stage of the game thought of that as bein Scots, I only thought of it as bein Dundee; which A'm completely comfortable with, but in ither parts of Scotland ye can't get away with it, ye know? Ye can't... seems like we huv tae... I used tae work in London, ye know, an A think that hud a big effect. A wad 'ae been a lot... A juist hud tae... A fund it a real strain, ye know, speakin Standard English, but... writin that, it's not like Scots tae me. It's just like it's Dundee. So for actual Broad Scots, A doan know. A cuid never really... tell ye very much about it, but Dundee." S.S.T.: *Somethin that A find fascinatin is the way that when ye get two Scots speakers together in a formal situation like this - like there's a mic sittin between us - they immediately fall back intae English. Like with ma bank manager, when we bump intae each ither on the street, it's aye guid Scots, but when we're on either side his desk, it's always perfect English.* M.M.: Of course ye do, heh heh! - and very clearly, too! It's cause ye went tae school in Scotland, didn't ye! That's why it is - ye were educatit in Scotland, so they won't let ye away with it. First thing ye've gottae do, if ye're gonnae wipe out any kin o power at all, then ye get rid of the language. And that, they've very successfully done. So we end up tryin 'ae claw it aw back, know? Scots, when it's self-conscious, I find it cuid be Chinese, ye know, it's juist alien - not that the Chinese are alien, but ye know what A mean? And people are very self-conscious about it. Ye're not like that at home, ye know? A mean, you're a journalist, A'm a musician, we're meetin in a pub in Edinburgh at the Festival, and, as you say, we speak English. Ha ha ha ha!" S.S.T.: *And feel uncomfortable if we're not.* M.M.: Yeh, well, I don't like to do it as a gesture, at all. A spent so much time in London, A got fed up wi people sayin "Yew wot?" all the time, and so ye are actually, juist in a practical sense of bein able tae get through yer life, you speak Standard English!" [unpublished interview, 1992]

[24] Some Germans consider Dutch a debased dialect of German in the same way that some Spanish consider Galician, and some English consider Scots. However, Holland has its own parliamentary state structure, and therefore valorizes Dutch as a language rather than a dialect (the Bavarians also attempt this within the German federal structure). Galician is practically Portuguese, and yet is considered a dialect of Spanish in Spain, while Portuguese is considered a language in Portugal, which again, has its own independent state structure. Scotland has only a miserable excuse (at time of writing) for a state structure of any kind, certainly has no parliament (although it has its own legal system), and is constantly viewed by Westminster politicians as a region rather than a nation. In this context, Scots can hardly hope to be seen as anything other than a dialect of English, until it has a greater recognition by the Scottish political and educational system, whether within the present sub-federal state structure or in some other future structure.

"bilingualism in one language", then the same is also true of the English language songs produced in Scotland. The reputation of The Proclaimers is centred on a highly specific Scottish identity. However, the above extract from the opening of their song *Throw the 'R' Away* is plainly written in English, with only one deviation from so-called correct grammar, and this deviation being an internationally recognised vernacular turn with no specific Scottish association. On the other hand, the text evidently deals with a language issue based on the difference between the "Caledonian clown" who sings these words and the "Saxon ears" of the addressee who has apparently objected to something in the former's linguistic practise. The key point here is not one of language per se, or even of dialect, but of accent – a certain accent of English which could not operate if the singer "flattened all the vowels / And threw the 'R' away". Here, however, we also become embroiled in the whole nomenclature of language, and its role in the distinction between Scots and English. For instance, although The Proclaimers write on the sleeve-notes "I", they sing the Scots "A", and equally they write English "was" while singing Scots "wes" (pron. wiz), and "to" for their sung "tae". This is the nebulous region between languages where words are held in common, but pronounced or spelt differently – consider the German word *musik*, pronounced practically the same as the French *musique*, both meaning in English and Scots, *music*. In the context of the Proclaimers' song, however, accent is the main signifier of the difference between the two identities of Scots and English – a difference which is articulated not so much through language in the strong sense, but through the manipulation of one language by another by means of its timbral transformation according to external rules. In the same way that one can identify a French accent in English, so the normal codes of timbral and rhythmic articulation in the Scots language can impose themselves upon the English language and, as Deleuze and Guattari hold, "set it in variation". Here, Scots acts as a Deleuzian "minor" language which infects the very roots of English as a "major" language, turning it around on a new axis. Thus, the language which The Proclaimers use is a form of English which, in Henderson's terms is "grazed" along its flank by the timbres and rhythms of Scots, only to become a subset of English. This subset of English is known to linguists as Standard Scottish English (the form of English now naturalized in Scotland as an indigenous language), such that it becomes a "minor" language form of the "major" English.

However, the heterogeneity of experience in English does not stop there. As Pat Kane has written,

Every time I open my mouth to sing I'm American. This is not a matter of choice. [*Tinsel Show*, p. 23]

Kane writes here not of a national linguistic contradiction^[25], but of a personal lack of choice such as any late-twentieth century singer in the West experiences. The homogeneity of the American version of popular

[25] ie. Kane is not arguing from the same position as Edwin Muir did, who, in discussing the basis of a national Scottish literature, claimed that both Scots and Gàidhlig were inadequate to the task, and that "Scotland can only create a national literature by writing in English" [*Predicament*, p.111]. Kane's comment is framed entirely within the personal, and not the national.

culture is now so widespread, that it has become a matter of personal experience which is not even questioned by the individual - to sing Rock music is considered *naturally* to sing with an American accent, and vernacular. To open one's mouth to sing and to therefore be American, to be singing in American English, is now an international condition. This is one reason why The Proclaimers were so identifiable as having rebelled against the accepted condition of Rock music - the situation is now so extreme that they did not even have to sing in a non-English language in order to make a political point. All that was needed was a non-American accent of English^[26]. However, Kane asserts that subversion can be carried out at an even closer proximity to the new *lingua franca*;

Does one simply accept that to love rock'n'roll is to love America - or does one employ irony to enjoyably distance the music from the society, or even use its techniques to convey a critique of both American and British societies? [*Tinsel Show*, p.25]

It is all a question of the direction in which this statement is taken, but before dealing directly with strategies it might suggest, and which will inevitably have a political agenda, it may be worth taking a glance at a recent damning critique of Kane and of the other Rock musicians, artists and novelists actively involved in the various constitutional reform groups which emerged in Scotland following the 1992 general election, accusing them largely of that form of fake nostalgic sentimentality known in Scottish literature as *kailyard*:

Pat Kane, the singer with Hue and Cry, bends over backwards trying to render the socio-linguistic contradictions of the here and now by lingering around the doorways of old tenements and yodelling fairly juiceless 3-minute pop songs, revelling in the ulterior glory of Glasgow's superior reality. 'Ma hame toon' and 'ma wee wean' run Kane's show: he's as sentimental as a lollipop [...] Hue and Cry (who sing 'Mother Glasgow' and 'Rolling Home' with a straight face) and Deacon Blue (who sing 'Raintown' with a shameless one), constitute the pop end of a new sweet urban Kailyard, the same belief in the virtues of normalcy and authentic, harsh, real Northern life help them - like their rural counterparts - to be attracted to independence like moths to the burner. [*Homing: The Anti-Kailyard Aesthetic of Bill Douglas*, Andrew O'Hagan, in *Edinburgh Review*, 89, Spring 1993, p.81]

An accusation of adopting a kailyard aesthetic cannot be taken lightly by such a pro-active member of the S.N.P. as Pat Kane. O'Hagan's

[26] The reasons behind The Proclaimers' rejection of the Americanization of Scottish popular culture are the well-travelled politics of Scottish Nationalism, a gloss on which can be read between the lines of the following: "In its powerless state, Scotland was ideally situated for siting the US and NATO nuclear frontier forces [...] The Americans have an interest in keeping Scotland's political situation stable [...] In these aims they have a willing ally in the British State." [*Britain's Secret War: Tartan Terrorism and the Anglo-American State*, p.18]

article makes a very clever attempt to turn the whole politics of kailyard upon their head - it is generally understood in most circles that kailyard literature (a kind of nightmarish linguistic Mills and Boon genre from the C19th) stood to belittle the Scots language by associating it primarily with children, cake-obsessed old ladies, toothless peasants and all other forms of reliable and loyal subjects for a Victorian imperialist audience, O'Hagan attempts to suggest that it was in fact a form of cultural nationalism, and that this aesthetic is still at large amongst today's nationalist artists such as Rock bands Hue & Cry and Deacon Blue, novelist William McIllvaney, and photographer Oscar Marzaroli. In other words, O'Hagan accuses these artists of the very same form of cringing kailyardism that eventually spawned such films as *Greyfriar's Bobby*, *Whisky Galore*, and possibly even *Brigadoon*.

However, the Michael Marra song which O'Hagan mentions Pat Kane covering, *Mother Glasgow*, is full of ironic manipulation of sentimental, and Unionist imagery^[27], not to mention the ironic positioning of Glasgow's own creation myth, that of its C6th founder the "Welsh" Scot, St. Kentigern, or Mungo;

In the second city of the empire
Mother Glasgow watches o'er her weans
Trying hard to feed her little starlings
Unconsciously she clips their little wings

Mother Glasgow's succour is perpetual
Nestling the Billy and the Tim
I dreamt I took a dander with Saint Mungo
To try to catch a fish that couldnae swim

Here, the writer and singer (both Catholics of Irish extraction) take an ironic side-swipe at the sectarian traditions of Green and Orange Glasgow. The use of the word "weans" here could position us towards sentimentality in the kailyard mode, but the possibility of nostalgia is broken by the ironic contrasts between lexis and signification - these "weans" are the Orange and the Green, the Billy and the Tim of a vicious sectarianism succoured by the Victorian-imperialist principle of divide and rule. This is the legacy the empire leaves for the "weans" of its "second city". No peace here; the *Bitter Suite* of the album's title is pervasive. Equally, the lame fish of the contemporary, polluted Clyde contrast with the magical fish of the St. Kentigern myths. Here, Glasgow has fallen under imperial rule. It hardly represents the form of kailyard aesthetic which O'Hagan charges it with, unless one misses the ironic disjunction between lyrical content and the apparently saccharin techniques of the music - a standard technique in Marra's repertoire.

Consider also another Glasgow song produced by a band which O'Hagan accuses of kailyardism. In the chorus of Deacon Blue's *Fellow*

[27] This song was sung at one of the constitutional protest rallies in Glasgow's George Square following the return of yet another Tory Unionist government in Westminster regardless of the fact that 75% of the Scottish electorate voted for parties supporting constitutional reform. A further irony was the delivery of the song on a stage located between statues of Queen Victoria and Prince Albert (replete with Scottish pigeon guano).

Hoodlums, we find singer Ricky Ross (an active campaigner in the constitutional movement) giving a version of Glaswegian experience which reworks the mythical Glasgow of hard-men and boot-boys into an unstable image bordering the political and the disposable;

Fellow hoodlums and engineers
The Union's south
And we're all here
I'm going up Buchanan Street
With a box of fireworks
And two bottles of Tizer

Here, the homely, childhood-oriented image of a Glaswegian soft drink which, in O'Hagan's terms could so easily slip into a kailyardism, is elided with an unspecified number of explosive goods and a hostility towards the political status quo within the context of a working class *sensus communis*. Perhaps even the Tizer bottle contains something fizzier than pop?

At the very least, the element of the Tizer bottle serves to relocate contemporary consumer culture within a specifically Scottish context, rather than the more prevalent American images of Coke or Pepsi. Even at this modest level, Ross appears to be working within Kane's idea of alienating the Americanized aspects of popular culture while using their techniques, resources, and language, and this is taken even further by the slight hints of political danger throughout^[28].

[4] Conclusion

When Political combustion ceases to be the object of Princes and Patriots, it then, you know, becomes the lawful prey of Historians and Poets.^[29]

To paraphrase Burns, who was after all more a song writer than a poet, when a community loses even its right to political self-determination, let alone the democratic means with which to achieve it, culture often takes over where institutional politics leave off. This is a concept heard throughout modern Europe, East and West, from Belfast to Bosnia, from Brittany to Bavaria. In the case of literature and song, the struggle for cultural expression will inevitably be located in what is often referred to

[28] More in line with the "inspirational" qualities of Runrig's politics, the final track of Deacon Blue's Seamus Heaney-titled album *Whatever You Say, Say Nothing*, has a far more optimistic and expansive feel. *All Over the World* is a peace anthem of international freedom: "All over the world / the wild, wild wind / rips through the mighty words / we kept ourselves from // All over, this earth / has never been strong / All Jericho's walls / they gently fall // I've been waiting for a golden, bright millennium / wakin early for the Union bonds bein broken, then gone / all over the world [X4] // I've been searchin for a new, new song of freedom / where no flag of conquest is furled, my words are spoken / all over the world / all over the world // I, I hear the sound / I, I hear the sound all over this land / people are waiting / to enter the world / like a new-born baby // All over the world / where nothing's been learned / the flags are changin / so let freedom unfurl."

[29] Robert Burns to Alexander Cunningham, 12-03-1791, quoted in *Scotland's Music*, p.202.

as The Language Issue. The expression of a culture need not take the form of a political doctrine, espoused in a neutral language, but can easily, and perhaps more potently be achieved by a neutral doctrine espoused in a politically charged language. The mere existence of any expression in an institutionally threatened or subordinated language can act as a strong affirmation of a culture's alterity to a political status quo. However, following on from Henderson, Deleuze and Kane, it is also possible to see various ways in which political confrontations can be played out in the spaces between closely related languages, and also in the spaces between various layers of the same language. At this level, the politics of subversion can almost transform into a kind of linguistic guerilla warfare, sometimes paying more than just structural homage to Burns' concept of *political combustion*.

It is all a question of context, and, in both the linguistic and the geographic sense, location. The 6th poet Aneirin was aware of these cultural and political dynamics when he wrote, like Burns, of the demise of a political system. We hear so often today of "the end o an auld sang" ^[30], but to translate Aneirin's words into the Braid Scots now spoken in his country, the rivers are full, and the flood has begun;

A wyselike sang anent braw hosts;
An eftir it ebbs, the river owrefletes.
- Aneirin, c.600 A.D.

[30] Comment made by the Chancellor of the Scottish Parliament at the end of the last session prior to the enactment of the Treaty of Union of 1707, dissolving Parliament and incorporating it into the English Parliament to create the (almost) unitary state of Great Britain.

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